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Although having conscious experiences is a fundamental feature of our everyday life, 
our understanding of what consciousness is is very limited. According to one of the 
main conclusions of contemporary philosophy of mind, the qualitative aspect of 
consciousness seems to resist functionalisation, i.e. it cannot be adequately  defined 
solely  in terms of functional or causal roles, which leads to an epistemic gap  between 
phenomenal and scientific knowledge. Phenomenal qualities, then, seem to be, in 
principle, unexplainable in scientific terms. As a reaction to this pessimistic 
conclusion it  is a major trend in contemporary  science of consciousness to turn away 
from subjective experiences and re-define the subject of investigations in 
neurological and behavioural terms. This move, however, creates a gap between 
scientific theories of consciousness, and the original phenomenon, which we are so 
intimately connected with.
The thesis focuses on this gap. It  is argued that it is possible to explain features of 
consciousness in scientific terms. The thesis argues for this claim from two 
directions. On the one hand, a specific identity theory is formulated connecting 
phenomenal qualities to certain intermediate level perceptual representations which 
are unstructured for central processes of the embedding cognitive system. This 
identity  theory is hypothesised on the basis of certain similarities recognised between 
the phenomenal and the cognitive-representational domains, and then utilised in 
order to uncover further similarities between these two domains. The identity  theory 
and the further similarities uncovered are then deployed in formulating explanations 
of the philosophically  most important  characteristics of the phenomenal domain—i.e. 
why phenomenal qualities resist functionalisation, and why the epistemic gap occurs.
On the other hand, the thesis investigates and criticises existing models of reductive 
explanation. On the basis of a detailed analysis of how successful scientific 
explanations proceed a novel account of reductive explanation is proposed, which 
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utilises so-called prior identities. Prior identities are prerequisites rather than 
outcomes of reductive explanations. They themselves are unexplained but are 
nevertheless necessary for mapping the features to be explained onto the features the 
explanation relies on. Prior identities are hypothesised in order to foster the 
formulation of explanatory claims accounting for target level phenomena in terms of 
base level processes—and they are justified if they help projecting base level 
explanations to new territories of the target level. 
The thesis concludes that the identity theory proposed is a prior identity, and the 
explanations of features of the phenomenal domain formulated with the aid of this 
identity  are reductive explanations proper. In this sense, the thesis introduces the 
problem of phenomenal consciousness into scientific discourse, and therefore offers 
a bridge between the philosophy and the science of consciousness: it offers an 
approach to conscious experience which, on the one hand, tries to account for the 
philosophically most important features of consciousness, whereas, on the other 




Humans are conscious beings and this fact permeates our whole life. Conscious 
experience is our access point to the world. What remains unconscious might trigger 
certain actions, nevertheless it  does not contribute directly to how we see our 
environment. Literally, the content of our conscious experience is all there is for us. 
Moreover, the reach of consciousness spreads far beyond perception and knowledge
—it features, for example, in our ethical judgments, and brings free will about. 
Understanding what consciousness is, and how it is connected to physical processes, 
thus, would be a key  milestone along the way towards reconciling our subjective 
mental life with the material world sciences inform us about.
 
Consciousness presents the world in a certain way. There is something it is like to 
see, smell, and taste, for example, a fresh strawberry. These felt qualities determine 
the way a strawberry appears to us; they determine what a strawberry  is for us. There 
is always a qualitative or phenomenal aspect characteristic of every  conscious 
experience, and exactly these phenomenal qualities are what populate our subjective 
mental life. Therefore, a proper scientific account of consciousness should involve an 
explanation of what phenomenal qualities are and how they are related to physical 
processes. 
 
However, according to the fundamental message of contemporary philosophy of 
mind, phenomenal qualities of conscious experience pose a serious problem for 
physical explanations. The heart of the problem is that the qualitative aspect of 
consciousness seems to resist functionalisation: it seems that phenomenal qualities 
cannot be adequately defined solely in terms of functional or causal roles (Chalmers, 
1996). Even if the causal roles played by a particular conscious experience get 
identified, it remains a further question why that specific phenomenal quality is 
experienced when the causal roles in question are filled.  
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That is, there seems to be an explanatory gap between explaining the phenomenal 
qualities of conscious experience, on the one hand, and explaining physical 
structures and functional processes, on the other (Levine, 1983). This problem is 
especially pressing once one recognises that what physical explanations are typically 
able to account for are structures and functions. Phenomenal qualities, then, seem to 
be in principle unexplainable in physical—and hence scientific—terms.
 
This pessimistic conclusion has fundamentally  affected the attitude of scientific 
approaches to consciousness. Instead of pursuing the original question—asking for 
an explanation of how consciousness is related to physical processes—scientists now 
mainly focus on finding what those physical processes are which co-occur with 
conscious experiences. Finding these so-called neural correlates became the primary 
goal of contemporary scientific approaches to consciousness (cf. e.g. Dehaene & 
Naccache, 2001).
Acknowledging that there is an explanatory gap between our conscious experiences 
and scientific knowledge, thus, results in a further gap, one between the philosophy 
and the science of consciousness. Philosophy and science have worked together for 
centuries throwing light on issues like the nature of life or matter. This alliance, 
however, seems to be at the verge of breakup when they  turn towards the 
characteristics of our subjective mental life—whereas the philosophical approach 
aims at understanding the fundamental features of conscious experience, the 
scientific approach concentrates merely on pinpointing its neural correlates. This gap 
is quite prominent in contemporary  interdisciplinary  discourse. Scientists—since due 
to its functional un-analysability cannot adequately operationalise the qualitative 
aspect of consciousness—try to re-define conscious experience in cognitive and 
neural terms. Philosophers, at the same time, relentlessly argue that though such 
scientific theories might be theories of cognitive access, for example, but are 
definitely not theories of consciousness itself, since they cannot account for the 
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phenomenal qualities of our conscious experiences (Tononi, 2004; Dehaene, et al., 
2006; Lamme, 2006). 
 
The fundamental aim of this dissertation is to bridge this gap between the philosophy 
and science of consciousness. I try to show that science is still able to resolve the 
mystery related to conscious experience. 
 
However, bridging the gap between the philosophy and science of consciousness 
does not amount to bridging the explanatory  gap itself. On the contrary: 
acknowledging that there is an explanatory gap is a fundamental tenet, a starting 
point of my approach. Phenomenal qualities might  well be functionally  un-
analysable, nevertheless, the very fact that they resist functionalisation, and that they 
give rise to an explanatory  gap are distinguishing features of conscious experience. 
Accounting for these—philosophically most important—characteristics of 
consciousness in purely  scientific terms is the very purpose of my doctoral 
dissertation.
 
After setting the stage by discussing how the doctrine of physicalism might best be 
formulated (cf. Chapter 1), how the so-called epistemic gap between our phenomenal 
and physical knowledge gets established (cf. Chapter 2), and how Phenomenal 
Concept Strategy, the received view in contemporary physicalist literature, explains 
the presence of the epistemic gap  (cf. Chapter 3), I present the main line of thought 
of the dissertation. I shift the focus from conceptual features to features of sensory/
perceptual representations and formulate my own account, the so-called Monadic 
Marker Account as an alternative to Phenomenal Concept Strategy. The Monadic 
Marker Account pursues the purpose of bridging the gap between the philosophy and 
science of consciousness via five consecutive steps
First, I investigate the structure present in conscious experiences. I argue that 
typically, experiences are complex—they have discernible structure with constituent 
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parts, which, in themselves, could occur as contents of standalone experiences. Some 
experiences, however, are simple, without any such structure—they have no 
discernible parts that could be experienced on their own. Having made these 
observations, I formulate and provide support for the central tenet of the first step of 
the dissertation’s main line of thought. I argue that the phenomenal quality of having 
a complex experience is jointly determined by  the discernible structure of the 
constituent parts, and the phenomenal aspect of the (ultimately) simple experiences 
of these constituents. (Cf. Chapter 4: §4.1.)
 
As the second step, I turn towards the cognitive-representational domain, which, in 
accordance with current  scientific approaches, underlies conscious experiences. It  is 
generally  accepted by  cognitive and neural theories that the representations involved 
in the processing of perceptual stimuli are organised into a hierarchy, such that 
representations at each level stand for parts of the features representations at  the next 
higher level stand for (Biederman, 1987; Hayworth & Biederman, 2006; Körding & 
Wolpert, 2006; Mamassian, 2006; Yuille & Kersten, 2006; Kouider, et al., 2010). I 
argue that if we add a further assumption to this picture than it becomes possible to 
understand how conscious experiences are related to the cognitive-representational 
system. The assumption in question claims that central processes (working memory, 
global workspace) have access only to a range of the levels of this hierarchy. By 
accessing multiple levels within this range simultaneously central processes are able 
to extract structural information related to the arrangement of the parts constituting 
represented features, which makes representations at higher levels of the accessible 
range structured for central processes. Contrary to this, even if within the entire 
hierarchy there are lower-level representations standing for constituents of the 
features representations at  the earliest stage of the accessible range stand for, central 
processes have no access to them. Therefore, representations at  the earliest stage of 
the range in question are monadic for central processes—central processes cannot 
extract structural information about the features they stand for. These monadic 
representations are the most basic meaningful units, which carry information for the 
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rest of the system; none of their properties can independently be interpreted by 
processes in the central system. (Cf. Chapter 4: §4.2, §4.3.1, §4.3.2.)
 
As the third step, I point out that there are essential similarities between the 
characteristics of the phenomenal realm uncovered in the first step  and the features 
of the cognitive domain discussed in the second step. First, subjects are able to 
discern structure present in their complex conscious experiences; similarly, central 
processes are able to extract structural information from perceptual representations 
within the range of the hierarchy of representations central processes have access to. 
Second, subjects are unable to discern structure in their simple conscious 
experiences; similarly central processes are unable to extract structural information 
from monadic representations. Third, the phenomenal quality of complex 
experiences is determined by  the phenomenal quality of simple experiences plus the 
structure characterising the arrangement of the constituent parts discernible for the 
subjects; similarly, the particular way  higher-level representations are structured for 
central processes is determined by  the lower-level (ultimately monadic) 
representations, plus the structural information extractable by central processes. That 
is, the role simple experiences play in the phenomenal domain is the very same role 
monadic representations play in the cognitive domain. On the basis of this similarity, 
I propose the following identity claim: the phenomenal qualities of simple conscious 
experiences are identical with how monadic representations present themselves for 
central processes of a cognitive system. (Cf. Chapter 4: §4.3.3.)
 
In the fourth step, I illustrate how the Monadic Marker Account works. I provide 
support for the identity statement proposed by showing that if one accepts the 
identity  claim, then one will become able to account for why phenomenal qualities 
resist functionalisation and why they  give rise to the explanatory gap  solely  in terms 
of the features of the cognitive-representational system. Monadic representations do 
not map the structure, only indicate the presence of the object they  stand for. Any 
kind of representation with whatever features is apt for playing the role of a monadic 
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representation in so far as the rest of the system treats it as a monadic whole. This 
feature, I argue, is able to account for the fact that phenomenal qualities resist 
functionalisation. Similarly, the explanatory gap necessarily arises in conscious 
cognitive systems deploying monadic representations. The source of the explanatory 
gap is that there is no a priori connection between scientific knowledge and how a 
cognitive system itself interprets monadic representations. On the one hand, access to 
how the system interprets monadic representations is privileged—it is restricted to 
the system itself,—whereas, on the other hand, the system lacks access to any of 
those features scientific investigations can provide information about. (Cf. Chapter 
5.)
 
Ultimately, I am arguing for an identity  theory. However, within philosophy of mind 
such identity claims have been severely criticised on the grounds that (a) they are so-
called brute (i.e. unexplained) identities, hence we do not have reasons to believe in 
them, and that (b) they are unique, i.e. unlike any other typical identity claim 
occurring in scientific explanations (Chalmers & Jackson, 2001; Chalmers, 2010a). 
The final, fifth step of my dissertation answers these challenges. I show that, contra 
(a), there are reasons for believing in the particular identity  claim I propose, and, 
contra (b), standard scientific explanations always deploy  identity  claims playing the 
same role the one proposed here plays. I argue that the fact that if one accepts the 
identity  claim in question then explaining features of consciousness in scientific 
terms becomes possible is sufficient for believing in the identity claim, especially  if 
one considers usual cases of scientific explanations (cf. Chapter 5: §5.3, and Chapter 
7: §7.3). Moreover, I argue that identities play a special role in reductive explanation, 
which is significantly  different from what is implied either by the transparent version 
of reductive explanation (Levine, 1993; Chalmers and Jackson, 2001; Kim, 2005), or 
by the inference to the best explanation based approach (Block and Stalnaker, 1999; 
McLaughlin, 2010). I show that typical scientific explanations deploy ‘prior 
identities’, i.e. identity claims, which themselves are unexplained but are 
nevertheless necessary for mapping the features to be explained onto the features the 
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explanation relies on. The identity claim connecting the phenomenal character of 
simple experiences to monadic perceptual representations fills the very same role: it 
is an unexplained explainer, deployed in order to uncover similarities between the 
phenomenal and the cognitive domains. Once these identities are accepted, 
similarities can be revealed, and standard scientific explanations—of, for example, 
why phenomenal qualities resist functionalisation and why they give rise to the 






1.1 The Doctrine of Physicalism
The broad framework of this doctoral dissertation is provided by a debate over 
whether the doctrine of physicalism is true or not. Physicalism, roughly speaking, is 
the view that  everything is physical, or as it is often put, the view that  there is 
nothing over and above the physical. The term originates from Otto Neurath 
(Neurath, 1931a, 1931b); however, what Neurath meant by this expression was quite 
different from how it is understood in contemporary literature. According to Neurath, 
the term physicalism stood for the view that for every statement there is a physical 
statement equivalent in meaning with it (cf. Stoljar, 2009a). Contrary to this, 
physicalism today  is usually  understood as a metaphysical claim about the nature of 
the world rather than a linguistic claim about statements.
The fundamental tenet of the doctrine is often captured metaphorically. David Lewis, 
for example, says that according to physicalism, by copying the physical realm (all 
the physical properties) one copies all the facts of the world (Lewis, 1983b). Or as 
Tim Crane (1991, 2001b) explains the view: once God had created all the physical 
properties and laws God’s work was done—all other properties came for free (cf. 
also Kripke, 1980; Owens, 1992). What these metaphors try to capture is a strong 
dependence relation between the physical facts and all other facts. Once the physical 
facts are fixed, they necessitate all other facts.
Intuitively, what counts as physical must be related to the science of physics. If so, 
however, then there are lots of facts—e.g. chemical, biological, psychological, social 
facts—which, at least  on the face of it, seem to be non-physical. There are chemical 
forces, biological functions, mental states, social relations, etc. which fall outside the 
scope of physics. From this perspective, what physicalism tells us is that these prima 
facie non-physical phenomena are in fact physically  acceptable (cf. Wilson, 2005, 
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2010) in the sense that they  are necessitated by the physical realm. According to 
physicalism, there are no facts about chemical forces, biological functions, mental 
states or social relations (etc.) over and above the physical facts.
In a nutshell, this is the doctrine of physicalism. However, in order to have a 
thorough understanding of the thesis and its consequences, one needs to clarify what 
exactly  is to be taken as physical and how to understand the ‘nothing over and 
above’ locution properly. §1.3-§1.5 and §1.6 deal with these issues in reverse order.  
Before going into these details, though, it might be useful to close this introductory 
section with a terminological point. In contemporary literature the terms 
‘physicalism’ and ‘materialism’ are often used interchangeably. As a matter of fact, 
however, the concept of materialism is a much older one than that of physicalism. 
According to the classical understanding, materialism is the view that everything is 
made up of matter. Material entities were typically characterised as being extended, 
impenetrable etc. Later the classical notion of materialism evolved into the modern 
notion of physicalism (cf. Wilson, 2006). The transition was influenced by those 
scientific discoveries which pointed out that the ultimate building blocks of nature 
like e.g. force-fields shared very few features of material entities taken in the 
classical sense. Thus instead of relying on the classical understanding of matter the 
doctrine of physicalism relies on the notion of physical which is supposed to stand 
for a scientifically informed characterisation of the fundamental entities building up 
nature. However, those who use the term ‘materialism’ in contemporary  debates do 
not evoke its classical understanding—what they  (e.g. Chalmers, 1996; Levine, 
2001; Papineau, 2002) have in mind is the very same doctrine as the one discussed 
by those employing the term ‘physicalism’ (e.g. Loar, 1990; Crane, 2001b; Loewer, 
2001); i.e. the doctrine relying on the notion of physical rather than that of matter. 
Nevertheless, since the notion of materialism is more or less still loaded with its 
classical interpretation, throughout this dissertation I shall follow those who refer to 
the doctrine in question as physicalism. 
2
1.2 The Causal Argument for Physicalism
Once we have an intuitive grasp on the concept of physicalism, the question what 
reasons its proponents have to hold the view arises. The current section deals with 
this problem—it introduces the case for physicalism, i.e. the main argument 
supporting the view. In this section my aim is only to briefly introduce the argument 
itself. In contemporary literature both the validity  and the soundness of the argument 
is hotly  debated (e.g. Yablo, 1992; Sturgeon, 1998; List & Menzies, 2009; Menzies & 
List, 2010; Raatikainen, 2010). Nevertheless, for our present purposes many  of the 
details of these debates are unimportant.
The line of thought which is most  widely referred to as the main argument for 
physicalism has many names, e.g. the causal argument (Papineau, 2002), the 
argument from causal closure (Stoljar, 2009a), or the causal exclusion argument 
(Kim, 1993b, 1998, 2005). This argument stems from the observation that prima 
facie non-physical (e.g. chemical, biological, mental, social, etc.) entities causally 
interact with physical entities. However, all physical events seem to have sufficient 
physical causes. So unless all those physical effects which have sufficient prima facie 
non-physical causes are systematically caused twice over, prima facie non-physical 
causes must be identical with physical causes. To put it more formally, the general 
version of the argument runs through the following premises.
 P1: Prima facie non-physical causes are sufficient for certain physical effects.
 P2: All physical effects have sufficient physical causes.
 P3: The physical effects of prima facie non-physical causes are not all 
  overdetermined.
The first premise tells us that certain physical effects have efficient prima facie non-
physical causes. The second premise tells us that all physical effects—and hence 
those having prima facie non-physical causes—have efficient physical causes. The 
third premise tells us that those physical effects, which are claimed to have two 
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distinct causes (a physical and a prima facie non-physical) are, in fact, not caused 
twice over. From these premises, the causal argument says, it follows that prima facie 
non-physical causes are, in fact, physical causes. That is, the causal argument 
motivates the doctrine of physicalism (claiming that there is nothing over and above 
the physical) by showing that those causes which prima facie appear to be non-
physical, turn out to be physical after all.
1.2.1 Prima facie non-physical causes having physical effects
Now let’s consider each premise in more detail. The first  premise captures the very 
observation motivating the argument itself: that there are certain prima facie non-
physical events causing physical events. For example, the event that I feel the urge to 
reduce my thirst (which is a mental, i.e. prima facie non-physical event)—together 
with my beliefs that there is water inside that bottle in front of me and if I lift it to my 
mouth I can satisfy that desire—results in my hand grabbing the bottle and lifting it 
to my mouth (which is a physical event). That is, it seems to be an observational fact 
that mental events cause physical events (and similarly with other prima facie non-
physical, e.g. biological, social, etc. events). 
Nevertheless, the causal argument is sometimes called into question via debating its 
first premise. Approaches following this line of thought do not accept that mental (or 
any other prima facie non-physical) events are causes of physical events. For 
example, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz suggested that there were no connections 
between the mental and the physical realms. According to his view, neither mental 
events cause physical events, nor vice versa. Instead, Leibniz argued, the apparent 
correlation between mental and physical events (e.g. that the occurrences of the 
desire to reduce thirst  are typically followed by lifting some bottle) are to be 
explained by relying on a so-called pre-established harmony: God has arranged the 
physical and the mental realms so that they ‘run parallel with each other’ thereby 
guaranteeing these correlations (Leibniz, 1898). 
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Another way  to deny that prima facie non-physical events cause physical events is to 
subscribe to the view called epiphenomenalism. According to epiphenomenalism, 
although prima facie non-physical (e.g. mental) events are caused by physical events, 
they  themselves do not cause any physical or other events—they are causal dead-
ends. For example, if one observes the shadows casted by  two colliding billiard balls 
one might want to conclude that  there is an incoming shadow pushing away the other 
shadow. Contrary to this, however, there is no causal connection between the two 
shadows: all the movement one observes is the result of the movement of the real 
billiard balls (and the light rays coming from a certain source).1
1.2.2 The causal completeness of the physical
The second premise captures the idea that the physical realm is causally closed—
one, who is looking for sufficient causes of physical effects will never need to leave 
the physical realm to find them. There is a causal chain leading to any physical effect 
consisting of solely  physical causes. This is the so-called causal completeness or 
causal closure thesis.
Note that the physical realm is quite unique with regard to this feature: no other 
realms are complete in this sense. For example, there are economical effects which 
have no sufficient economical causes, rather they are brought about by certain 
sociological or psychological causes (cf. e.g. the role of rational agents and their 
psychological needs in economical theorising). Similarly, the realm of sociology is 
incomplete as well: there are certain non-sociological (e.g. physical—say, a tsunami) 
events which are sufficient causes of certain sociological effects. Or consider the 
classical biological example: the occurrence of a certain mutation is a biological 
effect, the sufficient cause of which is typically a physical event, e.g. a high-energy 
5
1  Epiphenomenalism is most often criticised on the basis that it presupposes causal dead-ends. The 
problem with this commitment of epiphenomenalism is that it goes against how we typically account 
for natural phenomena.  As Papineau puts it: “So if epiphenomenalism were true, then the relation 
between the mental and the physical would be like nothing else in nature, since science recognises no 
other examples of ‘causal danglers’, ontologically independent states with causes but no 
effects.” (Papineau, 2002, p. 23). Also cf. Smart (1959), Jackson (1982), Chalmers (1996),  Kim (1998, 
2005).
photon hitting the DNA. That is, there are causal chains ‘leading out’ of the realms of 
economics, sociology, psychology, biology, etc. It is only  the realm of physics which 
seems to be general or broad enough so that all physical effects have sufficient 
physical causes. Whether the physical is really  causally complete, is, of course, an 
empirical issue. However, for example, David Papineau (2000) argues in length that 
the thesis has profoundly been established over the last 150 years.2
The prototypical view straightforwardly  denying the causal completeness of the 
physical is Descrates’ interactionalist  dualism. Descrates’ view claims that there are 
sui generis mental causes which interact with the physical realm and bring about 
physical effects which themselves have no sufficient physical causes (Descartes, 
1984). That is, the physical realm, according to interactionist  dualism is not  closed—
those physical events which are the effects of mental causes would have not occurred 
had mental events not caused them.3
Similarly, classical emergentism (cf. e.g. Alexander, 1920; Morgan, 1923; Broad, 
1925) claims that there are non-physical (so-called emergent) properties instantiated 
by certain compound objects which bestow novel causal powers upon the objects 
instantiating them. These novel causal powers affect the physical base out of which 
the special non-physical properties in question emerge. This so-called downward 
causation makes emergent properties causally efficacious and autonomous, which in 
turn entails that the instantiation of emergent properties violates the causal 
completeness of the physical.4
More recently, Peter Menzies and his colleagues have come forth with a proposal 
claiming that  under the so-called interventionist account of causation (Woodward, 
6
2 See also Spurrett and Papineau (1999) and especially David Spurrett’s doctoral dissertation (1999) 
for a detailed analysis of the causal completeness of the physical.
3 According to Descartes, the mental interacts with the physical via the pineal gland,  where it alters 
the direction of bodily movements. (Cf. Papineau, 2000) 
4 See §1.4 for a detailed discussion of emergentism. §1.4.2 explores the problem of emergent-physical 
causation in depth.
1997, 2003) the mental excludes the physical as the cause of certain physical effects. 
That is, the Menzies-proposal tries to show that although the causal completeness of 
the physical might be an attractive thesis under some (e.g. productive) accounts of 
causation, it seems to be doubtful if one subscribes to alternative accounts of 
causation (List & Menzies, 2009; Menzies & List, 2010; Raatikainen, 2010).
1.2.3 No overdetermination
The third premise captures the idea that systematic overdetermination is unlikely. If 
prima facie non-physical events do cause physical events (in accordance with P1), 
and if these physical events also have sufficient physical causes (in accordance with 
P2), and if the physical and prima facie non-physical events are distinct and 
independent of each other, then the physical events in question will be caused twice 
over by two independent causes. 
Overdetermination in itself, of course, is not something impossible. For instance, if 
two assassins, independently of each other, shot the same victim in such a way that 
the two bullets penetrated the victim’s heart  at  the same time, then the victim’s death 
would be overdetermined by the two shots. The two shots would be two independent 
causes bringing about the same effect (the death of the given victim at the given 
time). The victim would have died even if one of the assassins had missed her shot. 
A case like this, however, is a case of pure coincidence. Had one of the shots hit the 
heart of the victim only a second earlier (and supposing that death strikes 
instantaneously  after a heart-shot) the victim would have already been dead when got 
hit by the second shot. This situation would no longer be a case of 
overdetermination, but rather a case of causal preemption—the first  shot would have 
causally preempted the second shot: it would have caused the effect in itself (single 
cause, single effect) leaving no room for the second shot to display its causal 
potency.  
7
P1 and P2 together suggest that whenever a prima facie non-physical event causes a 
physical event, there is always a physical event as well, kicking in in exactly the 
same moment, and causing the very same effect. The no overdetermination thesis as 
captured by the third premise of the causal argument for physicalism expresses that 
this kind of systematic overdetermination is highly unlikely. Moreover, systematic 
overdetermination calls for an underlying mechanism, ensuring that a certain class of 
physical events always has two (or more) independent and individually  sufficient 
causes. No evidence supports that such a mechanism exists. The no systematic 
overdetermination thesis even coincides with our intuitions with regard to causation: 
we implicitly  presuppose that  an effect has a single sufficient cause. For example, the 
police stops its investigation when it finds the perpetrator; it  does not continue to 
look for a second, independent one. So it seems reasonable to appeal to the third 
premise as well (cf. Papineau, 2002, pp. 26-28; Kim, 2005, pp. 46-52).5
1.3 Understanding ‘Nothing Over and Above’
Now that we have a rough sketch of the main argument supporting the doctrine of 
physicalism at hand, it is time to dive into the details of how to understand the view 
properly. It is a common coin that according to physicalism, prima facie non-physical 
facts are nothing over and above the physical facts. However, the exact nature of this 
relation between the physical and the prima facie non-physical is controversial.
1.3.1 Eliminative physicalism
The most straightforward interpretation of the ‘nothing over and above’ clause is 
elimination: claiming that all there is is, literally, only the physical. Eliminative 
physicalism challenges the existence of those entities which get identified via 
apparently  non-physical terms. The classical example of this view is the elimination 
8
5  For an argument biting the bullet, and claiming that mental causation is a genuine case of 
overdetermination see for example Mellor’s (1995) ‘belts and braces’ view. Note that Kim’s version of 
the causal arguments is targeting the so-called non-reductive version of physicalism (cf. §1.3.3). In 
this case, though, the no overdetermination thesis is not that straightforward, since the two proclaimed 
causes (say, a mental cause and its subvenient physical base) are not ontologically independent (cf. 
e.g. Yablo, 1992; Carey, 2011). 
of phlogiston from the scientific theory of combustion. Briefly, phlogiston theory 
states that all flammable materials contain a special ingredient, called phlogiston, 
which is released when the material in question burns. However, subsequent 
scientific discoveries revealed serious flaws in the theory, and finally, the phlogiston 
theory  had been replaced by the oxygen theory  of combustion. As it turns out, the 
role phlogiston played in the phlogiston theory is almost exactly  the opposite of the 
role oxygen plays in the oxygen theory. The conclusion is that there is no such thing 
in nature as phlogiston—what there is is oxygen instead. To put it in another way: the 
term ‘phlogiston’ does not refer at all. That is, eliminative physicalism denies the 
existence of the entity eliminated. It  claims that such an entity is a postulation of a 
seriously flawed, fundamentally  mistaken theory, and as a theoretical term is non-
referring: there is nothing in nature which is picked out by the term. This is a strong 
claim rendering certain terms empty.6
Historically  a much weaker claim is also associated with eliminative materialism. 
The difference between the two interpretations is that  the weaker understanding of 
eliminativism acknowledges that the terms of the ‘mistaken’ theory refer, but  only 
inaccurately—there are better, more accurate, ways to pick out their referents, and 
these better ways will eventually take over the place of the mistaken theory. 
Consider, for example, the relation between Newtonian mechanics and special 
relativity—especially their use of the term ‘mass’. Unlike in the case of phlogiston, 
the relativistic theory  succeeding Newtonian mechanics does not dispense with the 
term ‘mass’, but rather claims that its definition requires some refinement: what the 
Newtonian term ‘mass’ picks out is only a limiting case of what the relativistic term 
‘mass’ stands for. Note how different the strong claim is from the weak claim. The 
strong claim entails that certain prima facie non-physical properties do not exist, 
whereas the weaker claim is compatible with the view that prima facie non-physical 
9
6  In contemporary philosophy of mind, eliminative physicalism stands for the view that common-
sense understanding of the mental is mistaken and our ordinary notions of mental states are empty (cf. 
P. M. Churchland, 1981; P. S. Churchland, 1986).
properties do exist, and are indeed physical properties: prima facie non-physical 
terms stand, though inaccurately for physical properties (cf. Ramsey, 2011).7
In the course of this dissertation I follow the distinction introduced by Savitt (1974) 
between eliminativism and reductionism. According to this understanding, 
eliminativism is ontologically radical, whereas reductionism is ontologically 
conservative. That  is, the fundamental tenet of eliminativism is best characterised by 
the strong claim above, i.e. by the claim that the terms to be eliminated designate 
nothing in nature. The weaker claim, on the other hand, characterising the terms to be 
eliminated as inaccurate designators of physical properties, is closer to the view 
called reductionism.
1.3.2 Reductive physicalism
Considering only those possibilities which do not deny the existence of prima facie 
non-physical properties, the most straightforward interpretation of the ‘nothing over 
and above’ clause is identity: prima facie non-physical facts depend on physical facts 
because each and every prima facie non-physical property is identical with a physical 
property  (or set of properties). According to this interpretation, then, those properties 
which on the face of it appear to be non-physical are in fact physical. That  is, those 
properties which are initially identified as e.g. chemical, biological, psychological 
etc. properties are claimed to be physical properties.8
The most famous version of this interpretation of physicalism is the so-called identity 
theory  of the mind (Place, 1956; Feigl, 1958; Smart, 1959). The identity theory is a 
10
7 Rorty (1965) is a good example of confusing the stronger claim with the weaker one. See Conman 
(1968), Lycan and Pappas (1972), and Savitt (1974) for clarifying the distinction between the two 
claims.
8 Of course,  a lot turns on how we define what it is to be physical. See §1.6 for more on this question. 
For our present purposes, it is enough to note that under a theory-based definition of physical (saying 
that something is physical if it is picked out by a term of physics) one might feel tempted to object 
against the identification of prima facie non-physical properties with physical properties on the basis 
of the fact that prima facie non-physical properties are picked out by certain terms of chemistry, 
biology, etc. Notice, however, that the criterion that something is physical if it is picked out by a term 
of physics is only a sufficient condition—it is compatible with the same thing being picked out by a 
term of physics and a term of, say, chemistry.
particular thesis about mental states. It claims that mental states and events are not 
just correlated with but identical to brain processes. That is, say, having an 
experience of seeing something red is identical with having brain process XYZ. At 
first sight, this might be a quite contra-intuitive claim, for perceptual experiences 
seem to be very different from brain processes. For example, there is nothing red in 
the brain (brain haemorrhage put aside), and similarly  the experience of seeing 
something red is hard to be localised in space, or attributed with extension. The 
identity  theory answers this problem by emphasising that having an experience of red 
is not itself red.9 The identity theory  identifies the property of having an experience 
of red with the property of having brain process XYZ. Put in another way, the terms 
‘having an experience of red’ and ‘having brain process XYZ’ have the same 
referents. They differ in meaning, nevertheless they pick out the same thing—just 
like the terms ‘Morning Star’ and ‘Evening Star’ have different meanings, still they 
both refer to planet Venus (cf. Smart, 2008). That is, the point identity theory  makes 
is this: instead of there being two distinct entities (a mental event and physical 
process) there is only one thing which can be picked out in two quite distinct ways.10
Note that contrary to what some might think, the identity theory does not eliminate 
mental phenomena. Reading the fundamental claim of the identity theory as saying 
‘all there really is is just the physical’ is misreading it. Identifying two objects 
eliminates neither of them. Claiming that Bob Dylan is Robert Allen Zimmerman 
does not imply the non-existence of either Bob Dylan or Robert Allen Zimmerman. 
On the contrary, an identity  ensures that both Bob Dylan and Robert Allen 
Zimmerman exists—and it ads the further claim that they happen to be the same 
person. True, an identity statement eliminates the number of entities that would exist 
if the identity statement were false but does not eliminate any of the named objects. 
For example, someone, who without knowing their identity would have thought that 
Bob Dylan and Robert Allen Zimmerman were two separate persons, would now 
11
9 Cf. what U. T. Place calls ‘the phenomenological fallacy’ (Place, 1956). See also in Smart (1980, pp. 
111-112).
10 See §6.3.2 for more details. 
know that  there is only one person. However, she would not conclude that any of her 
earlier thoughts like ‘Bob Dylan exists’ or ‘Robert Allen Zimmerman exists’ was 
wrong.
Similarly  with scientific identity  statements like water is identical to H2O. The claim 
here is that the entity which under certain conditions (say, in everyday life, observing 
it, for example, in a lake) is called ‘water’ is the same entity  which under different 
conditions (in scientific practice, observing it, for example under an electron-
microscope) is called ‘H2O’. Identity statements claim that there is one entity that 
can be picked out in two different ways. That is, according to identity statements 
both of the terms in question refer. Recall that this is exactly what is denied by 
eliminativism. For example, when one argues for eliminating phlogiston what one 
implies is that the term phlogiston does not refer—there is nothing in the world that 
is picked out by the term.11
The identity theory  is often considered as a version of reductive physicalism. 
However, the relation between the identity  theory  and reductionism needs 
clarification as the concept of reduction has multiple connotations. According to the 
so-called functional model of reduction (Kim, 1998, 1999, 2005)—which is the 
received view in contemporary philosophy  of mind (cf. e.g. Levine, 1993; Chalmers, 
1996; Van Gulick, 2001)—a property gets reduced to another property  via a process 
consisting of the following steps. First the property to be reduced is redefined in 
functional terms, i.e. in terms of a functional role. Second, the property  in the 
reducing base which actually plays the given functional role is identified. And third, 
this then gets supplemented by a theory explaining how the property  of the reducing 
base is able to perform the functional role in question. Thus a property gets reduced 
to another property.12 Jaegwon Kim, for example, uses functional reduction to show 
12
11  Identity statement, especially the similarity of mind-brain identities to classical cases of scientific 
identities or to identity claims connecting proper names is of special interest in this dissertation. The 
issue emerges over and over again throughout the dissertation and culminates in chapters 6 and 7, 
which are entirely devoted to this topic.
12 See §6.2.3 for more details on functional reduction.
that mental properties reduce to the physical base properties actually realising them. 
The conclusion is often formulated as an identity  claim: mental property  M is 
identical to physical property P. This would, then, suggest that reduction amounts to 
formulating an identity statement. Note, however, that reduction cannot be 
synonymous with identification: reduction is asymmetrical whereas identification is 
symmetrical. While mental property M is reduced to physical property P in the above 
model of functional reduction, the opposite is not true: property P is not reduced to 
property  M. Contrary to this, identities are symmetrical: if property P is identical 
with property M then property M is identical with property P as well.
According to Tim Crane, this distinction between reduction and identification points 
out that there are two different ways in which one can use the notion of reduction 
(Crane, 2001a). One way of understanding reduction is explanatory: a phenomenon 
is reduced in this sense if by this process it is “made more comprehensible or 
intelligible” (Crane, 2001a, p. 54). The explanatory aspect of reduction is especially 
prevailing in so-called mechanistic reductions which are trendy extensions of the 
Kimian functional model of reduction in contemporary philosophy of science 
(Bechtel, 2007, 2008). Mechanistic reductions explain why a certain system is able 
to do what it does via decomposing it into a mechanism (an organised structure) of 
its working parts. Mechanistic reductions show, for example, that a given whole S 
performs a certain task because (1) it is identical with the organised structure of 
entities X1, X2 etc., and (2) these entities when organised spatially  and temporally in 
the right sort of way together perform the task in question.13  This explanatory 
connotation of the general notion of reduction is the main reason why reduction is 
not analogous with identification—the ‘making more intelligible’ relation is not 
symmetrical: whereas, for instance, understanding the organisation of X1, X2, etc. 
gives some insight into the workings of S, the opposite is not true. Explanatory 
reduction is typically  a relation between theoretical terms of different theories, and 
plays a crucial role in inter-theoretical reductions in philosophy of science. 
13
13 See §7.2.1 for more details on mechanistic explanation.
The other understanding of reduction is reduction in a strict ontological sense: a 
relation between entities certain terms pick out. Claiming that mental property M is 
reduced to physical property P in this ontological sense expresses that the referent of 
the term ‘mental property  M’ is the same as the referent of the term ‘physical 
property  P’. That is, ontologically  reducing a certain property to another one amounts 
to identifying the two properties. Thus, it is the ontological aspect of reduction which 
is analogous to identification, and therefore relevant in metaphysical contexts. That 
is, if one is concerned with versions of physicalism—as we are here—then, given 
that physicalism is a metaphysical thesis, reductive physicalism is correctly 
understood as an ontological thesis claiming that prima facie non-physical properties 
are identical with physical properties.14
1.3.3 Non-reductive physicalism
Not more than a decade after the heyday of the identity  theory in philosophy of mind, 
and only a few years after that the defining piece on reduction in general philosophy 
of science had been published (E. Nagel, 1961), Hilary Putnam proposed an 
argument which almost immediately led to the demise of reductive physicalism 
(Putnam, 1967). Putnam pointed out that the idea behind identity theory was 
extremely implausible. For, thus Putnam’s line of thought goes, the identity  theory 
requires that the physical properties corresponding to a mental state must be the same 
in all those creatures which can share the same mental state. However, biologically 
quite distinct  beings like humans and, say, octopi produce, for example, similar pain 
avoidance behaviour and therefore likely possess the mental state of feeling pain. 
Since their biological organisation (including evolutionary history) is quite different, 
arguing that nevertheless the physical property corresponding to feeling pain in 
humans and in octopi is the very same property would be an extremely strong claim. 
Note, that  Putnam’s argument does not show that the identity  theory must be wrong, 
14
14  Chapters 6 and 7 present a more detailed analysis of the concept of reduction in general, the role 
identities play in reductions, and the relation between identity statements and explanation in particular.
it only claims that the identity theory  is empirically unlikely.15 Putnam’s alternative 
suggestion is that  mental properties, rather than being identical to physical properties 
are realised by  them. Since, according to Putnam’s claim, the very same mental state 
can be realised by many  different physical states, mental states are multiply 
realised.16 
Putnam’s point  is that  the identity theory cannot incorporate cases of multiple 
realisability, and therefore must be abandoned in favour of a view that can. The view, 
which, according to Putnam, is best suited for this task (i.e. dealing with cases of 
multiple realisability) is functionalism. That is, Putnam argues for functionalism, as 
opposed to identity theory, on the grounds that in the light of multiple realisability, 
the former is more plausible than the latter. Functionalism, roughly, is the view that 
certain properties are identified via their functions, i.e. the roles they  fill, the causal 
connections they have to other properties. In our present context, functionalism can 
be put as a view claiming that those properties which, on the face of it, appear to be 
non-physical, are in fact functional properties, strictly distinct from (i.e. not identical 
with) physical properties.17
15
15  However, it is possible to strengthen Putnam’s original argument by ‘going modal’, and claiming 
that the pertinent identities—if true at all—are necessarily true. In this case,  then, the mere possibility 
of multiple realisability falsifies the identity theory.
16  Soon after Putnam’s seminal paper, Jerry Fodor extended the multiple realisability argument to 
philosophy of science in general (Fodor, 1974). Fodor argues against the classical Nagelian view of 
inter-theoretical reduction, according to which all special science kinds are—with nomological 
necessity—coextensive with physical kinds (see §6.2.1 for more on Nagelian reduction). Fodor claims 
that special sciences are very much in the business of formulating interesting generalisations about 
events whose physical descriptions have nothing in common. In the Fodorian picture special science 
kinds do not reduce to lower-level special science kinds (and ultimately to physical kinds) in the 
standard Nagelian sense. Fodor’s proposal represents special science kinds as being multiply realised 
by the lower-level kinds: the antecedent and the consequence figuring in a special-science law are 
each connected with a disjunction of predicates in the lower-level science. The kinds of the higher-
level science are realised by very different kinds in the lower-level science. This contradicts Nagelian 
reductive attempts, Fodor argues,  since though each of the predicates at the lower level—one-by-one
—are connected by a proper law of the lower-level science, their disjunctive generalisations, due to 
the variety of the realisers, are not law-like.
17 Note that some proponents of functionalism do not follow this understanding (which is called role 
functionalism). Jaegwon Kim, for example, argues that functionally defined properties are identical 
with their realisers (hence, this view is called realiser functionalism), and multiple realisability based 
objections can be overcome by evoking species-specific reductions (e.g. Kim, 1998, 2005). Cf. 
functional reduction as in §1.3.2 and §6.2.3. 
Those versions of physicalism, which, being persuaded by the multiple realisability 
argument, reject identities as a viable interpretation of the ‘nothing over and above’ 
locution are in general called versions of non-reductive physicalism.18 Non-reductive 
physicalism, thus, holds that there are properties distinct from physical properties 
which nevertheless depend on physical properties. The standard way of capturing 
this dependence relation—i.e. the most general interpretation of being nothing over 
and above the physical—is usually  formulated via the notion of supervenience. 
Supervenience is a relation between two sets of properties A and B. A properties 
supervene on B properties if and only if there can be no changes in A properties 
without there being changes in B properties. Or to put it in another way: if A 
properties supervene on B properties then whenever any two objects instantiating 
both A and B properties are indistinguishable with respect to their B properties they 
must also be indistinguishable with respect to their A properties (cf. Davidson, 1970, 
p. 98).19
If one fills this into the slogan of physicalism (there is nothing over and above the 
physical) what one gets is this: prima facie non-physical properties supervene on 
physical properties. This way of putting physicalism is sometimes called 
supervenience physicalism (Stoljar, 2009a). Being committed to the supervenience 
thesis, however, is not sufficient for defining physicalism properly. As it has been 
argued by  many (e.g. Horgan, 1993; Kim, 1999; Crane, 2001b) a pure 
supervenience-based account of physicalism fails to distinguish itself from 
emergentism. Emergentism20  is usually  understood as physicalism’s best traditional 
16
18 See, however, Davidson (1970) for a view not falling into this category.
19 If the definition quantifies over objects in the same world, the resulting version of supervenience is 
so-called weak supervenience. Similarly, if the definition quantifies over objects in all possible 
worlds, the result is strong supervenience.  And finally, if the definition quantifies over entire possible 
worlds (talking about two possible worlds which if indistinguishable with respect to B properties are 
also indistinguishable with respect to A properties) then the resulting version is global supervenience. 
Weak supervenience is generally considered to be too weak to cover the needs of physicalism (since it 
is compatible with,  for example, Leibniz’  pre-established harmony). It is a common coin that strong 
supervenience entails global supervenience, however, whether global supervenience entails strong 
supervenience is hotly debated (cf. Kallestrup, 2011).
20 At least its ontological version—see Footnote 21 below.
rival (Wilson, 2005). It is a version of a combination of substance-monism and 
property  dualism holding that  there are emergent properties which are genuinely 
novel in the sense that they are not consequences of physical properties, and still they 
are not  entirely independent of them (cf. e.g. Broad, 1925; McLaughlin, 1992). 
According to the classical interpretation (based on Broad, 1925), emergents are: (E1) 
basic—they are neither identical with, nor derivative (not even in principle) from 
physical properties; (E2) genuinely causal—they bestow new causal powers on the 
particulars instantiating them; and (E3) determined by physical properties—they 
emerge only  when an appropriate set of physical properties are instantiated.21 Now 
the problem is this: the kind of determination emergentism is committed to is exactly 
what is meant by  supervenience. That is, if we accepted a pure supervenience-based 
formulation of physicalism, then emergentism, due to (E3), would become a version 
of physicalism. This would pose a problem, since the ontological reading of (E1) and 
(E2) is in tension with any version of physicalism.
In the literature, this problem is usually  solved by differentiating between the modal 
strength of the supervenience relation physicalism and emergentism endorse: 
physicalism claims that all prima facie non-physical properties supervene on physical 
properties with metaphysical necessity, whereas according to emergentism, there are 
properties (the emergent ones) which supervene on physical properties only with 
nomological necessity  (van Cleve, 1990; McLaughlin, 1992; Kirk, 1996; Stoljar, 
2000).
 
However, in an influential paper, Jessica Wilson (2005) questioned the viability of 
this distinction. She argues that interpreting emergentism as being committed only to 
nomological necessity is mistaken—given a certain plausible account  of properties 
17
21  (E1)-(E3) allow at least two different readings: an epistemological and an ontological one. 
According to the epistemological reading, emergents are explanatorily basic—they are unpredictable 
from the knowledge of, and unexplainable in terms of the physical properties. The ontological reading 
says that emergents are metaphysically basic—they are over and above the physical properties in a 
metaphysical sense. (E1)-(E3) are compatible with Broad’s view, and also with most contemporary 
accounts. Shrader (2009) posits a characterisation which is similar to my (E1)-(E3) ontologically 
understood, and argues that it is a set of necessary conditions for any account of ontological 
emergence.
and causal powers, emergentism, just like physicalism, deploys metaphysical 
necessity. In what follows, I will show that Wilson’s argument doesn’t go through. 
That is, I will argue that the ‘nothing over and above’ clause is best  understood as 
metaphysical determination. However, in order to be able to run my argument at full 
force, first I need to clarify a few issues related to emergentism.
1.4 Interpreting ‘Nothing Over and Above’ as
Metaphysical Determination
First, (E1) tells us that emergents are genuinely novel properties of a system. They 
are—as it is often put—properties of composite objects which neither are possessed 
by any of the constituents of the composites nor are the resultants (cf. Lewes, 1875) 
of the properties of the parts.22 That is, emergent properties are not derivative23 from 
the properties instantiated by the entities composing the composite object. 
Second, (E2) expresses that emergents contribute new causal powers to the particular 
instantiating them. By  instantiating an emergent property  an individual gets in 
possession of a novel causal power which is not derivative from the causal powers 
bestowed by the properties instantiated by parts of the individual in question. That is, 
the behaviour (the effects) of a system instantiating emergent properties is different 
from the behaviour the (otherwise unchanged) system would have performed had it 
not instantiated emergent properties. To put is shortly: emergent properties are both 
causally efficacious and autonomous. 
Third, what (E3) says is that though emergents are not resultants of the properties 
instantiated by the composing parts in the above sense, they are nevertheless 
18
22  Here I shall follow the British Emergentists’ (Alexander, 1920; Morgan, 1923; Broad, 1925) 
understanding of emergence. On their account, emergent properties are always properties of 
composite objects.  See, however, e.g. Batterman (2002) for an account of emergentism which denies 
the significance of part-whole relations.
23 The term ‘derivative’ is intended to be neutral to the ontic/epistemic distinction here. The rest of the 
section clarifies how to give this neutral term a proper ontological reading.
determined by them in a certain way. As C. D. Broad formulated this determination 
relation: 
“the characteristic behaviour of a living body is completely  determined by the 
nature and arrangement of the chemical compounds which compose it, in the 
sense that any whole which is composed of such compounds in such an 
arrangement will show vital behaviour and that nothing else will do 
so.” (Broad, 1925, pp. 67-68)  
 
In the following subsections my objective is to show how (E1), (E2), and (E3) might 
be best understood in order to get a coherent approach. In the course of this 
endeavour I shall distinguish two kinds of emergent laws and determine their nature. 
Let’s start in reverse order.
1.4.1 Understanding (E3)
As the Broad quotation above tells us emergent properties are determined by 
physical properties24 in the sense that whenever a certain set of physical properties is 
instantiated in a certain structure (i.e. whenever the components of a given composite 
form a specific order) the emergent property gets instantiated.25
 
Let’s say that  a composite object o is composed out of some components c1, c2,…, cj 
in such a way that they form a structure s and instantiate physical properties P1, P2,
…, Pk. In this case the determination relation says that  if object o instantiates 
emergent property  E then every object o* having some components cm, cn,…, cr 
forming structure s and instantiating physical properties P1, P2,…, Pk will necessarily 
instantiate E. That is, according to the physical-emergent determination, it is the 
19
24 Specifying what counts as a physical property is a controversial issue (cf. Crane & Mellor, 1990). 
For present purposes take the term as referring to the properties instantiated by the parts of the 
composite object. See §1.6 for an extensive discussion of this issue.
25  According to Broad—as the ‘nothing else will do so’ clause expresses,—the opposite is also true: 
the emergent property is instantiated only if a particular structure of certain physical properties is 
instantiated. However, in contemporary literature, it is often argued that emergent properties are 
multiply realised. (Cf.  Bedau, 1997; Laughlin & Pines, 2000; Bedau, 2008) So, in order to keep the 
analysis presented here compatible with those views, which are committed to the multiple realisability 
of emergents, the physical-emergent determination shall be taken as a one-way determination relation.
instantiation of structure s of properties P1, P2,…, Pk (for short: 〈 P1, P2,…, Pk | s 〉) 
that gives rise to the instantiation of emergent property E.
 
The physical-emergent determination tells us that  instantiating a structure s of 
physical properties P1, P2,…, Pk is a sufficient condition for instantiating emergent 
property  E. This condition allows us to connect the particular structure of the 
physical properties to the emergent property itself by  a connecting principle telling 
us a rule about when the emergent property  in question gets instantiated: whenever 
the particular structure of the physical properties is instantiated. That is, these 
connecting principles characterise the instantiation of emergents—they define, so to 
speak, when emergent properties emerge out  of physical properties. Connecting 
principles of this sort are what C.D. Broad calls trans-ordinal laws:26
“A trans-ordinal law would be a statement of the irreducible fact that  an 
aggregate composed of aggregates of the next lower order in such and such 
proportions and arrangements has such and such characteristic and non-
deducible properties.” (Broad, 1925, pp. 77-78)
Trans-ordinal laws connect emergent properties to the corresponding structures. In 
this sense, trans-ordinal laws assign emergent properties to the structures of the 
physical base property sets and determine the instantiation of the emergent properties 
in question. In accordance with the categoricalist27 understanding of laws of nature, 
instantiations of certain structures of some physical properties determine the 
instantiation of an emergent property because there are trans-ordinal laws connecting 
them. That is, the occurrence of an emergent property is due to there being a trans-
ordinal law connecting the emergent property  to the particular physical base property 
20
26 Trans-ordinal laws are sometimes called emergent laws. Here I would like to avoid this terminology 
and reserve the term ‘emergent law’ for a broader set. It is a purpose of this and the following section 
to draw attention to the difference between two subsets of emergent laws.
27 Categoricalists think that the roles properties play are inessential to their nature. Roughly, according 
to the categoricalist, in addition to properties, there are contingent N-relations (second order 
universals) connecting properties and telling them what to do.  The fact that property P necessitates the 
instantiation of property Q is due to there being an N-relation connecting P and Q. Laws of nature are 
these contingent facts—e.g. N(P, Q).  (Cf. Armstrong, 1983).  To see how emergentism might be 
understood in a non-categoricalist (i.e. dispositional essentialist) framework, consult §1.5.5.
set. Emergent property E is instantiated by  object o* instantiating a structure s of 
properties P1, P2,…, Pk in virtue of a trans-ordinal law LTO ( 〈 P1, P2,…, Pk | s 〉, E ).
Trans-ordinal laws tell us that whenever 〈 P1, P2,…, Pk | s 〉 gets instantiated E also 
gets instantiated. According to the interpretation of ontological emergence advocated 
here, neither the instantiation of 〈 P1, P2,…, Pk | s 〉 precedes the instantiation of E in 
time, nor vice versa. LTO-s are special laws of nature (partly) because they are not 
causal laws; what they express are synchronic, non-causal co-variations between the 
emergent properties and the corresponding structures of certain physical properties. 
Though, due to LTO-s, emergent properties are nomologically determined by  physical 
properties, according to this interpretation, it is not the case that the instantiation of 
〈 P1, P2,…, Pk | s 〉 causes the instantiation of E—rather 〈 P1, P2,…, Pk | s 〉 non-
causally necessitates E.28
 
On the basis of all this, (E3) is to be understood in the following way. Physical 
properties determine emergents in the sense that  instantiations of specific structures 
of certain physical properties non-causally necessitate the instantiations of 
corresponding emergent properties in virtue of some special laws of nature—trans-
ordinal laws—connecting the instantiations of emergent properties to the 
instantiations of the requisite physical property-structures. 
1.4.2 Understanding (E2)
(E2) says that emergent properties are causally efficacious and autonomous. This 
means that whenever an emergent property E gets instantiated by an object o it 
bestows certain novel causal powers upon object o. According to the ontological 
reading, these new causal powers are novel in the sense that they are metaphysically 
independent of the causal powers bestowed by the properties parts of object o 
instantiate. Those nomologically different possible worlds where 〈 P1, P2,…, Pk | s 〉 
21
28 See §1.5.3 for more details about the causal vs. non-causal interpretations of trans-ordinal laws.
is instantiated with all the causal powers of P1, P2,…, Pk but the novel causal power 
of E is not manifested (say, because the relevant LTO is not present and thus E does 
not appear) are causally different from the world where the novel causal power of E 
gets manifested as well.
 
The causal efficacy of emergent property E is manifested by causal connections 
between E and either other emergent properties or some physical properties.29 Again, 
according to categoricalism, the causal link between emergent property E and 
physical property  Pn is due to a law of emergent causation LEC ( E, Pn ) establishing a 
nomological connection between an emergent and a physical property. What LEC ( E, 
Pn ) tells us is a causal regularity: whenever emergent  property E gets instantiated, it 
is followed by an instantiation of physical property Pn.30 That is, though both LEC-s 
and LTO-s connect emergent properties with physical ones, they differ from each 
other in an important aspect—whereas LTO-s express synchronic, non-causal co-
variations, LEC-s express causal regularities.
 
In the literature, the distinction between LEC-s and LTO-s is often overlooked. For 
example, O’Connor and Wong clearly do not make this distinction when they say 
that “[the] newness of [an emergent] property […] entails new primitive causal 
powers, reflected in laws which connect complex physical structures to the emergent 
features.” (O'Connor & Wong, 2012) The problem here, strictly  speaking, is that in 
accordance with the interpretation presented so far, there are no laws reflecting new 
causal powers and connecting complex physical structures to emergent features at the 
same time. On the one hand, LTO-s, though connect complex physical structures to 
emergent features by assigning 〈 P1, P2,…, Pk | s 〉 and E to each other, do not reflect 
new causal powers since they express synchronic non-causal co-variation. On the 
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29  Here I set aside questions concerning emergent-emergent causation and concentrate on emergent-
physical causation. See Kim (1998, 2005) for an argument showing how emergent-emergent causation 
necessitates emergent-physical causation.
30 First, due to limitations in space, I set aside the problem of whether the idea of effects temporally 
preceding their causes is viable or not. Second, note that cases where E and Pn are instantiated by a 
composite object and a constituent part of it, respectively, are the interesting cases of so-called 
reflexive downward causation. See §1.5.3 for more on the temporality of causes and effects.
other hand, LEC-s, though reflect new causal powers by  expressing causal 
connections between emergent and physical properties do not connect complex 
physical structures to emergent features since it is the emergent property E which is 
related to Pn by LEC ( E, Pn ) not the complex structure 〈 P1, P2,…, Pk | s 〉.
 
According to this interpretation, then, the instantiation of the structure of the physical 
properties 〈 P1, P2,…, Pk | s 〉 non-causally necessitates the instantiation of emergent 
property  E, which in turn causes the instantiation of physical property Pn. That is, 
〈 P1, P2,…, Pk | s 〉 plays an indirect  role in the causation—first, the instantiation of 
〈 P1, P2,…, Pk | s 〉 necessitates the instantiation of E, and second, the instantiation of 
E causes the instantiation of Pn. The picture this interpretation suggests is the 
following: due to LTO, by instantiating a special structure of certain physical 
properties an object instantiates an emergent property which, due to LEC, bestows 
new causal powers upon the object resulting in causing some novel physical 
effects.31
1.4.3 Understanding (E1)
So far, we have seen that there are two different sets of emergent laws: trans-ordinal 
laws and laws of emergent causation. Now let’s consider what (E1) says about the 
status of these emergent laws. (E1) says that emergent properties are basic in the 
sense that they are not  resultants of the physical realm. The ontological reading 
claims that non-resultant properties are metaphysically  novel. They are not identical 
with any physical property (or set of physical properties). Moreover, they are 
metaphysically  independent of the instantiation of physical properties: instantiating a 
non-resultant property  is not equivalent with instantiating a certain set of physical 
properties. Therefore, (E1)—ontologically understood—claims that the instantiation 
of the appropriate set of physical properties in itself (given laws of physics) does not 
entail the instantiation of the emergent property. Emergent properties are basic, then, 
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31 See §1.5.3 and §1.5.4 for more details about other possible interpretations of LTO-s and LEC-s.
in a relative sense that  they  are not grounded32 in the physical realm (consisting of 
physical properties, plus physical laws).
 
However, though emergent properties are not grounded in the physical realm taken in 
itself, they are not totally ungrounded either, since they are grounded in the physical 
realm, plus trans-ordinal laws. This is what, according to our analysis, (E3) tells us: 
emergent properties—due to LTO-s—depend on physical properties. It is due to the 
relevant LTO that once 〈 P1, P2,…, Pk | s 〉 is instantiated E gets instantiated as well. 
This means, that emergent properties are non-resultants only  if LTO-s themselves are 
non-resultants (of physical laws and property distributions33). According to the 
ontological reading, then, it entails that trans-ordinal laws are fundamental laws in 
the same sense as those physical laws which are not grounded in other physical laws 
and property distributions. Were emergentism true of the actual world, in a possible 
world with the same fundamental physical property distribution and fundamental 
physical laws as in the actual world, emergent laws would still not necessarily  hold. 
That is, according to emergentism, LTO-s are not deducible (not even in principle) 
from, nor are they necessitated by the laws and property  distributions of the physical 
realm.
 
Similarly, (E2)—in accordance with the ontological reading—claims that the new 
causal powers bestowed upon objects by emergent properties due to LEC-s are novel 
in the sense that these causal powers are not  grounded in the causal powers of the 
physical properties parts of these objects instantiate. Two possible worlds which are 
similar in every physical respect (having the same physical laws and same structures 
of physical properties) might be different with regard to the instantiation of Pn, i.e. 
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32  Here I follow Jonathan Schaffer (2009) in taking ‘grounding’ as a primitive metaphysical relation 
which defines the notion of fundamentality—a property is fundamental if and only if it is ungrounded. 
Ungrounded properties are metaphysically primary; grounded properties are metaphysically 
dependent.
33 And rules of composition. See Beckermann (2000) for the importance of rules of compositions.
with regard to whether laws of emergent causation hold or not. That is, LEC-s are not 
necessitated34 by the laws and property distributions of the physical realm.35
 
To sum up, both LTO-s and LEC-s are independent of the laws and property 
distributions of the physical realm. In other words, LTO-s and LEC-s are additional 
laws in the sense that  they  neither are among the laws of physics nor are necessitated 
by them. As Samuel Alexander puts it  concerning LTO-s, their existence is “to be 
noted [...] under the compulsion of brute empirical fact, or, as I should prefer to say 
in less harsh terms, to be accepted with the ‘natural piety’ of the investigator.” (1920, 
ii, pp. 46-47).
1.4.4 Distinguishing physicalism and emergentism
Having all these at  hand makes it  possible to settle the issue of how to understand the 
‘nothing over and above’ clause in the doctrine of physicalism. First of all, note that 
contrary to, for example, what Kim (2009) claims, ontological emergentism is a 
consistent view. True, on the face of it, (E1) and (E3) contradict to each other: 
whereas (E3) claims that there is a determination relation between physical and 
emergent properties, (E1) denies this. However, on the one hand, what (E3) claims is 
that there is a nomological determination—due to trans-ordinal laws—between 
emergents and the physical realm, whereas, on the other hand, what (E1) denies is 
that emergents are grounded in, i.e. are metaphysically determined by the physical 
realm in itself. That is, ontological emergence, as characterised by  (E1)-(E3) is a 
coherent view.
 
Moreover, these characteristics readily distinguish emergentism from physicalism if 
we interpret the ‘nothing over and above’ clause as metaphysical determination. In 
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34 The necessitation in question both here and in the case of LTO is of course metaphysical. The idea of 
laws being nomologically necessitated by other laws seems to yield the strange view that laws are 
connected by further laws (and thereby threatens with a regress).
35 Nor are laws of emergent causation necessitated even by a base supplemented by trans-ordinal laws 
(and thus consisting of physical property distributions, rules of composition, physical laws,  plus trans-
ordinal laws). Cf. §1.4.2.
accordance with this interpretation, then, physicalism claims that all the facts are 
metaphysically necessitated by  the set of physical facts and laws (cf. eg. Stoljar, 
2005; Papineau, 2008). That is, what physicalists are committed to is that physical 
properties and physical laws together metaphysically necessitate all prima facie non-
physical properties.
 
As we have seen, emergent properties are governed by  two sets of laws: trans-ordinal 
laws (LTO-s) and laws of emergent causation (LEC-s). Both LTO-s and LEC-s are 
additional laws of nature in the sense that they are neither among the laws of physics, 
nor are necessitated by them. LTO-s and LEC-s are not grounded in physical laws and 
property  distributions—they are additional in the metaphysical sense; two possible 
worlds identical in every  physical respect might still be different with regard to how 
LTO-s and LEC-s look like, or even whether they are present. That is, contrary  to what 
physicalism claims, physical properties and laws alone do not necessitate emergent 
properties. However, physical properties and laws together with trans-ordinal laws 
do necessitate emergent properties.
 
So physicalism is committed to and emergentism rejects metaphysical necessity in 
the following sense: prima facie non-physical properties are necessitated given 
physical laws and property  distributions no matter what other laws of nature there 
might be. In what follows I shall argue that this is what ultimately tells physicalism 
and emergentism apart: whereas physicalists think that all properties supervene with 
metaphysical necessity  on physical properties and laws emergentism holds that there 
are emergent properties which supervene only  with nomological necessity  on the 
very same base, since, in addition to physical properties and laws, emergent laws 
need to be fixed as well in order to get emergent properties.
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1.5 A Problem with the Metaphysical/Nomological 
Distinction
Although differentiating between emergentism and physicalism on the grounds of the 
modal force of the necessitation relation they are committed to looks promising, it 
has to face with a recent objection put forward by Jessica Wilson (2005).
1.5.1 Jessica Wilson’s objection
According to our analysis introduced above, if one copied all the physical laws and 
property-distributions of the actual world, but not the emergent laws, then (even if 
emergentism was true of the actual world) there would be no emergent properties and 
no novel causal powers in the copy world. Wilson (2005) argues in length that this 
analysis is mistaken. Her point is that without emergent laws being copied physical 
properties would not be instantiated. Wilson provides a twofold argument supporting 
this claim. On the one hand, she argues that the so-called Contingency view about 
laws—holding that “there are possible worlds where scientific properties of the type 
that actually  exist  are governed by very different  laws than those actually governing 
such properties” (Wilson, 2005, p. 438)—is in tension with naturalism.36  Since 
physicalists in general consider themselves as naturalists, this tension forces them to 
adopt the so-called Necessitarian view about laws over the Contingency view.37 On 
the other hand, she argues that if one adopts the Necessitarian view—saying that the 
nature of properties depends on the laws of nature which govern them—then the 
conclusion above follows: without the emergent laws being present in a possible 
world the physical properties would not be properly instantiated. My aim here is to 
point out that Wilson’s conclusion does not follow even if one accepts the 
Necessitarian view.
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36  What Wilson calls the Contingency view is a consequence of categoricalism, the view about the 
nature of properties endorsed in §1.4.1 and §1.4.2. Cf. footnote 26.
37 Contrary to categoricalism, so-called dispositional essentialism claims that the roles properties play 
are essential to their nature. According to this view, laws of nature “spring from within the properties 
themselves” (Bird, 2007,  p.  2). That is, dispositional essentialism is an anti-Humean position; it claims 
that laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. Wilson’s Necessitarian view is essentialist about the 
causal roles properties play—cf.  (S1) in Wilson’s argument as reconstructed in §1.5.2. See §1.5.5 for 
more about dispositional essentialism.
 
According to the Necessitarian view: “any possible world where there exists a 
scientific property of a type that actually exists is a world where hold all the laws 
actually governing that property” (Wilson, 2005, p. 438). Consequently, if the nature 
of (at least some) physical properties depends on emergent laws, then in those 
possible worlds, which are a minimal physical duplicate of the actual world there 
hold all the emergent laws as well (given emergentism is true of the actual world). 
Thus the difference between physicalism and emergentism with respect to the modal 
force of the supervenience relation they endorse vanishes.
 
This argument might require some unpacking. Fist  of all, Wilson subscribes to Gene 
Witmer’s view, according to which what is metaphysically possible reflects the 
nature of things under consideration (Witmer, 2001). Building upon this, Wilson 
argues that in those cases where the nature of entities under consideration is (at least 
partly) determined by the actual laws of nature the distinction between metaphysical 
and nomological possibility  cannot be made. Wilson’s point is that the cases of 
physicalism and emergence are of this type, and thus it is pointless to argue that 
emergent properties are nomologically  but not metaphysically  determined by 
physical properties.
 
To drive this point home, Wilson needs to establish the claim that (some) physical 
properties depend on emergent  laws. In doing so, she first introduces a line of 
thought supporting the Necessitarian view in general, and then she applies this 
scheme to the case of emergentism. Wilson reaches the general claim through the 
following steps. First, following (Shoemaker, 1980, 1998) and others38 she accepts 
that the causal powers bestowed by so-called ‘broadly scientific properties’ 
essentially  individuate these properties. Second, she adopts the view that laws of 
nature express (among other things) causal powers. From this, it  follows that 
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38 Eg.: Swoyer (1982), Elder (1994), Ellis (2001).
scientific properties are essentially  individuated by their actual governing laws. (Cf. 
Wilson, 2005, p. 437) 
 
The Necessitarian view about laws is what one gets after embracing all these steps. 
What this view tells us about emergentism is that if one copies all the physical laws 
and property-distributions of our world (supposing that emergentism is true of our 
world) but does not copy LTO-s and LEC-s, then the copy-world will not be 
indistinguishable from our world in every physical respect, since both LTO-s and LEC-
s govern physical properties39 which in turn, due to the lack of these emergent laws, 
will not be individuated properly. Strictly  speaking, if emergentism is true then, 
according to the Necessitarian view, it is impossible to make an exact physical copy 
of the actual world without copying LTO-s and LEC-s as well. That is, in every 
possible world where the physical properties of the actual world are instantiated, 
emergent properties are instantiated as well—i.e. emergent properties supervene on 
physical properties with metaphysical necessity.
1.5.2 The core argument against Wilson’s objection
For a detailed argument against this critical objection, let’s first sum up how Wilson 
gets to her conclusion saying that emergent properties are metaphysically 
necessitated by physical properties. There are two crucial premises in the line of 
thought resulting in this conclusion. The first is the acknowledgement that there are 
emergent laws connecting emergent and physical properties. On the basis of our 
analysis of (E2) and (E3), we can say that this seems to be a well-established 
premise. The second premise is accepting the claim that certain physical properties 
are essentially individuated by these emergent laws. Wilson reaches this claim 
through the following steps:
 
 (S1)  Scientific properties are individuated by their causal powers.
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39 As it is captured by their formulations LTO ( 〈 P1, P2,…, Pk | s 〉,  E ) and LEC ( E, Pn ), where P1, P2,
…, Pk and Pn denote physical properties.
 (S2)  Laws of nature express causal powers.
 (S3)  Properties are individuated by their governing laws.
Here (S3), the claim in question, is the consequence of (S1) and (S2). If scientific 
properties are individuated by  their causal powers (S1), and if these causal powers 
are expressed by laws of nature (S2), then these laws of nature expressing the causal 
powers of the scientific properties in question individuate (at least partly) scientific 
properties. Applying this general scheme to the special case of physical properties 
and emergent laws (S1)-(S3) read like this:
 (S1*)  Physical properties are individuated by their causal powers.
 (S2*)  Emergent laws express causal powers of physical properties.
 (S3*)  Physical properties are individuated by emergent laws.
That is, the statement that certain physical properties are essentially individuated by 
emergent laws relies on the truth of two claims. On the one hand, the truth of the 
general claim that all physical properties are individuated by their causal powers 
(S1*), and, on the other hand, the truth of the particular claim that there are emergent 
laws expressing causal powers of physical properties (S2*). In what follows, I 
presuppose the truth of the (S1)-(S1*) claim, and concentrate solely on the truth of 
(S2*).
For being able to evaluate the truth of (S2*), let’s consider how it fits into our 
analysis of emergent laws. As we have seen, a trans-ordinal law LTO ( 〈 P1, P2,…, Pk | 
s 〉, E ) assigns a specific structure of certain physical properties and an emergent 
property  to each other, expressing synchronic, non-causal co-variation: whenever the 
specific structure of certain physical properties 〈 P1, P2,…, Pk | s 〉 gets instantiated 
emergent property  E also gets instantiated. It is not  the case, that the instantiation of 
〈 P1, P2,…, Pk | s 〉 causes the instantiation of emergent property E but rather that 〈 P1, 
P2,…, Pk | s 〉 non-causally  necessitates E due to LTO. That is, though LTO act  on 
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physical properties P1, P2,…, Pk it does not express any of their causal powers. 
Trans-ordinal laws, then, do not satisfy (S2*).
 
Laws of emergent causation, on the other hand, do express causal powers. They 
express the novel causal powers of emergent properties and connect them to physical 
events. So a law of emergent causation LEC ( E, Pn ) expresses that the instantiation 
of emergent property E causes the instantiation of physical property Pn. That  is, LEC 
( E, Pn ) expresses forward looking causal powers of emergent property E, and 
backward looking causal powers of physical property Pn.40  Note that LEC-s 
expressing forward looking causal powers of emergent properties do not satisfy 
(S2*), since what (S2*) requires is an emergent law expressing causal powers of 
physical properties, and emergent properties are not physical properties.41
 
Where are we now? We have seen that for Wilson’s argument to go through it  is 
necessary  for (S2*) to be true. (S2*) requires emergent laws to express causal powers 
of physical properties. There are two sets of emergent laws, LTO-s and LEC-s. LTO-s 
do not express causal powers, only  LEC-s do. And the only physical properties whose 
causal powers are expressed by LEC-s are Pn-s. In the general formulation of laws of 
emergent causation—LEC ( E, Pn )—Pn-s are placeholders for those novel physical 
effects which would not have occurred if emergent properties had not been 
instantiated. An important characteristic of emergentism is the very  fact that 
emergent properties do make a difference in the sense that if a system instantiates 
emergent properties then its behaviour (the effects the system causes) will be 
different compared to a similar system not  instantiating emergent properties. Pn-s are 
exactly  the consequences of this difference-making. So when one chases the question 
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40  See Shoemaker (2003, 2007) for the distinction between forward looking and backward looking 
causal features. Here I follow Jessica Wilson’s terminology in characterising causal profiles with the 
expression of causal powers, instead of causal features. Accordingly, the backward looking causal 
power of Pn is to be understood as a part of the causal profile of Pn—namely its ‘power’ to be affected 
in a certain way.
41  Note that I do not beg the question here. By the claim that emergent properties are not physical 
properties all I mean is that they are not properties of composing parts, i.e.  they do not get into the 
supervenience base in question.
of how strong the dependency  relation between an emergent property  and a specific 
structure of certain physical properties (forming the supervenience base of the 
emergent property) is, what one definitely does not want to do is including Pn-s in 
the supervenience base. What this all means is that, though the causal powers (at 
least the backward looking ones) of Pn-s are expressed by  LEC-s, this has nothing to 
do with the question we are after here: whether the supervenience base of emergent 
properties determines emergents with nomological or metaphysical necessity—
simply because Pn-s are not part of the relevant supervenience bases.42
 
The moral is that  Wilson’s argument doesn’t go through since neither LTO-s nor LEC-s 
satisfy (S2*) in the relevant way: there are no emergent laws playing part in the 
individuation of those physical properties which form the supervenience base of the 
emergent properties in question. So there is nothing inconsistent in conceiving 
copying the supervenience base of a given emergent without copying the 
corresponding LTO-s and LEC-s. Referring to the difference in the modal force of the 
supervenience relation emergentism and physicalism are committed to, thus, remains 
to be a viable way of distinguishing between the views of emergentism and 
physicalism, and hence understanding physicalism as the doctrine that all facts are 
metaphysically  necessitated by  the physical facts (laws plus property distributions) 
seems to be the best way to understand it.
1.5.3 Refining the core argument—round 1: trans-ordinal laws 
as causal laws
In the previous section I have presented a core argument for the claim that Wilson’s 
objection fails because neither trans-ordinal laws nor laws of emergent causation 
play  a role in individuating those physical properties which form the supervenience 
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42 It is possible to maintain the claim that Pn has no role here even if one wants to put this in terms of 
copying whole worlds instead of copying relevant supervenience bases only. Since the instantiation of 
Pn at t1—in line with the diachronic understanding of causation—is caused by the instantiation of E at 
t0 copying the whole world at t0 does not copy Pn. In general, the causal relation between E and Pn 
might be synchronic or diachronic, and reflexive or irreflexive. The synchronic reflexive case would 
pose a problem even to the local supervenience based formulation (copying only the relevant base). 
However, I follow Kim (1999) in thinking that synchronic reflexive causation is problematic.
base of emergent properties. However, there are some loose ends which need to be 
tied up for my argument to succeed. 
First of all, in answering Wilson’s objection, I rely on the claim that trans-ordinal 
laws are not causal laws, but rather express synchronic non-causal necessitation. 
Were trans-ordinal laws causal laws, i.e. were the connections between 〈 P1, P2,…, Pk 
| s 〉 and E causal, trans-ordinal laws would satisfy Wilson’s (S2*), since trans-ordinal 
laws would express causal powers of relevant physical properties. On the one hand, 
P1, P2,…, Pk form the supervenience base of emergent property E, thus their 
individuation is relevant here. On the other hand, if LTO expresses causal powers of 
P1, P2,…, Pk, then LTO does play a role in individuating relevant physical properties.
 
Understanding emergentism as a causal phenomenon is certainly an option.43  For 
example, most recently Timothy O’Connor (1994, 2000; 2005) has argued for a 
dynamical understanding of emergence where the relation between emergent 
properties and their base properties is diachronic and causal in nature. Nonetheless, it 
seems that such an approach is more the exception than the rule. E.g. McLaughlin 
(1992, 1997), van Cleve (1990), Crane (2001b), Kim (1999, 2006a, 2006b), and 
Papineau (2000, 2008) all agree that ontological emergence is best understood as a 
synchronic, non-causal determination relation.44 It certainly seems right to say, that 
according to the received view—according to how it is most often interpreted—
emergence is a non-causal phenomenon, i.e. trans-ordinal laws express synchronic 
non-causal determination. Nonetheless, as critiques might want to stress, the 
attractiveness of (or the amount of general sympathy towards) a causal understanding 
of emergentism is not an issue here. As long as a causal understanding is a viable and 
coherent option, it seems safe to say that Wilson’s argument ultimately succeeds: the 
metaphysical/nomological distinction cannot serve as the basis of a general strategy 
for distinguishing emergentism and physicalism.
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43 See Mill (1843) for an early account where emergence is a causal phenomenon.
44 For earlier versions of this position see C.D. Broad (1925) and Lloyd Morgan (1925).
 
However, the fact that the metaphysical/nomological distinction does not work for a 
causal understanding of emergentism is something I happily accept. Remember, the 
original question was whether the metaphysical/nomological distinction can 
differentiate between emergentism and physicalism. Wilson argues that it cannot 
since in cases where emergent laws govern physical base properties the 
metaphysical/nomological distinction simply  vanishes. We have seen, that this 
conclusion only follows if emergent determination is interpreted as a causal 
connection, i.e. if LTO-s are understood as causal laws. But under such an 
interpretation the original question does not even arise. The causal understanding of 
emergentism readily distinguishes itself from physicalism. Even if some interpret the 
determination relation within emergentism as a causal relation, no one has ever 
interpreted the determination relation within physicalism as such. Physicalism holds 
the view that prima facie non-physical properties are ultimately grounded in physical 
properties. Grounding is a synchronic relation. This clearly tells physicalism apart 
from any version of emergentism subscribing to a diachronic causal interpretation of 
the determination relation.
 
Moreover, interpreting emergent dependence as a synchronic causal connection 
won’t help either. For physicalism also claims that the causal powers of prima facie 
non-physical properties are grounded in the causal powers of physical powers, and 
causal determination typically is not suitable for playing this role—the causal powers 
effects usually  have are not grounded in the causal powers of their causes. That is, 
even if emergent determination might be understood as a synchronic causal 
connection, this version would straightforwardly distinguish itself from physicalism, 
since the determination relation physicalism is committed to cannot be interpreted in 
a similar way.
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1.5.4 Refining the core argument—round 2: a different 
understanding of emergent causation
One might want to argue that the distinction between trans-ordinal laws and laws of 
emergent causation is unnecessary. Although it is true that LEC ( E, Pn ) connects 
emergent property E (as a cause) to physical property  Pn (the effect), but since LTO 
( 〈 P1, P2,…, Pk | s 〉, E ) provides a link between emergent property E and complex 
structure 〈 P1, P2,…, Pk | s 〉 by assigning them to each other, it  is possible to 
substitute 〈 P1, P2,…, Pk | s 〉 for E in LEC ( E, Pn ). The resulting LEC* ( 〈 P1, P2,…, Pk 
| s 〉, Pn ) is a law which expresses the emergent novel causal power and connects it to 
a complex physical structure. One advantage of this approach might be that it allows 
one to commit oneself to some kind of an Occam’s razor, and instead of positing two 
sets of additional laws (LTO-s and LEC-s) one can prefer positing only one set of 
additional laws (LEC*-s).
 
However, the strong claim behind merging LTO and LEC into LEC* is more than a 
simple application of Occam’s razor. It yields an entirely  new interpretation of 
emergence. According to this interpretation the formula LEC* ( 〈 P1, P2,…, Pk | s 〉, 
Pn ) expresses a causal connection between properties P1, P2,…, Pk and property  Pn. 
It assigns a direct role to the physical properties P1, P2,…, Pk in causing Pn. That is, 
the strong claim behind the LEC* approach is that the physical properties P1, P2,…, Pk 
themselves bestow the causal power of instantiating the emergent effect Pn.45
 
Clearly, this approach poses a problem for my objection against Wilson’s argument. 
For LEC*-s express novel causal powers of relevant physical properties (P1, P2,…, 
Pk). This is exactly  what is required by Wilson’s crucial premise (S2*). So it seems, 
that under this interpretation of emergentism Wilson’s argument has its full power 
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45  Contemporary literature (e.g. O'Connor & Wong, 2012) often talks about ‘emergent laws’ 
connecting physical properties with emergent effects without distinguishing between trans-ordinal 
laws and laws of emergent causation—as though what they meant was something similar to the LEC* 
approach. However, as closer reflection reveals, they are not committed to the strong claim behind the 
LEC* interpretation as presented here. Rather they understand LEC* only as a shorthand for the LTO – 
LEC pair, assigning only an indirect role to 〈 P1, P2,…, Pk | s 〉 in the causation of Pn.
forcing us to abandon the metaphysical/nomological distinction as a useful one. 
However, I think that  this is not the result Wilson really wants. Even if the 
metaphysical/nomological distinction does not apply to the LEC* approach, this 
leaves my argument entirely intact. Remember, the claim I am arguing for is that 
relying on the metaphysical/nomological distinction provides a general method for 
distinguishing physicalism from emergentism.46 Now even if Wilson’s argument goes 
through in this case, it  doesn’t really matter, simply because the LEC* approach is a 
non-starter here—since, as it turns out, it is a version of physicalism.
 
First of all, the LEC* approach eliminates emergent property  E. That is, according to 
this view, there are no novel physically ungrounded emergent properties. Instead of 
E, physical properties P1, P2,…, Pk  bestow the causal power of instantiating Pn upon 
the object in question. Moreover, there are no physically ungrounded causal powers 
either. The power of instantiating Pn might be novel, since none of the physical 
properties bestow it individually or in any combination other than s. Nonetheless, the 
instantiation of Pn is grounded in the powers of the physical properties P1, P2,…, Pk 
instantiated by  components of the object—namely  (at least  partly) in those powers 
which become manifested only if these properties get arranged into the specific 
structure s.
 
What all this means is that the LEC* approach, by  denying the existence of physically 
ungrounded higher level properties and physically ungrounded higher level causal 
powers, abandons the basic tenets of ontological emergence which made it 
incompatible with physicalism. To put it in another way, as some might see it, it is a 
virtue of the LEC* approach that it  provides an understanding of emergentism 
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46 In cases where telling physicalism and emergentism apart is not straightforward. Cf. §1.5.3.
compatible with physicalism.47  The moral is that rather than being at odds with 
physicalism, the LEC* approach is a version of it. Thus there is no need for 
distinguishing them from each other. So the fact that we cannot differentiate between 
them on the grounds of the metaphysical/nomological distinction does not disqualify 
the strategy I am advocating.
1.5.5 Refining the core argument—round 3: property
individuation and full-fledged dispositional essentialism
So far we have seen that Wilson’s argument can’t get  off the ground since the 
requirements of  premise (S2*) are not met—neither trans-ordinal laws nor laws of 
emergent causation express causal powers of relevant  physical properties. However, 
the so-called Necessitarian view introduced in Section 3 is not  as stringent as it  could 
be. All it is committed to is that properties (at least partly) are individuated by their 
causal powers. This opens up the possibility  of evading my objection by 
strengthening this commitment. If one claimed that properties are individuated not 
only by their causal powers but by all their potentialities then one would be able to 
block my argument.48  Substituting the Necessitarian view with this latter view—
which might be called ‘full-fledged dispositional essentialism’—would entail (S1’)-
(S3’) as follows:
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47  I do not have enough room here to discuss whether the LEC* approach provides a viable 
interpretation of emergentism. However, note that this view, as introduced above, is in fact an actual 
position held, for example, by Sydney Shoemaker (2007). Simplifying a bit, Shoemaker claims that 
P1, P2,…, Pk have two sets of causal powers: so-called manifest powers which they bestow upon the 
individual instantiating them regardless of the context of instantiation, and so-called latent powers 
which become manifested only if P1, P2,…, Pk get instantiated in specific structure s and remain latent 
when they get instantiated individually or in any other combination. The causal power of instantiating 
Pn then is grounded in the manifest and latent powers of P1, P2,…, Pk.  Shoemaker himself proposes 
this account as one which is compatible with physicalism. (Cf. Shoemaker, 2007, pp. 71-79)
48  As it happens, what Wilson has in mind is a more stringent version of Necessitarianism (personal 
communication).  She thinks that LEC (or as she prefers to think of it, the sudden occurrence of a new 
force field) is necessitated by the instantiation of 〈 P1,  P2,…, Pk | s 〉.  As a consequence, in all possible 
worlds where 〈 P1, P2,…, Pk | s 〉 is instantiated LEC is present.  That is, Wilson’s understanding of 
emergence is different from what is characterised by (E1)-(E3). Though Wilson is able to account for 
the novelty of emergent causal powers in some sense (in terms of the occurrence of a new force field) 
her view is unable to incorporate the claim that the causal powers bestowed by emergents are 
genuinely novel in the sense that they are not bestowed by any physical properties.  This,  then, 
threatens with Wilson’s view being a non-starter as a version of ontological emergentism. See the 
argument of this section for more details.
 (S1’)  Physical properties are individuated by all their potentialities.
 (S2’)  Emergent laws express certain potentialities of physical properties.
 (S3’)  Physical properties are individuated by emergent laws.
My original strategy would clearly  fail here, since the requirements of premise (S2’)
—as opposed to those of (S2*)—are indeed met by trans-ordinal laws. For trans-
ordinal laws do express certain potentialities of some relevant physical properties: 
namely that they give rise to emergent properties whenever they are instantiated in 
the right sort  of way. According to full-fledged dispositional essentialism, P1, P2,…, 
Pk are individuated not only by their causal powers but  also by  all other potentialities 
they  have, including the one that  their instantiation in structure s brings about the 
instantiation of emergent property E. That is, the disposition that they  give rise to E if 
instantiated in structure s plays a part in individuating P1, P2,…, Pk, so in every 
possible world where they  are present they  have this disposition. In other words, 
there can be no possible worlds where P1, P2,…, Pk are instantiated but E is not, 
which means that instantiating E is metaphysically determined by instantiating 〈 P1, 
P2,…, Pk | s 〉. Thus the metaphysical/nomological distinction is of no use here in 
telling ontological emergentism and physicalism apart.
 
However, as others have already argued elsewhere (cf. Yates, 2009), this version of 
dispositional essentialism is at  odds with any  (E1)-(E3) incorporating interpretation 
of emergentism, especially with the claim that emergent properties bestow genuinely 
novel causal powers.
 
The problem is this. According to full-fledged dispositional essentialism, if an 
emergent property supervenes on a physical property  then the fact that the physical 
property  gives rise to the emergent property is essential to the physical property. 
Similarly: the genuinely  novel causal power the emergent property  bestows is 
essential to the emergent property. That  is, what is essential to the physical property 
is that it  gives rise to an emergent property bestowing that particular novel causal 
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power (among other powers). Bestowing the novel causal power thus is, essential to 
the physical property. Had that particular causal power not been bestowed, the 
physical property would not have been individuated—for bestowing the causal 
power is necessary for individuating the emergent property, which in turn is 
necessary  for individuating the physical property. By the definition of bestowal49, 
then, it follows that the physical property bestows the novel causal power. This, 
however contradicts with how genuine novelty is understood in (E2). The causal 
power an emergent property bestows is supposed to be novel in the sense that it is 
not bestowed by the physical base of the emergent (neither is it grounded in the 
powers bestowed by the base).50
 
Where does this all leave us? First, we have seen that relying on the metaphysical/
nomological distinction seems to be a natural way of distinguishing physicalism and 
emergentism. Wilson’s argument drew attention to the fact that the distinction cannot 
be made if relevant physical properties are individuated by emergent laws. I objected 
by showing that emergent laws do not play a part in individuating relevant physical 
properties. This objection fails though, if properties are individuated not only  by their 
causal powers but by  all their potentialities. Nevertheless, since those who subscribe 
to this latter view of property individuation cannot make sense of the emergentist 
claim that emergent properties bestow genuinely novel causal powers, the fact that 
the metaphysical/nomological distinction doesn’t apply  to this case leaves the 
39
49 There are different ways to formulate such a definition. The one favoured here claims that property 
P bestows causal power C upon object o if and only if,  necessarily, for any object o which has causal 
power C, it has C in virtue of having P. The transitivity of the ‘in virtue’  relation, then, entails that the 
novel causal power of the emergent property gets bestowed by the physical property.  Note the 
difference between this definition and a modal one defended, for example,  by David Yates saying that 
a property bestows a power upon a particular if and only if, necessarily, if the particular instantiates 
the property then the particular has the power (cf. Yates, 2009, p. 119). The latter definition fails to 
correctly characterise cases where a particular instantiates two necessarily coextensive properties. 
50 This is not a problem for the categoricalist approach. For categoricalists can rely on laws of nature 
in accounting for direct power-bestowal. The categoricalist answer could then proceed in the 
following way. The emergent property directly bestows the novel causal power due to LEC, whereas 
the physical property brings about the emergent property due to LTO. The physical property bestows 
the causal power only in the sense of bringing about the emergent property. Neither LEC nor LTO 
connect the physical property to the causal power (and no other law does), thus on the categoricalist 
account, the physical property does not bestow directly the particular causal power in question. This 
law-based reply is not available for the full-fledged dispositional essentialist, neither are other 
strategies (cf. Yates, 2009, pp. 124-125).
original argument entirely intact. That is, relying on the difference in the modal force 
of the determination relation is still able to help distinguishing physicalism from any 
(E1)-(E3) incorporating interpretations of emergentism.
To sum it up, physicalism is committed to and emergentism rejects metaphysical 
necessity in the following sense: prima facie non-physical properties are necessitated 
by physical laws and property distributions no matter what other laws of nature there 
might be. That is, whereas physicalists think that all properties supervene with 
metaphysical necessity  on physical properties and laws emergentism holds that there 
are emergent properties which supervene only  with nomological necessity  on the 
very same base, since, in addition to physical properties and laws, emergent laws 
need to be fixed as well in order to get emergent properties.
1.6 What is Physical?
Now that  we have tracked how to understand the ‘nothing over and above’ clause in 
the definition of physicalism properly, our next task is to consider what the term 
‘physical’ stands for. However, before turning our attention to this question, let’s first 
consider how metaphysical necessitation as featuring in the characterisation of 
physicalism might be best interpreted.
1.6.1 A note on how to understand metaphysical necessity: 
focus on the base set
If one considers the textbook definition of metaphysical and nomological necessity, 
then one might start to worry that contrary to all the efforts presented so far, one is 
forced to conclude that there is no difference in the modal force of the necessitation 
relation emergentism and physicalism embrace. For it seems that the textbook 
understanding of metaphysical and nomological necessity  implies that both 
emergentism and physicalism embraces nomological necessity.
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The problem is that taking the textbook definition of metaphysical necessity at  face 
value seems to be in tension with how it is usually deployed in the physicalism 
literature. According to the general understanding of what metaphysical necessity is, 
something is metaphysically necessary  if it is true in all possible worlds, no matter 
what the laws of nature are in those worlds. That is, something is metaphysically 
necessary  in a possible world w if and only if it is the case in every possible world 
regardless of what laws hold in those worlds. Contrary to this, something is 
nomologically necessary, if it is true in all the possible worlds with the same laws of 
nature as the actual world. That is, something is nomologically necessary in a world 
w if and only if it is the case in every possible world with the same laws as w.51
 
In accordance with these textbook definitions, then, a physicalist  endorsing 
metaphysical necessitation should claim that prima facie non-physical properties are 
determined by physical properties no matter what the laws of nature are in a given 
world. This, however, is clearly not the case: what physicalists are committed to is 
that physical properties and physical laws together necessitate all prima facie non-
physical properties. The physicalist claim is that all God had to do in order to create 
everything there is was creating an initial distribution of physical properties plus 
setting up all the laws of physics.52 Had a different set of physical laws been set up 
by God, the world would have turned out differently. Arguably, this is not what one 
has in mind when considering the textbook understanding of metaphysical necessity. 
Instead, it seems to be a standard case of nomological necessity: physical facts 
necessitate all the facts given laws of physics. That is, it seems that physicalism—
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51  On the one hand, the standard examples of metaphysical necessity are identities like ‘Cicero is 
Tully’ or ‘water is H2O’  and cases of the determinable-determinate relation like the one holding 
between red and scarlet. If, for example, an object has the determinate colour scarlet then it has the 
determinable colour red, no matter what the laws of nature are. Similarly, in all possible worlds, 
regardless of the laws holding in those worlds, water is identical with H2O. On the other hand, the 
standard examples of nomological necessity are cases like ‘elephants can’t fly’, or ‘water freezes at 32 
degrees Fahrenheit’. Elephants cannot fly in those possible worlds where the laws of nature are 
similar to those of our world—it might well be the case that there are possible worlds where the 
gravitational coefficient is smaller than in our world and elephants can easily float around in mid-air. 
Similarly,  were laws relevant for phase transitions different, water would possibly freeze at 
temperatures different from 32 degrees Fahrenheit.
52 Cf. e.g. Crane (1991).
given the textbook definitions of metaphysical and nomological necessity—claims 
that prima facie non-physical properties are nomologically necessitated by  physical 
properties.
 
This worry can easily  be converted into an objection against the claim that it is the 
metaphysical/nomological distinction what tells emergentism and physicalism apart. 
Physicalism in fact, the objection goes, is a conjunction of two claims; first that 
prima facie non-physical properties supervene on physical properties with 
nomological necessity and second that there are only  physical laws in the actual 
world. The emergentist agrees with the first claim, but denies the second, since 
according to emergentism, in addition to physical laws, there are also emergent laws 
in the actual world. That is, both physicalists and the emergentists agree that physical 
facts determine all the facts given laws of nature. They disagree, however, in what 
laws of nature there are. The consequence is that  it  is not  the modal strength what 
distinguishes between physicalism and emergentism but the question of what counts 
as an emergent law and what counts as a physical law.
This problem, however, is only superficial. It draws attention to the fact that in the 
context of the physicalism-emergentism debate the term ‘metaphysical necessitation’ 
is utilised with a special focus on the supervenience base. According to what has 
been called the textbook definition, the supervenience base contains properties, and 
what is investigated is whether this base in itself is able to necessitate the 
supervening property. If it does, without the extra requirement of fixing laws of 
nature, then the necessity in question is metaphysical. However, there is a sense in 
which physicalists correctly  refer to the necessity  they are committed to as 
metaphysical—they claim that the supervening properties in question (the prima 
facie non-physical properties) are necessitated by a particular supervenience base 
without the requirement of fixing additional laws of nature. The difference lies in the 
fact that physicalists usually take the supervenience base to include, in addition to 
physical properties, the laws of physics as well. Thus, their commitment that fixing 
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no extra laws of nature is required is exactly  what rules emergentism out: no 
additional emergent laws are needed to be fixed for all the properties to be 
necessitated by the supervenience base in question (including physical properties and 
laws of physics). That is, even if, literally, the physicalists’ use of metaphysical 
necessity collapses into the textbook use of nomological necessity (since it requires 
laws of nature, namely laws of physics to be fixed) it still seems to be correct to say 
that the supervenience base in question metaphysically  necessitates what  supervenes
—correct in the sense that laws not in the supervenience base need not be fixed for 
this kind of necessitation to take place.
 
So what really happens when one evaluates supervenience claims like the one that 
physicalism is committed to is the following. First, one runs into prima facie non-
physical properties and their governing laws. Then one considers whether prima 
facie non-physical properties supervene on physical properties and laws. This 
question ultimately  comes down to whether the laws governing prima facie non-
physical properties—i.e. LTO-s in the case of emergent properties—are determined 
by physical laws and property distributions. If they  are, then they need not be fixed 
in addition to fixing the supervenience base of physical laws and properties, and 
physicalism turns out to be true. If, however, they  are not, then fixing the 
supervenience base (physical properties and laws) is not sufficient on its own; the 
extra step  of fixing additional laws of nature (the laws governing the prima facie non 
physical properties) is also necessary. In this latter case, physicalism turns out to be 
false.53
 
The moral is this: take a prima-facie non-physical phenomenon and consider whether 
it occurs in a possible world where the base-set (including physical laws and 
property  distributions) is present without the necessary step of putting the governing 
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53 Note that when considering the status of the governing laws of prima facie non-physical properties 
one can rely neither on the textbook understanding of nomological necessity—since as it is generally 
conceived there are no lawful connections between laws—nor on the textbook understanding of 
metaphysical necessity—since the necessitation does not hold regardless of laws of nature (what is at 
issue is exactly the status of certain laws relative to others).
laws of this prima facie non-physical phenomenon into the possible world as ‘extra’ 
or ‘additional’ laws—that is, consider whether the governing laws of the 
phenomenon in question are determined by  the base set. Physicalists say  that  these 
governing laws are determined by  physical laws and property distributions: once 
physical laws and property distributions are fixed, all the laws of nature are fixed. 
Emergentists, on the contrary, say that there are special properties whose governing 
laws are not determined by the base set.
1.6.2 Hempel’s dilemma and the via negativa
Now note that if it is true that emergent properties are nomologically necessitated—
via emergent laws—by a supervenience base consisting of physical properties and 
physical laws, then it  is also true that emergent properties are metaphysically 
necessitated by a supervenience base consisting of physical properties, physical laws, 
plus emergent laws. That is, if beyond physical properties and physical laws one also 
includes emergent laws into one’s supervenience base, then the above way of 
distinguishing physicalism from emergentism doesn’t work anymore. If physicalism 
is committed to the view that prima facie non-physical properties are metaphysically 
determined by a base set containing physical properties and physical laws, whereas 
emergentism is committed to the view that prima facie non-physical properties are 
metaphysically  determined by a base set containing physical properties, physical 
laws, plus emergent laws, then it  seems that the crucial difference between 
physicalism and emergentism is not the modal strength of the determination relation 
they endorse, but instead what they allow into the base set.54
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54  This line of thought stresses the point that emergent laws are just as fundamental as fundamental 
physical laws are. Both trans-ordinal laws and laws of emergent causation are independent of the 
physical realm—they are not necessitated metaphysically by the physical.  The metaphysical 
independence of emergent laws might warrant why they should be included in the base set. As some 
could possibly argue, there is no difference between a fundamental physical law and an emergent law. 
Both are independent from any other set of laws and property distributions. To this effect, emergent 
laws are indistinguishable from fundamental physical laws. So if the base set should include all those 
properties and laws which are fundamental (that is, not determined by any sub-set of the base set) then 
it definitely should include emergent laws.
If, however, emergent laws were admitted into the base set, then the emergentist 
would agree with the physicalist that all prima facie non-physical properties are 
metaphysically  determined by the base set. In this case, the only way to characterise 
the difference between physicalism and emergentism would be to define what to 
admit into the supervenience base. To put it in another way, what this line of thought 
asks is the following. Why do we refer, on the one hand, to certain fundamental laws 
as physical and include them in the supervenience base whereas, on the other hand, 
other similarly fundamental laws are dubbed emergent and additional and get 
excluded from the base?
The problem of how to describe what the term ‘physical’ amounts to in the definition 
of physicalism is called Hempel’s Dilemma (cf. Hempel, 1969). Usually it  is 
understood as a problem concerning properties—what types of properties should one 
rely  on as constituents of one’s supervenience base when formulating the doctrine of 
physicalism. However, the above line of thought shows that one should also consider 
laws, not just properties. 
The most vivid exposition of Hempel’s dilemma has probably been given by Crane 
and Mellor (1990) who argue that one cannot formulate what counts as ‘physical’ 
without making the term either obviously  false or trivially true. In our present 
context, Hempel’s dilemma is the problem of what  one should include in the 
supervenience base of physicalism.55 The first  horn of the dilemma shows that if one 
defines the content of the supervenience base of physicalism on the grounds of 
current physics, then physicalism most certainly will turn out to be false, since it is 
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55 Originally, Crane and Mellor concentrated on the causal closure of the physical, the crucial premise 
of the causal argument for physicalism. In that context Hempel’s dilemma reads as follows. On the 
one hand, if ‘physical’ is explicated in terms of the entities current physics recognises,  then the causal 
completeness of the physical is very unlikely to be true, since it is highly probable that future physics 
will identify new categories of physical causes. On the other hand, if ‘physical’ is the subject matter of 
a yet unknown future-physics, then either we are in no position to assess its closure, since we do not 
yet know what it is,  or it makes the causal closure thesis trivial by presupposing the closure of the 
future-physics in question (cf. Crane & Mellor, 1990).
very likely that  in the future—in the light of new scientific discoveries—physicist 
will revise the properties and laws currently posited by physics.56
The second horn of the dilemma warns us that relying on future completed physics 
won’t help either. According to one formulation of this worry, a future completed 
physics will extend in such an extent that it will incorporate all properties. This 
future state of physics would then yield a quite literal sense of physicalism: there 
would be nothing over and above the physical, since everything would be included in 
the supervenience base (cf. Ney, 2008).57  Admitting everything into the 
supervenience base naturally  trivialises physicalism. It is more important from our 
present perspective what happens if one extends the supervenience base in a more 
economical fashion, i.e. if one admits only those properties and laws which are 
necessary  for metaphysically  determining all other phenomena. In this regard, only 
those properties and laws can get into the supervenience base, which are 
metaphysically  independent of everything else already in the supervenience base and 
are necessary for metaphysically determining those phenomena which could not be 
so determined by the supervenience base prior to this extension. Nonetheless, this 
would still render physicalism trivially  true: if physicalism is the view that all facts 
are metaphysically necessitated by a certain supervenience base, then defining what 
to admit into the supervenience base in a way that ensures that everything is 
metaphysically necessitated by the base makes the whole point circular. 
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56 There are a few philosophers who nevertheless think that physicalism can rely on current physics. 
For example, Andrew Melnyk (1997) explicitly endorses this view. Moreover, it is possible to give a 
similar reading to Papineau (2000) as well. Papineau argues that there is a historic case for the causal 
closure in the sense that scientific discoveries of the past centuries has already shown us that the 
physical realm is causally closed. It seems to suggest that for Papineau current physics is causally 
closed.  Since the causal closure of the physical is the crucial premise of the causal argument for 
physicalism, it follows that physicalism seems to be true even if one relies on current physics.
57 There is another way of developing the second horn of the dilemma: if one tries to capture the idea 
of physicalism via relying on completed future physics, then it will become unclear what physicalism 
amounts to. After all, we just simply do not know what completed future physics will endorse.
The most popular way of overcoming Hempel’s dilemma in contemporary  literature 
is following a so-called via negativa58  strategy, i.e. providing a ‘complementary 
definition’ by—instead of determining what is in the base set—determining what is 
not (cf. Spurrett & Papineau, 1999; Gillett & Witmer, 2001; Montero, 2001; Montero 
& Papineau, 2005; Worley, 2006). Typically, the via negativa strategy captures the 
physical as the non-mental. This move is motivated by an intuition stemming from 
the traditional antagonism between materialism and classical Cartesian dualism. 
Physicalism, which in this context is considered as the heir of materialism, should 
adhere to the thesis that  mentality is not a fundamental (i.e. metaphysically 
independent) feature of the world. In this spirit, no matter to what extent future 
physics will extend the physical realm, it should not incorporate anything mental. 
That is, physicalism remains true as long as its supervenience base (metaphysically 
necessitating everything else) is free from mental properties and laws. This leaves us 
with the following definition: all facts are metaphysically necessitated by a 
supervenience base determined by  ideal future physics, and containing nothing 
mental (cf. Wilson, 2006).
1.6.3 Conflicting intuitions
Mental phenomena, however, are not the only candidates for featuring in the via 
negativa strategy. David Papineau (2002), for example, argues in length that 
biological phenomena must also be excluded from the supervenience base of 
physicalism. Accordingly, for Papineau the physical is what is identifiable non-
mentally and non-biologically, i.e. as inanimate (cf. Papineau, 2002, pp. 40-43). 
Beyond mental and biological phenomena other candidates for being excluded from 
the supervenience base in the definition of physicalism are chemical, social, ethical, 
aesthetic, etc. phenomena. Excluding only the mental is worrisome since 
fundamental chemical, biological, social, etc. phenomena are just as demolishing 
with regard to physicalism as fundamental mentality is: if fundamental chemical, 
biological, social, etc. properties and laws were needed for accounting for all the 
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58 This term has most probably been coined by Gillett and Witmer (2001).
facts (in a metaphysical sense), then that would just as much falsify physicalism, as if 
fundamental mentality was needed. In other words, excluding only the mental from 
the supervenience base is too arbitrary, and does not cover the original connotations 
of physicalism.
Such a worry might be motivated by another intuition capturing the tension we could 
already observe in the previous sections: physicalism is incompatible with 
ontological emergentism. Applying the via negativa strategy  in this context amounts 
to determining the supervenience base of physicalism as ‘non-emergent’: if one is 
persuaded by the intuition that physicalism is incompatible with ontological 
emergence, then one cannot admit anything into the supervenience base of 
physicalism, which is claimed to be ontologically emergent.
The worry that excluding only  the mental from the supervenience base is an arbitrary 
move draws attention to the fact that following the ‘physicalism is not Cartesian 
dualism’ intuition is in tension with the ‘physicalism is not ontological emergentism’ 
intuition, since holding that physicalism and ontological emergentism are 
incompatible is a stronger commitment than holding that physicalism and Cartesian 
dualism are incompatible. Imagine, for example, that certain chemical phenomenon 
turned out to be ontologically emergent. In this case, for those who are guided by the 
‘physicalism is not  ontological emergentism’ intuition, physicalism would be 
falsified, since they  would feel inclined to exclude the chemical from the 
supervenience base, which in turn would not metaphysically  necessitate all the facts. 
Contrary  to this, those who prefer only the ‘no fundamental mentality’ clause, and 
thereby happily admit fundamental chemical properties or laws into the 
supervenience base would see this only  as a necessary extension of the base (in order 
to ensure that it metaphysically necessitates all the facts), and thus would still feel 
that physicalism is safe and sound.
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Interestingly, Jessica Wilson, though shares the intuition that ontological 
emergentism is incompatible with physicalism (Wilson, 2005), nevertheless thinks 
that relying on the ‘no fundamental mentality’ clause suffices (Wilson, 2006). Wilson 
argues that one does not need to be bothered with candidates other than the mental 
since either excluding the mental readily excludes them as well, or they have already 
been proved to be ontologically dependent on the physical. On the one hand, 
mentality is a precondition for the existence of social, ethical, aesthetic (etc.) 
phenomena. It is very plausible, Wilson claims, that social processes, moral agency, 
aesthetic response are all, at least to some degree, constituted by mentality  (cf. 
Wilson, 2006, p. 76). On the other hand, as the advances of the last century  testify, 
chemical and biological phenomena can be metaphysically  necessitated by physical 
entities. As Wilson puts it: “chemical and biological features of reality can, in actual 
fact, be ontologically accounted for in terms of configurations of relatively 
fundamental entities that are not themselves chemical or biological” (Wilson, 2006, 
p. 75).
 
That is, Wilson argues that even if we are committed to the intuition contrasting 
physicalism with ontological emergentism we have no reason to worry about other 
than the mental. Excluding the mental from the supervenience base of physicalism 
will automatically exclude the social, ethical and aesthetic, whereas, in line with 
current science, it seems to be a safe bet to say that there are no ontologically 
emergent chemical and biological phenomena.
 
Note, however, that  something must have gone astray here, with regard to the latter 
case. The issue at hand is not what current science seems to suggest, but rather what 
we need to pre-cautiously exclude from the supervenience base in order to preserve 
the intuitive message of physicalism no matter what future science will discover. The 
very idea behind the via negaitva strategy is that  determining which natural 
phenomena are such that  their fundamentality  would intuitively falsify physicalism, 
and defining the physical accordingly, gives us a tool to block the worry that not yet 
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known future physics could unacceptably  extend the range of the physical, and hence 
render the doctrine of physicalism trivially true. 
 
It very well might be the case (even if at the moment it seems improbable), that at 
some point future science will discover certain biological or chemical processes and 
claim that they are fundamental—that they cannot be ontologically accounted for in 
terms of, and are metaphysically  independent from the non-biological or the non-
chemical. This possible future development of science would intuitively  falsify 
physicalism. Excluding fundamental chemical and biological properties and laws 
from the supervenience base encodes this intuition into the definition of physicalism.  
 
Note that this worry is not entirely groundless even from the perspective of present 
day science. For example, the question whether there are emergent biological 
phenomena is still debated. Even if the vast majority of the physicalism literature 
agrees that emergence within biology (if any) is only epistemological, some still find 
it possible that there are genuinely  (i.e. ontologically) emergent biological 
phenomena (cf. eg. Boogerd, et al., 2005; Kauffman & Clayton, 2006). Similarly, 
some still think that the arguments which are supposed to show that the chemical can 
be ontologically accounted for in terms of the physical are inconclusive (cf. eg. 
Scerri, 2007). Moreover, some argue that there is ontological emergence even within 
physics. E.g. Silberstein and McGeever (1999), Laughlin and Pines (2000), 
Batterman (2002), and Papineau (2008) all hold the view that there are (or at least 
might be) ontologically emergent macro-physical phenomena.59
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59 The latter is an interesting issue. Ontologically emergent macro-physical phenomena would clearly 
falsify microphysicalism—the view that all the facts are metaphysically necessitated by the properties 
and laws of the mereologically most fundamental entities (cf. Pettit, 1993, 1994; Papineau, 2008; Tye, 
2009). However, it would be entirely compatible with versions of physicalism which are not 
committed to the intuition that the domain of the ‘physical’ in the definition of physicalism should be 
limited to the properties and laws of the mereologically most fundamental entities. See Papineau 
(2008) for a detailed discussion.
The moral is that  Wilson is too quick when she takes it for granted that emergentism 
about the chemical or the biological has already been proved wrong. Moreover, and 
more importantly, she seems to miss the whole point behind the via negativa strategy.
1.6.4 The ultimate via negativa: physicalism relativised
Recall that ontological emergentism formulated as a general thesis tells us that there 
are certain special (emergent) properties which are necessitated nomologically  but 
not metaphysically by  the physical. This formulation, however, suffers from the very 
same problem the general formulation of physicalism struggles with: it  needs to 
determine what the ‘physical’ is. 
 
The via negaitva strategy provides an easy  answer here: a particular property is 
ontologically emergent if it is necessitated nomologically but not metaphysically by a 
supervenience base including neither the particular property in question nor its 
governing laws. In fact, proponents of emergentism are always emergentists about a 
particular phenomenon.60  One might be an emergentist about certain biological 
phenomena, certain chemical phenomena, certain physical phenomena, etc. Note that 
these are quite different varieties of emergentism. Emergentism about the chemical, 
for example, claims that there are certain chemical properties which emerge out of a 
base set  containing nothing chemical. Emergentism about  the biological, on the other 
hand, claims that certain biological properties emerge out of a base set  which might 
contain something chemical but definitely  nothing biological. Even if Wilson is 
probably  right that excluding the mental from the supervenience base will exclude 
everything social, ethical, aesthetic, the opposite is certainly  not true: a 
supervenience base including the mental must not automatically  include everything 
social, ethical or aesthetic. Therefore emergentism about, say, the social could also be 
a coherent view claiming that  there are social phenomena emerging out of the non-
social (which might very well include individual mental properties and laws).
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60 Cf. Broad and Scerri, who are emergentists about certain chemical processes (Broad, 1925; Scerri, 
2007), or Laughlin and Batterman, who are emergentists about certain physical phenomena (Laughlin 
& Pines, 2000; Batterman, 2002), etc.
 
These different versions of emergentism tell us something about different target 
domains relative to different base domains: the properties and the laws of the 
particular target domain under consideration are emergent relative to the base 
domain, where the only restriction regarding the base is that it should not include the 
properties and laws of the actual target domain. That is, the right way  of thinking 
about emergentism is not as emergentism per se, i.e. as a single, general doctrine, but 
rather as emergentism about something. Emergentism is not an absolute notion but  a 
relative one—relative to the target and relative to the base.
 
Note that all that has been said so far is in line with how the whole issue of 
emergentism, and for that matter, how the whole issue of physicalism arises. First, 
one runs into a phenomenon, which presents itself as a special phenomenon with 
some characteristic properties. On the basis of these characteristic properties one 
categorises it as, for example, a chemical, biological, or mental (etc.) phenomenon. 
This categorisation also means that the particular phenomenon will present itself as a 
prima facie non-physical phenomenon, since its characteristic properties intuitively 
distinguish it from standard physical phenomena.61
 
The question to be answered then is whether these properties and their governing 
laws are metaphysically necessitated by an appropriately  chosen base set. Note that 
including these properties or their governing laws into the base set just begs this 
question. Consider how uninteresting it is to ask if mentality is metaphysically 
necessitated by a supervenience base containing mental properties. Of course it is. 
The interesting question is whether mentality is metaphysically  necessitated by a 
supervenience base not containing anything mental. If the answer is no then dualism 
about the mental will follow. If the answer is no, but there are psychophysical laws 
of the trans-ordinal kind (i.e. if the mental is nomologically necessitated), then 
ontological emergentism about the mind will follow. Finally, if the answer is yes, 
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61  Such characteristic properties and the related non-physical categories might be, for example, 
intentionality for the mental, or agenthood for the biological.
then what one gets might be called physicalism about the mental. That  is, the moral 
above—namely that emergentism (and also dualism and most interestingly from our 
present perspective, even physicalism) is a relative notion is exactly  what is dictated 
by the logic of how the problem at issue arises.
 
Note how the original moral has been generalised. It is not just ontological 
emergentism which is naturally reads as a relative notion. As we have seen it in the 
previous paragraph, dualism and even physicalism can be given a similar, relative 
reading, defining it as a particular claim about a certain target phenomenon and 
relative to a base not containing anything specifically related to that very target.
 
Relative physicalism about a certain phenomenon, thus, is the thesis that a particular 
target phenomenon is metaphysically necessitated by a supervenience base from 
which all characteristic properties and laws of the target phenomenon are excluded.62
 
That is, from this perspective it seems that the ultimate intuition motivating 
physicalism is this: if a phenomenon is characterised by some special, prima facie 
non-physical features then one does not need to posit these characteristic features as 
fundamental for being able to ontologically account for the target phenomenon.63 
 
Relative physicalism, in a certain sense, is significantly  different from the general 
doctrine of physicalism. Nonetheless, it  gets the spirit of physicalism right: the 
metaphysical fabric of nature is tight. Phenomena which are identified via certain 
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62 And also the proto-properties of the phenomenon—cf. e.g. naturalistic dualism (Chalmers, 1996), or 
panpsychism (e.g. T. Nagel, 1979). Of course, the base set might be further restricted. One might be 
interested in the question whether a particular phenomenon can be ontologically accounted for in 
terms of the properties and laws of the mereologically most fundamental entities, which then would 
yield microphysicalism about that particular phenomenon.
63  This claim captures why it seems intuitively attractive to exclude anything mental, chemical, 
biological, social, etc. from the supervenience base of physicalism considered as a general doctrine—
the related characteristic features (e.g. intentionality, chemical behaviour, biological agency, social 
dynamics, etc.) are those which prima facie appear to be non-physical,  i.e. are identified as features 
different from those physical entities typically possess. Cf. Crane (2001a) who tries to overcome the 
second horn of Hempel’s dilemma by claiming that all that physicalism needs is an ontological 
commitment to that kind of entities current physics posits. The prima facie non-physical features in 
question here are typically of a very different kind than those posited by current physics. 
characteristic features and thus present  themselves as prima facie non-physical are 
never fundamental. The metaphysically  necessary  building blocks all belong to the 
same domain—there are no other domains floating around freely, without being 
metaphysically  anchored. That is, all seemingly independent domains of nature are in 
fact metaphysically connected to each other.
In accordance with all this, from now on the version of physicalism, which is going 
to be in the centre of my interest is physicalism about consciousness and relative to a 
base containing nothing conscious. This supervenience base, beyond physical 
properties and laws, also contains chemical and biological phenomena. That is, from 
now on, I shall use the term ‘physical’ as a cover-term for the physical, chemical and 
biological. In fact, certain characteristically  biological processes play  a crucial part in 




and the Epistemic Gap
2.1 Conscious Experience
Imagine that you wake up, open your eyes, and gradually become aware of your 
surroundings. You see the face of your loved one lying on the pillow right next to 
you. You hear her soft breathing, and smell the scent of her hair. These feelings are 
part of how you experience her. In fact, the way the shape of her face, the sound of 
her breathing, and the smell of her hair appear to you, are distinctive characteristics 
of your actual conscious experience.
The problem of consciousness—which is the immediate context  of this doctoral 
thesis—is whether the phenomenon that can be grasped via such characteristic 
features fits into the physical world. Physicalism about consciousness is a thesis 
claiming that it does: conscious experience is metaphysically necessitated by a 
supervenience base excluding everything having these characteristic features.1
Physicalism about consciousness is motivated by a particular version of the causal 
argument for physicalism introduced in §1.2. It  is one of the most fundamental 
observations we have that our conscious experiences are tightly embedded in the 
causal network of the physical world. Physical causes do affect our conscious 
experiences, which in turn are also able to affect the physical world. A hornet’s sting 
(a physical cause) results in sharp pain (a conscious experience) which then affects 
our bodily  movements—we pull our hand away immediately (a physical effect). As 
David Papineau summarises it: “conscious mental occurrences have physical 
effects” (Papineau, 2002, p. 17). This observation, once plugged into the causal 
argument as its first premise, leads (via the ‘causal closure of the physical’ and ‘the 
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1 Or their proto-variants. Cf. Footnote 62 in §1.6.3.
no-overdetermination’ theses) to the conclusion that conscious mental occurrences 
must be identical with physical states.
However, what makes the case of consciousness more like a mystery is that at the 
same time we undoubtably  have a quite strong intuition pulling us towards the 
opposite direction. Shapes as we see them, sounds as we hear them, scents as we 
smell them—i.e. the distinctive characteristics of our experiences, which seem to 
define the very nature of consciousness—are nothing like physical states.2
2.1.1 The phenomenal character of conscious experience
The world we live in is the world of our conscious experiences. Everything we 
perceptually know about the environment around us is given as a conscious 
experience. When I wake up  and see that face, hear that breathing, smell that scent, 
and recognise where I am and who is lying next to me, there is something it is like 
for me to be there, and see, hear and smell all those things. I live in a vivid world of 
feelings.
In his seminal paper, Thomas Nagel (1974) introduced the notion of what-it-is-like-
ness, and argued that what having a conscious experience for a creature amounts to is 
there being something it  is like to be that creature. In other words, a creature is 
conscious (have a conscious experience) if there is something it is like for that being 
(to undergo the experience in question). The world appears in a certain way to those 
creatures which are capable of having conscious experiences—they have a rich inner 
phenomenal life. This inner life is what is often called the phenomenal or the 
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2 Cf. the characteristic features of prima facie non-physical phenomena as discussed in Footnote 61 
and Footnote 63 in §1.6.3.
qualitative character of conscious experience.3 Phenomenal properties, or qualia, are 
the introspectively accessible features of the inner life—the way things appear to 
those having the experiences.4
Note that it is not just the case that phenomenal properties are introspectively 
accessible, but they are accessible only introspectively.5 The phenomenal character of 
an experience is exactly  what it is like for the creature actually experiencing it to 
have that particular experience. No other creatures have access to that very token 
phenomenal quality. That is, the phenomenal character of an experience is a 
subjective character. Even if I react by saying ‘ouch’ and seem to know what it  could 
be like when my friend is telling me about her being stung by  a hornet, this is just 
due to the fact that  I suppose that my friend’s pain is similar to my pain. I do not 
have access to her pain; by saying ‘ouch’ I do not respond to her experience. I am 
simply  empathising with her—thinking of my own pain and projecting it on her.6 It is 
especially obvious if we consider creatures whose perceptual system is different from 
ours. Nagel’s original examples were bats (T. Nagel, 1974). Bats use sonars to 
navigate, which is unlike any  perceptual modality  we humans have access to. This 
fact in itself prevents us from being able to rely  on presumed similarities between our 
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3 Note the difference between creature- and state-consciousness. A creature (i.e.  a whole organism) is 
conscious if there is something it is like to be that creature, i.e. if there is a specific way the world 
appears from the point of view of the creature.  A particular mental state or process is conscious if 
there is something it is like to be in that state, i.e. if the state has qualitative or phenomenal properties. 
Phenomenal properties are sometimes thought of as referring to the overall structure of experience. In 
this sense, the qualitative character of experience, the ‘raw feeling’, is a constituent of the phenomenal 
character—together with the spatial, temporal, and conceptual organisation of experiences (cf. Van 
Gulick, 2011).
4 Since Nagel published his paper, it has become quite a custom to appeal to the what-it-is-like-ness of 
an experience in order to grasp the fundamental characteristic of phenomenal consciousness (cf.  e.g. 
Chalmers, 1996; Crane, 2001a; Papineau, 2002). See, however,  Paul Snowdon (2010) for an argument 
claiming that Nagel’s slogan is, in fact, trivial and absolutely uninformative.
5  I am not committed to any particular account of introspection here.  See Schwitzgebel (2010) for 
more on different approaches to introspection.
6 To be more accurate,  it is non-inferential access to the phenomenal character of an experience that is 
restricted to the actual subject of the experience in question. It is possible to have inferential access to 
one’s pain, for example, via observing one’s pain behaviour. The issue here, however,  is not 
accessibility in this broad (inferential) sense, but rather ownership. A particular experience necessarily 
belongs to the actual subject—it is owned by the subject. Each particular experience must have an 
owner,  and it can be owned only by that very subject actually experiencing it. Cf. e.g. Tye (1995, 
2007).
experiences and theirs. Therefore, we have no idea what it  is like to be a bat. In other 
words, the phenomenal character of conscious experience is inherently tied to a 
particular point of view—the point of view of the subject of the experience. 
Phenomenal consciousness, as it might be put, is the first-person aspect of the mind 
(cf. Chalmers, 1996, p. 16).7
2.1.2 The hard problem
Let’s consider again the case of me waking up  and finding myself in the middle of a 
phenomenal world consisting of shapes, sounds and smells. These experiences help 
me determining where I am and recognising who is next to me. However, I can 
imagine a fancy automaton which would just as well be capable of detecting the light 
rays reflected from the face, the air-waves produced by the breathing, and the 
molecules emitted by  the hair. This automaton, by analysing the signals detected, 
could even determine its location and recognise the person next to it. However, no 
inner life it would have—there would be nothing it would be like for the automaton 
to detect all those signals. This automaton, though could process information just as 
well as we do, would lack the inner life so characteristic of ourselves. It seems that 
information processing and phenomenal consciousness are two distinct phenomena.8
Several authors distinguish between two different kinds of consciousness along these 
lines. David Chalmers, for example, contrasts the phenomenal concept of the mind 
with the psychological concept of the mind (Chalmers, 1996), whereas Ned Block 
argues for a distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness (Block, 
1995). Both of these dichotomies try to capture the distinction between a first-person, 
qualitative, introspectively accessible, and an objective, causal, scientifically 
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7 Note that being aware of the phenomenal qualities of a conscious experience amounts to being aware 
of the qualities of the object the experience represents. That is, these qualities do no appear to be the 
qualities of the experience itself, but rather qualities of the external object (or bodily process). The 
shape of the face,  the sound of the breathing, the smell of the hair one is aware of after waking up all 
appear to be qualities of the face, the breathing and the hair respectively, and not of the corresponding 
experiences themselves. That is, experiences are transparent, or diaphanous (cf. e.g. Tye, 2000, 2007).
8 See Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, and especially §4.3.3, §5.3.2 and §5.3.3 for my own view about the 
relation between information processing and phenomenal consciousness.
expressible aspect of consciousness. On the one hand, Chalmers’ phenomenal 
concept of the mind and Block’s phenomenal consciousness both refer to the 
subjective phenomenal character of conscious experience as introduced in §2.1.1. On 
the other hand, the psychological concept of the mind and access consciousness are 
terms trying to grasp the third-person, information processing aspect.
Chalmers clarifies what he means by the psychological concept in this way:
“This is the concept of mind as the causal or explanatory basis of behavior. A 
sate is mental in this sense if it plays the right sort of causal role in the 
production of behavior, or at least an appropriate role in the explanation of 
behavior. According to the psychological concept, it matters little whether a 
mental state has a conscious quality  or not. What matters is the role it plays in a 
cognitive economy.” (Chalmers, 1996, p. 11)
Block gives the following three conditions of access consciousness, which he takes 
to be together sufficient, but not all (especially the third one) necessary:
“A state is access-conscious if, in virtue of one’s having the state, a 
representation of its content is (1) inferentially  promiscuous [...], that is, poised 
for use as a premise in reasoning, (2) poised for rational control of action, and 
(3) poised for rational control of speech.” (Block, 1995, p. 231)
‘Access consciousness’ and ‘the psychological concept of the mind’ are functional 
notions—what makes a state access conscious or mental in the psychological sense, 
is what the sate does (what functional role it  plays) in the system it  is embedded in. 
Contrary  to this, the phenomenal character of conscious experience seems not to be a 
functional notion.9  To see this, consider again our model case: seeing the face, 
hearing the breathing and smelling the scent of the hair of the loved one lying next to 
us. Seeing, hearing and smelling are all functional notions (standing for processes 
consisting of how external stimuli get  detected, how categorisation and recognition 
happens, etc.). That is, in order to explain these capabilities what one needs to do is 
59
9  Though see, for example,  Dennett (1991) who argues in length that consciousness is a purely 
functional notion.
specifying certain mechanisms which are able to perform the functions in question. 
Once this is done, an explanation of how the information processing goes during 
these activities is given. But why this information processing is accompanied by a 
phenomenal feel—i.e. why it is like something to see, hear and smell—seems to be a 
further question. All these activities could go on ‘in the dark’ without the presence of 
any inner life, just like in the case of the automaton above. That is, explaining all the 
functions leaves out the phenomenal character of consciousness.10
This idea is already present in Nagel’s original text. As he puts it:
“[The what-it-is-like-ness of an experience] is not analyzable in terms of any 
explanatory  system of functional states, or intentional states, since these could 
be ascribed to robots or automata that behaved like people though they 
experienced nothing. It  is not analyzable in terms of the causal role of 
experiences in relation to typical human behavior—for similar reasons.” (T. 
Nagel, 1974, pp. 436-437)
Now the problem is that the way science typically  progresses is by  providing 
functional explanations. The way science helps us understand that, say, water is H2O 
consists in determining the functional role water plays, and then showing how H2O is 
able to fill the very same functional role.11 If, however, the realm of the phenomenal 
character of conscious experience is left intact by functional explanations, then 
standard scientific methodology  seems to be inapt to help us understand how 
phenomenal consciousness is connected to the physical world. This is why Chalmers 
calls the problem of experience the hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 1995). 
As opposed to the so-called easy problems (e.g. explaining discrimination, 
reportability, etc.), in the case of the hard problem we do not even know how to start 
tackling the problem. The so-called easy problems might, of course, be relatively 
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10 For more on functional explanations leaving out the phenomenal aspect of consciousness see §2.2.2. 
See also Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. 
11 To be more precise, science provides many different kinds of explanation, e.g.  causal, teleological, 
reductive, etc. However, it is functional explanation which is in the centre of attention in the debate 
over physicalism about consciousness. See  Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion of this issue. Note, that 
science also provides structural descriptions. The significance of this is introduced in §4.1.2.
hard, but at least we have a grip on the subject matter: we know how to approach the 
question with our standard scientific methodology. Contrary to this, however, we are 
clueless with regard to the hard problem.
2.2 Epistemic Arguments against Physicalism about 
Consciousness
Explaining why  certain physical processes are accompanied by phenomenal qualities 
could very well be a hard problem—this in itself, however, would not be fatal for 
physicalism about consciousness. Nonetheless, some think that accounting for 
phenomenal consciousness is not just a hard but an intractable problem for 
physicalism. They  argue that there are sound arguments showing that physicalism 
about consciousness is in fact false. 
2.2.1 The general strategy
Such arguments usually proceed as follows. First, they establish an epistemic gap 
between the realm of our conscious experiences and the realm of physical processes. 
Second, from the presence the epistemic gap, they infer the existence of an 
ontological gap between physical properties and phenomenal properties. Third, they 
point out that if there is an ontological gap between physical properties and 
phenomenal properties characteristic of conscious experience, then physicalism 
about consciousness is false.
The first step, establishing an epistemic gap, amounts to showing that there is no 
epistemic entailment from physical/scientific knowledge to phenomenal knowledge. 
In other words, there is no epistemic entailment12 from physical truths to phenomenal 
truths. Signs of this so-called epistemic gap has already appeared in the previous 
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12  Cf.: “the most basic sort of epistemic entailment is a priori entailment, or implication. On this 
notion,  P implies Q when the conditional ‘If P then Q’  is a priori—that is, when a subject can know 
that if P is the case, then Q is the case with justification independent of experience” (Chalmers, 2010a, 
p. 109). Chalmers argues that all the different versions of the epistemic argument against physicalism 
(cf. §2.2.2-§2.2.4) can be interpreted as making a case against the claim that physical truths imply 
phenomenal truths. 
section. We have seen that standard scientific methodology  is inapt to help  us 
understand why there is conscious experience accompanying physical processes. No 
matter how detailed our knowledge is in terms of physical properties, we cannot infer 
from this phenomenal truths like what it  is like to undergo a certain conscious 
experience (cf. §2.2.2). Similarly, as we have also seen, even if a creature is capable 
of all the fine details of information processing we perform, we still find it 
conceivable13 that  the creature is only  an automaton, i.e. lacks an inner phenomenal 
life (cf. §2.2.3).
The second step of the general strategy  consists of concluding on the existence of an 
ontological gap on the basis of the presence of an epistemic gap. This is the crucial 
premise of the epistemic arguments—in fact, this is the premise doing all the work in 
the process of reaching the desired conclusion that physicalism is false. Without it, 
pointing out that there is an epistemic gap  between physical and phenomenal 
knowledge would remain a claim purely  about knowledge itself, without any 
metaphysical conclusion. Claiming that there is an ontological gap between physical 
properties and phenomenal properties amounts to arguing for the failure of 
ontological entailment between physical and phenomenal facts. Physical facts fail to 
ontologically entail phenomenal facts if phenomenal properties are not necessitated 
metaphysically 14 by physical properties, e.g. if it is possible for the physical facts to 
hold without the phenomenal facts holding (cf. Chalmers, 2003, 2010a).15
Physicalism about consciousness is the thesis that  conscious experience is 
metaphysically  necessitated by a physical supervenience base, i.e. a base excluding 
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13  The kind of conceivability in question here is ideal negative conceivability: a statement S is 
conceivable in this sense if a reasoner cannot rule out S on the basis of ideal rational reflection. That 
is,  if S is conceivable, then S is epistemically possible. It is the crucial second step of the epistemic 
arguments against physicalism which try to establish a further link between conceivability and 
metaphysical possibility (cf. Chalmers, 2002).
14 Cf. Chapter 1, especially §1.5.
15  The move from an epistemic gap to an ontological gap is motivated by the so-called Entailment 
Thesis.  See §2.3 for a detailed discussion. See Chalmers (2002, 2004, 2010b) for an extensive 
argument (so-called two dimensional argument) supporting the link between conceivability and 
metaphysical possibility.
everything having the characteristic features of conscious experience (cf. §1.6.4). 
Therefore, if there was an ontological gap  between the physical and the phenomenal, 
then physicalism about consciousness would clearly be false: the ontological gap 
between the physical and the phenomenal would prevent the physical supervenience 
base to metaphysically  necessitate conscious experience. This concludes the 
epistemic argument against physicalism about consciousness.
That is, the common structure shared by all the arguments which start from the 
observation that there is an epistemic gap between physical truths and phenomenal 
truths, and reach the conclusion that physicalism about consciousness is false can be 
summarised as follows:
 Epistemic Argument against Physicalism about Consciousness
 (P1) There is an epistemic gap between physical and phenomenal truths.
 (P2) If there is an epistemic gap between physical and phenomenal truths, 
  then there is an ontological gap between physical and phenomenal 
  properties.
 (P3) If there is an ontological gap between physical and phenomenal 
  properties, then physicalism about consciousness is false.
 (C) Physicalism about consciousness is false. (Cf. Chalmers, 2010b, p. 110)
2.2.2 Levine’s explanatory gap
Now that we have seen the general structure of the epistemic arguments against 
physicalism about  consciousness, it is time to discuss the individual arguments in 
detail. First, consider the so-called Explanatory Gap Argument.
This argument starts with an analysis of one of the observations already introduced in 
§2.1.2, namely that explaining all the functions seems to leave out conscious 
experience. Joseph Levine (1983) compares identity statements typically  populating 
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scientific explanations16  like ‘water is H2O’, or ‘heat is mean molecular kinetic 
energy’ with identity  statements concerning consciousness like ‘pain is C-fibres 
firing’. He argues that  whereas scientific identity statements are fully explanatory, 
psycho-physical identities concerning consciousness leave something crucial 
unexplained. The identity  statement ‘heat is mean molecular kinetic energy’ is fully 
explanatory in the sense that:
“our knowledge of chemistry and physics makes intelligible how it is that 
something like the motion of molecules could play the causal role we associate 
with heat. Furthermore, antecedent to our discovery  of the essential nature of 
heat, its causal role [...] exhaust our notion of it. Once we understand how this 
causal role is carried out there is nothing more we need to 
understand.” (Levine, 1983, p. 357)
Of course, as Levine himself acknowledges it too, the claim that  ‘pain is C-fibres 
firing’ can be explanatory  in a very similar sense. One might feel tempted to argue 
from one’s subjective point of view, that one winces and pulls one’s hand away 
because of the pain one feels when one is stung by a hornet. That is, ‘pain’ can be 
associated with a causal role (e.g. producing pain behaviour upon receiving painful 
stimuli). Then, by knowing how C-fibres firings fill this role, i.e. by  knowing the 
mechanism how the hornet’s sting activates C-fibres, and how C-fibres stimulation 
causes wincing and other pain behaviour, one becomes able to motivate, to make 
intelligible the ‘pain is C-fibres firing’ claim. In this sense, the statement ‘pain is C-
fibres firing’ is explanatory.
However, it  is not fully explanatory. The concept of pain is only partly of the causal 
role of pain—it is also of what it is like to be stung by a hornet, i.e. of the 
phenomenal character of a painful experience. This is what is left out by claiming 
that pain is C-fibres firing; it does not explain why C-fibres firing filling the 
functional role above should feel the way it does. As Levine puts it:
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16 Cf. §1.3.2. See Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion.
“[T]here seems to be nothing about C-fiber firing which makes it naturally  ‘fit’ 
the phenomenal properties of pain, any more than it would fit some other set of 
phenomenal properties. Unlike its functional role, the identification of the 
qualitative side of pain with C-fiber firing (or some property of C-fiber firing) 
leaves the connection between it and what we identify it  with completely 
mysterious. One might say, it  makes the way pain feels into merely  a brute 
fact.”17 (Levine, 1983, p. 357)
Here what Levine relies on is the idea that when one explains a phenomenon by 
describing a causal mechanism then the fact that this mechanism is in operation must 
entail the presence of the phenomenon in question. If such a mechanism is in place 
but the occurrence of the phenomenon does not follow, then relying on the 
mechanism is inapt to explain the phenomenon (cf. Levine, 2001, p. 74). Identity 
statements in standard scientific explanations are explanatory exactly because they 
show how certain mechanisms are able to produce the very effects which are 
characteristic of the explanandum. So, for example, on the one hand, heat in classical 
thermodynamics is energy transferred from regions with higher temperature to 
regions with lower temperatures. On the other hand, molecules with higher mean 
kinetic energy collide more with other molecules in their vicinity  thereby 
accelerating them, and thus transfer their kinetic energy to other regions occupied by 
molecules with lower original mean kinetic energy. ‘Heat is mean molecular kinetic 
energy’ is explanatory because once we understand the mechanism involving 
molecules we immediately see why heat is present.
The same cannot be said of identities concerning conscious experiences. No matter 
how detailed knowledge one has about the mechanisms of C-fibre firings one is still 
unable to see why the presence of feeling pain should follow. It  seems to be equally 
conceivable that when one’s C-fibres are firing one feels joy, or nothing at all. This is 
in stark contrast with the scientific cases: once we understand the properties and 
dynamics of H2O molecules, or the mechanisms of momentum transfer we 
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17 See Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 for more on brute identities.
immediately have a grasp why H2O is water, or why mean molecular kinetic energy 
is heat, as opposed to something else. 
In the standard scientific cases the identifications are made intelligible by a match 
between the causal-functional role of entities at the two sides of the identity. These 
functional roles fully characterise the entities in question. Contrary  to this, conscious 
mental states cannot be fully  characterised by  their functional roles—over and above 
these functional roles there is their phenomenal character, the qualitative feel one 
experiences when undergoing them. This is why  ‘pain is C-fibres firing’ is not fully 
explanatory: though it is explanatory with regard to the functional aspect of the 
concept pain, it is not explanatory with regard to its phenomenal aspect.18
Levine explicitly  argues that from the fact that there is an explanatory gap  no 
metaphysical conclusion follows, and thus the presence of the explanatory gap  is 
compatible with physicalism (Levine, 1983, 1993, 2001). However, David Chalmers 
thinks that with an extra premise expressing a link between epistemic and ontological 
gaps Levine’s explanatory gap can be turned into an argument against physicalism 
about consciousness. This extra premise says that what cannot be physically 
explained is not itself physical (cf. Chalmers, 1996, 2003, 2010b).19  The resulting 
Explanatory  Gap Argument is a version of the epistemic arguments against 
physicalism about consciousness. It proceeds as follows:
Explanatory Gap Argument
(P1)  Physical accounts explain only structure and function.
(P2)  Explaining structure and function does not suffice to explain 
 consciousness.
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18  Roughly, the argument concluding on the ‘heat is mean molecular kinetic energy’  claim proceeds 
via two premises. The first premise is a priori saying that heat is whatever plays the heat role. The 
second premise is a posteriori expressing the observation that mean molecular kinetic energy plays 
the heat role. The identity statement follows from these two premises. Cf. §6.3 for a much more 
detailed discussion of the role identities play in reductive explanation. 
19 Cf. §2.2.1 and especially §2.3.
(P3)  What cannot be physically explained is not itself physical.
(C) Physicalism about consciousness is false. (Cf. Chalmers, 2010b, pp. 
105-106)
As a version of the epistemic argument the Explanatory Gap Argument relies on the 
lack of epistemic entailment. The kind of epistemic entailment in question here is 
explainability, and the epistemic gap is the explanatory gap—the observation that 
phenomenal truths cannot be explained by  citing physical truths. To be more precise, 
the Explanatory Gap  Argument claims that the implication from physical truths to 
phenomenal truths would require a functional analysis of consciousness. Since a 
functional analysis of consciousness cannot be given phenomenal truths are not 
implied by  physical truths. This is established by the first two premises of the 
Explanatory  Gap Argument. The extra third premise connects the epistemic 
conclusion to an ontological conclusion: it infers from the failure of explaining 
consciousness in physical terms to the conclusion that consciousness is not physical. 
From this the claim that physicalism about consciousness is false follows (Chalmers, 
2003).
2.2.3 Chalmers’ conceivability argument
According to Levine, the problem of other minds is one of the major symptoms of 
the fact that  there is an explanatory gap. The problem is that no matter how detailed 
knowledge one might have about the physical processes taking place during one’s 
conscious experience, one is unable to use this knowledge to decide whether other 
creatures are conscious or not. Since knowledge of the physical processes is 
knowledge of structure and function, and explaining structure and function does not 
tell us anything about the phenomenal character of conscious experience, we just 
simply  cannot know whether the same physical processes are always accompanied 
by the same felt quality. Even if we accept it as an unexplained, brute fact that certain 
qualities are felt when particular physical processes take place, it only supports that 
creatures similar to us in their physical structure and functioning share the same 
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phenomenal life we enjoy—it does not help  with regard to creatures sufficiently 
different from us.
The so-called conceivability argument takes this line of thought a step further by 
emphasising that it is not  necessary that when particular physical processes take 
place one always feel the same qualities. Since this connection is unexplained, we 
can always conceive of a situation where the physical processes are present but they 
are accompanied by no felt quality. The automaton above was an elementary 
example for this. The only  requirement there was a similarity  in functioning in a 
broad sense.20 A more sophisticated example is of a total physical duplicate, whose 
physical structure and functioning down to the smallest detail is the same as ours. 
Such creatures (physical duplicates of humans), if they have no phenomenal life at 
all, are called phenomenal zombies.21
In contemporary literature David Chalmers is the main promoter of an argument 
against physicalism about consciousness starting from the premise that zombies are 
conceivable. He characterises zombies as follows:
“So let us consider my zombie twin. This creature is molecule for molecule 
identical to me, and identical in all the low-level properties postulated by a 
completed physics, but he lacks conscious experience entirely. [...] To fix ideas, 
we can imagine that right now I am gazing out the window, experiencing some 
nice green sensations from seeing the trees outside, having pleasant taste 
experiences through munching on a chocolate bar, and feeling a dull aching 
sensation in my right shoulder. What is going on in my zombie twin? He is 
physically identical to me, and we may as well suppose that  he is embedded in 
an identical environment, He will certainly be identical to me functionally: he 
will be processing the same sort of information, reacting in a similar way  to 
inputs, with his internal configurations being modified appropriately  and with 
indistinguishable behavior resulting. He will be psychologically identical to me 
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20 Thus the automaton as it is presented in §2.1.2 is an example of the qualia-based arguments against 
functionalism. Cf. e.g. Block (1980).
21  For early accounts of zombies see Campbell (1970) and Kirk (1974a, 1974b). Campbell talked 
about an ‘imitation man’, a physical duplicate of human beings who has no conscious experience at 
all. Kirk has coined the term ‘zombie’ for such a creature and argued that zombies were 
counterexamples to physicalism.
[...]. He will be perceiving the trees outside, in the functional sense, and tasting 
the chocolate, in the psychological sense. All of this follows logically  from the 
fact that he is physically  identical to me, by virtue of the functional analyses of 
psychological notions. He will even be ‘conscious’ in the functional senses 
described earlier—he will be awake, able to report the contents of his internal 
states, able to focus attention in various places, and so on. It  is just that none of 
this functioning will be accompanied by any real conscious experience. There 
will be no phenomenal feel. There is nothing it  is like to be a 
zombie.” (Chalmers, 1996, p. 95)
The crucial question with regard to phenomenal zombies is not  their natural 
possibility—Chalmers acknowledges that most  probably  there are no phenomenal 
zombies in the actual world, nor are they naturally possible (there are no zombies in 
those worlds which are like our world with respect to all laws of nature). What 
Chalmers is really interested in is whether they are metaphysically possible.22  He 
argues that the best guide to whether phenomenal zombies are metaphysically 
possible is whether their notion is conceptually coherent. Chalmers claims that “if no 
reasonable analysis of the terms in question points toward a contradiction, or even 
makes the existence of a contradiction plausible, then there is a natural assumption in 
favor of logical possibility” (Chalmers, 1996, p. 96). If there was a conceptual 
entailment from physical processes to felt  qualities then the notion of a phenomenal 
zombie would be conceptually incoherent. However, as the explanatory gap  shows, 
there is no such conceptual entailment.
The conceptual coherence of phenomenal zombies might be attacked by claiming 
that those who think that phenomenal zombies are conceivable are, in fact, 
insufficiently  reflective and thus overlook an incoherence (cf. Chalmers, 1996, p. 
99). But the burden of proof in this case is on the opponent claiming that there is an 
incoherence lurking in the description of the situation. Without such proof, Chalmers 
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22  In fact, Chalmers prefers the term ‘logical necessity’ over ‘metaphysical necessity’. By logical 
necessity he means this: “B-properties supervene logically on A-properties if no two logically possible 
situations are identical with respect to their A-properties but distinct with respect to their B-
properties” (Chalmers, 1996, p. 35) However, he acknowledges that his logical necessity is very close 
to metaphysical necessity. As he puts it: “the metaphysically possible worlds are just the logically 
possible worlds [... and the] metaphysical possibility of statements is logical possibility with an a 
posteriori semantic twist” (Chalmers, 1996, p. 38). Here I follow the vast majority of the physicalism 
literature by using the ‘metaphysical’ notion.
argues, we have every right to conclude that the notion of phenomenal zombies is 
conceptually coherent, and that phenomenal zombies are in effect metaphysically 
possible. Since the metaphysical possibility of physical duplicates of humans lacking 
phenomenal consciousness entails that physical facts does not  necessitate 
metaphysically  phenomenal facts, the falsity of physicalism about consciousness 
follows. That is, the conceivability argument has the following structure:
 Conceivability Argument
(P1)  It is conceivable that there are zombies.
(P2)  If it is conceivable that there are zombies, it is metaphysically possible 
 that there are zombies.
(P3)  If it is metaphysically possible that there are zombies, then consciousness 
 is non-physical.
(C) Physicalism about consciousness is false. (Cf. Chalmers, 2010a, pp. 
106-108)
That is, the kind of epistemic entailment in question here is reflective 
conceivability23, and the manifestation of the epistemic gap is the conceivability  of 
the total absence of phenomenal consciousness even if the physical if fully present. 
The Conceivability  Argument claims that the implication from physical truths to 
phenomenal truths would require that one cannot rationally  conceive of all the 
physical truths without phenomenal truths. Since the thought of a phenomenal 
zombie seems conceptually coherent, i.e. one is able to rationally conceive of all 
physical truths without phenomenal truths, phenomenal truths are not implied by 
physical truths. This is established by  the first  premise of the Conceivability 
Argument. The second premise claims that there is a direct link between epistemic 
conclusions and ontological conclusions: it infers from the conceivability of zombies 
to the metaphysical possibility of zombies. The third premise expresses that if 
phenomenal zombies are metaphysically possible then the phenomenal character of 
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23  I.e. considering if philosophical zombies can be ruled out on the basis of ideal rational reflection 
given all the physical truths. Cf. Footnote 13 in §2.2.1.
conscious experience is something over-and-above the physical. From this the claim 
that physicalism about consciousness is false follows.
2.2.4 Jackson’s knowledge argument
The third influential argument against physicalism about consciousness is Frank 
Jackson’s Knowledge Arguments (Jackson, 1982, 1986). Its basis is a thought 
experiment about Mary, a future scientist with a little deficit in experiences. As 
Jackson describes:
“Mary is confined to a black-and-white room, is educated through black-and-
white books and through lectures relayed on black-and white television. In this 
way she learns everything there is to know about the physical nature of the 
world. She knows all the physical facts about us and our environment, in a 
wide sense of ‘physical’ which includes everything in completed physics, 
chemistry, and neurophysiology, and all there is to know about the causal and 
relational facts consequent upon all this, including of course functional roles. If 
physicalism is true, she knows all there is to know. For to suppose otherwise is 
to suppose that there is more to know than every physical fact, and that is what 
physicalism denies. Physicalism is not the noncontroversial thesis that the 
actual world is largely  physical, but the challenging thesis that it  is entirely 
physical. This is why physicalists must hold that complete physical knowledge 
is complete knowledge simpliciter. […] It seems, however, that Mary does not 
know all there is to know. For when she is let  out of the black-and-white room 
or given a color television, she will learn what it  is like to see something red, 
say. […] Hence, physicalism is false. This is the Knowledge Argument against 
physicalism in one of its manifestations.” (Jackson, 1986, p. 291).
That is, Mary is a future scientist, who knows everything about the physical 
processes of colour vision. She has a complete knowledge in physical terms about 
what goes on in human brains when we see colours. However, apart from all this, 
Mary has never ever experienced colours. She grew up in a black-and-white room. 
She acquired all her knowledge via black-and-white books and black-and-white 
televisions. Then one day Mary is let out  of her room and sees a ripe tomato. This is 
the first time she becomes acquainted with the experience of seeing something red. 
At this point the question is if the knowledge she acquires in this situation is a new 
piece of knowledge, or something she already knew from her previous studies.
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Jackson claims that Mary does learn something new, something she did not already 
know: she learns what it is like to have a reddish experience. If so, argues Jackson, 
then physicalism is false, since before she came out of her room, Mary already knew 
all the physical facts about seeing something red, and such a complete physical 
knowledge should have entailed all the facts about seeing something red.  
For Mary, who had a complete physical knowledge about red experiences, learning 
something new means that she learns something over and above the physical facts, 
i.e. that she learns about a further property of red experiences. This further property 
is the property  of what the experience of seeing something red is like. It is a 
phenomenal property—a property  not entailed by the full description of the physical 
facts and not identical with any physical-functional property.
The knowledge argument relies on two premises. The first one tells us that Mary has 
complete physical knowledge (about what happens when someone sees something 
red) before she leaves her black-and-white room; i.e. that she knows all the physical 
facts—everything physical there is to know—about having reddish experiences. The 
second premise tells us that Mary  learns something new after her release, i.e. that she 
acquires some kind of new knowledge concerning facts about seeing something red
—information she did not know before she left her room. From these two premises, 
the knowledge argument concludes that there are phenomenal (non-physical) facts 
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about seeing something red, and thus physicalism must be rejected.24 To put it more 
formally:
Knowledge Argument
(P1)  Mary knows all the physical facts.
(P2)  There are truths about consciousness that are not deducible from
 physical truths.
(P3)  If there are truths about consciousness that are not deducible from 
 physical truths, then there are non-physical facts.
(C) Physicalism about consciousness is false. (Cf. Chalmers, 2010a, pp. 
108-109)
That is, the kind of epistemic entailment in question here is deducibility, and the 
epistemic gap  appears as presented by the observation that  phenomenal truths cannot 
be deduced from physical truths. The Knowledge Argument claims that the 
73
24 It might be worth noting that in the original version of the thought-experiment (Jackson, 1982) the 
knowledge argument is formulated using the notion of ’information’. The original argument runs as 
follows. P1: Mary has all the physical information about seeing something red without ever having 
seen red. P2: When she sees red for the first time Mary comes to know some information about seeing 
something red she did not know before. C: There is non-physical information about seeing something 
red; i.e. not all information is physical information. Cf. Nida-Rümelin (2010).
Horgan points out that this original version allows two interpretations. According to the weaker one 
‘having all the physical information’ translates onto ‘having complete physical knowledge’, and 
according to the stronger one, onto ‘knowing all the physical facts’ (Horgan, 1984).
The weaker version can be put in the following way: (WeakP1) Mary has complete physical 
knowledge about seeing something red without ever having seen red. (WeakP2) When she sees red for 
the first time Mary comes to acquire some kind of knowledge concerning facts about seeing 
something red—something she did not know before. (WeakC) There is some kind of non-physical 
knowledge concerning facts about seeing something red; i.e. not all knowledge is physical knowledge. 
Note that this weaker conclusion is compatible with physicalism. Cf. §3.1.
By contrast, the stronger version runs as follows: (StrongP1) Mary knows all the physical facts about 
seeing something red without ever having seen red. (StrongP2) When she sees red for the first time 
Mary comes to know some facts about seeing something red she did not know before. (StrongC) 
There are non-physical facts about seeing something red; i.e.  not all facts are physical facts.  Cf. Nida-
Rümelin (2010).
The main difference between the weaker and the stronger version is that whereas the weaker one has 
an epistemological conclusion (i.e. not all knowledge is physical knowledge) the stronger version 
concludes to an ontological claim (i.e. not all facts are physical facts). Although Jackson’s original 
account (Jackson, 1982) implies both versions, from his later discussions (Jackson, 1986, 1998) it 
turns out that it is the stronger version what he has in mind.
implication from physical truths to phenomenal truths would require the deducibility 
of phenomenal truths from physical truths. Since it is shown that a perfect reasoner 
who knows all the physical truths is unable to deduce phenomenal truths from 
physical truths, phenomenal truths are not implied by  physical truths. This is 
established by  the first two premises of the Knowledge Argument. Again, the third 
premise connects the epistemic and ontological domains: it infers from the failure of 
deducing truths about consciousness from physical truths to the conclusion that there 
are non-physical facts (phenomenal properties instantiated by  certain particulars). 
From this the claim that physicalism about consciousness is false follows.
2.3 The Entailment Thesis and A Priori Physicalism
In the previous sections we have seen the major versions of the epistemic argument 
against physicalism. In this final section of Chapter 2, I would like to concentrate on 
the main motivation behind these arguments. 
One way  of illustrating the very  idea behind the supervenience-based formulation of 
physicalism25  is this: two possible worlds cannot differ in their prima facie non-
physical properties or laws without there being a difference in their physical 
properties or laws. To put it a bit  more formally, physicalism is true at a possible 
world w if and only if any world which is a minimal physical duplicate of w is a 
duplicate of w simpliciter (cf. Jackson, 1994, p. 27). 
Here a physical duplicate of w duplicates all the physical facts as well as all the 
physical laws (cf. §1.6.1). The ‘minimal’ clause is required to evade the problem of 
‘epiphenomenal ectoplasm’, i.e. the case where there is a non-physical property 
which has no causal connections to anything else. Without this extra clause, 
physicalism would rule out such a world (cf. Horgan (1983) and Lewis (1983b)). 
Jackson’s proposal solves the problem by restricting the definition to minimal 
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25  Saying, according to its initial formulation,  that all prima facie non-physical facts metaphysically 
supervene on physical facts. Cf. §1.3, but also §1.6.4 for a ‘relativised’ formulation.
physical duplicates, i.e. to duplicate worlds which are identical with w in all physical 
respects but do not contain anything else.26
Physicalism, this formulation says, is true in the actual world, if copying everything 
physical from the actual world (and initially including nothing else in the copy-
world) results in a copy-world, which is identical with the actual world in all respect. 
That is, from physicalism it  follows that the physical facts (and laws) entail all the 
facts (and laws). Frank Jackson calls this consequence of physicalism the Entailment 
Thesis: if ΣP is the full physical description of a world w (describing all the physical 
facts and laws of w, and just them) and Q is an arbitrary  (but true) fact of w, then, 
necessarily, if ΣP then Q (cf. Jackson, 1994).27 In other words, if physicalism is true, 
then the material conditional ‘if ΣP then Q’ is a necessary truth. 
Now given that this material condition is necessary, the question arises whether it is 
a priori. Can the material condition ‘if ΣP then Q’ be known a priori, or only just a 
posteriori? That is, does the full physical description of the world a priori entail such 
facts as, for example, the chemical fact that ‘water boils at 212 °F at sea level’, or the 
geographical fact that ‘water covers 60% of planet Earth’, or the phenomenal fact 
that ‘this is what it is like to taste water’?
Proponents of the epistemic arguments against physicalism answer with a definite 
yes. They  argue that the correct  understanding of the entailment from all the physical 
facts to any arbitrary fact is a priori. That is, they  argue that  the correct 
understanding of physicalism is a priori physicalism, and the correct understanding 
of the Entailment Thesis is the A Priori Entailment Thesis: the physical facts a priori 
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26  There are other problems with the correct formulation of physicalism which are well beyond the 
scope of this section. See e.g. Kim (1993a) for the ‘lone ammonium molecule’ problem, Jackson 
(1998) for the ‘necessary beings’ problem, and Hawthorne (2002) for the ‘blockers’ problem.
27 Cf. 6.3.1,  especially Footnote 18 there.  David Chalmers argues that the correct formulation of the 
Entailment Thesis interprets Q as an arbitrary positive fact. As Chalmers puts it: “Negative existential 
facts such as ‘There are no angels‘ are not strictly logically supervenient on the physical, but their 
nonsupervenience is quite compatible with materialism.” (Chalmers, 1996, p.  41) This can be fixed 
either by restricting Q to positive facts or by adding an extra second order ‘that’s all’  fact to the 
supervenience base of physicalism (cf. Chalmers, 1996, p. 41).
entail all the facts. In other words, the material condition that ‘if ΣP then, e.g. water 
covers 60% of planet Earth’ is a priori knowable. Once one knows all the physical 
facts about the world one is able to deduce any arbitrary fact about the world solely 
by means of a priori reasoning, without leaving the armchair.28 
Given all this, it is now clear why establishing an epistemic gap between physical 
facts and phenomenal facts is so important for the arguments introduced in this 
chapter. For establishing an epistemic gap amounts to showing that there is no 
epistemic entailment from physical knowledge to phenomenal knowledge, i.e. that 
even if one knows all the physical facts one is still unable to deduce phenomenal 
facts by  means of a priori reasoning alone. Now if physicalism entails the A Priori 
Entailment Thesis then the mere observation that phenomenal facts are not a priori 
entailed by the physical facts falsifies physicalism.29
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28  See Chapter 6 for an extensive discussion of the role this so-called ‘a priori passage’ view (cf. 
Jackson, 2003) plays in reductive explanations.
29 Or to be more precise, physicalism about consciousness. Cf. §1.6.4.
Chapter 3: 
Phenomenal Concept Strategy
3.1 Introducing Phenomenal Concepts
Recall Jackson’s Knowledge Argument. It starts with the claim that pre-release Mary 
knows everything there is to know about colour vision that can be learned in a black-
and-white room (i.e. knows all the physical facts). Then it proceeds with the claim 
that post-release Mary learns something new, she learns a new fact she had not 
previously  known (namely what it is like to see something red). From these two 
premises the Knowledge Arguments concludes that physicalism is false.1
If one wants to resist the conclusion of such an argument one can follow two 
strategies: either deny the soundness of the argument by claiming that one or both of 
the premises are false, or deny the validity of the argument by  claiming that the 
conclusion does not  really follow from the premises. Physicalists defending 
physicalism against the Knowledge Argument have tried all of these possibilities.2 In 
this chapter I shall focus on the latest attempt to block the Knowledge Argument. 
This attempt is called Phenomenal Concept Strategy3, and it is widely considered as 
a general strategy  defending physicalism against all versions of the epistemic 
argument. In what follows, first I shall introduce the main idea behind the strategy 
itself in the context  of the Knowledge Argument, and then focus on how phenomenal 
concepts—the key ingredients of the strategy—might be best understood.
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1 Cf. §2.2.4, and especially Footnote 24 there. 
2 For example, Churchland (1985) and Harman (1990) challenge the first premise by denying that pre-
release Mary knows all the physical facts. Dennett (1991) challenges the second premise by denying 
that post-release Mary learns anything new. Lewis (1983a, 1990) and Nemirow (1980, 1990) follow 
the second route, and challenge the validity of the argument by claiming that the Knowledge 
Argument equivocates on the term ‘knowledge’: whereas pre-release Mary knows everything in terms 
of propositional knowledge (knowing that),  post-release Mary learns something new in terms of 
abilities (knowing how).
3 This term has been coined by Stoljar (2005).
3.1.1 There is something about Mary
Instead of the original Knowledge Argument, consider the following, slightly 
modified thought experiment. Suppose that Mary is not immediately released out 
into the ‘wild’ where she can freely encounter with all different kinds of coloured 
objects, but first is shown a piece of paper with a patch of red on it (cf. Nida-
Rümelin, 1996). Now with this clever move, the experimenters can avoid cases 
where post-release Mary is able to infer the colour she is actually seeing on the basis 
of her shape recognition capabilities (‘that is a London-bus’) and her previous 
knowledge (‘London-buses are red’). There is no way for Mary to infer the colour of 
the patch on the paper in a similar way. That is, Mary, in this new version of the 
thought experiment, is unable to refer to her colour experience with an old concept 
she acquired previously back in her room. However, she is nevertheless able to form 
propositions like “I will have this experience again before the day  is out” (Papineau, 
2002, p. 62). Propositions like this have truth-values and thus, by formulating such 
propositions, Mary, in fact, expresses propositional knowledge.
Note two things. First, since Mary in the scenario above is not able to use her old 
colour concept she acquired in her room to refer to her actual experience she is 
deploying new concepts, new vehicles of thought to think about her actual 
experience. The term ‘this experience’ above is such a new vehicle of thought, a so-
called phenomenal concept, which picks out Mary’s actual experience. Second, by 
acquiring these new phenomenal concepts and utilising them, Mary becomes able to 
form novel proposition. That is, Mary gains new propositional knowledge.
In other words, post-release Mary  does learn something new: a novel way of 
thinking. However, even if this is more than just a mere ability  since it results in new 
propositional knowledge,4 it  does not necessarily  mean that  Mary learns something 
about a new fact. On the contrary, physicalists retort: she learns a new way of 
thinking about an old fact—a fact she has already  learned inside her room in terms of 
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4  Cf. the so-called Ability Hypothesis of Lewis (1983a, 1990) and Nemirow (1980, 1990) claiming 
that all that Mary learns are new routes to her old physical-functional concepts. See Footnote 2 above.
physical-functional concepts (e.g. terms like ‘neural activation’ etc.). That is, this line 
of thought argues, the Knowledge Argument is right in claiming that post-release 
Mary gains new propositional knowledge, however, it is wrong in moving from this 
claim to the further claim that this new propositional knowledge is knowledge of a 
new fact.5
3.1.2 Phenomenal Concept Strategy
Acknowledging that there are phenomenal concepts—special vehicles of thought 
with the aid of which one can think about one’s own experiences in a way, which is 
distinct from thinking about these experiences in terms of physical-functional 
concepts—opens up  the possibility of blocking the Knowledge Argument in its anti-
physicalist form. Moreover, the same strategy is useful to block all versions of the 
epistemic argument against physicalism.
As we have seen, the epistemic argument against physicalism relies on an a priori 
interpretation of the Entailment Thesis: physical truths should a priori entail all the 
truths (cf. §2.3). The Explanatory Gap  Argument, the Conceivability Argument, and 
the Knowledge Argument all start with establishing an epistemic gap between 
physical and phenomenal knowledge. Since according to the A Priori Entailment 
Thesis, the entailment from physical truths to phenomenal truths should be a priori 
knowable, the existence of such an epistemic gap straightforwardly leads to the 
denial of physicalism.
With phenomenal concepts in hand, however, it becomes possible to block this line 
of thought. Proponents of Phenomenal Concept Strategy argue that the existence of 
the general epistemic gap is due to a conceptual gap between phenomenal and 
physical-functional concepts. All that the first premises of the different versions of 
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5 Cf. Footnote 24 of §2.2.4—this line of thought accepts the weak and rejects the strong interpretation 
of the Knowledge Argument.
the epistemic argument really  show is just that there is this conceptual gap, i.e. that 
phenomenal concepts are conceptually irreducible to physical-functional concepts. 
Physical-functional concepts are the concepts featuring in scientific terminology—
they  are objective, and pick out their referents from a third-person perspective, 
independently of one’s own experiences. They typically refer by causal, functional, 
or structural descriptions. All the knowledge Mary could acquire in her black-and-
white room were conveyed by such physical-functional concepts. Contrary to this, 
phenomenal concepts are accessible only via experiences. As we have seen, they  are 
the vehicles of thought when one thinks about one’s own experiences.
The fundamental tenet of Phenomenal Concept Strategy  is the claim that there is a 
conceptual gap  between phenomenal and physical-functional concepts. For this to be 
the case, proponents of the Strategy must characterise phenomenal concepts in a way 
which renders them conceptually  irreducible to physical-functional concepts.6 
Typically they do so by  emphasising that phenomenal concepts refer directly, i.e. 
they  do not refer by descriptions but rather pick out their referents without relying on 
contingent modes of presentations.7 
Pre-release Mary, since she has learned everything she knows via descriptions, could 
not acquire phenomenal concepts about colour experiences. She acquires them upon 
her first  encounter with coloured objects, and thereby she acquires new propositional 
knowledge. Since her phenomenal concepts are conceptually irreducible to physical-
functional concepts, there was no way she could conclude on this new piece of 
propositional knowledge before her release. This is the reason why Mary learns 
something new after her release. However, the new concepts post-release Mary 
acquires need not necessarily  refer to new facts. It very well might be the case (and 
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6 That is, according to Phenomenal Concept Strategy,  phenomenal concepts neither a priori imply nor 
are a priori implied by physical-functional concepts.
7 See more on this later. The rest of this chapter is devoted to understanding the special characteristics 
of phenomenal concepts. 
proponents of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy argue that actually  it is the case) that 
these new concepts refer to facts which has already been picked out by some of 
Mary’s old physical-functional concepts. With this move, phenomenal concept 
strategy is able to block the second premise of the epistemic arguments: there really 
is an epistemic gap between phenomenal and physical knowledge, however, it is due 
to a conceptual gap and thus does not indicate the existence of an ontological gap. 
3.1.3 A posteriori physicalism
Phenomenal Concept Strategy does not provide an argument showing how 
phenomenal and physical-functional concepts co-refer. It only draws attention to that 
there is nothing in the anti-physicalist arguments which would exclude this 
possibility. In this sense, Phenomenal Concept Strategy is a defence of physicalism—
it does not argue for physicalism, but rather shows that the presence of an epistemic 
gap is not necessarily fatal for physicalism. Phenomenal and physical-functional 
concepts, even if they are conceptually irreducible to each other, could nevertheless 
refer to the same property. That is, according to Phenomenal Concept Strategy, 
ontological conclusions do no follow from epistemic considerations concerning 
phenomenal knowledge. 
The version of physicalism Phenomenal Concept Strategy defends is a posteriori 
physicalism. It acknowledges that the Entailment Thesis holds—physical facts entail 
all the facts,—however, denies that the entailment is a priori knowable. The move 
from physical knowledge to phenomenal knowledge is only  a posteriori: one cannot 
infer phenomenal truths from physical knowledge by means of a priori reasoning 
alone, but needs to rely on further experiences. Thereby, the typical examples of how 
phenomenal and physical-functional concepts co-refer are the classical cases of 
Kripkean a posteriori identities, like ‘Cicero is Tully’, or ‘water is H2O’ (Kripke, 
1980).8
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8  See Part III (Chapter 6 and Chapter 7) for an extensive discussion of a priori and a posteriori 
entailment, and the role of identities in reductive explanations in general.
3.2 The Locus Classicus: Brian Loar’s Account
In this and the forthcoming sections my  aim is to clarify how different proponents of 
the Phenomenal Concept Strategy  characterise phenomenal concepts. I start  with 
Brian Loar, who proposed the initial version of Phenomenal Concept Strategy (Loar, 
1990, 1997). Loar’s main motivation was to put  forward an account of phenomenal 
concepts which could explain how phenomenal concepts can pick out  a physical 
property  via a non-contingent mode of presentation, and be conceptually independent 
of all physical-functional concepts. According to his solution, phenomenal concepts 
are direct recognitional concepts.
3.2.1 Recognitional concepts
According to Loar, so-called recognitional concepts “have the form ‘x is one of that 
kind’; they are type-demonstratives. These type-demonstratives are grounded in 
dispositions to classify, by way of perceptual discriminations, certain objects, events, 
situations.” (Loar, 1997, p. 600)
 
So, for example, when an expert chicken sexer decides of a particular chick whether 
it is a male or a female, she employs a recognitional concept. Untrained individuals 
lack the crucial recognitional concepts—to them, male and female day-old chicks 
look similar. By  being able to discriminate male- and female cloacae one becomes 
able to bring certain chicks under one concept (e.g. ‘this one is of the male-type’), 
and other chicks under another concept (e.g. ‘this one is of the female-type’). Note 
that the names ‘male’ and ‘female’ as denoting the two kinds are insignificant here. 
The recognitional concepts one acquires during a chicken-sexer training allows one 
to recognise two sets of the stimuli (cloacae) as two different types regardless 
whether one is informed about the public language names of these types.9
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9  Sure one must have two names to refer to these two types one becomes able to discriminate, 
however, their role is only to anchor the two types at the level of public language. Cf. §3.5 for a 
related account, namely, David Papineau’s recent view on perceptual concepts.
Loar emphasises four characteristics of recognitional concepts. First, a recognitional 
concept is “recognitional at its core” (Loar, 1997, p. 601). That is, one cannot extract 
recognitional concepts from descriptions; one acquires them only via perceptual 
categorisation. In other words, possessing a recognitional concept requires the 
exercising of a recognitional ability.10
Second, recognitional concepts “need involve no reference to a past instance, or have 
the form ‘is of the same type as that (remembered) one’” (Loar, 1997, p. 601). That 
is, bringing an actual perceptual stimulus under a certain recognitional concept does 
not necessarily  involve active comparison—one is able to judge that the actual 
perceptual stimulus is ‘another one of those’ without necessarily  comparing the 
actual stimulus to a particular past instance (cf. Loar, 1997, p. 601).11 
Third, “recognitional abilities depend on no consciously accessible analysis into 
component features; they can be irreducibly  gestalt” (Loar, 1997, p. 601). Just as 
expert chicken sexers are not really capable of producing a positive description of 
how a male cloaca looks like, recognitional concepts do not necessarily  reveal the 
details of the perceptual stimuli.
Fourth, “recognitional concepts are perspectival; [... they are] in part individuated by 
their constitutive perspective” (Loar, 1997, p. 601). That is, perceiving the same 
object from different perspectives might lead for someone to form one recognitional 
concept from one perspective and another from another perspective, thus failing to 
recognise the two sets of stimuli as presenting the same object (since the two 
recognitional concepts are a priori independent).
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10  Recognitional ability might be characterised as a capacity to store perceptual templates, compare 
actual perceptual stimuli against these templates, and judge them as similar or different. Cf. §3.5 for a 
more detailed discussion.
11  Again,  see §3.5 for an account detailing how stored templates can abstract away from particular 
instances.
3.2.2 Conceptual independence
Loar’s proposal is that phenomenal concepts are recognitional concepts picking out 
certain physical properties of the brain. Phenomenal concepts are those recognitional 
concepts which we deploy in phenomenological reflection: they reveal certain 
properties of the brain phenomenologically—independently of the physical-
functional descriptions of these brain properties. As Loar formulates the fundamental 
tenet of Phenomenal Concept Strategy (cf. §3.1.2): “phenomenal concepts are 
conceptually independent of physical-functional descriptions, and yet pairs of such 
concepts may converge on, pick out, the same properties.” (Loar, 1997, p. 602).
Of course, the conceptual independence of phenomenal concepts from physical-
functional descriptions plays a crucial part in Loar’s account: it  explains why no a 
priori entailment follows from the fact that they  both pick out the same property. 
Justifying the claim of conceptual independence, then, is of fundamental importance 
for Loar’s account. 
Loar supports the conceptual independence claim by appealing to the recognitional 
nature of phenomenal concepts. He says that “recognitional concepts and theoretical 
concepts are in general conceptually independent” (Loar, 1997, p. 602). Theoretical 
concepts (i.e. physical-functional concepts) pick out their referents via analysing 
them in scientific terms, i.e. describing their causal and functional properties—what 
causal roles they play, and how their component parts form a certain structure. 
Contrary  to this, recognitional concepts discriminate their referents without analysing 
them in scientific terms. As Loar puts it: “basic recognitional abilities do not depend 
on or get triggered by conscious scientific analysis” (Loar, 1997, p. 603).
Note, however, that this latter claim is not true in general, thus relying on the 
recognitional nature of phenomenal concepts will not suffice on its own. Though it is 
true of some examples that no amount of “book learnin’” (cf. Papineau, 2002) can 
help  one to recognise first instances of certain experiences, it  is definitely  not true of 
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all possible perceptual cases. On the one hand, it seems to be true of recognising a 
patch of red, for example, whereas, on the other hand, it seems to be false with 
regard to chicken sexers. As Biederman and Schiffrar (1987) showed, after reading a 
short description explaining how typical male and female cloacae look like 
(something very hard to learn by  experience) inexperienced subjects were able to 
categorise problematic cases at the same level of accuracy as experienced chicken-
sexers could do (whereas without reading such descriptions, the accuracy of 
untrained subjects’ performance was significantly worse). What this tells us is that 
physical/theoretical descriptions are able to affect recognitional concepts.12
Though the third feature of recognitional concepts Loar cites13 seems to be correct, it 
is not equivalent with the claim that descriptions of component features and 
recognitional concepts of the ‘wholes’ are always conceptually independent. It  well 
might be the case—as it is, in the case of chicken sexers—that independence is true 
in one direction (no matter how experienced a chicken sexer is, it  is extremely  hard 
for her to formulate a positive description of how a male or female cloaca looks like), 
but not  true in the opposite direction (information about component features, parts, 
and structures triggers better recognitional abilities).
To recap the ideas presented so far: phenomenal concepts are special recognitional 
concepts picking out physical properties (brain states), which are nevertheless 
conceptually independent of physical-functional descriptions of the very  same brain 
states. Loar puts great effort into explaining the conceptual independence claim by 
relying on two further claims: first that phenomenal concepts refer directly, and 
second that the physical-functional properties, when picked out by phenomenal 
concepts, provide their own mode of presentation. In the next two sections I shall 
analyse these two claims respectively.
85
12 Compare this with §4.1, where a similar observation plays a crucial role.
13  “Recognitional abilities depend on no consciously accessible analysis into component 
features” (Loar, 1997, p. 601).
3.2.3 Direct reference
Loar says that phenomenal concepts are direct recognitional concepts. Phenomenal 
concepts are special recognitional concepts because they do not connote contingent 
modes of presentation that are metaphysically independent of the kinds they  pick out. 
Referring directly, then, means picking out the referent without being mediated by 
contingent modes of presentation.14  What the Direct  Reference claim says, then, is 
this:
(DR)  Direct Reference:
  Phenomenal qualities, when picked out by phenomenal concepts, 
  are picked out directly.
To put it in another way, phenomenal concepts and theoretical concepts have 
different conceptual roles. Theoretical concepts allude to scientific descriptions, and 
thus to contingent modes of presentation.15 Phenomenal concepts, on the other hand, 
present their referents in a direct way. Grasping a phenomenal concept directly 
reveals the essence of the referent: that is, when exercising a recognitional concept 
one is in a position to know the essence of the referent.16 
However, one might wonder why there is an epistemic gap between one’s 
phenomenal knowledge employing phenomenal concepts and one’s physical-
functional knowledge employing fundamental scientific terms, if the referent of both 
ways of thinking is the same property. The reason why one might find the presence 
of the epistemic gap problematic is this. On the one hand, as it is advocated by Loar, 
phenomenal concepts reveal the essence of their referents. On the other hand, some 
theoretical terms also reveal the essence of the property  they pick out: fundamental 
86
14 Note that having contingent modes of presentations does not exclude referring directly. Cf. Kaplan’s 
content/character distinction (Kaplan, 1989). See also §3.3.2.
15 Some of these scientific descriptions nevertheless pick out scientific essences. See below.
16  The essence of a thing is “a property of it such that necessarily it has it and nothing else 
does” (Lewis, 1999, p. 328). Cf. also Stoljar (2009b).
scientific descriptions (if correct) capture the basic nature of the entities they talk 
about—there can be no ‘more fundamental’ entities playing e.g. the electron-role 
(given that electron-talk is part of the fundamental theory). That is, fundamental 
theoretical terms capture the essence of their referents in the sense that they are 
“conceptually  interderivable with some theoretical predicate that reveals the internal 
structure of the designated property” (Loar, 1997, p. 603).17
What we have then, if both concepts refer to the same property, is two direct grasps 
on the essence of a certain property. Anti-physicalists argue that two such direct 
grasps need to reveal the essence transparently: one must be able to recognise that 
the two grasps reveal the same essence. However, this is not the case—grasping the 
essence of, say, pain via a directly  referring phenomenal concept does not put  us into 
an epistemic situation where we can immediately recognise that this essence is the 
same that can be grasped via a fundamental theoretical term; nor vice versa. 
Therefore, the anti-physicalist argument goes, the two concepts must refer to two 
distinct properties.
Loar claims that the expected transparency is only an illusion. He says: “what 
generates the problem is not appreciating that there can be two conceptually 
independent ‘direct grasps’ of a single essence, that is, grasping it demonstratively  by 
experiencing it, and grasping it in theoretical terms” (Loar, 1997, p. 609). In other 
words, Loar claims that the transparency  argument above equivocates on ‘capturing 
the essence’—phenomenal concepts and fundamental theoretical concepts capture 
the essence of their referents in a different way (cf. Loar, 1997, p. 603). How 
fundamental theoretical terms reveal the essence of the referent seems to be 
uncontroversial. Thus understanding exactly how demonstrative grasping goes (what 
referring directly for a phenomenal concept amounts to and how it is performed) is a 
fundamental part of making sense of Loar’s account.18
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17 For alternative views on fundamental physical properties consider Hawthorne’s causal structuralism 
(2001), or Russellian monism (Russell, 1927; Stoljar, 2001).
18 See §3.3 for more on clarifying how direct reference can be accounted for.
3.2.4 Own mode of presentation 
In order to fully  appreciate Loar’s proposal, let’s consider first why phenomenal 
concepts are special recognitional concepts. There is a trivial difference between a 
phenomenal concept and the recognitional concept an experienced chicken sexer 
utilises when recognising and categorising a particular cloaca as of the male-type: 
whereas the recognitional concept of this latter type picks out an external property 
(the male cloaca), phenomenal concepts pick out certain internal properties (brain 
states, as argued by physicalists).
It is not enough, however, to restrict recognitional concepts to those self-directed 
ones which pick out an internal property. One can deploy  a self-directed 
recognitional concept to pick out certain bodily  states other then phenomenal 
qualities. Loar’s example is picking out cramps. Cramps are muscle contractions 
typically accompanied by a characteristic cramp-feeling. Let’s consider the scenario 
when a cramp  occurs in one’s body and one experiences the characteristic cramp-
feeling. In such a scenario, one is able to focus one’s attention either to the cramp-
feeling, or to the cramp itself. In the first case one picks out a particular brain state 
(given physicalism is true) by  a phenomenal concept categorising it as a feeling of 
the cramp-feeling-type, whereas in the second case, one picks out the cramp itself by 
a self-directed recognitional concept categorising it as a particular muscle contraction 
at a particular site of one’s body.
When one is deploying the cramp concept (the recognitional concept picking out 
muscle contraction), one is referring to “a muscular property  indirectly, by way of a 
causal chain that is mediated by  the phenomenal quality associated with the 
concept” (Loar, 1997, p. 604). That is, the cramp concept refers by way of a 
contingent mode of presentation: cramps cause cramp-feelings, the actual cramp-
feeling focuses one’s attention to the cramp itself, and one recognises the particular 
cramp as something of the cramp-type by deploying a self-directed recognitional 
concept (cramp concept).
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Contrary  to this, argues Loar, when one is deploying a cramp-feeling concept (a 
phenomenal concept picking out a brain state), one is referring to a brain property 
directly, not by way of a contingent mode of presentation. The phenomenal concept 
picks out the particular cramp-feeling (brain state) as one of the cramp-feeling type. 
Here the token cramp-feeling focuses one’s attention to the phenomenal quality 19 
type ‘cramp-feeling’. As Loar puts it: “a phenomenal concept has as its mode of 
presentation the very phenomenal quality  that it picks out” (Loar, 1997, p. 604). This 
is what I shall refer to from now on as the Own Mode of Presentation claim:
(OMP) Own Mode of Presentation:
  Phenomenal qualities, when picked out by phenomenal concepts, 
  provide their own modes of presentation. 
The whole picture Loar presents, then, is this. By deploying a fundamental physical-
functional concept (theoretical description) one picks out a certain physical (brain) 
property  under a direct grasp  which reveals the physical structure of the property. By 
deploying a phenomenal concept one is able to pick out the very same physical 
(brain) property  under a direct but different grasp  which reveals the essence of the 
property  via a demonstrative act, mediated by a mode of presentation which involves 
the experience itself, resulting in recognising it as ‘of that feeling-type’. Since two 
concepts with these characteristics are irreducible to each other no a priori 
connection can be drawn between the two ways of conceiving the same property.
Note that on Loar’s account the OMP-claim is an unexplained explainer—Loar uses 
the OMP-claim to explain the DR-claim: he accounts for how phenomenal concepts 
refer directly  by claiming that phenomenal qualities when picked out by phenomenal 
concepts provide their own mode of presentation. However, the OMP-claim itself is 
left quite unexplained. In what follows I shall introduce more accounts of 
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19  I use the term ‘phenomenal quality’ neutrally,  i.e.  as a term not implying that there is any non-
physical property involved.
phenomenal concepts and concentrate on their contribution to understanding Loar’s 
Direct Reference and Own Mode of Presentation claims. 
3.3 Elaborating on the Direct Reference Claim
First, let’s consider two accounts of phenomenal concepts which claim to clarify 
Loar’s Direct Reference claim. The first one is Michael Tye’s causal-recognitional 
account (Tye, 2003), the second is the demonstrative/indexical account advocated by 
John Perry (2001), John O’Dea (2002), and Janet Levin (2008).
3.3.1 The causal-recognitional account
Tye (2003) subscribes to the view that appealing to special phenomenal concepts is 
the best way to defend physicalism about consciousness against anti-physicalist 
objections. Phenomenal concepts, for him, are special because of three reasons.
First, they are not physical concepts. Given that phenomenal concepts are the 
vehicles of thought one deploys when one becomes aware of the phenomenal 
character of one’s experience, exercising a phenomenal concept means focusing 
attention on what it is like to have that particular experience.20  Were phenomenal 
concepts physical concepts, Mary would know what it is like to see red well before 
her release, since she already knows everything there is to know about colour vision 
in physical terms. However, according to the conclusion of the Knowledge 
Argument, this is not the case: Mary  acquires new knowing-that (though of an old 
fact) when she leaves her room and sees red for the first time. Since phenomenal 
concepts are not physical concepts, Mary does not possess them while she lives in 
her room—she acquires them only when she first  sees something red and attends to 
the colour experience she is having.
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20 According to Tye, phenomenal concepts refer to experience types. See §3.5.2 for an argument to the 
very same conclusion.
Second, phenomenal concepts are not demonstrative concepts utilising physical 
sortals. Tye asks us to imagine a modified version of the Mary thought experiment. 
In this modified version Mary is able to bring another person’s brain states under 
recognitional concepts by using a future device called cerebroscope. The 
cerebroscope connects the other person’s brain with Mary’s room in a way which 
makes Mary able to read from the device what particular brain state the person is in. 
So with the aid of this device Mary can form thoughts like ‘that  person is in brain 
state F’ where ‘F’ is a physical predicate expressing the physical properties of the 
brain state. No matter whether that particular brain state picked out by Mary as ‘brain 
state F’ corresponds to the person’s having the experience of seeing something red, it 
is still true that when Mary  leaves the room and sees something red for the first time 
she makes a new discovery and acquires a new piece of knowledge.
Third, phenomenal concepts have no a priori associated co-referential physical 
concepts. This third claim says that someone who possesses a phenomenal concept 
cannot know a priori what physical concept picks out the same referent as the 
phenomenal concepts does. This is the very point the so-called Explanatory Gap 
Argument draws attention to: it is always intelligible to ask why a certain physical 
state feels the way it does (even if an identity  theory is true). Co-referential 
phenomenal and physical concepts are conceptually  independent. In other words, 
what this third feature of phenomenal concepts shows is that the reference fixers of 
phenomenal concepts are not a priori associated physical descriptions.
From all this, Tye argues, it follows that phenomenal concepts refer directly. It is not 
the case that phenomenal concepts refer via a contingent mode of presentation. There 
are no properties distinct from the referent and picked out by certain physical 
descriptions which could present the referent itself by being a priori associated to it. 
Phenomenal concepts have “no associated reference fixers”, they have “no 
descriptive content at all” (Tye, 2003, p. 95). As Tye summarises his own account: 
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“phenomenal concepts are non-demonstrative, general concepts that refer directly 
without the assistance of any associated reference-fixers.” (Tye, 2009, p. 51)
Tye accounts for direct reference in causal terms. As he puts it: 
“my proposal [...] is that phenomenal concepts refer via the causal connection 
they  have with their referents. In first approximation, a phenomenal concept C 
refers to a phenomenal quality Q via C’s being the concept that is exercised in 
an introspective act of awareness by  person P if, and only  if, under normal 
conditions of introspection, Q is tokened in P’s current experience and because 
Q is tokened.” (Tye, 2003, p. 97)
That is, what Tye proposes is a causal covariation account: phenomenal concepts and 
their referents—phenomenal qualities—causally covary  with each other. Phenomenal 
concepts refer directly  due to there being a causal link between them and their 
referents. When one focuses one’s attention toward an experience one’s having a 
certain phenomenal concept gets exercised because a particular phenomenal quality 
is tokened in one’s experience. Had a different type of phenomenal quality  been 
tokened, a different phenomenal concept would have been exercised.
This cannot be the whole story, however. A pure covariation-based formulation of 
causation is not sufficient, since effects of common causes also covary  with each 
other despite the fact that they themselves are not causally linked. What is needed to 
overcome this pitfall is an asymmetric dependence condition: if a state S causally 
covaries under normal conditions with feature F and also with some other feature G 
then S and F are causally  linked under normal conditions only if “were F to fail to 
covary  with G, the causal covariation link between S and F under optimal (normal) 
conditions would still hold but that between S and G would be broken” (Tye, 2003, 
p. 98). This further condition solves the problem posed by  cases where a phenomenal 
concept covaries with both a phenomenal quality and some other physical property 
which itself is not  a phenomenal quality. The phenomenal concept refers to the 
phenomenal quality as long as were the phenomenal quality  to fail to covary with the 
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non-phenomenal quality, the phenomenal concept would still causally covary  with 
the phenomenal quality but not with the non-phenomenal quality.
This is still not the whole picture yet. For one might object that a more developed 
version of a cerebroscope poses a problem. Remember, in a previous example, a 
cerebroscope connected another person’s brain to Mary’s room in a way that Mary 
could read (say from a screen) what brain state the person was in. Now imagine that 
the cerebroscope is linked directly  to Mary’s brain (thus connecting the other 
person’s brain to Mary’s brain) in a way which makes it possible for Mary to 
recognise the other person’s brain states by the act of introspection. Imagine next that 
the other person sees something red. Due to being wired to the other person’s brain in 
the appropriate way, Mary now is able to recognise the other person’s brain state 
(which is the distinctive phenomenal character of seeing something red) and think 
that the other person is seeing something red without Mary herself actually 
experiencing seeing something red.
This case fulfils all the requirements of the causal covariation account. Mary 
acquires a concept  which refers directly to the phenomenal quality of seeing 
something red, but this concept  is not a phenomenal concept since Mary still doesn’t 
know what it is like to see something red.21  That is, not all concepts that refer 
directly  are phenomenal concepts. ‘What  makes a concept refer directly’ is a 
different question than ‘what makes a concept phenomenal’. Tye’s proposal for 
answering the former question is the causal covariation account. Nonetheless, he 
needs to add further supplement in order to answer the latter question.
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21  Tye’s original example goes like this: “Fred is a 21st century neuroscientist who is incapable 
himself of feeling pain in virtue of a neurological defect he has had since birth. Fred has a device 
partly wired into his brain that causes him to think that another person is feeling pain when and only 
when the external part of the device is directed at the other person's brain and the relevant brain state 
is present there. Fred's thought exercises a concept of pain, but that concept isn't a phenomenal 
concept. For Fred does not know what it is like to experience pain,  and intuitively one cannot grasp 
the phenomenal character of pain, one cannot have a phenomenal concept of pain, without knowing 
what it is like.” (Tye, 2003, p. 98)
Tye thinks that what makes a concept that refers directly to a phenomenal quality a 
phenomenal concept is that “it  functions in the right sort of way” (Tye, 2003, p. 99). 
Due to the conceptual irreducibility of phenomenal concepts, however, this 
functioning cannot be specified a priori in purely  non-phenomenal terms. The best 
one can get, Tye argues, is the following specification:
“A concept is phenomenal […] if and only if (1) it  is laid down in memory as a 
result of undergoing the appropriate experiences [...] (2) it tends to trigger 
appropriate conscious images (or quasi-images) in response to certain cognitive 
tasks, and (3) it  enables its possessors to discriminate the phenomenal quality 
to which it refers directly and immediately  via introspection.” (Tye, 2003, p. 
99) 
Tye also ads that this functioning brings with it a distinctive first person perspective 
on phenomenal qualities. I shall elaborate on important aspects of this specification 
of what makes a phenomenal concept phenomenal in the subsequent sections where I 
shall compare other accounts of phenomenal concepts with Tye’s approach.
The fundamental point now—the moral of this section—is this. Tye’s causal-
recognitional approach accounts for the direct reference of phenomenal concepts in 
terms of causal covariation. What makes a phenomenal concept directly  refer to a 
phenomenal quality  is that the phenomenal concept gets exercised only if the 
appropriate phenomenal quality is being tokened and because it is being tokened.
3.3.2 The demonstrative/indexical account
According to the so-called demonstrative/indexical account (Perry, 2001; O'Dea, 
2002; Levin, 2007) phenomenal concepts work like demonstratives or pure 
indexicals. Indexicals, in general, are terms the referents of which are “dependent on 
the context of use” (Kaplan, 1989, p. 490). Demonstratives are special indexicals, 
which refer to an object picked out via an act of demonstration, i.e. a “presentation of 
a local object discriminated by a pointing” (Kaplan, 1989, p. 490)—e.g. ‘this’, ‘that’. 
Pure indexicals are indexicals for which “no associated demonstration is 
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required” (Kaplan, 1989, p. 491)—e.g. ‘I’, ‘now’, ‘here’. That is, what a 
demonstrative or pure indexical refers to depends on the specific context of the 
actual use. My utterance ‘that  chick’ might pick out as its referent one of the photos 
used in the classical Biederman and Schiffrar experiment (1987)22, or a cute little 
plush animal my  niece usually plays with depending on whether I am pointing out to 
the article, or the toy. Similarly, the utterance ‘here’ might pick out Edinburgh, or 
Budapest depending on whether the utterer at the time of the actual utterance is in 
Edinburgh, or in Budapest.
Utterances in general are uttered in a particular context and are evaluated in a 
particular circumstance. The context is a “possible occasion of use” (Kaplan, 1989, 
p. 494) of an utterance.23 The circumstance of evaluation is a possible state of the 
world on the basis of which one tries to determine the truth of falsity of the utterance 
(cf. possible worlds in Kripke, 1980).24 
Indexicals are special in at least two respects. First, as we have already seen, the 
context of utterance plays an important part in determining the content—and 
ultimately  the reference—of certain, indexical involving, utterances. The utterance ‘I 
submit my  dissertation in Edinburgh’ expresses the proposition that ‘Peter submits 
his dissertation in Edinburgh’ if it is uttered by  myself, and is true if evaluated under 
actual circumstances, whereas it expresses the proposition that ‘Gina submits her 
dissertation in Edinburgh’ if it is uttered by my wife, and is false if evaluated under 
actual circumstances. ‘I’ picks out me in the first  case, and my wife, Gina, in the 
second case. This is what Kaplan (1989) calls the content of an indexical: it is what a 
particular use picks out—the actual utterer in the case of ‘I’, the actual place of the 
utterance in the case of ‘here’, the object the utterer points at in the case of ‘that’, etc. 
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22 Cf. §3.2.2.
23 A context is characterised by an agent (the actual utterer),  a time (the actual time of the utterance), 
and a location (the actual place of the utterance).
24  By evaluating of a sentence under a given circumstance one gets a truth value, whereas by 
evaluating a singular term under a given circumstance one gets an object.
The character of an indexical is what determines “the content in varying 
contexts” (Kaplan, 1989, p. 505), i.e. defines how the context of use affects the 
content. That is, the character is a function from contexts to contents, it tells us how 
the content changes from context to context—e.g. it tells us that the content of ‘I’ is 
‘the actual utterer’, whoever it  is in the actual context, the content of ‘here’ is ‘the 
actual place of utterance’, wherever the utterer is in the actual context, etc. (cf. 
Speaks, 2011).25
Second, the reference of indexicals depends only on the context of use, and not on 
the circumstance of evaluation. Once one determines the referent of an indexical in a 
particular context, it remains the same under different circumstances. Contrary to 
this, the reference of a non-indexical term is determined by the circumstance of 
evaluation and not the context of use. Compare the term ‘that chick’ with the term 
‘the famous chick featuring in the Biederman-Schiffrar article’. Imagine that I utter 
the first sentence while pointing at Figure 2 in Biederman and Schiffrar’s article. In 
this case, the content of the first utterance is ‘the chick Peter is pointing at on the 3rd 
of September, 2011 while sitting in his living room in Budapest’, whereas the content 
of the second utterance is ‘the chick with the property  of being utilised as an 
illustration in the Biederman-Schiffrar article’. Now, evaluated under the actual 
circumstance, both terms pick out the same object: the particular day-old-chick the 
picture of which has been used as an illustration in the 1987 Journal of Experimental 
Psychology paper co-authored by Biederman and Schiffrar. However, if I evaluated 
the two terms in a possible world where Biederman and Schiffrar, instead of studying 
chicken-sexer, went on to study, say, children’s categorisation of plush animals and 
artefacts, and utilised a photo of a plush chick as an illustration, then the references 
of the two terms would come apart—the first term would still pick out the same day-
old-chick, whereas the second term would refer to the plush chick. 
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25 In the case of non-indexicals the content does not change with different contexts. What determines 
the content is the content itself, or as it is often put, the character of non-indexicals coincides with 
their content.  
Unlike the description utilised in the second term, the indexical ‘that’ fixes the 
reference of ‘that chick’ regardless the possible circumstances of evaluation. The 
second term refers via a description, i.e. picks out its referent via contingent 
properties which can change from circumstance to circumstance, whereas the first 
term, the indexical, refers directly. As Kaplan puts it, the semantic rules of indexicals 
“provide directly that the referent in all possible circumstances is fixed to be the 
actual referent” (Kaplan, 1989, p. 493). 
Proponents of the demonstrative/indexical account of phenomenal concepts 
capitalise on these features of indexicals. For example, John O’Dea (2002) argues 
that similarly to how the character of indexicals determine what they pick out 
depending on the context, there is a similar ‘rule’ for phenomenal concepts 
determining their referents. So, for example, just as the referent of, say, ‘here’ (as in 
‘I am here’) is determined by the rule ‘the actual location of the utterance’, the 
referent of, say, ‘pain’ (as in ‘I am in pain’) is determined by the rule ‘the kind of 
state the utterer is actually  in when she injures herself’ (cf. O'Dea, 2002, p. 175). 
Note that ‘pain’ here is a public language word. O’Dea argues, that we learn to use 
the word ‘pain’ in situations when we injure ourselves to describe the sensation we 
are having, and thereby we acquire a phenomenal use of this word.26  Now this 
phenomenal use of ‘pain’ will pick out the kind of state the user is actually in when 
she uses the term regardless whether the user is a member of the normal population 
(and thus is having an experience similar to the painful sensation we typically have 
in a similar situation) or, say, is an invert and is feeling pleasure every time she 
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26 Similarly, O’Dea argues, the way we learn the names of colour sensations—a phenomenal use—is 
“parasitic on the way we learn the names of colours” (O'Dea, 2002, p. 174)—a perceptual use (cf. 
§3.5). Typically, a child learns such words in situations where, for example, her parent points to the 
grass and says ‘that colour is green’. The child thereby learns the name of the colour of grass 
(whatever phenomenal quality she experiences when she looks at the grass), and consecutively she 
learns to refer to her phenomenal state by an inward ostension ‘that experience is green’ (cf. O'Dea, 
2002, p. 174). 
injures herself.27 In this respect, phenomenal concepts work like indexicals do: the 
kind of state they  refer to is jointly  determined by their character and the actual 
context of their use (i.e. who uses them). The character of ‘pain’ is ‘the kind of state 
the utterer is actually in when she injures herself’ both for the invert and the non-
invert—it is invariant to different uses of the term. However, the content of ‘pain’ is 
different for the invert (state X; i.e. normal pleasure state) and for the non-invert 
(state Y; i.e. normal pain state)—and it might very well change for every user.28
Note that the emphasis, here, is not on public language terms like ‘pain’ or ‘red’, not 
even on their phenomenal use. The same story might be told with demonstratives as 
well. Consider Nida-Rümelin’s version of the Mary thought experiment (cf. §3.1.1). 
In that case, when Mary  is finally  let out of her room she is shown a sheet of paper 
with a patch of red on it. In this case, lacking any clues which could be matched up 
with the rules she has learned in her room about the use of public language terms, 
she is unable to use the term ‘red’. Still, she can refer to her particular experience by 
using the term ‘that experience’. Just as one might use the term ‘that chick’ together 
with an outward ostension, one uses the term ‘that experience’ together with an 
inward ostension to pick out a particular experience one is having. The character of 
‘that experience’ is something like ‘the kind of state the utterer is actually 
introspectively pointing at’, whereas its content is the actual phenomenal state itself, 
which, again might change for every  token use. Nonetheless, once the content is 
fixed by an actual use, the referent won’t change no matter under what circumstance 
one tries to evaluate the proposition containing the phenomenal concept in question. 
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27 An invert, in general, is a person who is similar to us in every physical respect, nevertheless, certain 
experiences she is having are inverted relative to those we are having in similar situation.  So,  for 
example, a ‘colour-invert’  when looking at ripe tomatoes has experiences similar to those we have 
when looking at the grass,  and vice versa. Similarly,  a ‘pain-invert’ might be someone, who feels 
pleasure in situation we normally feel pain, and vice versa.
28  Cf.  O’Dea (2002, pp. 177-178). Note that states X and Y are private states. This, however, isn’t 
essential to the demonstrative/indexical account. Indexicals typically pick out accessible features of 
the context of utterance. Nevertheless,  the content of indexicals is irreducible to any descriptive 
content. This is why, so the argument goes, phenomenal concepts are irreducible to non-phenomenal 
concepts. 
That is, phenomenal concepts refer directly—as opposed to via contingent properties
—in the same sense indexicals do.
Levin (2007) goes a step further in characterising direct reference. She draws 
attention to the fact that though the character of indexicals map contexts to contents 
and thus determine the content of the indexical, this content is irreducible to the 
character or to any other descriptive content. That is, indexicals and phenomenal 
concepts alike, do not refer via reference fixing descriptive modes of presentation, 
but rather refer directly. This direct reference, Levin argues, might best be 
characterised by shifting focus from pure indexicals to demonstratives. Type-
demonstratives are mere pointers directed at certain types29 of experience. Where the 
pointer is directed at is determined by which property  causes differentially the use of 
the particular demonstrative. In line with this, the experience causally  responsible for 
the application of a certain phenomenal concept in the introspective act of 
recognition and re-identification is the referent of that particular phenomenal 
concept. This is how phenomenal concepts refer directly. As Levin puts it, the 
referent of phenomenal concepts is:
“determined solely by the causal and dispositional relations an individual has 
to her internal states that  are effected by an introspective ‘pointing in’; that is, 
by the fact that she’s in causal contact with a certain property  and is disposed to 
reidentify it on subsequent occasions.” (Levin, 2007, p. 89, original emphasis)
When Nida-Rümelin’s version of Mary is shown a piece of paper with a patch of red 
on it, she immediately  becomes able to subsequently  recognise and re-identify that 
reddish experience as another instance of ‘that experience’. Upon a novel encounter, 
she would be able to express the proposition that ‘I have already had that experience 
before’. ‘That experience’ here refer to the reddish sensation Mary is having, argues 
Levin, because this sensation is that triggers—or, as Levin puts it, differentially 
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29 Levin argues that it is the class of phenomenal concepts picking out experience types (as opposed to 
tokens) which are of crucial importance since only they can play a part in the recognition and re-
identification of an experience. Cf. §.3.5.
causes (cf. Levin, 2007, p. 91)—the application of the phenomenal concept (‘that 
experience’) in terms of which Mary thinks about the sensation. 
As a moral, note that the demonstrative/indexical approach subscribes to a very 
similar causal account of direct reference than the causal-recognitional account does. 
This causal account of reference is a common ground in most contemporary 
approaches to phenomenal concepts. However, some argue, much more need to be 
said about the relation between phenomenal concepts and their referents than the 
postulation of a brute causal link. In the next section I shall focus on those attempts 
which try to answer this challenge.
3.4 Elaborating on the Own Mode of Presentation 
Claim
The accounts presented so far share the view that phenomenal concepts and their 
referents are distinct entities, and these referents are connected by a causal link to the 
application of phenomenal concepts. This, however, seems to pose a problem: if 
phenomenal concepts and their referents are distinct entities then they might occur 
independently of each other. It  seems conceivable, then, that one deploys the 
phenomenal concept RED*30  when having greenish experience (or without having 
any colour-experience at all).31  This is highly  counter-intuitive though: RED* is 
supposed to be the very vehicle of thought one deploys when one thinks about a 
reddish experience. That is, intuitively, anybody who introspectively deploys the 
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30  Where RED* is the specific recognitional/demonstrative concept picking out the subjective 
phenomenal quality of reddish experiences. Note that RED* is different from the phenomenal use of 
the public language word ‘red’ (cf. §3.3.2)—RED* is supposed to be the special vehicle of thought 
one deploys when one thinks about one’s reddish experience. It is a further question if one associates 
this phenomenal concept with information about red objects and hence with the public language word 
‘red’ (as non-inverts would normally do), or with, say, information about green objects and hence with 
the public language word ‘green’  (as colour inverts would do). See more about phenomenal concepts 
and associated information in §3.5. Stoljar (2005) clarifies what kind of concepts one might have 
related to red stimuli. The concept RED* as used here corresponds to his RED SENSATION.
31  Distinct entities linked only by causation are metaphysically independent, i.e. there are 
metaphysically possible worlds where the laws of nature are different, and thus the causal link in 
question doesn’t exist (under a categoricalist understanding of laws of nature—cf. Footnote 27 in 
§1.4.1). Cf. Balog (2012a).
phenomenal concept RED* in order to pick out an actual experience is actually 
having a reddish experience (cf. Balog, 2012a).
This suggests that there is a tighter, more intimate link between phenomenal concepts 
and their referents than ‘brute’ causation (cf. Carruthers, 2004; Balog, 2012a). This 
tighter link is what Loar tried to capture by his OMP-claim: phenomenal qualities, 
when picked out by phenomenal concepts, provide their own modes of presentation. 
That is, when one is thinking about one’s own reddish experience this deployment of 
the phenomenal concept RED* somehow involves the reddish experience itself. In 
what follows I shall introduce two accounts of phenomenal concepts which try  to 
make it intelligible how such an involvement might work.
3.4.1 The higher-order experience account
Carruthers (2000b, 2000a, 2001, 2004) subscribes to the view that phenomenal 
concepts are pure recognitional concepts with no contingent modes of presentation. 
It is Carruthers’ main concern to show how such recognitional concepts are possible 
in a physicalistically acceptable way.
Phenomenal concept as pure recognitional concepts satisfy two separate 
requirements. First, phenomenal concepts consist in the capacity to recognise the 
type of experience they are concepts of. By deploying the phenomenal concept 
RED* one is able to recognise and re-identify  the reddish experience-type. Second, 
phenomenal concepts have no conceptual connection with physical-functional 
concepts. One cannot acquire the recognitional capacity solely by acquiring 
knowledge in terms of physical-functional concept—not even if one knows 
everything there is to know in terms of these concepts. That is, phenomenal concepts 
are irreducible to, i.e. conceptually independent of, non-phenomenal concepts.
However, it seems that phenomenal concepts have conceptual connections with other 
phenomenal concepts. A typical example of this conceptual connection is the very 
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fact that ‘this experience’ is the paradigm formulation of a phenomenal concept—i.e. 
that one is able to refer to one’s particular experience by the phenomenal concept 
‘this experience’. When seeing something red, and deploying a particular 
phenomenal concept (say, RED* to refer to the reddish experience) one can know 
that the state one recognises as reddish is an experiential state. That is, one 
recognises the state one is in as an experiential state; one knows that ‘this state’ is an 
‘experience’ where both terms are pure recognitional (and phenomenal) concepts. 
The former is a more concrete one whereas the latter is a more abstract one.
Where we are left is this. When presented with something red we are able to 
recognise it as an instance of red and we are also able to recognise it as an instance of 
colour. During recognition we deploy purely recognitional concepts. In the very 
same way, we are also able to recognise our experience (the reddish quality) as an 
instance of reddish experience and bring it under the concept RED* or as an instance 
of experience and bring it  under the concept of ‘experience’. The purely 
recognitional concepts deployed in this higher-order recognitional task (recognising 
not physical stimuli but experiences of those stimuli) are phenomenal concepts.32
According to Carruthers, “a concept is recognitional when it can be applied on the 
basis of perceptual or quasi-perceptual acquaintance with its instances. And a 
concept is purely recognitional when its possession-conditions make no appeal to 
anything other than such acquaintance.” (Carruthers, 2004, p. 320) That is, when one 
deploys the first order recognitional concept ‘red’ or ‘colour’ one is perceptually (or 
quasi-perceptually, i.e. in imaginative re-creation) acquainted with a red object, 
which is by being directly present is available to recognitional classification. 
However, an analogous interpretation of the higher-order recognition of experiences 
is problematic for those who would like to reject qualia, the non-physical properties, 
which are directly present to the mind when deploying phenomenal concepts, and are 
subjects of recognitional classification. Accounting for acquaintance in physically 
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32 See §3.5 for more on how the more abstract concept ‘experience’ refers. 
acceptable (non-qualia) terms is what is needed in order to explain the nature of 
phenomenal concepts.
Moreover, it  seems that this acquaintance-relation is what underpins the intimate 
connection between phenomenal concepts and their referents. As Carruthers 
formulates this intimate relation: 
“What I recognize when I deploy a recognitional concept of experience is in 
some sense presented to me (albeit non-conceptually) as an experience. I do 
not merely find myself judging ‘This is K’, as it were blindly, or for no reason. 
Rather, I think that I am aware of, and can inspect and reflect  on the nature of, 
the event which evokes that recognitional judgement.” (Carruthers, 2004, p. 
322) 
That is, in a certain way, experiences present themselves as experiences. This is 
exactly  Loar’s Own Mode of Presentation claim, i.e. that phenomenal qualities, when 
picked out  by phenomenal concepts, provide their own modes of presentation. 
According to Carruthers, then, providing an account of the acquaintance-relation—
and thus accounting for Loar’s OMP claim—is the main challenge for physicalist 
approaches to phenomenal consciousness. And, Carruthers argues, causal accounts 
are not up to the task. Instead, he proposes a so-called dispositionalist  higher-order 
thought account (Carruthers, 2000a, 2004).  
The approach Carruthers proposes is one of the many variants of the higher-order 
representational theories of phenomenal consciousness. All these theories agree that 
for a state to be conscious it  should be suitably related to higher-order representations 
of that very state. The dispositionalist higher-order thought account claims that those 
mental states are conscious which are available in a non-inferential way  to a ‘theory 
of mind’ or ‘mind-reading’ system producing higher-order thought, i.e. those mental 
states, which are “available to cause higher-order thoughts about [their] occurrence 
and content” (cf. Carruthers, 2004, pp. 330-331). This availability to the mind-
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reading faculty results in that the states in question, in addition to their first-order 
content, will have second-order content as well.
Let’s say that one is actually  staring at a ripe tomato and having the experience of 
seeing red. The first-order content of one’s relevant perceptual state here represents 
the state of the environment, i.e. it  represents the tomato as red. If this state is 
available to the mind-reading faculty then it will also have second-order content. The 
second-order content  of the state in question is an experience-representing one: it 
represents the very state as an experience of red. The second-order content of the 
state represents the state itself as an experience of red in virtue of the fact that the 
mind-reading faculty contains a concept (a phenomenal concept) which is apt for 
referring to that state.
Carruthers argues that the mind-reading faculty 33 is an evolutionary product (cf. 
Carruthers, 2000b). It is a belief-forming system operating on the first order content 
of perceptual states. It lets its possessor understand the subjective nature of 
experience, it allows one to think not just about the object represented by a 
perceptual state but also about how that perceptual state represents the object. As 
Carruthers puts it, the mind-reading faculty  makes it possible to “grasp the is/seems 
distinction” (Carruthers, 2004, p. 332). Once such a faculty is at work, one becomes 
capable of making judgements about one’s experiences themselves. For example, one 
becomes capable of judging one’s experience as of the reddish experience type. One 
makes this judgement in virtue of recognising the perceptual state in question as 
presenting the object as red. That is, these judgements are second-order recognitional 
judgements. (Cf. Carruthers, 2004, pp. 332-333)
To recap: a perceptual state whose cause under normal conditions is a red object, if 
available to the mind-reading faculty, has both a first-order content red and a second-
order content experience of red. Just as one is able to form pure recognitional 
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33  Which, for those favouring the massive modularity thesis, might naturally occur as a module in 
higher cognition.
concepts to recognise and categorise the object  via the first-order content as of the 
red object type, one is also able to form pure recognitional concepts to recognise and 
categorise one’s experience via the second-order content as one of the ‘experience of 
red’ type. This latter set of concepts is the set of phenomenal concepts.
This approach accounts for the intimate connection between phenomenal concepts 
and their referents, and thus for the OMP claim, in the following way. If a perceptual 
state with the first-order content red is available to the mind-reading faculty, it will 
automatically possess the second-order content experience of red. That  is, the second 
order-content is completely  parasitic34 on (but distinct  from) the first-order content. 
The perceptual state which presents the object as red, i.e. the experience of red itself 
gains the second-order content of ‘experience of red’ by being available to the mind-
reading faculty. Via this second-order content the subject becomes capable of 
categorising or re-identifying the experience, i.e. forming a phenomenal concept. 
This is the sense, Carruthers argues, in which an experience (a phenomenal quality) 
provides its own mode of presentation when picked out by a phenomenal concept.
3.4.2 The constitutional account
As we have seen, Loar explains how phenomenal concepts refer directly (the DR-
claim) by  claiming that phenomenal concepts have the phenomenal qualities they 
pick out as their own modes of presentation (the OMP-claim). Papineau (2002) 
draws attention to the fact that this claim is ambiguous. On the one hand, one might 
understand it as expressing the simple thought that when a phenomenal quality is 
referred to by  a phenomenal concept, there is no further property contingently related 
to the phenomenal quality mediating between the referent (the phenomenal quality) 
and the concept (the phenomenal concept). In this sense, then, the OMP-claim 
simply rephrases the DR-claim, it adds nothing to it.
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34 That is, on Carruther’s view, exercising the perceptual concept that represents objects as, say, red is 
a precondition on exercising the phenomenal concept RED*. Cf. §3.5.
On the other hand, though, one might recall the classical understanding of modes-of-
presentation—the Fregean picture, where the mind by being able to think of certain 
properties uses this ability to form a term to refer to entities possessing those 
properties (cf. Papineau, 2002, p. 104). On this reading, what the OMP-claim would 
suggest is this: “the mind somehow already  has the power to think about some 
phenomenal property, [...] and then uses this ability  to form a mode of presenting that 
property” (Papineau, 2002, p. 104). But this is clearly  nonsense. If the mind already 
has the power to think about a phenomenal property why would the mind bother to 
construct some further mode of presentation to enable itself to think about that 
phenomenal property. Or to put it the other way around: the claim that in thinking 
about a phenomenal property  the mind relies on its ability to think about phenomenal 
properties is circular—it presupposes phenomenal concepts in the explanations of 
phenomenal concepts. That is, Papineau argues, the Fregean understanding of the 
OMP-claim ought to be rejected and a DR-analogous interpretation should be 
preferred.
Still, there is more to say  about the OMP-claim which goes beyond the DR-claim. 
According to the so-called Constitutional Account (Hill & McLaughlin, 1999; 
Papineau, 2002; Block, 2007; Balog, 2012a) phenomenal qualities, when picked out 
by phenomenal concepts, provide their own mode of presentation because 
phenomenal concepts are partly constituted by the phenomenal qualities they refer to. 
Every  phenomenal concept token—which picks out a phenomenal quality  type—is 
partly constituted by a token phenomenal quality. That is, the token state that realises 
a token concept is also a token of the referent. Phenomenal concepts are thus special 
because the vehicles involved when they are deployed are special in that they are 
also (partly) the vehicles of the very experiences the phenomenal concepts refer to.
In the case of non-phenomenal concepts it  doesn’t matter what particular neural 
configuration constitutes a particular token of the concept in question as long as the 
requisite causal/informational relations between the neural realiser and the referent of 
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the concept hold. Contrary to this, the constitutional account argues, in the case of 
phenomenal concepts, “constitution matters for reference, both in terms of how the 
reference is determined, and in terms of how the concept cognitively ‘presents’ its 
reference” (Balog, 2009, p. 306).
The constitutional account easily explains the intimate connection between a 
phenomenal concept and its referent, and how the phenomenal quality serves as its 
own mode of presentation. If phenomenal qualities partly constitute phenomenal 
concepts, then by thinking about phenomenal qualities in terms of phenomenal 
concepts one automatically gets acquainted with phenomenal qualities themselves: 
by tokening a phenomenal concept one also tokens the experience itself which is 
referred to by the concept.
This, however, rises an important question. “How do phenomenal concepts come to 
refer to experiences that they themselves exemplify? How does the constitution 
relation determine or partly  determine the reference of a phenomenal 
concept?” (Balog, 2009, p. 308) The constitutional account focuses on phenomenal 
concepts being constituted by  experiences. But constitution in general does not fix 
reference. Neither referents of a concept typically  constitute the concept itself (e.g. 
the concept DAY-OLD CHICK is not constituted by  day-old chicks), nor does a 
concept typically pick out its constituents (e.g. though according to a naturalist 
reading neurons constitute the concept DAY-OLD CHICK it does not refer to 
neurons but rather to day-old chicks).35
Some proponents of the constitutional account (Papineau, 2002; Balog, 2012a) 
explain this special feature of phenomenal concepts in terms of an analogy with how 
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35  In fact, there are two separate questions here. The first-order question asks what the referent of a 
concept is, whereas the second-order question asks how the concept gets to have that referent. With 
regard to phenomenal concepts, Balog and Papineau agree on the first order question (the referent is 
the phenomenal quality, which, in fact,  is a physical property), but disagree about the second-order 
question: Balog emphasises that reference is determined by constitution (Balog, 2012a), whereas 
Papineau argues for a causal-teleosemantic account (Papineau, 2002, 2007). See §3.5 for more on 
Papineau’s account.
quotation works. The so-called quotational approach draws attention to the fact  that 
the specific connection between constitution and reference (an item partly constitutes 
another item which refers to the first item) is a fundamental feature of linguistic 
quotation. A linguistic item partly  constituted by a pair of quotation marks and partly 
by something between the quotation marks refers to whatever there is inside the 
quotation marks. As Balog puts it: “In a quotation expression, a token of the referent 
is literally  a constituent of the expression that refers to a type which it exemplifies 
and that expression has its reference (at  least partly) in virtue of the properties of its 
constituent.” (Balog, 2009, p. 308)
In line with this, the quotational approach to the constitutional account suggests that 
phenomenal concepts are composed of a perceptual state and an operator acting on it
—i.e. a an ‘experience operator’ and a ‘perceptual filling’. The operator has the 
structure ‘the experience: ---’ where ‘---’ stands for a blank slot filled by perceptual 
states. Phenomenal concepts, then, are formed by such experience operators 
prefixing perceptual experiences. These terms, in turn, pick out what fills the blank 
slot in the operator that is, what the experience operator operates on (cf. Papineau, 
2002, p. 117). As Papineau puts it:
“The referring term incorporates the things referred to, and thereby forms a 
compound which refers to that thing. Thus, ordinary  quotation marks can be 
viewed as forming a frame, which, when filled by a word, yields a term for that 
word. Similarly, my  phenomenal concepts involve a frame, which I have 
represented as ‘the experience: ---’; and, when this frame is filled by an 
experience, the whole then refers to that experience.” (Papineau, 2002, p. 117)
So, simply speaking, phenomenal concepts refer to the item which fills the frame 
‘the experience: ---’, i.e. on which the experience operator is applied. But this simple 
picture can’t be right. Consider one of the textbook cases of deploying phenomenal 
concepts: the imaginative re-creation of a certain experience. In this case, for 
example, in the case when one imagines what it is like to see the colour of a day-old 
chick, what one does is imagining the yellow colour of a day-old chick and then 
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applying the experience operator on it. The problem is that  what gets ‘quoted’ in this 
case, i.e. what fills the blank slot in the experience operator, is an imaginative 
experience, not an original perceptual one. This is a problem since usually, when one 
imagines how it  looked like when one last  saw the yellow colour of a day-old chick 
and thinks about this experience with the aid of the ‘the experience: ---’ operator, 
what one will focus on, what one will be thinking of is the original experience of 
seeing the yellow colour of a day-old chick. The product of the imaginative re-
creation—as Papineau puts it—is only a “faint copy” (Papineau, 2002, p. 118) of the 
original one. However, when deploying a phenomenal concept, one is reflecting on 
the original experience not this faint copy. 
Papineau’s solution is that phenomenal concepts deployed in imaginative re-creation 
do not refer to the particular (imaginative) experience actually quoted but to “any 
experience that resembles it appropriately” (Papineau, 2002, p. 118). Consider, for 
example, the master chicken-sexer, who even at  home cannot stop thinking about 
chicken-sexing, and imaginatively re-creates a ‘seeing a day-old-chick’ experience in 
her mind while sitting on her sofa. The phenomenal concepts exercised when she is 
musing about what it is like to see, say, the colour of a day-old-chick refers to all 
those experiences which ‘appropriately’ resemble the one actually quoted.36  To 
motivate this claim, Papineau relies on an analogy with how demonstratives like 
‘that colour’ refer not just to the actual shade the utterer is pointing at but to a whole 
range of similar shades resembling the one actually present.
Given this resemblance claim, note that the quotational model itself does not explain 
the semantic power of phenomenal concepts, i.e. does not provide an account of how 
phenomenal concepts refer. Rather, it is exactly the resemblance claim which tells us 
what the referents of certain phenomenal concepts are: those experiential states 
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36 Papineau argues that this ‘resemblance account’  can be applied to cases where one thinks about an 
experience one is actually having as well. The actual experience this introspective use of the 
experience operator prefixes, Papineau claims, is a vivid copy (rather than a faint one) of the 
experience of seeing yellow, because perceptual categorisation amplifies the actual perceptual 
experience. (Papineau simply assumes that one can consciously see, say, something yellow without 
seeing it as yellow—cf. Papineau, 2002, p. 121, Footnote 11.)
which resemble the actual experience being quoted by (i.e. filling the blank slot in) 
the experience operator. Surely, this is not much of an explanation of how 
phenomenal concepts refer until an account of resemblance is provided. For this 
purpose, Papineau turns toward a causal-teleosemantic theory of representation. As 
he puts it:
“All that is needed is that subjects be disposed to use these terms to respond to 
such resembling instances in a uniform way, and perhaps that these 
dispositions have an appropriate history. On the causal or teleosemantic 
account of representation that I am assuming, it  will be facts of this kind that 
determine the semantic power of terms which invoke appropriate resemblance 
to exemplars, whether or not the users of the terms articulate any  ideas of such 
resemblances. In particular, it  will be facts of this kind that will enable 
phenomenal concepts to refer to experiences which resemble ‘quoted’ 
exemplars appropriately.” (Papineau, 2002, p. 119)
That is, the resemblance claim only tells us what the referent of phenomenal 
concepts are—it does not tell us why phenomenal concepts so refer. For an answer to 
this latter question, one should turn to the causal-teleosemantic theory: phenomenal 
concepts refer to those experiences which resemble the one actually quoted because 
whichever of these ‘resembling experiences’ is instantiated it causes the application 
of the same phenomenal concept, or because tracking the appropriate set of 
resembling experiences is the very function of the particular phenomenal concept (cf. 
Papineau, 2002, p. 121). 
To sum up, Papineau’s quotational variant of the constitutional approach to 
phenomenal concepts relies on two distinct ideas to account for the crucial features 
of phenomenal concepts. The quotational model itself (i.e. that an experience 
operator gets applied on perceptual experiences) accounts for how experiences 
provide their own mode of presentation when picked out by  phenomenal concepts, 
whereas a causal-teleosemantic theory of representation accounts for how 
phenomenal concepts refer.
110
3.5 Phenomenal Concepts and Perception
In his more recent writings Papineau moves away from the quotational account of 
phenomenal concepts. He still thinks that phenomenal concepts has a close 
relationship  with perceptual states, but no longer thinks that the analogy with 
linguistic quotational marks correctly captures this relationship. In this section I 
introduce his new account of phenomenal concepts, with a particular focus on how 
phenomenal concepts fit into the process of perception.37
3.5.1 Perceptual concepts
Imagine that a true novice joins our master chicken sexer—it’s not just that she (the 
novice) has never ever tried to determine the sex of a day-old-chick, but  she has 
never ever seen a day-old-chick before. So when she stands next to the master 
chicken sexer and sees a day-old-chick for the first time, she might  form the thought 
‘oh, I haven’t seen anything like that before’. However, after this first encounter, she 
will become able to imaginatively re-create the day-old-chick in her mind, and 
recognise it upon new encounters. That is, the novice can form thoughts like ‘I 
wonder what that is called’ (recalling the first encounter from memory), or ‘that’s 
what I have seen today’ (skimming through the great handbook of chicken sexing 
later the evening of the first encounter).
The vehicles of thought deployed in these cases are so-called perceptual concepts. 
Perceptual concepts are the vehicles of thought making it possible for subjects to 
think about perceptible entities—entities featuring in one’s perceptual experiences. 
They  are formed upon the first encounter with a novel entity, and can later be 
111
37  Papineau motivates his shift from his original account to the new account by citing a challenge 
attributed to Tim Crane and Scott Sturgeon.  The challenge draws attention to the fact that on 
Papineau’s original account any exercise of a phenomenal concept “will demand the presence of the 
experience itself or an imaginatively re-created exemplar thereof” (Papineau, 2007, p. 112).  But the 
problem, then,  is that it seems impossible for Mary to think the following thought truly: “I am not now 
having that experience (nor re-creating it in my imagination)” (Papineau, 2007, pp.  112-113). In 
thinking this thought Mary would use the phenomenal concept just acquired. But Mary wouldn’t be 
able to think such a thought truly on Papineau’s original account,  since according to that the exercise 
of phenomenal concepts “did indeed depend on the presence of the of the experience or its 
imaginative re-creation” (Papineau, 2007, p. 113).
activated upon new encounters, or when imagining the entity without its actual 
presence.
Papineau draws attention to that though it might be tempting to think of such 
perceptual concepts as some kind of demonstratives (since their deployment is 
typically described by relying on the demonstrative term ‘that’—cf. above), 
nevertheless they are not demonstratives. As we have seen, demonstratives pick out 
different things in different contexts (cf. §3.3.2). As opposed to this, perceptual 
concepts pick out the same thing no matter what the actual context of their 
deployment is. Perceptual concepts track certain perceptible entities—it is not the 
case that they  pick out one entity at one time of deployment and a totally different 
entity at another time of deployment. To understand how they do so, it is useful to 
first see what Papineau thinks about the way  perceptual concepts fit into the 
workings of the perceptual system.
According to Papineau, the perceptual system generates certain sensory templates on 
the basis of the information collected and conveyed by the sensory organs.38 These 
templates, the realisation of which might be thought of as certain neural activation 
patterns, can be stored, and re-activated upon new encounters and imaginative re-
creation. Such sensory templates serve as the perceptual basis for categorising, 
recognising, and ultimately  tracking certain entities. The cognitive system is able to 
accumulate information about the entities these sensory templates stand for, and 
attach this body of information to the sensory template. Thus when the sensory 
template gets activated all this attached information gets activated as well39  thus 
enabling the subject to interact with the entity  not just on the basis of the information 
the subject’s perceptual system is able to collect during the actual encounter, but also 
on the basis of all the information that has been encoded and attached to the template 
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38  Papineau here follows Prinz (2002). Cf. §5.1.2 and §5.2.1 for more on the architecture of and the 
exact processes within the perceptual and cognitive systems.
39  Stored sensory templates might be activated in the sense that they get ‘resonated’  by certain 
incoming stimuli (cf. Papineau, 2007, p. 115). 
during previous encounters. For example, the novice chicken sexer might not have 
seen the eyes of the day-old-chick when she first saw it and was concentrating on its 
cloaca. Nevertheless, upon her next encounter with the chick when she has time to 
take a good look at the eyes as well, she is able to attach this information to the 
sensory  template, which in turn, from that moment on, will carry  information about 
both the eyes and the cloaca of the day-old-chick (cf. Papineau, 2007, pp. 114-115). 
A sensory template together with this body of attached information is what constitute 
a perceptual concept. That is, perceptual concepts consist of these two parts: the 
sensory  template and the attached body of information.40  Consequently, perceptual 
concepts are able to carry information from one use to another. It is exactly this 
feature, the capability  to carry  information from one use to another, which clearly 
distinguish perceptual concepts from demonstratives—demonstratives never carry 
information about the entity picked out by a previous use (cf. Papineau, 2007, p. 
115).41 
Given the idea that a perceptual concept accumulates information about a particular 
entity and makes it available for further use (guiding interactions, etc.) we 
immediately have a grasp on how perceptual concepts refer. The referential power of 
perceptual concepts is determined by their function to accumulate information about 
certain entities: a perceptual concept refer to that  entity which it accumulates 
information about. If the perceptual concept the novice chicken sexer forms upon her 
first encounter with a day-old-chick carries specific information about idiosyncratic 
features of the chick (e.g. the specific shape of its bill etc.) then the perceptual 
concept refers to the particular chick. If however, a perceptual concept carries 
information like ‘has yellow fur-like feather’ and nothing specific to a particular 
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40  Compare this to the files—with a P-slot for perceptual templates and an A-slot for abstract 
information—associated to concepts within the Fodorian framework. See §5.2.1 for a detailed 
discussion.
41  As Papineau puts it: “Information about an entity referred to by a demonstrative on one occasion 
will not in general apply to whatever entity happens to be the referent the next time the demonstrative 
is used.  By contrast, perceptual concepts are suited to serve as repositories of information precisely 
because they refer to the same thing whenever they are exercised.” (Papineau, 2007, p. 115)
chick, then it refers to the day-old-chick type. The point, as Papineau formulates it, is 
that “different sorts of information are projectible across encounters with different 
types of entities” (Papineau, 2007, p. 116). 
That is, the referent of a perceptual concept  is determined by the kind of information 
the given perceptual concept carries. If the kind of information carried by a 
perceptual concept is most appropriate to the day-old-chick type, then that perceptual 
concept will refer to the day-old-chick type. It the information carried is most 
appropriate to the particular day-old-chick, then the corresponding perceptual 
concept will refer to the particular chick (cf. Papineau, 2007, p. 117).42
Papineau argues that perceptual concepts form structured hierarchies (cf. Papineau, 
2007, p. 117).43  So, for example, in the case above, the perceptual concept of a 
particular day-old-chick adds extra information to the body of information of the 
perceptual concept picking out the day-old-chick type. Seen from the other direction, 
perceptual concepts picking out more and more abstract entities (say, birds, animals) 
can be formed by abstracting away from the specific information carried by  the 
perceptual concept referring to the day-old-chick type.44
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42  Subjects might not be particularly good at recognising certain entities—that is,  recognitional 
abilities can misfire. For this reason,  Papineau thinks that Loar is wrong in thinking of perceptual 
concepts as recognitional concepts. The novice chicken sexer might be unable to discriminate between 
the day-old-chicks she sees during her first and second encounters, nevertheless, this must not entail 
that she cannot think about a particular chick only about the chick type (cf. Papineau, 2007, p. 117).  
43 Within such a hierarchy, the activation of a specific perceptual concept automatically activates all of 
those more general perceptual concepts which ‘cover’  the referent of the specific one (cf. Papineau, 
2007, p. 117).
44 Papineau further argues that subjects are able to detach the body of information originally attached 
to a particular sensory template,  and store it in a non-perceptual ‘file’ which in turn accumulates 
information about the same entity the original perceptual concept does, but allows for non-perceptual 
thoughts about that entity. Such non-perceptual thoughts might be like the one the novice chicken 
sexer forms when later in the evening of the day of her first encounter with day-old-chicks she starts 
turning the pages of the great handbook of chicken sexing and thinks ‘I wonder if that cute little thing 
is in here’—without imaginatively re-creating the day-old-chick. Papineau argues that such non-
perceptual thoughts are possible and calls the concepts playing a part in forming them (i.e. the non-
perceptual ‘files’) perceptually derived concepts (cf. Papineau, 2007, pp. 118-119). 
3.5.2 Phenomenal concepts
Papineau equates conscious perceptual experiences with the activation of a certain 
range of perceptual concepts.45  He also assumes that the phenomenal character of 
conscious perceptual experiences is determined by the sensory templates involved in 
the perceptual concepts the activation of which constitute the conscious perceptual 
experiences in question. That is, on Papineau’s account, if, for example, the master 
chicken sexer deploys the same sensory template when thinking about a particular 
day-old-chick, which is also deployed by the novice chicken sexer when she thinks 
about the day-old-chick type, then the phenomenal character (the ‘what-it-is-
likeness’) of the two experiences they are having will be the same (cf. Papineau, 
2007, pp. 117-118).46
Phenomenal concepts—the mantra of this chapter says—are our vehicles of thought 
when thinking about the phenomenal character of conscious experiences. Given that 
this phenomenology is tied to the stored sensory templates, it is a natural idea that we 
use these very  sensory templates to think about the phenomenology itself. This is 
exactly  the main idea behind Papineau’s new account of phenomenal concepts. As he 
puts it:
“I want now to suggest that we think of phenomenal concepts as simply a 
further deployment of the same sensory templates, but in this case being used 
to think about perceptual experiences themselves rather than about the objects 
of those experiences.” (Papineau, 2007, p. 122) 
That is, when the novice chicken sexer first sees a day-old-chick she forms a 
corresponding sensory template. With the aid of this template she can think several 
different thoughts. For example, she can think about the particular day-old-chick. In 
this case, she uses the template to accumulate information about the particular chick 
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45  What Papineau has in mind here is that activations at early stages of visual processing, though 
might qualify as perceptual concepts as defined by him, most probably do not constitute conscious 
experiences. Compare this with my core hypothesis in §4.2.3.
46 See also in §5.2.
by collecting information appropriate to the particular chick and attaching it to the 
template. Alternatively, she can think about the day-old-chick type. In this case, she 
uses the very  same template to accumulate information about the day-old-chick type 
by attaching such information to the template which is appropriate to the type. Or, 
Papineau argues, she can think about seeing a day-old-chick. In this last case, she 
uses the template to accumulate information about the conscious experience itself, 
i.e. she attaches experience-specific information to the template. This use of the 
sensory  template, then, constitutes a phenomenal concept. That is, phenomenal 
concepts consist of sensory templates plus experience-specific information attached 
to them. And just as a perceptual concept consisting of a sensory  template and some, 
say, a particular day-old-chick specific information attached to it  refers to that 
particular day-old-chick, a phenomenal concept consisting of the same sensory 
template plus some ‘the experience of seeing a day-old-chick’ specific information 
attached to it picks out the experience of seeing a day-old-chick as its referent.47
This is Papineau’s new account of phenomenal concepts. Note that this new account 
shares an important feature with Papineau’s original quotational account: 
phenomenal concepts use an experience in order to mention it (cf. Papineau, 2007, p. 
123). According to the original quotational account  phenomenal concepts consisted 
of an experience operator of the form ‘that experience: ---’ plus a particular 
perceptual experience filling the blank slot of the operator. Within this framework, a 
phenomenal concept refers to an experience by  using it in the sense of involving it 
inside the experience operator.48 According to Papineau’s new account, phenomenal 
concepts consist of a sensory  template and some information specific (most 
appropriate) to that  experience type. Within this new framework, a phenomenal 
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47  Papineau argues that since particular experiences, unlike particular spatiotemporal entities, do not 
persist over time they cannot re-occur, i.e. subjects cannot re-encounter with particular experiences. 
Hence,  experiences-specific information attached to a sensory template is always experience-type-
specific, and thus phenomenal concepts refer to experience types rather than token experiences. 
Consequently, in order to pick out a particular experience, one cannot rely solely on phenomenal 
concepts—one needs to rely on further descriptions like ‘the particular experience I am having 
now’ (cf. Papineau, 2007, p. 123). 
48 To be more precise: phenomenal concept within the quotational framework refer to experiences 
resembling the one being involved inside the experience operator—cf. §3.4.2.
concept refers to an experience type by using it in the sense that an instance of that 
experience type goes with the stored sensory template and thus becomes activated 
whenever the phenomenal concept in question is exercised. In this sense, thus, 
Papineau’s new account provides a similar explanation of how experiences provide 
their own mode of presentation when picked out by phenomenal concepts: the 
experience-type is mentioned by using an instance of the experience-type itself.49
I would like to close this chapter by drawing attention to how Papineau’s new 
account anchors phenomenal concepts in the process of perception. In doing so, it 
sets the stage for the main part of this dissertation: the discussion of certain features 
of perceptual representations (cf. Chapter 4), and a detailed analysis of how these 
features can determine the special characteristics of phenomenal concepts, or even 
account for the classical target phenomena of Phenomenal Concept Strategy  without 
relying on specific conceptual features—and thus provide an alternative to 
phenomenal concepts based approaches (cf. Chapter 5).50
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49  Papineau answers the challenge originally motivating him to turn away from the quotational 
account (cf. Footnote 37 in the beginning of §3.5) by claiming that just as it is possible to derive non-
perceptual files from perceptual concepts it is also possible to derive non-perceptual files from 
phenomenal concepts. Such files stores and accumulates information about certain experience-types, 
without also including a sensory template. Since, as we have seen, the phenomenology goes with the 
sensory template, such derived files have no phenomenology. Analogously to perceptually derived 
concepts, these files might be called phenomenally derived concepts. They make it possible for 
subjects to think thoughts like ‘I am not now having that experience (nor re-creating it in my 
imagination)’, i.e. to think about experiences in a non-phenomenal way, since exercising these 
phenomenally derived concepts does not activate the experiences they mention.
50  In this chapter I concentrated on introducing the fundamental idea behind, and the difference 
between the main versions of Phenomenal Concept Strategy. For arguments against this strategy, see 
Chalmers (2007), Levine (2007), or White (2007). For arguments answering the challenges raised by 
these authors and thus defending Phenomenal Concept Strategy, see, for example, Block (2007), 
Papineau (2007), Levin (2008), Diaz-Leon (2008, 2010), or Balog (2012b).
Part 2
The Monadic Marker Account
Chapter 4: 
Monadic Markers
4.1 Three Observations about Conscious Experience
Imagine a new-born joey. Wait, you haven’t seen one yet? No worries, I can tell you 
how it looks. Imagine a foetus with forelegs only. Oh, you haven’t  seen a foetus 
either? All right, imagine then a bean-shaped creature approximately the size of a 
lima bean. Now imagine that it  has tiny arms: there are two cylinder shaped 
outgrowths on each side of the bean (these are the upper arms) and there is a cone 
shaped formation (the forearm) connected to each cylinder with an elbow. And 
imagine that it is pinkish.
4.1.1 Structure in experiences
Can a description like the one above help in getting a grip on what it is like to see a 
new-born joey? It seems to be a safe bet to say that it  can. After all, it is quite similar 
to those everyday descriptions we often give when we would like to help someone 
imagine something unseen—and we usually succeed. In order to see what the 
relevant factors are in these descriptions, consider two thought experiments.
First, imagine a marsupial-expert, Josephine, who knows everything there is to know 
about marsupials: how they mate, how young ones are born, how they  make their 
way up through the fur of the mother into the pouch, and so on. However, imagine 
that Josephine has never ever seen a joey; she has spent all her life locked up  in a 
room deprived of all joey  sights. She has been carefully trained: no photographs, no 
pictures, not even a sketch of a joey has ever been presented to her. Nonetheless, she 
has been given as detailed as possible descriptions about the shape, colour and size 
of all different kinds of marsupials including new-born joeys. Now consider this 
question: can Josephine imagine what it is like to see a new-born joey on the basis of 
these descriptions alone, without actually seeing one?
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Second, consider the more extreme case, where Josephine is deprived of all shape 
sights. Imagine, for example, that Josephine has been given glasses at her birth 
imitating the effect  of a cataract: she might see some colours, but not definite shapes
—all visual experiences she can ever have are blurry. Furthermore, imagine that she 
has even been deprived of all tactile shape stimuli as well, just in case the answer to 
Molyneux’s question (Locke, 1690/1987; Fazekas & Zemplén, 2005) turned out to 
be affirmative.1 Now imagine, that our shape-deprived Josephine is provided with all 
the descriptions the original marsupial-deprived Josephine has ever been given, and 
consider the question if shape-deprived Josephine can imagine what it is like to see a 
new-born joey.
Intuitively it seems that the two cases above are different. In the first case, it seems 
true that Josephine knows (i.e. is able to imagine) what it is like to see a new-born 
joey. After all, in the first case, Josephine is in a position analogous to the position 
fellows of the Royal Society of the early  1800s were in, who learned everything 
possible about marsupials solely from the written reports of the expeditions sent to 
discover the new land of Australia—and it seems reasonable to suppose that they 
could imagine how, say, kangaroos or joeys looked like well before the first sketches 
arrived.
Contrary  to this, in the second case Josephine seems to lack the relevant knowledge: 
it seems that she would learn something new if her glasses were taken off and a joey 
was presented to her. Intuitively, she wouldn’t be in a better position even if she was 
not only a marsupial-expert (thanks to the descriptions given to her), but omniscient 
with respect  to all the physical facts—if she knew everything there is to know about 
the physical world in terms of descriptions (say, if the book of all physical 
knowledge, famous Mary is using, had been read out loud to Josephine).
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1 Though see Held et al. (2011) showing that the newly sighted fail to match seen with felt.
Shape-deprived Josephine has never ever had a shape experience, and thus is 
unfamiliar with shapes in general. Just as Mary, who lacks all relevant colour 
concepts2, shape-deprived Josephine lacks all the relevant shape-related concepts. 
This is the main difference between shape-deprived Josephine and marsupial-
deprived Josephine: the latter possesses a lot of shape-related concepts ready at hand 
to be deployed when interpreting the descriptions given to her. Contrary to this, 
shape-deprived Josephine has no grounds whatsoever to grasp the meaning of the 
descriptions informing her about the shape of a new-born joey.3 
The descriptions in question are useful because they inform the uninformed about a 
certain shape by decomposing the original shape into parts (simpler constituent 
shapes) and determining the relative positions of these parts. Describing a new-born 
joey  as a lima been with two cylinders and two cones attached to it at the right places 
is useful only for those who are familiar with how beans, cylinders and cones look 
like. Marsupial-deprived Josephine is such a person, shape-deprived Josephine is not. 
In other words, seeing a joey  is a complex experience. It is complex in the sense that 
the content of the experience itself (i.e. what one experiences) has constituent parts—
parts that one is able to discern within one’s complex experience, and can be contents 
of experiences on their own right. One can have independent, stand-alone 
experiences of such constituents without necessarily experiencing other parts of the 
original complex experience, or without the presence of anything else at all in the 
experience (other than the constituent in question). So, for example, seeing a joey is 
a complex experience: one is able to discern and recognise a tiny arm or the colour 
pink within one’s experience of seeing a joey. Moreover, one can undergo the 
experience of seeing tiny arms without  they necessarily being connected to a lima 
bean shaped creature (or to anything at all), and similarly seeing something pinkish 
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2 The relevant concepts in question, of course, are phenomenal concepts, not ordinary language colour 
concepts. Cf. §3.1.
3 See §4.1.2 for a detailed discussion of why this is so.
might just as well be experienced on its own by, say, staring at a pink wall from 20 
centimetres as in a Ganzfeld-experience (Metzger, 1930).4
Note that these parts freely recombine. One can have an experience of seeing a 
sphere instead of the lima bean with exactly the same tiny arms attached to it, or one 
can undergo the experience of seeing beans, cylinders, cones attached to each other 
in the right (joey-ish) sort of way but painted in blue. This is exactly what  happens in 
the first case. Marsupial-deprived Josephine has never ever seen a joey, but since she 
is familiar with experiences of seeing beans, cylinders, cones, and the colour pink, 
she is able to recombine these in a way she has never experienced them before. Thus, 
on the basis of the description informing her how to combine the constituents, she is 
able to learn what it is like to see a new-born joey.5
In the second case, though, shape-deprived Josephine is not able to imagine what it is 
like to see a new-born joey. The reason for this is that she is not familiar with the 
relevant constituent parts. Since she wears cataract-glasses she has never ever seen 
beans, cylinders or cones. Nor has she seen anything more basic like straight lines, 
curves, etc. She might have ideas about what pinkish looks like but she is unable to 
combine seeing something pinkish with anything with a definite shape, no matter 
how detailed descriptions about the particular shape is given to her, simply because 
she has no access to experiences of simple shapes and thus she is unable to combine 
them into more complex shapes. 
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4 For the sake of brevity, in what follows I will talk about e.g. the experience of seeing a tiny arm as a 
constituent part of the experience of seeing a joey, or, in general, about experiences being constituted 
by less complex experiences.  By using this expression, however, I do not intend to imply that 
experiences are indeed constituted by other experiences. This way of talking should be understood as 
a shorthand for the case where one can discern and attend to a part of what one is experiencing—a 
part, which could be the content of a standalone experience on its own right.
5 Note that the first person who has ever sketched an imaginary creature, say, a dragon or a unicorn 
was quite similar to marsupial-deprived Josephine (or to Royal Society fellows of the 1800s) in terms 
of being deprived of some complex (in this case, dragon or unicorn) sights. Still, she could imagine 
what it was like to see the creature in question, and produce the corresponding sketch.
Experiences have structure: there are complex experiences constituted by  less 
complex parts. These less complex parts can have further constituents, which 
themselves might just as well be built  up from still less complex parts, etc. For 
example, the experience of seeing a new-born joey  has as its constituent part the 
experience of seeing a tiny  arm, which in turn has as its constituent part the 
experience of seeing a cone-shaped formation.
There seem to be, however, a bottom level. At that level units constituting higher 
level complexes themselves have no further constituent parts—they are simple: none 
of their parts can be the content of standalone experiences. For example, the 
experience of seeing a new-born joey also has as its constituent part the experience 
of seeing something pinkish. Even if some (cf. Boynton, 1997; Tye, 2000) argue that 
seeing something pink is a complex experience having constituents like seeing 
something red and something white, it  seems reasonable to argue that at least unique 
hue experiences—seeing something red, yellow, green, or blue (as seen in a 
Ganzfeld, for example)—are simple colour experiences.6  They have no constituent 
parts whatsoever. Though unique hues themselves have certain fundamental features 
like hue, saturation and lightness (or brightness) these are not apt for being contents 
of stand-alone experiences. One cannot have an experience of seeing a particular hue 
without necessarily seeing saturation and lightness at the same time.7
That is, from the cases of the two (the marsupial-deprived and the shape-deprived) 
Josephines we can conclude on the following observations:
(O1) Most experiences are structured.
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6  See, for example, Hardin (1988) and Thompson (2000) for an argument claiming that all colour 
experiences are simple in the above sense.
7  Cf.  Jakab (2000) for a similar claim. Jakab tries to account for the ineffability of experiences in 
terms of absence of constituent structure of certain experiences. Note, however, that Jakab does not 
differentiate between claims about the structure of experiences and claims about the structure of 
representational states—he uses constituent structure in the sense of syntactic structure and ties it to 
representational atomism. Contrary to his account, here I treat phenomenological structure and 
representational structure separately, and it is a particular aim of my approach to establish a relation 
between the two. Cf. §4.2 and especially §4.4.1.
Typically, experiences are complex—they have discernible constituent 
structure with discernible parts that, in themselves, could occur as contents of 
standalone experiences.
(O2) Some experiences are unstructured.
Some experiences are simple, without any constituent structure—they have no 
discernible parts that could be contents of standalone experiences.
4.1.2 Structure and phenomenal character
So far we have seen that Josephine is able to imagine what complex experiences 
might be like solely on the basis of descriptions specifying constituent parts and their 
relative positions—if, and only if, she is already familiar with (i.e. has previously 
experienced) the constituents in question.
Note that what happens here is Josephine concluding on the phenomenal character of 
complex experiences on the basis of the phenomenal character of simple experiences 
plus descriptions. Complex experiences, just  as simple ones, have phenomenal 
character. There is something it is like to see something red, and similarly, there is 
something it is like to see a new-born joey. What Josephine’s example shows is that 
the phenomenal character of complex experiences can be accounted for in terms of 
the phenomenal character of experiencing their constituent parts8 plus descriptions 
about the structure the constituent parts are organised into when forming the content 
of the complex experience.
These structural descriptions rely on spatial terms expressing the relative positions of 
the constituents. These spatial terms are the regular spatial terms utilised in forming 
physical descriptions, e.g. ‘below’, ‘next to’, etc. That is, it is possible to conclude on 
the phenomenal character of complex experiences solely on the basis of the 
phenomenal character of simple experience plus physical description.
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8 In the sense emphasised in Footnote 4 above in §4.1.1.
In fact, this is a quite interesting feature of having complex experiences. It seems that 
physical descriptions can convey relevant information about the discernible structure 
of conscious experiences. In other words, there seems to be some sort of overlap 
between phenomenal structure and physical structure. The experience of seeing a 
new-born joey is a complex experience with some internal phenomenal structure. As 
we have seen, the phenomenal character of such an experience is partly determined 
by a description (conveying information about the relative position of the 
constituents), which is formulated in purely physical (spatial) terms. To put it in 
another way: the phenomenal structure one can discern in one’s complex experience 
(representing spatial structure) can only  be characterised with the very  same spatial 
vocabulary one deploys when one characterises regular spatial relations in physical 
descriptions.
To support this claim, consider the intuitive difference between the cases of Mary 
and shaped-deprived Josephine. Whereas Mary  is able to make sense of the 
information about the stimuli resulting in regular colour experiences conveyed by the 
descriptions given to her, it seems that the same task is problematic for shape-
deprived Josephine. Though Mary cannot imagine red, green, etc., she is perfectly 
able to understand concepts like surface reflectance, electromagnetic waves and 
wavelengths, and thus has no problems with the descriptions given to here. Contrary 
to this, since what shape-deprived Josephine cannot imagine are exactly  those 
features, which play an important part in the very descriptions informing her about 
the physical bases of shape vision—e.g. an object having straight or curved edges, 
etc.—shape-deprived Josephine lacks the relevant concepts, which could help  her in 
making sense of the descriptions provided to her.
That is, a shape-deprived subject cannot interpret descriptions characterising shapes. 
Shape experiences are quite unique in that  their phenomenal characteristics 
‘resemble’ in some sense the physical characteristics of the objects they represent. 
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Shape experiences are described by  the very same vocabulary one uses to describe 
the shape of the object stimulus. Compare this with other types of experiences. Just 
as colour-deprived Mary has no problems using a colour-term neglecting vocabulary 
to talk about the features of lightwaves, a smell-deprived subject could just  as well 
understand descriptions characterising the shape of molecules9, or a sound-deprived 
subject the features (e.g. frequency, intensity) of compressed air. The fact that the 
vocabularies describing the physical features of the stimuli giving rise to colours, 
smells, etc. are different from the vocabularies describing the phenomenology tied to 
these experiences—whereas in the case of shapes and spatial relations in general 
there is no such different vocabulary—informs us about that, in a certain respect, 
attending to shape-percepts can tell us more about actual shapes (the object stimulus 
leading to shape-percepts, i.e. the spatial distribution of matter) than attending to 
colour-percepts can about actual colours (the object stimulus leading to colour-
percepts, i.e. surface reflectances)—cf. Kulvicki (2005). There is something more to 
colours (and smells etc.) than what is presented by experiences—and only colour 
(etc.) science can tell us what it is (e.g. surface reflectance). In contrast  with this, 
shape perceptions seem to reveal what there is to be known about shapes (the edges, 
corners, curves they have); we do not need shape science to do this.10
To recap: whereas the structure of colour-, smell-, or sound (etc.) experiences is 
unlike physical structure11, the structure of shape experiences is ‘similar’ to the 
physical (spatial) structure of the objects triggering the visual system. This is in fact 
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9 Or their vibrations (cf. Turin, 2006).
10  Cf. also Jakab (2003, 2006) who argues that shape experiences are revelatory in a sense in which 
colour experiences are not. Note that one might want to argue here that the fact that for characterising 
the phenomenal structure of shape experiences one needs to rely on the very same vocabulary which 
is also deployed for the characterisation of regular spatial relations is only a sign of the transparency 
of experience rather than a clue to the nature of the structure of experiences. This line of thought, 
however, will not work, since the transparency claim applies to colour experiences as well—it seems 
that our experiences present objects as being coloured. However, there is a separate vocabulary for 
characterising the object stimulus of colour experiences,  whereas such a distinct vocabulary is not 
available for shapes. That is, the point is not that objects and experiences of them can be characterised 
with the same vocabulary, but rather that there is an alternative vocabulary available for the 
characterisation of the object stimuli of certain experiences (e.g. colours, smells, etc.) whereas there is 
no such alternative available for other experiences (e.g. shapes).
11 I.e. physical structure of the objects represented.
Locke’s observation about the distinction between primary and secondary properties 
(Locke, 1690/1987): whereas our ideas of primary  properties (e.g. shapes in 
particular and spatial relations in general) resemble primary properties themselves, 
our ideas of secondary  properties (e.g. colours, smells, etc.) do not resemble 
secondary properties.12
The moral is that for characterising the internal phenomenal structure of complex 
experiences we use the very same expressions and terms, which are usually  deployed 
when characterising physical spatiotemporal structure. This is why purely physical 
descriptions conveying information about physical structure can really  help  someone 
imagine having a complex experience.
This structural aspect is definitely part of the phenomenal quality of conscious 
experience. Seeing a particular shape (say, the shape of a new-born joey) could not 
be like what it is without certain information about structure being conveyed in the 
experience. That is, physical descriptions can and do penetrate the realm of 
phenomenal characters—a significant amount of information about the phenomenal 
character of complex experiences can be depicted by  physical descriptions. 
Consequently, there is no further explanatory (or in general: epistemic—cf. §2.2) gap 
related to the phenomenal character of complex experiences given that one is 
familiar with the simple experiences constituting the complex one in question. 
Physical descriptions do their work, and inform those who are acquainted with the 
items mentioned by the descriptions what it is like to see a complex experience (say 
a new-born joey). 
Still, this structural aspect does not  exhaust the phenomenal character of complex 
experiences, since simple experiences have phenomenal character as well. This is our 
third observation regarding structure in experiences:
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12 This Lockean resemblance-claim is often debated.  See §5.3.1 for an extensive argument in favour of 
a distinction between primary and secondary properties.
(O3) PhenQual (complex) = PhenQual (simple) + Structure
The phenomenal aspect of having a complex experience is
jointly determined by
(a) the structure simple constituents are organised into, and
(b)  the phenomenal aspect of these simple constituents. 
Note, that the structural aspect can wholly  be captured by  descriptions deploying 
solely  physical terminology; it is the phenomenal aspect  of simple constituent 
experiences that seems to resist reductive explanation.13  Thus the epistemic gap—
even in the case of complex experiences—stems from a gap between our knowledge 
of the phenomenal character of simple experiences and our physical knowledge.
4.1.3 Further defending the observations made
So far I have made three observations and formulated three corresponding claims. 
(O1) says that most experiences are structured in the sense that  they have discernible 
constituent structure with discernible parts which could occur as contents of 
standalone experiences. (O2) says that there are some experiences which are 
unstructured in the sense that  they have no constituent  structure, no discernible parts 
that could be contents of standalone experiences. (O3) says that the phenomenal 
character of complex experiences is jointly determined by  the phenomenal character 
of their constituents plus the structure these constituents are organised into. 
Despite the arguments provided in the previous section, one might find these claims 
unsupported. That is, one might feel tempted to resist accepting these observations. 
In this section I investigate how one might  reject (O1), (O2), or (O3)—and defend 
them against possible objections. In the course of this endeavour, I shall further 
clarify how these observational claims might best be understood.
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13 Cf. Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.
Take (O1) first. One might want to argue against (O1) by pointing out that the 
argument claiming that something is structured because it is made up from certain 
parts mixed together in a certain way is, in fact, inconclusive: it very well might be 
the case that though certain parts together constitute a new entity, this new entity is 
an indecomposable holistic mixture of its parts; i.e. the whole itself is unstructured. 
For example, if one adds salt to a glass of water and stirs it, then the resulting salty 
water does not seem to be structured in any  relevant sense. Note, however, that I try 
to support the claim that  there are structured experiences by thought experiments 
(marsupial-deprived Josephine) and real-world examples (fellows of the British 
Society of the 1800s) purportedly  showing that it is possible for one to imagine 
having a previously unexperienced complex experience on the basis of a description 
mentioning experiential constituents (which have already been experienced on their 
own or as parts of other experiences the subject has previously had) plus their 
structure (typically  spatial arrangement). The very fact that as a result of such an 
imaginative exercise (i.e. trying to imagine having an experience of, say, seeing a 
previously  unseen object) one becomes able to recognise the very  object in question 
shows that the constituent parts and their structure are discernible within the result. If 
the result were a novel indecomposable holistic mixture then one would not be able 
to recognise it solely  on the basis of a description mentioning only its constituents 
and the way they are mixed.  
Also note that (O1) is a claim about the phenomenology of having an experience of 
an object. It  is the phenomenal character of a complex experience which is such that 
one is able to discern constituent structure and parts in it. Here the opponent, 
however, might try  to resist again. For couldn’t it be the case that those experiences I 
dubbed complex are, in fact, phenomenologically holistic and unstructured, and the 
structure one is able to discern is only  representational structure? Such experiences 
would represent complex objects, but the way it is like to have them would be 
unstructured. As a first part of my answer, note that experiences which are 
phenomenally unstructured but nevertheless stand for complex structured objects are 
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possible. In §4.3 I discuss in great detail how phenomenally simple unstructured 
experiences can represent complex structured objects.14 However, experiences of this 
latter kind are such that one is unable to discern structure in them—after all, this is 
what being phenomenally unstructured amounts to. If internal structure is 
phenomenally unavailable for the subject in her conscious experience then it is 
impossible for the subject to discern any kind of representational structure in her 
experience. This is the very idea behind the transparency thesis, i.e. the claim that 
being aware of the phenomenal qualities of a conscious experience amounts to being 
aware of the qualities of the object the experience represents (cf. e.g. Tye, 2000),15 
and one of the main motivations behind representational theories of consciousness 
(cf. Lycan, 2008).16  That  is, the opponent’s two conditions, i.e. having a 
phenomenally holistic and unstructured experience, and nevertheless being able to 
discern representational structure within the experience contradict with each other, 
and thus cannot be the case all at once. I conclude that there is discernible structure 
in certain experiences, and this structure is structure within the phenomenal character 
of those experiences.17
Take (O2) next. Here the fundamental claim is that there are some experiences in the 
case of which the subject is not able to discern any  kind of constituent structure. The 
paradigmatic examples used were homogeneous unique hue experiences. Note again, 
that this claim is also about the phenomenal character of experiences. The central 
observation behind the claim is that when one considers what it  is like to have, say, a 
yellow experience, then one is unable to discern constituent parts within the yellow 
experience in the same way one can discern constituent parts within a new-born joey, 
or a day-old-chick experience. However, one might want to object here that we 
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14 See also §5.1.
15 See also Footnote 7 in §2.1.1.
16 Note, however, that even if I hold (O1), it does not commit me to representationalism. See §4.3 and 
§5.3.1 for arguments which run straight against representationalism.
17  Note that my claim about the complexity and structure of certain experiences is compatible both 
with the unity of consciousness (cf.  Brook & Raymont, 2010), and with such structure being dynamic 
(cf. Metzinger, 1995).
cannot make such an observation. We never really experience unique hues in 
themselves—rather we experience certain objects as being yellow. And in these cases 
it is not so straightforward that  one cannot discern some internal structure within the 
phenomenology of one’s experience. To overcome this obstacle, relying on 
homogeneous unique hue experiences as subjects can have them in a Ganzfeld-
setting was my strategy above. However, one could argue (as, in fact, e.g. Metzinger 
and Walde (2000) have argued) that homogeneous colour experiences in a Ganzfeld-
setting fail to qualify as ‘experiences on their own right’, since they typically vanish 
within 3-6 minutes (cf. Metzinger & Walde, 2000, p. 355). This, however, doesn’t 
affect my argument. On the one hand, experiencing homogenous unique hues in a 
Ganzfeld-setting for 3-6 minutes is an experience good enough. On the other hand, 
and more importantly, it has never been a part of the line of thought above that one 
has to experience the so called simple (i.e. unstructured) experiences in themselves. 
One is able to imagine what it is like to see a day-old-chick even if one has never 
ever seen a day old chick, and never ever had a homogeneous yellow experience 
(never participated in a Ganzfeld experiment). What matters is having previous 
experiences within which one could discern those constituent parts which are 
mentioned in the descriptions used in the imagination task. Simple experiences, as it 
has been already noted, can freely recombine.
That is, the main point of (O2) is that when one discerns certain constituent structure 
within one’s complex experience, then it  is often the case that there is a hierarchy 
within this structure: certain constituent parts have further discernible constituents 
etc. However, there seem to be certain experiences which can be discerned as 
constituents of other experiences, but they  themselves have no further discernible 
constituents. Experiencing yellow is such an experience. These experiences might be 
experienced on their own, as for example in a Ganzfeld-setting (for 3-6 minutes), but 
this is not a crucial requirement. What is crucial, though, is that they have no 
constituents which could be discerned and independently experienced even for 1 
second.
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Finally, take (O3). This last  claim seems to be the most controversial and contra-
intuitive of all, mainly because the very idea behind it—that one is able to conclude 
on the phenomenal character of a complex (yet unexperienced) experience solely on 
the basis of knowing the phenomenal character of its constituents (i.e. on the basis of 
previously  experiencing these constituents either in separation or as parts of other 
complexes) and a description detailing how these constituents are arranged—seems 
to be questionable, and has to face with some straightforward counterexamples. 
Consider for example a Hermann grid (Hermann, 1870), and someone who has never 
ever seen a Hermann grid before (but has nevertheless had normal visual experiences 
involving rectangles, squares, black and white). Now run the following thought 
experiment: imagine this Hermann-grid-deprived individual who is given a 
description telling her about a grid-map with white streets (rectangles) and black 
squares between them, and then asked to imagine what it is like to see a Hermann 
grid. Will this Hermann-grid-deprived individual be surprised when she first has the 
chance to see a real Hermann grid? Most probably, the opponent would argue, yes, 
since even if she could imagine white streets bordering black squares, she would 
definitely not expect to see grey parches in those street crossings she is not directly 
looking at. That is, those knowing what it  is like to see white rectangles and black 
squares will not know what it is like to see a Hermann-grid (which consists of 
nothing more than white rectangles and black squares), even if they are told how 
these constituents are arranged. The phenomenal character of the whole seems to be 
more than the phenomenal character of the parts plus structure.18 
Note, however, that this is a counterexample to a claim which has never been 
intended to be implied by (O3). (O3) is not the claim that the phenomenal character 
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18 Other nice examples, involving only basic shapes, might be the Zöllner illusion or the Poggendorff 
illusion (cf. Zöllner, 1860). In the case of the Poggendorf illusion, for example, a straight black line is 
crossing behind a white rectangle with black borders at an angle of 45 degrees.  Anyone,  who is 
Poggendorf-illusion-deprived might be expected to be able to imagine (if familiar with black lines and 
white rectangles) how the Poggendorf illusion would look like—except, that most probably they 
would be wrong: when actually experiencing the Poggendorf illusion subjects see the two parts of the 
black line on the two sides of the white rectangle as being offset rather than aligned.
of experiencing a complex object is jointly determined by  the phenomenal character 
of experiencing parts of the object plus the structure the parts of the object are 
arranged into when forming the object. Rather, it  is the claim that the phenomenal 
character of experiencing certain constituents discernible as constituents of a 
complex experience plus structural descriptions detailing the discernible structure of 
the complex experience jointly determine the phenomenal character of the complex 
experience in question. That is, the description provided should not be about how the 
object stimulus is structured, but rather how the complex experience of seeing the 
object stimulus is structured. So the alternative thought experiment—the one (O3) 
does rely on—goes like this. Ask the Hermann-grid-deprived individual to imagine a 
grid-map with white streets and black squares between them and grey patches in the 
street crossings except the one she is directly looking at. After given this description 
(and given that she has already seen white, black, grey, squares and rectangles) will 
the subject be surprised when presented with a Hermann grid? (O3) claims that no, 
she won’t be. There might very well be special rules characterising how the human 
visual system integrates information which result in illusory  percepts,19  this, 
however, has nothing to do with (O3). (O3) is a claim about phenomenal character 
and phenomenal structure.20
4.2 Three Claims about Perceptual Representations
Having made the observations above about structure in experiences, in what follows 
I shall turn towards the representational underpinnings of conscious experiences with 
the purpose of trying to find a similar pattern in the cognitive-representational realm. 
That is, in the following sections I shall concentrate on whether there is anything 
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19  In the case of the Hermann-grid, see Baumgartner (1960) and Schiller and Carvey (2005) for 
explaining the mechanisms underlying the perceived illusion.
20 A similar answer can be given to any example relying on Gestalt effects and the Law of Prägnanz.
cognitive- and neuroscience can inform us about that might be corresponded to the 
observations made at the phenomenal level.21 
With regard to the representational level, one might feel tempted here to object  that 
what I have said so far is quite reminiscent of the obsolete theory of structuralism 
(e.g. Titchner, 1929). According to structuralism, complex mental phenomena are 
generated via assembling fundamental building blocks. For example, the building 
blocks of the perceived shape of an object are simple sensations with determinate 
quality, intensity, duration, etc. Structuralists claimed that the mind worked in 
accordance with the slogan ‘the whole is equal to the sum of its parts’. 
However, structuralism has soon been questioned on methodological grounds.22 
Moreover, Gestalt psychology (cf. e.g. Wertheimer, 1958) straightforwardly denied 
the basic tenet of structuralism and argued that  the fundamental operation of the 
mind is holistic (slogan-wise: the whole is more than the sum of its parts). This 
holistic operation is based on organisational principles (law of closure, law of 
similarity, law of proximity, etc.). In short, according to gestaltism, a complex 
perceived shape is not generated from assembling simple parts but is perceptually 
primary—a direct result of the way the perceptual system operates. Therefore, the 
opponent might want to conclude, the way I have characterised the phenomenal 
quality of complex experiences must be flawed.
True, structuralism is problematic (however, mainly on only  methodological 
grounds), and my account of the phenomenal character of complex experiences 
seems to be in tension with Gestalt  principles. This tension, however, as we have 
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21 This strategy is standard in scientific endeavours seeking for relations between different realms or 
explanations of certain phenomena in terms of other phenomena. See §7 for a quite detailed 
discussion of this issue. 
22  Structuralism relied on analytic introspection, a method which was supposed to provide 
scientifically reliable data about the basic constituents of experiences via introspective descriptions. 
However, analytic introspection was found to be unreliable: different subjects gave different 
descriptions even under similar experimental conditions. 
already seen it, is only superficial.23 Moreover, this objection misses the whole point 
of the previous section. What has been said so far is not intended as a theory of how 
perception works. (Remember, the debate between structuralists and Gestalt 
psychologists is about how the process of perception goes.) The claim of §4.1 is not 
that the process of perception generates complex experiences via combining simple 
experiences into a structure depicted by the physical descriptions in question. Rather, 
the claim is only that  such structure is present in one’s conscious experience. What 
the underlying mechanisms generating conscious experience are is another matter. 
In the rest of this chapter, I am going to turn towards this question. In what follows, I 
will assume that  there are certain perceptual representations corresponding to 
conscious experiences24. First, in the remaining part of §4.2 I shall make and defend 
three claims about the characteristics of the representations in question,25 and then 
refine them on the bases of theoretical considerations coming from, and empirical 
evidences provided by state-of-the-art cognitive neuroscience. §4.3.1 and §4.3.2 shall 
clarify the consequences of the representational features §4.2 sheds light on. Finally, 
§4.3.3 shall introduce how the three observations of §4.1 and the three claims of §4.2 
together lead to an account of conscious experience, and how this account fits into 
contemporary theories of consciousness.
4.2.1 Simple and complex representations
First of all, note that the observations presented in §4.1 match up with classical 
accounts of vision and object recognition (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Marr, 1982; 
Biederman, 1987) quite well. 
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23 See §4.1.3 and especially Footnote 20 there.
24  §4.3.3 clarifies in exactly what sense perceptual representations correspond to conscious 
experiences.
25  Neither of these claims are committed to problematic structuralist principles. In fact, both are 
compatible with modern approaches to the process of perception relying on multiple channels (F. 
Campbell & Robson, 1968) and even Bayesian inferences (cf. §4.2.2 and §4.2.3).
According to Biederman (1987), for example, the perceptual mechanism responsible 
for object recognition proceeds as follows. First, the perceptual system generates 
representations of primitive components and provides information about how these 
components are arranged. Then characteristics of the components and their 
arrangement is matched to representations of objects in the memory (where a 
representation of an object is basically a structural description expressing the 
relations among the components). The primitive components (called geons, standing 
for geometrical ions) are hypothesised to be simple, typically  symmetrical volumes 
lacking sharp concavities, such as blocks, cylinders, spheres, and wedges.
Biederman’s theory clearly has close ties to the fundamental idea behind 
structuralism. However, on the one hand, it is free from the problematic 
methodological toolkit of classical structuralism, and, on the other, seems to be 
compatible with modern, e.g. connectionist, approaches to mental representations. 
In order to show this, Hummel and Biederman (1992) introduced a neural network 
model for object recognition, which was able to generate a viewpoint-invariant 
structural description specifying the object’s parts and the relations among them. 
They  proposed a network consisting of seven layers, such that the same output unit 
responded to an object regardless of (i) where its image appeared in the visual field, 
(ii) the size of the image, and (iii) the orientation in depth from which the object was 
depicted. Hummel and Biederman claimed that cells at the first two layers answered 
to features of component geons of the represented object. As they formulated:
“Specialized connections in the model's first  two layers parse images into 
geons by  synchronizing the oscillatory  outputs of cells representing local 
image features (edges and vertices): Cells oscillate in phase if they represent 
features of the same geon and out of phase if they represent features of separate 
geons. These phase relations are preserved throughout the network and bind 
cells representing the attributes of geons and the relations among them. The 
bound attributes and relations constitute a simple viewpoint-invariant structural 
description of an object. The model's highest layers use this description as a 
basis for object recognition.” (Hummel & Biederman, 1992, p. 485)
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Still moreover, in a further study Hayworth and Biederman (2006) argued that there 
is empirical evidence supporting Biederman’s original theory. They presented fMRI 
studies suggesting that there are certain brain regions serving as the neuronal basis of 
object-part representations corresponding to geons. In particular, they claimed that 
neural representation of shape in the lateral occipital complex (LOC) is an 
intermediate one, encoding the parts (i.e. geons) of objects, rather than local features, 
templates, or object concepts. 
To summarise, according to Biederman, in the perceptual system there is a hierarchy 
of representations (cf. also Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Marr, 1982) consisting of simple 
and complex shape representations. Simple representations—i.e. the representations 
of cones, cylinders and the like (geons)—are the basic constituents of all complex 
shape representations. Of course, constitution has a special meaning here. The claim 
that complex representations are constituted by simple representations is not a claim 
about the vehicles of these representations. Rather, the claim is that  simple 
representations stand for constituent parts of what complex representations stand for.
The perceptual system also encodes the structural information describing how those 
parts simple representations stand for are organised into the objects complex 
representations stand for. This structural information (along with information about 
the simple constituent parts), then, enters the centre executive system and results in 
object recognition.
That is, simple perceptual representations constitute more complex perceptual 
representations in the following sense. In our cognitive system there is a hierarchy  of 
perceptual representations ranging from simple through less complex to more 
complex representations. Less complex representations stand for features, which are 
parts of the features represented by more complex representations. Moreover, further 
processes are able to extract structural information from this hierarchy of 
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representations encoding the arrangement according to which the parts less complex 
representations stand for are organised into the wholes more complex representations 
stand for. The centre system utilises simple representations and structural information 
together when recognises and categorises a complex object.
On the basis of all this, the initial claims concerning the representational hierarchy 
underlying conscious experiences can be formulated as follows:
(C1) Most perceptual representations are structured.
In the hierarchy of perceptual representations most representations are complex
—they  have constituent structure in the sense that there are primitive 
representations standing for parts of the complex object a complex 
representation stands for.
(C2) Some perceptual representations are unstructured.
In the hierarchy of perceptual representations some representations are simple
—they  have no constituent parts in the sense that there are no more primitive 
representations standing for parts of what simple representations stand for. 
(C3) Structured reps = Unstructured reps + structural info.
For further processes the particular way  complex representations are structured 
is determined by the set of the simple representations constituting (in the above 
sense) the complex one, plus the structural information expressing the relation 
between the features simple representations stand for.
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4.2.2 Representational hierarchy according to contemporary 
cognitive neuroscience
The three claims above—(C1), (C2) and (C3)—has been formulated on the basis of 
classical high-level theories of object recognition (e.g. Biederman, 1987).26  Note, 
however, that even if this approach is supported by low-level accounts (Hummel & 
Biederman, 1992) and even by neurophysiological data (Hayworth & Biederman, 
2006) much more is needed to be said about whether the claims are compatible with 
state-of-the-art theories. The problem is that nowadays the particular view regarding 
representations that dominates Biederman-style approaches is generally considered 
as outdated. 
In contemporary cognitive neuroscience interpretations of the results of experimental 
paradigms designed to uncover the representations corresponding to conscious 
experience typically rely on the signal detection theory  (e.g. Kouider & Dupoux, 
2004; de Gardelle & Kouider, 2009; de Gardelle, et  al., 2009),27  and internal 
processes within representational hierarchies are hypothesised in the light of 
Bayesian inferences (Kersten & Yuille, 2003; Lee & Mumford, 2003; Kersten, et al., 
2004; Mamassian, 2006; Yuille & Kersten, 2006). In general, Bayesian inferences 
determine the probability of a particular hypothesis given a certain observation—i.e. 
how probable it is that the hypothesis in question is true given that  a certain 
observational evidence is detected—on the basis of the prior probability  of the 
hypothesis, plus the compatibility  of the evidence with the hypothesis (the likelihood 
of the evidence in the light of the hypothesis).
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26  Biederman’s geon theory is utilised here only as a paradigmatic example of the general classical 
approach which thinks of object representations in terms of specific configurations of basic parts. See 
Wallis and Bülthoff (1999) for a review comparing this (as they call it, ‘LEGO land’) approach with 
view- and image-feature based approaches.
27  Signal detection theory claims that in forced choice paradigms the discrimination of signal from 
noise depends on two factors: (1) the discriminability index, which is a measure of internal response 
in terms of the separation and spread of the internal response probability density functions of the 
signal and the noise, and (2) the criterion location along the internal response axis determining a 
threshold of reporting signals. Bayesian decision theory provides resources to optimise the setting of 
this criterion location based on prior knowledge (typically gained by learning) regarding the 
probability distributions of the signal and the noise.
The essence of Bayesian approaches to perception is that within a hierarchy of 
representational states low-level cues make bottom-up proposals, which are validated 
by higher-level models (cf. Yuille & Kersten, 2006, p. 302). Imagine, for example the 
process of interpreting a set of written words executed by the visual system. This 
stimulus is processed through a hierarchy of representations ranging from very  low 
levels where a fine-grained distribution of incoming visual energy is represented, 
through higher levels representing oriented edges, still higher levels representing 
segments, letters, words, and finally  the meaning of the words. On the level of 
oriented edges feature detectors extract  orientation information, determine oriented 
edges, and provide bottom-up proposals of possible segments on the basis of prior 
knowledge regarding the probability  distribution of segments. These segment models 
then are deployed in a feed-back loop  to calculate how well the proposed segment 
models explain the edge-features detected. Similarly, at the next higher level 
segments are grouped in accordance with prior knowledge regarding the probability 
distribution of letters and letter models are proposed in the feed-forward channels to 
the next higher levels. These letter models then are used for determining how well 
they explain the image features, etc. until the processing reaches the highest level.
This picture of a hierarchical organisation of representations matches up nicely  with 
the classical claim that there is a representational hierarchy  ranging from simple to 
complex representations where simple representations are the primitive constituents 
of the complex ones in the sense that simple representations stand for parts of objects 
complex representations stand for.
However, the claims of §4.2.1 (especially  C1 and C2) look problematic in the light of 
the Bayesian approach. The problem is that  within a Bayesian framework 
representations at every  level are unstructured for the further processes of the next 
higher level. The only information representations at the level of oriented edges carry 
for processes at the level of segments is that particular edges with certain orientation 
are present in the visual stimulus. Processes at the level of segments cannot extract 
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any further information about the visual stimulus from the representations of oriented 
edges. Similarly, the only information processes at the level of letters can extract 
from lower level representations of segments is that certain segments are present in 
the stimulus. Errors regarding oriented edges are lost at  this stage—they are screened 
off by representations of segments. The same happens at higher levels as well: at the 
level of words lower level letter representations are interpreted as mere markers of 
certain letters being present in the stimulus, and processes have no longer access to 
the errors regarding segments. That is, it seems that  the distinction according to 
which there are lower level simple unstructured representations and higher level 
complex structured representations evaporates once one subscribes to the Bayesian 
framework.
4.2.3 Refining the claims: representational hierarchy and 
central access
The problem, any attempt seeking for a pattern similar to the one depicted by (O1)-
(O3) within the realm of representations underlying conscious experience has to face 
with, then, is this. On the one hand, it seems that some kind of a distinction between 
unstructured and structured representations ought to be found within the 
representational realm, whereas, on the other hand, the most influential 
contemporary  approach to perceptual representations—Bayesianism—seems to be 
incompatible with this distinction.
However, I believe that by introducing an additional hypothesis this discrepancy 
could be resolved. First, note that the prospects of my proposal hinge on the right 
interpretation of what has been called ‘further processes’ in §4.2.1. Remember, 
according to (C1) most perceptual representations are structured, whereas according 
to (C2) some are unstructured for further processes. The apparent incompatibility 
between the claims (C1)-(C3) and the Bayesian framework is due to the 
interpretation of these further processes as processes at the next higher level in the 
hierarchy of representations.
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Now compare this interpretation with what we have already seen with regard to 
Biederman’s original theory, namely that it is the processing of the central executive 
system that  results in object-recognition: according to Biederman’s theory, geon-
characteristics and structural information describing their relative positions enter the 
central executive system where they  are matched to stored viewpoint-invariant 
representations of objects. Similarly, the idea that the processes correlating with 
conscious experiences involve at least  accessibility for central systems like working 
memory (Baddley  & Hitch, 1974) or the global workspace (Baars, 1988) is 
prevailing in almost all contemporary cognitive and neurobiological theories of 
consciousness (Baars, 1988; Prinz, 2000; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Dehaene, et 
al., 2006; de Gardelle & Kouider, 2009; Kouider, 2009).28 
That is, in the claims that some perceptual representations are structured whereas 
others are unstructured for further processes, this last term ‘further processes’, 
instead of being interpreting as processes of the next higher level within the 
hierarchy of perceptual representations, should rather be interpreted as processes of 
the central systems like working memory or the global workspace.
With this clarification in place, it is possible to derive a genuine distinction between 
structured and unstructured representations—if one adds the following further 
assumption. Suppose that within the hierarchy of perceptual representations there is a 
range within which all stages of representations are simultaneously and 
independently accessible by central processes. Although representations at  each stage 
are unstructured inputs for the processes at the next stage, representations at earlier 
stages stand for parts of what representations at later stages stand for, and central 
processes are able to extract this structural information via their access to all the 
levels of these representations within said range. Therefore, for central processes 
representations at later stages of this range are structured.
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28 See however Lamme (2006) or O’Regan and Noë (2001) for alternative approaches.
However, in accordance with the assumption added, central processes do not have 
access to all levels of representations of the full hierarchy. Only  those representations 
can be accessed by central processes, which fall within the range in question. 
Consequently, even if there are lower level representations standing for constituents 
of the features representations at the earliest stage of the range stand for, central 
processes have no access to them. Therefore, representations at  the earliest stage of 
the range are unstructured for central processes—working memory or the global 
workspace cannot extract structural information about the features they stand for. 
These representations are the most basic meaningful units, which carry information 
for central processes; none of their properties can independently be interpreted by 
processes in the central system. They screen off for working memory  or the global 
workspace all the features (errors regarding these features, i.e. all other possible 
interpretations that might have been resulted in different bottom-up proposals) 
represented at levels lower than the earliest stage of the accessible range. Those 
representations are unstructured, then, which are at the entry-level of that range of 
the hierarchy of perceptual representations, which is accessible for central processes.
Note that the underlying characterisation that  perceptual representations form a 
hierarchy, as we have already seen it, is unproblematic even in a Bayesian 
framework: modern approaches hold the view that perceptual systems process 
stimuli through a hierarchy  of representations from very low levels where incoming 
energy distributions and local features are represented, through intermediate levels 
with viewpoint-centric representations of segments of integrated features, and 
shapes, to high levels of viewpoint-independent representations of objects and their 
meaning. 
That is, with the aid of a Core Hypothesis about how central processes access the 
hierarchy of perceptual representations it becomes possible to establish a distinction 
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between unstructured and structured representations.29 This Core Hypothesis says the 
following:
Core Hypothesis
Central processes (working memory, global workspace) have access only  to a 
range of the levels of the full representational hierarchy involved in the 
processing of perceptual stimuli.30
On the basis of this Core Hypothesis, the three claims related to the representations 
underlying conscious experience can be refined in the following way:
(C1*) Most perceptual representations are structured.
Within the accessible range of the hierarchy of perceptual representations all 
non-entry  level representations are structured for central processes—they have 
constituent structure in the sense that there are other (lower level) 
representations also accessible for central processes standing for parts of the 
complex object a structured representation stands for.
(C2*) Some perceptual representations are unstructured.
Within the accessible range of the hierarchy of perceptual representations all 
entry  level representations are unstructured for central processes—they have no 
constituent parts in the sense that  no representations are accessible for central 
processes standing for parts of the object an unstructured representation stands 
for.
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29  See §4.3.2 for more on how unstructured representations resulting from the Core Hypothesis are 
related to other types of unstructured representations one can find within the cognitive-perceptual 
architecture. This comparison shall reveal the real importance of the Core Hypothesis. 
30  Note that though this hypothesis has been introduced as a mere assumption, it is not without any 
support. For example, modularist approaches to cognitive architecture claim that early level 
perceptual processing is encapsulated and inaccessible for the central system (Fodor, 1983; 
Carruthers, 2006). Similarly, Jesse Prinz (2000, 2002, 2007a, 2007b) argues in length that levels at the 
earliest stage of the hierarchy of perceptual representations lack accessibility by central processes in 
the relevant sense (see also Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Dehaene, et al., 2006; Kouider, et al.,  2010). 
Ultimately, the question whether this Core Hypothesis is correct or not is an empirical issues. It is the 
duty of further empirically-driven investigations to deliver judgment on this matter.
(C3*) Structured reps = Unstructured reps + structural info.
For central processes the particular way structured representations are 
structured is determined by the set of the unstructured representations 
constituting (in the above sense) the structured one, plus the structural 
information extractable by central processes expressing the relations between 
the features unstructured representations stand for.
4.3 Monadic Markers
So far I have made and defended the claim that there is a sense in which perceptual 
representations can be classified into the two categories of structured and 
unstructured representations. Why this distinction is so important becomes clear if 
one examines the specific features unstructured representations have.
4.3.1 Unstructured representations
To fully appreciate the specific features of unstructured representations, let’s 
compare them to the characteristic features of structured representations. Given that 
central processes have access to the representations of the constituent parts of 
complex objects structured representations stand for, and thus are able to extract 
structural information describing how the constituents of these complex objects are 
arranged, structured representations carry information about the physical structure of 
the objects they stand for. That is, structured representations present their referents 
for central processes as having structure.
Contrary  to this, unstructured representations are such that  they  are the most basic, 
primitive representational components available for central processes, i.e. they have 
no further constituents in the sense introduced above: there are no more primitive, 
lower level representations accessible for central processes standing for constituents 
which themselves are parts of the whole represented by  an unstructured 
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representation. That is, it  is impossible for central processes to extract structural 
information about  the objects unstructured representations stand for. Consequently, 
unstructured representations present their referents for central processes as 
unstructured.
Though unstructured representations might stand for quite complex states of affairs 
and their vehicles might also be quite complex, for central processes of the system 
they  are embedded in they appear as unstructured, monadic wholes. That is, it is 
neither the object  represented nor the vehicle of the representational state that is 
unstructured, but the very way  this representation is interpreted by the processes 
operating on it. Unstructured representations are the most basic ‘meaningful’ units 
carrying information for the rest of the system—none of their parts or properties can 
independently be interpreted by further processes (including processes of the central 
system).
In fact, the states of affairs unstructured representations stand for can be arbitrarily 
complex. Nevertheless, unstructured representations will not represent this internal 
complexity of the object they stand for—they only  indicate the presence of the 
represented object. This is the basic function of unstructured representations: to 
indicate or mark the presence of complex states of affairs in the outside world. In 
contrast with structured representations, which due to the fact that their parts and 
properties can individually  be interpreted by central processes are able to carry 
structural information, unstructured representations convey nothing else about  the 
represented object except its presence. They are internally generated signals which 
might have distinctive properties helping further processes in distinguishing them 
and organising them into similarity  spaces, but these features screen off the features 
of the represented objects. If the properties of an unstructured representation mapped 
the properties of the represented object,31 then the representation would be able to 
carry  information about features of the represented object. Since, however, it is not 
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31 Kulvicki (2004, 2005) calls this kind of mapping isomorphism. §5.3.1 elaborates on this issue.
the case, the actual way they indicate the represented object  is detached from the 
properties of the object. The only  information further processes have access to 
regarding the object is its presence. That is, all further processes have is the 
unstructured representation as if it was a tag the system could use to indicate the 
occurrence of a certain state of affairs.32
Take, for example, the smoke signal indicating whether a new pope has been elected 
at the papal conclave. After the Pope dies, the College of Cardinals is summoned for 
a series of ballots to elect a new pope. After the ballots the papers used for voting are 
burned. The colour of the smoke signals thus generated indicate the result of the 
ballots to the people assembling in St Peter’s Square. Dark smoke indicates that the 
ballot was unsuccessful, whereas white smoke indicates that a new pope has been 
elected. The smoke signals, as used here, are unstructured representation in the sense 
discussed above. First, the object they  stand for—the actual process of balloting—is 
quite complex with a lot  of features (e.g. number of participating cardinals, 
distribution of votes, identity  of the new Pope elected, etc.). These features, however, 
are screened off by the properties of the signal itself: people in St Peter’s Square 
cannot extract information about, say, the distribution of votes solely  on the basis of 
the smoke signal. All they have access to are the properties of the signal itself. Note 
that except  its colour, no other feature of the signal corresponds to features of the 
balloting process. Therefore, people do not pay attention to these other features of the 
signal. The molecular constitution of the smoke, the shape of the smoke cloud, etc. 
are all unimportant for those waiting for the results. It is only the colour of the smoke 
people really care about, and thus this is the only  feature of the signals on the basis of 
which people organise them into a ‘similarity space’ (with white smoke indicating a 
successful, dark smoke indicating an unsuccessful event). That is, even if the signal 
itself is quite complex (with special molecular constitution, shape, etc.), for further 
processes—in this case, for people in St Peter’s Square—it is unstructured. The 
smoke is the signal, and its colour is its only  meaningful feature carrying information 
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32  See §5.1 for a detailed discussion of how unstructured representations and screening off can be 
characterised in an information-theoretical framework.
about the event indicated. This is the signal’s only meaningful feature because 
whereas it corresponds to a particular state of affairs, no other features of the signal 
map any other features of the ongoing events. Consequently, the only information the 
signal carries is that the particular state of affairs occurred.
That is, unstructured representations are such that they provide an informational cut-
off point for the systems operating on them. There might well be a lot of information 
to be captured and carried (since the object  or event represented is complex), and 
even the signal, the representational vehicle itself might very well be able to carry 
this information (since the representational vehicle is also complex), still, no further 
information is carried. Subsequent processes cannot extract further information from 
unstructured representations about the features of the complex states of affairs the 
occurrence of which is indicated by them. From a certain point of view this is a 
virtue of unstructured representations: they are tools for avoiding informational 
overflow within the representational system. For the sake of efficiency, the amount 
of information captured and represented by any system must stay between 
manageable measures. Unstructured representations might be considered as serving 
this purpose.33
4.3.2 Unstructured representations due to sensitivity 
threshold and monadic markers
In the section above I have agued that  unstructured representations provide an 
informational cut-off point for the systems operating on them. Note, however, that 
for every cognitive-representational system there is a natural informational cut-off 
point regardless whether my Core Hypothesis holds or not. Any cognitive system 
which is not completely  detached from its environment must possess some input 
mechanisms registering the physical stimuli coming from the environment and 
transducing them into signals the cognitive system is able to operate on. Now if an 
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33  See §5.1 for more examples of unstructured representations, and a detailed account of how they 
work. 
input mechanism has a sensitivity threshold below which it is unable to discriminate 
details in the incoming physical stimuli, then, necessarily, the signals (i.e. 
representations) produced by such an input mechanism when operating at its most 
fine-grained resolution will present the registered states of affairs as unstructured. 
Since the input mechanism is unable to register the internal structure of those 
features of the incoming stimuli which fall below its sensitivity threshold, the 
representations produced by the input mechanism will only indicated that there are 
such-and-such states of affairs present in the stimuli without carrying further 
structural information about the represented objects.
So, for example, the human eye has a spatial sensitivity threshold—a finite angular 
resolution of 50 white-black stripe-cycles per degree. This means that the eye is 
insensitive to white-black line pairs thiner than 0.35mm viewed from 1 metre (Russ, 
2007). That is, all the fine-grained structure of an object (e.g. its molecular shape), 
which is below this resolution will be lost: the visual input mechanism will not be 
able to encode information about this fine-grained structure, and henceforth no 
features of the signal will carry information about  it. The input mechanism will 
register all those stimuli as the same, which have the same coarse-grained (i.e. 
sensitivity-level) structure regardless of their fine-grained (i.e. below-sensitivity) 
structure. Consequently, details about this below-sensitivity structure is inaccessible 
for the system. For the system, features of the object at the sensitivity-level are such 
that no further details about them can be recovered. The representations standing for 
these features (even if their vehicle is complex) are unstructured for further 
processes. 
That is, if an input mechanism has a sensitivity threshold, then the representations 
generated by this input mechanism will be unstructured (even for central processes). 
Note that  these unstructured representations are at the lowest level of the full 
representational hierarchy—they are right at the entry level; they are generated 
directly  by the input mechanism. Central processes have no access to representations 
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standing for parts of what the specific representations in question stand for simply 
because there are no such ‘simpler’ representations within the system. These 
unstructured representations stand for the finest details the input mechanism is 
sensitive to.
So from this perspective, there is a way in which one can sensibly differentiate 
between representations that are structured and representations that are unstructured 
for central processes—even without my  Core Hypothesis. Representations that are at 
the lowest level of the representational hierarchy are unstructured for central 
processes due to the sensitivity  threshold of the input mechanisms, whereas all 
higher-level representations within the hierarchy of perceptual representations can be 
seen as structured for central processes. However, this distinction would not  work for 
our present purposes. Remember, my aim here is to find a pattern related to the 
hierarchy of perceptual representations similar to the one observed with regard to 
conscious experiences—i.e. to find representational structures that could be 
corresponded to experiential states. Given this aspiration of the whole endeavour, the 
problems is this: unstructured representations at the lowest level of the 
representational hierarchy are very bad candidates for being the underpinnings of 
conscious experience. For example, Jesse Prinz, concentrating on the visual 
modality, argues that V1, the neural substrate of low-level visual representations, 
cannot be the ‘locale’ of consciousness (Prinz, 2000, 2007a, 2007b). As Prinz 
summarises:
“The destruction of V1, the main neural correlate of low-level vision, 
apparently  results in the loss of visual experience. Still, there is mounting 
evidence that V1 cannot be the locale of consciousness (see Crick & Koch, 
1995; and Koch & Braun, 1996, for reviews). For one thing, visual 
hallucination can occur for a period after V1 has been destroyed (Seguin, 
1886). Similarly, some subjects who experience blindsight after V1 damage 
continue to have phenomenal experiences in the blind fields under certain 
conditions (Weiskrantz, 1997). As Crick and Koch emphasize, V1 also seems 
to lack information that is available to consciousness. First, our experience of 
colors can remain constant across dramatic changes in wavelengths (Land, 
1964). Zeki (1983) has shown that such colour constancy is not registered in 
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V1. Second, V1 does not seem responsive to illusory contours across gaps in a 
visual array (von der Heydt, et al., 1984). If V1 were the locale of 
consciousness, we would not experience the lines in a Kanizsa triangle [...]. 
The fact that consciousness is lost when V1 is destroyed is, therefore, better 
interpreted as evidence that V1 is a primary source of inputs to another region 
in which consciousness can rightfully be said to reside.” (Prinz, 2000, pp. 
245-246)
That is, Prinz emphasises that the content of conscious experiences does not match 
up well with the features represented at the lowest-levels of the visual 
representational hierarchy. This claim generalises to all the different modalities. The 
lowest-levels of perceptual representations typically  stand for incoming energy 
distributions and local features which do not appear in consciousness, and are 
insensitive to some of the information which is available in conscious experiences.
Instead of low-levels, Prinz, following Jackendoff (1987) and Crick and Koch 
(1995), argues that  the best candidates for being the locale of consciousness are the 
intermediate levels of the representational hierarchy.34 At these levels representations 
stand for viewer-centred shapes, illusory  contours, constant colours, motion, etc. (cf. 
Prinz, 2000, pp. 245-246). That is, any attempt which seeks for identifying a pattern 
similar to the one found in conscious experience within the hierarchy  of perceptual 
representations, should better to be able to locate this pattern at the intermediate 
levels rather than at the lowest level of the representational hierarchy. 
This conclusion draws attention to the real value of the Core Hypothesis introduced 
in §4.2.3: it shows how it could be possible to make the distinction between 
structured and unstructured representations within that range of the representational 
hierarchy which seems to be the best candidate for being corresponded to conscious 
experiences. If there is a finite range somewhere between the low- and the high-
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34  Prinz also argues that high-level representations are also bad candidates for being the locale of 
consciousness. At high-levels, representations stand for e.g. object-centred shapes, picking out an 
object independently of the actual point of view. However, conscious experiences are viewpoint 
dependent: the way it is like to see a certain shape from a given point of view is typically different 
from the way it is like to see the same shape from another point of view. 
levels of the representational hierarchy which is unique in the sense that relevant 
central processes have access only to this range of the representational hierarchy, 
then for these central processes representations at the entry level of this range will be 
unstructured, whereas representations at higher levels of this range will be 
structured.35 
That is, from the perspective of being good candidates for underpinning conscious 
experiences, there is a crucial difference between unstructured representations at the 
lowest-level of the representational hierarchy (which are unstructured due to a 
sensitivity threshold) and unstructured representations at the intermediate level 
(which are unstructured due to a lack of central access to lower levels). To emphasise 
this difference, and to distinguish unstructured representations at the intermediate 
level of the representational hierarchy  from any other kind of unstructured 
representation, from now on I am going to use the term ‘monadic markers’ for 
unstructured representations at the intermediate level. As we have seen above, this 
name captures two essential features of unstructured representations. On the one 
hand, they are monadic for the processes operating on them, since these processes 
cannot extract any further information about the objects they stand for, whereas on 
the other hand, they  are markers, since rather than mapping the characteristics of the 
represented objects, they only mark their presence. According to this terminology, 
then, monadic markers are those perceptual representations at the intermediate levels 
of the representational hierarchy, which, in accordance with the Core Hypothesis, are 
unstructured for central processes.
4.3.3 The Monadic Marker Account of conscious experience
The first part of this chapter (§4.1) concentrated on conscious experience, whereas 
the second part (§4.2) focused on perceptual representations. In this final section of 
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35  Note that Prinz’ theory of Attended Intermediate-level Representations also emphasises the 
importance of accessibility for central processes.  The kinds of relevant central access in Prinz’  theory 
is access by attentional mechanisms and the fact that intermediate level representations ‘broadcast’ to 
working memory (Prinz, 2000, 2007a, 2007b). 
this chapter, I shall introduce an account of conscious experience, which, on the one 
hand, is able to fit the results emerging from these two separate parts together, and on 
the other hand, possesses a significant amount of explanatory power with regard to 
the special characteristics of phenomenal consciousness.
In §4.1 I have argued for three claims related to conscious experience. I have pointed 
out that conscious experience is structured. Complex experiences have constituent 
parts, which are discernible for at least trained subjects, and can be independently 
experienced. Constituent parts can have further constituents etc., however, there is a 
bottom level with simple experiences which themselves have no further discernible 
constituents that could be contents of stand-alone experiences. Furthermore, I have 
claimed that the phenomenal character of complex experiences is jointly determined 
by the phenomenal character of their simple constituents and the structural 
information describing how the constituents are organised to form the complex. I 
have also argued that the internal phenomenal structure present  in complex 
experiences of spatial relations is itself spatial. That is, the structural information one 
is able to extract from one’s own spatial experience can only be characterised by  the 
very same spatial vocabulary one deploys when one characterises regular spatial 
relations in physical descriptions.
Next, in §4.2 I have argued for three claims related to those representations, which 
are involved in the processing of perceptual stimuli. I have claimed that the 
representations in question form a hierarchy, such that representations at each level 
stand for parts of the features representations at the next higher level stand for. Then, 
I have hypothesised that central processes (working memory, global workspace) have 
access only to a subset of the levels of this hierarchy forming a range, and have 
further argued that central processes via accessing multiple levels of representations 
within said range are able to extract structural information related to the arrangement 
of the parts constituting represented features, due to which representations at higher 
levels of this range are structured for central processes. However, since such 
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structure cannot be extracted with regard to representations at the entry-level of this 
range, these latter representations are monadic markers—representations at the 
intermediate level of the representational hierarchy, which are unstructured for 
central processes.
The two stories above share some important characteristics. In particular, 
observations (O1), (O2) and (O3) correspond to claims (C1*), (C2*) and (C3*) 
respectively.
(O1)-(C1*)
Subjects are able to discern structure present in their complex conscious 
experiences; similarly, central processes are able to extract structural 
information from perceptual representations within the range central processes 
have access to.
(O2)-(C2*)
Subjects are unable to discern structure in their simple conscious experiences; 
similarly  central processes are unable to extract structural information from 
monadic markers (representations at the entry-level of the range in question). 
(O3)-(C3*)
The phenomenal character of complex experiences is determined by  the 
phenomenal character of simple experiences plus the structure characterising 
the arrangement of the constituents (constituents of constituents, etc., 
ultimately  simple parts) discernible by the subjects; similarly, the particular 
way higher-level representations are structured for central processes is 
determined by the lower-level representations (and further still lower-level 
representations, etc., ultimately monadic markers) encoding parts of what the 
higher-level representation encodes, plus the structural information extractable 
by central processes.
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Note that the structural information central processes are able to extract from the 
accessible range of perceptual representations is information about the physical 
structure of the stimuli. Thus, on the one hand, representational structure encodes or 
carries information about physical structure. On the other hand, phenomenal 
structure is also closely tied to physical structure: as it has been argued for in §4.1.2, 
phenomenal structure—at least spatial structure as discernible in conscious 
experiences36—reflects, or resembles37  physical structure. That is, via their link to 
physical structure, phenomenal structure featuring in (O1)-(O3) and representational 
structure featuring in (C1*)-(C3*) can be corresponded to each other. 
The account of consciousness I am proposing here is based on these similarities. It 
recognises that the role simple experiences play in the phenomenal domain is the 
very same role monadic markers play  in the cognitive domain. On the basis of this, 
the proposal claims that the phenomenal character of simple conscious experiences 
as defined in §4.1 correspond to how monadic markers, as defined in §4.2 and §4.3, 
are dealt with, or interpreted by central processes of the cognitive-representational 
system. To be more accurate, in line with how such correspondence-claims are 
typically formulated38, the proposal takes the form of an identity-claim:
Monadic Marker Account of Conscious Experience
The phenomenal character of simple conscious experiences is identical with 
how monadic markers are interpreted by central processes of a cognitive 
system.
According to the Monadic Marker Account of Conscious Experience, those features 
of the stimulus are conscious, which are represented at levels of the hierarchy of 
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36 Or more generally: structure related to primary qualities. See §5.3.1 for an extensive discussion of a 
monadic-marker-based account of the primary-secondary quality distinction.
37 Again, §5.3.1 is going to shed more light on how this resemblance-claim might best be understood.
38 See Chapter 7, and especially §7.2 for an argument to this effect.
perceptual representations falling into that particular range central processes have 
access to. Simple experiences correspond to monadic markers in the sense that the 
phenomenal character of simple experiences is identical with how monadic markers 
are interpreted by central processes. Similarly, complex experiences correspond to 
higher level representations, and their structure corresponds to the structure central 
processes extract from the range of representations they access in the sense that the 
phenomenal character of complex experience is jointly determined by  the structure 
extracted, and by how monadic markers are interpreted by central processes.
Note that the Monadic Marker Account of Conscious Experience, as formulated 
above, is an identity claim connecting phenomenal consciousness with how certain 
perceptual representations (monadic markers) are integrated into a cognitive system. 
Identity claims of this kind (typically identities connecting consciousness with 
certain physical processes) are often called brute identities or strong necessities in the 
literature (cf. e.g. Chalmers, 2010b). They are claimed to be ad hoc, unsupported and 
unlike any other kind of standard identity claims deployed in scientific explanations. 
The Monadic Marker Account of Conscious Experience, as I shall argue in the 
following chapters, is, however, immune to these objections. In this chapter, I have 
shown, that  it is not ad hoc and unsupported in the sense that it has been formulated 
on the basis of certain similarities between the phenomenal and representational 
domains. In Chapter 5 I shall argue that it is not ad hoc and unsupported in the sense 
that it can be put to the test: it  can be used to account for such essential features of 
conscious experience as the fact that phenomenal qualities resist functionalisation 
and the occurrence of the epistemic gap. Furthermore, in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 I 
shall point it out that it is far from being unlike any other kind of standard identity 
claim featuring in scientific explanations—on the contrary, the Monadic Marker 
Account as an identity claim plays exactly  the same role standard identities play in 
scientific explanations, properly understood.
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Before turning our attention to these issues, however, I would like to close this 
chapter with a final remark. The Monadic Marker Account in itself is not able to tell 
which perceptual representations are conscious rather than unconscious, i.e. it does 
not specify  precise requirements perceptual representations need to fulfil in order to 
become conscious. For example, as we have seen in §4.3.2, the Monadic Marker 
Account says nothing about why  unstructured representations at the lowest level of 
the representational hierarchy play no part in being relevant (in a direct way) to 
conscious experience—instead, it turns to an existing theory of consciousness and 
follows its guidance with regard to this question. That is, the Monadic Marker 
Account is not a full-blown theory of consciousness. Rather it  is like a universal 
plugin: it  needs a proper theory of consciousness, a ‘host’, which is able to designate 
a set of perceptual representations as a good candidate for being the ‘locale’ of 
conscious experience, and once such a set is given, the Monadic Marker Account can 
be plugged in into the particular host theory in question and help it to become more 
than a mere correlational claim, i.e. to produce real explanations—explanations of 
e.g. why subjects experience the particular phenomenal structure they do, why 
phenomenal qualities resist functionalisation, and why  there is an epistemic gap. To 




Monadic Markers in Action
5.1 Monadic Markers within Dretske’s Framework
In the previous chapter the Monadic Maker Account has been introduced. This 
chapter focuses on the Monadic Maker Account in action. In what follows I shall 
investigate how it fits into different psycho-semantic frameworks, how it departs 
from Phenomenal Concept Strategy, and how it  is able to be more than a mere 
correlational thesis—i.e. how it is apt for providing novel explanations of important 
features of conscious experience.
In 2005, Murat Aydede and Güven Gülzedere have published a lengthy but highly 
informative paper in Nous, which argues for a version of Phenomenal Concepts 
Strategy from a Dretskean information-theoretic viewpoint. Surprisingly, their 
account and the Monadic Makers Account, though stem from very different 
observations and are motivated by very different considerations, converge on quite 
similar claims. This makes Aydede and Güzeldere’s account a natural starting point 
here.
5.1.1 The information-theoretic framework
Aydede and Güzeldere (2005) build on Fred Dretske’s information-theoretic psycho-
semantics (Dretske, 1981). According to the Dretskean framework, a source s by 
being F (i.e., some entity s having an attribute F) generates a certain amount of 
information which is proportional to the number of alternative possibilities 
eliminated (by being F instead of, say, G or H, etc.). A signal r—any event, 
condition, or state of affairs whose existence or occurrence depends on s being F—
carries the information that s is F iff “the conditional probability of s’s being F, given 
r (and k), is 1 (but, given k  alone, less than 1)”, where k stands for what the receiver 
of the signal already knows about the possibilities existing at the source (Dretske, 
1981, p. 65). The signal carries the information that s is F in virtue of possessing 
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certain properties—its so-called information carrying properties. So for example, the 
signal of an analog speedometer display is able to carry information about the speed 
of a vehicle, and does so in virtue of having certain properties, namely a needle 
pointing at a particular place on the dial.
Pieces of information can be nested in each other. As Dretske puts it, “[t]he 
information that t is G is nested in s’s being F = s’s being F carries the information 
that t is G” (Dretske, 1981, p. 71). For example, the information that a vehicle travels 
at 52 km/h nests the information that the vehicle’s speed is between 51 km/h and 55 
km/h, or the information that  the vehicle in question is moving. Any signal (e.g. the 
speedometer) carrying the information that  the vehicle travels at 52 km/h also carries 
these further pieces of information.
Certain pieces of information nest  other pieces of information, but not all 
information is nested in further pieces of information. To capture this, i.e. the 
difference between two ways information can be encoded in a signal, Dretske 
introduces the distinction between digital and analog information. As Dretske 
formulates it:
“A signal carries the information that s is F in digital form if and only if the 
signal carries no additional information about s, no information that is not 
already nested in s’s being F. If the signal does carry additional information 
about s, information that is not nested in s’s being F, then I shall say  that the 
signal carries this information in analog form. When a signal carries the 
information that s is F in analog form, the signal always carries more specific, 
more determinate, information in both analog and digital form. The most 
specific piece of information it  carries (about s) is the only piece of information 
it carries (about s) in digital form. All other information (about s) is coded in 
analog form.” (Dretske,1981, p.137).
The speedometer of a vehicle, as we have seen, carries, for example, the information 
that the vehicle is moving. However, the speedometer does not present the vehicle as 
merely moving but as travelling at 52 km/h. Travelling at  52 km/h is a particular way 
of moving; it is a more specific piece of information. That is, the fact  that the vehicle 
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is moving is nested in a more specific piece of information, and therefore is encoded 
in the signal in analog form. The information that the vehicle travels at 52 km/h 
carried by the speedometer is not nested in any other piece of information—it is the 
most specific, most informative piece of information the speedometer is able to carry. 
That is, according to Dretske, the speedometer carries this information in digital 
form. 
A signal is not apt for providing more detailed, more determinate information about 
those facts which it encodes in digital form. Imagine a digital speedometer which 
only displays round values ending in either 0 or 5. So, for example, when the 
vehicle’s speed falls between 1 and 5 km/h the speedometer displays 5 km/h, when it 
falls between 6 and 10 km/h the speedometer displays 10 km/h, etc. This digital 
speedometer, just like the analog one, is able to carry the information that the vehicle 
is moving. Moreover, this digital speedometer, just like the analog one, carries the 
information that the vehicle is moving in analog form—nested in some more specific 
piece of information. Similarly, both speedometers are able to carry  the information 
that the vehicle’s speed is between 51 km/h and 55 km/h. However, whereas the 
analog speedometer carries this piece of information in analog form (nested in the 
more specific information that the vehicle is travelling at 52 km/h), the digital 
speedometer carries it in digital form. The digital speedometer cannot reveal any 
more specific information about the car’s moving than that its speed falls between 51 
and 55 km/h. This is the most specific, most determinate information it carries.
It is one thing that a signal cannot reveal more specific information than those pieces 
which it encodes in digital form. It is quite another matter whether the analog 
information nested in the digital information of a signal is extractable or not.1  A 
mechanism extracts an analog information from a signal if it  produces a new signal, 
which carries the analog information in question as the most specific information it 
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1  Dretske himself does not distinguish between extractable and non-extractable analog information. 
See Kulvicki (2004) for introducing this distinction.
carries, i.e. encodes it in digital form.2 That is, when a mechanism extracts an analog 
information from a signal, it  digitalises this piece of information and excludes all 
other information carried by  the original signal. In order to do so, the mechanism 
needs to be causally sensitive to the analog information carried by the original signal. 
We have seen that a signal carries an information in virtue of possessing a certain 
property. Therefore, the extracting mechanism needs to be causally sensitive to this 
information carrying property of the signal.
Imagine that I find the idea of the digital speedometer above very fancy, and would 
like to have a similar digital display  in my car. I go to a car tuning service, where 
they  build in a ‘speedometer-digitaliser’ into my car, on top of the analog 
speedometer. It is connected to the analog speedometer such that it  detects the actual 
position of the needle. It is wired in a way that  it displays 5 km/h if, and only if the 
needle is between the 0 and the 5 km/h marks on the dial (0 km/h mark excluded, 5 
km/h mark included), 10 km/h if, and only  if the needle is between the 5 and the 10 
km/h marks, etc. Now when my car travels at 52 km/h the analog speedometer, as we 
have seen, carries the information that the vehicle’s speed is between 50 and 55 km/h 
nested in the more specific information that the vehicle travels with 52 km/h, i.e. 
encoded in analog form. My  new gadget digitalises this analog information. The 
original analog speedometer is able to carry information about the speed of the 
vehicle in virtue of having a needle pointing at a particular place on the dial. The 
speedometer-digitaliser is sensitive to this property of the original signal. It extracts 
the information that the vehicle’s speed is between 50 and 55 km/h by registering 
that the needle is between the 50 and 55 km/h marks. The display  of the 
speedometer-digitaliser produces a new signal (displays 55 km/h) which carries the 
extracted information in digital form—it is the most specific information the 
digitaliser display  is able to carry since it is insensitive to the actual position of the 
needle. The digitaliser extracts this information by  disregarding irrelevant features of 
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2 Hence, information extraction is also called digitalisation.
the original signal, i.e. abstracts away from the actual position of the needle, and thus 
from the most specific information carried by the original signal.
However, not all analog information is extractable in the above sense. To see this, 
consider the following example. Imagine that a plane is landing at an airport, and a 
picture is taken when the plane is approaching the runway. This picture represents, or 
encodes quite a lot of information about the actual state of affairs: the exact shape of 
the plane visible from the point of view of the camera, the type of the plane (say, an 
Airbus A380), the airline logo on the fin, the colour of the painting on the plane’s 
fuselage, its distance from the ground, etc. The most specific information (the exact 
shape of the plane with all the characteristics, etc.) is encoded in digital form. More 
abstract (i.e. less specific) information, e.g. that there is an airplane with four engines 
landing is encoded in analog form, since it  is nested in the most specific information 
carried by the picture—the picture doesn’t depict just an airplane with four engines, 
it represents an airplane with four engines, a characteristically placed flight deck, a 
very specific shape, etc. The picture communicates the fact that there is a plane 
landing by carrying some much more specific information.
Now imagine a buzzer system, which produces a buzzing sound with a specific pitch 
when and only when a situation exactly like the one represented by the picture 
occurs. Let’s further assume that the buzzer system is insensitive to all those finer 
details, which are indistinguishable in the picture due to its finite resolution. Dretske 
argues that when the buzzer goes on and produces the sound with the specific pitch, 
it carries exactly the same information (digital as well as analog) as the picture (cf. 
Dretske, 1981, pp. 138-139). Still, there is an important  difference between the 
picture and the buzzing as signals carrying information about the landing of the 
Airbus A380.
The picture represents the Airbus A380 as an airplane with four engines, a 
characteristically placed flight deck, a very specific shape, etc. It carries the 
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information that there is an airplane with four engines in virtue of having certain 
properties (i.e. in the case of a printed picture, certain dots of paint forming 
characteristic patterns—P4E). Similarly, it carries the information that there is an 
airplane with a characteristically  placed flight deck in virtue of some other properties 
(other dots of paint forming different patterns—PFD), etc. The picture carries that 
there is an Airbus A380 in virtue of having all these properties (P4E+PFD+...) at the 
same time. Any system which is sensitive to property  P4E, but  not to PFD, etc. is able 
to disregard irrelevant features of the picture, and extract (digitalise) the information 
that there is an airplane with four engines.
Contrary  to this, the buzzing system represents the Airbus A380 as a buzzing sound. 
The buzzing sound has no other properties only its specific pitch. Thus the sound 
carries the information that there is an Airbus A380 in virtue of having the property 
Pitch. Since the information that there is an Airbus A380 nests the information that 
there is an airplane with four engines, every signal carrying information that there is 
an Airbus A380 also carries the information that there is an airplane with four 
engines. If one wants to build a system, which is able to extract this nested 
information, one needs to construct  a digitaliser which is sensitive to the information 
that there is an airplane with four engines, but disregards the information that there is 
an Airbus A380. However, since Pitch is the only property of the signal, the digitaliser 
cannot be sensitive of anything other than Pitch. Now the problem is evident: the 
buzzing sound carries its most specific information in virtue of having Pitch, so 
anything sensitive to Pitch is sensitive to the digital information carried by the signal, 
and thus cannot extract a piece of analog information by  disregarding all other pieces 
of information carried by the signal.
On the basis of all this, it  is possible to formulate the definition of extractability. If a 
signal r having properties P1, P2,... carries in digital form the information that s is F, 




r carries the information that s is G in extractable form just in case there is 
some property of r, Pi, in virtue of which r carries the information that s is G 
but not the information that s is F or any  other Q that nests the information that 
s is G. (cf. Kulvicki, 2004, p. 385)
5.1.2 Sensation, perception, and cognition within the 
information-theoretic framework
The information-theoretic framework works with the following picture of the 
sensory-cognitive architecture. The sensory system, which consists of transducers 
and pre-conscious, low-level processors connects the central cognitive system to the 
environment. Transducers convert the physical input (different forms of energy) into 
neural signals usable by the rest of the sensory system, which processes the 
information transformed by transducers. Sensory  representations form the interface 
between the sensory  system and the cognitive system—they are the outputs produced 
by the sensory system and the inputs consumed by the cognitive/conceptual system 
(which in turn controls behaviour). It is the particular sensory  representation that 
transfers information about a distal layout (the object represented) for the conceptual 
system.3
These sensory representations carry a lot  of details in digital form about the objects 
they  represent, and, in addition, nested in the digital information, a lot of further 
information encoded in analog form. This information is made available for the 
central system, which extracts certain pieces of analog information, and encodes 
them in digital form. That is, from an information-theoretic perspective, the cognitive 
system is an analog-digital converter. As Dretske puts it:
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3  I follow Aydede and Güzeldere’s terminology here. Aydede and Güzeldere’s sensory system and 
sensory representations roughly correspond to the perceptual system and perceptual representations of 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.  The representational hierarchy discussed in Chapter 4 is a hierarchy inside 
Aydede and Güzeldere’s sensory system. The cognitive/conceptual system (Aydede and Güzeldere) 
roughly corresponds to the central system (Chapter 4). See Footnote 4 in this chapter for further 
clarification.
“Perception is a process by means of which information is delivered within a 
richer matrix of information (hence in analog form) to the cognitive centers for 
their selective use. Seeing, hearing, and smelling are different ways we have of 
getting information about s to a digital-conversion unit whose function it is to 
extract pertinent  information from the sensory representation for purposes of 
modifying output. It is the successful conversion of information into digital 
form that constitutes the essence of cognitive activity. [...] Cognitive activity is 
the conceptual mobilization of incoming information, and this conceptual 
treatment is fundamentally  a matter of ignoring differences (as irrelevant to an 
underlying sameness).” (Dretske, 1981, p. 142)
That is, concepts, produced by  the cognitive system, are representational states 
carrying the information extracted from sensory representations in digital form. If, 
for example, when an air traffic controller looks out of the control tower’s window 
and catches sight of an Airbus A380 landing, her sensory  system makes a rich array 
of information available for her cognitive system representing fine details of the 
airplane (including the four engines, the place of the flight deck, the colour of the 
fuselage, the logo on the fin, etc.). Her cognitive system, in turn, digitalises pieces of 
the analog information available, forming concepts—and thus contributing to 
recognising and categorising the stimulus—like AIRPLANE, or AIRBUS.
Aydede and Güzeldere (2005) start off with this picture. They supplement it by 
distinguishing between three classes of concepts: sensory concepts like RED, 
perceptual concepts like ROUND, and observational concepts like AIRPLANE. The 
distinction between these three sets of concepts is based on the abstraction/
digitalisation distance between sensory representations and related concepts. As we 
have seen, concepts digitalise analog information nested in the most specific 
information carried by sensory  representations. The more information is disregarded 
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by a concept, the longer the abstraction/digitalisation distance is between the sensory 
representation and the concept.4
Observational concepts have the longest abstraction/digitalisation distance because 
these concepts deliver information that can be extracted from many sensory 
representations with widely different digital informational contents. The digital 
information carried by the concept AIRPLANE can just as well be extracted from 
visual sensory representations of two wings, a fuselage, a fin, etc., as from, for 
example, auditory representations of jet engine noise, airflow noise, etc. 
Perceptual concepts have a shorter abstraction/digitalisation distance. Though they, 
just like observational concepts, do abstract away from details carried in the sensory 
representation, they are more closely connected to the particular sensory 
representation they are acquired from than observational concepts. As Aydede and 
Güzeldere puts it: “[t]he information necessary and sufficient for the correct 
application of these concepts [...] is normally  contained in the sensory base from 
which they  are directly acquired” (Aydede & Güzeldere, 2005, p. 208). That is, 
contra observational concepts, their necessary acquisition conditions tie perceptual 
concepts to specific sensory representations. Examples of perceptual concepts (in the 
visual case) are concepts of spatiotemporal relations, geometric figures, and shapes. 
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4  Aydede and Güzeldere’s sensory and perceptual concepts might be corresponded to Papineau’s 
perceptual concepts (cf. §3.5). Note however, that whereas Papineau’s perceptual concepts are at least 
partly constituted by a perceptual template (which might be corresponded to intermediate level 
perceptual representations as discussed by Prinz (2000); cf.  4.3.2),  Aydede and Güzeldere’s concepts 
are novel representational states extracting information from sensory representations. Aydede and 
Güzeldere’s observational concepts further complicate the picture. As Aydede and Güzeldere argues 
(see below), observational concepts can be acquired via book learning. That is, they are definitely not 
perceptual concepts in Papineau’s sense. Perceptual concepts in Papineau’s sense are tied to viewpoint 
centric perceptual representations. Note that it is possible to draw a finer-grained conceptual hierarchy 
than that of Aydede and Güzeldere. In this hierarchy, ROUNDViewpointCentric might be seen as a 
perceptual concept in Papineau’s sense: it answers to round objects (circles) from those vantage points 
where they do look round. ROUNDViewpointInvariant is not tied to a particular viewpoint: it answers to 
round objects from many different vantage points,  even from those where they do not look round (cf. 
high level, viewpoint independent perceptual representations as discussed by Prinz (2000); see also 
§4.3.2). Finally,  ROUNDModalityInvariant is not even tied to the visual modality: it is activated when one 
reads or hears about round objects. Observational concepts,  as Aydede and Güzeldere characterise 
them seem to be similar to this last kind of concepts.
Sensory  concepts have a minimal abstraction/digitalisation distance. Their digital 
informational content is part of the digital informational content of the sensory 
representations they are acquired from. In other words, sensory concepts disregard 
only a minimal amount of the digital information present in sensory representations
—there is only  a minimal loss of information in the process of digitalisation. The 
prime example Aydede and Güzeldere use for illustrating sensory concepts are colour 
concepts. When the air traffic controller catches sight of the landing Airbus A380 her 
sensory  representation carries information about a vast amount of detail, including 
the logo—say, a white kangaroo on a red background. The air traffic controller’s 
cognitive system automatically picks up the colour information and encodes them in 
the sensory concepts WHITE and RED. These sensory concepts digitalise almost all 
the information carried by  the sensory  representation about the colour of the fin. The 
small amount of information loss is due to the fact that whereas sensory 
representations always present a colour as a particular shade, sensory concepts 
disregard the shade-specific information.5
Aydede and Güzeldere claim that sensory concepts are special, and argue that by 
relying on the special features of sensory concepts it becomes possible to explain 
why the epistemic gap occurs. Therefore, their account is a version of the 
Phenomenal Concept Strategy. The argument they propose runs as follows.
Since the abstraction/digitalisation distance between sensory concepts and their 
sensory  base is minimal—i.e. there is almost no loss of information in the acquisition 
of a sensory concept—the central cognitive system doesn’t need to do much 
digitalisation. Almost no extra information is used and then discarded in the process 
of acquisition. As Aydede and Güzeldere puts it, the mechanism that mediates the 
informational link between the tokenings of a sensory concept and the instantiations 
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5  Aydede and Güzeldere reserve the notion of concept for those cognitive structures, which are 
involved in diachronic recognitional and identificational tasks. Though we are able to discriminate 
between different shades of a colour synchronically, we cannot do this diachronically. This 
observation leads Aydede and Güzeldere to the claim that there is some information loss in the process 
of digitalisation between the sensory representation of a colour and the corresponding sensory concept 
(Aydede & Güzeldere, 2005, pp. 207-208). 
of the property  it refers to (the sustaining mechanism of the concept) is not cognitive. 
The acquisition and deployment of sensory  concepts is innate and automatic, and 
more interestingly, brute and primitive: whenever a system occupies the relevant 
sensory  states it  is ‘triggered‘ to acquire the corresponding sensory concept. Sensory 
concepts are closely tied to their sensory base—so closely  that they  are necessarily 
acquired from the sensory  representations of the properties sensory concepts denote 
(Aydede & Güzeldere, 2005, pp. 210-212).
Contrary  to this, the acquisition of perceptual and observational concepts involve 
digitalisation. There is a certain amount of information (some in the case of 
perceptual concepts, and a lot in the case of observational concepts) used and then 
disregarded by  the cognitive system. The abstraction/digitalisation distance of 
observational concepts is the longest; though they can be acquired from the sensory 
representations of the properties they denote, it is not necessarily so. Observational 
concepts can also be acquired by other means, i.e. book reading, or inference.  Their 
sustaining mechanisms are cognitive.
In the Dretskean framework, the semantic content of a concept is that  piece of 
information, which is completely digitalised by the concept (cf. Dretske, 1981, p. 
185). A piece of information about an object is completely digitalised, if the signal, 
which carries it as its most specific information does so without this information 
being nested in some other piece of information about an intermediary structure.6 In 
our present context, this is an important requirement, since sensory representations 
play  an intermediary role between concepts and the properties denoted by  the 
concepts. However, in the case of observational concepts, it poses no problem: 
observational concepts can be acquired in many different ways (via many different 
sensory  representations), so it  seems plausible that they  track distal objects without 
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6 “Structure S has the fact that t is F as its semantic content =
(a) S carries the information that t is F and
(b) S carries no other piece of information,  r is G, which is such that the information that t is F is 
nested (nomically or analytically) in r’s being G.” (Dretske, 1981, p. 185)
tracking hugely disjunctive proximal (intermediary) properties (cf. Aydede & 
Güzeldere, 2005, p. 214).
Not so, with sensory concepts. In the case of sensory concepts, the complete 
digitalisation of the distal objects fails. Sensory concepts are directly and necessarily 
acquired from specific sensory representations, thus they seem to carry the most 
specific information about their environmental source by carrying the most specific 
information about an intermediary structure, namely the corresponding sensory 
representation. This means, that the most specific informational content7 of sensory 
concepts is dual—it consists of information about the external property denoted by 
the concept, and information about the properties of the intermediary sensory 
representation (cf. Aydede & Güzeldere, 2005, p. 216). That is, the information-
theoretic framework seems to give the wrong result: if the semantic content of a 
concept is that piece of information which is completely  digitalised, then the 
semantic content of a sensory concept is not the external property (what should be), 
but the corresponding sensory representation. 
Aydede and Güzeldere solves this problem by arguing that the conceptual system 
needs to integrate information carried by  sensory concepts with information carried 
by perceptual and observational concepts. Since perceptual and observational 
concepts have their semantic content anchored in the environment (i.e. they are 
deployed in the recognition and categorisation of external objects), there better be 
mechanisms in place within the cognitive system, which lock the semantic content of 
sensory  concepts to the external part of their dual most specific informational 
content.8 Again, when the air traffic controller catches sight of the Airbus A380, her 
cognitive system needs to integrate those features presented by  the sensory concepts 
RED and WHITE, with the features presented by perceptual concepts like CURVED, 
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7  The informational content of a concept is the information carried in digital form plus all the 
information nested in the digital content (Aydede & Güzeldere, 2005, p. 205).
8 However, Aydede and Güzeldere do not specify the underlying mechanisms.
and observational concepts like KANGAROO, as the features of a distal object. As 
Aydede and Güzeldere put it:
“It is the pressure exerted by our practical interests in having a coherent global 
representation of our external environment that forces the conceptual system to 
pick out the [external property] redness as the semantic content of 
RED.” (Aydede & Güzeldere, 2005, p. 218)
As a next step, Aydede and Güzeldere argue that the main difference between 
perception of external properties and introspection of internal sensory  states is the 
way they utilise the same structure.9 As we have seen, the cognitive system picks up 
information generated at the level of sensory representations10  automatically, and 
with a very little loss of information, thus forming certain representational structures 
within the cognitive system with a very short abstraction/digitalisation distance from 
sensory  representations. These representational structures carry  information about the 
particular internal sensory representations they are acquired from, and, as a 
consequence of this, about the specific external properties the sensory 
representations in question stand for. Thereby, they have a dual (most specific) 
information content.
Now when one perceives properties of external objects, one deploys these 
representational structures in such a way, which utilises the external element of the 
information content of these structures. This is the case, which has already been 
discussed—the deployment of sensory concepts.
Parallel with this, when one introspects one’s internal states, one deploys the same 
representational structures in such a way, which utilises the internal element of the 
information content of these structures. Aydede and Güzeldere argue that this is the 
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9  Note how similar this claim is to the one made by Papineau (2007)—cf. §3.5.2.  However, the 
framework Papineau is using is more Fodorian than Dretskean. See §5.2 below.
10  Aydede and Güzeldere argue that sensory representations are information generating sources on 
their own—they eliminate the possibilities of alternatives. When a concrete sensory representation is 
instantiated it eliminates the possibilities of other representations being instantiated (cf.  Aydede & 
Güzeldere, 2005, pp. 223-225). 
case of deploying phenomenal concepts. That is, on Aydede and Güzeldere’s account, 
deploying a phenomenal concept amounts to utilising the same representational 
structure, which is utilised when one deploys a sensory concept, but the two 
mechanisms—i.e. the phenomenal (internal) and the sensory  (external) utilisations—
differ in which part of the information content of the representational structure they 
select as the semantic content of the concept in question.11 
With all these at hand, it is easy to see how Aydede and Güzeldere’s account fits into 
Phenomenal Concept Strategy. Phenomenal Concept Strategy  claims that 
phenomenal concepts are special, i.e. unlike any other concepts, which ultimately 
results in their conceptual irreducibility.12 Aydede and Güzeldere’s account explains 
what is special about phenomenal concepts: they (together with sensory concepts, of 
course) have their semantics fixed by a direct and immediate informational link to 
sensory  representations. Consequently, sensory/phenomenal concepts are 
independent of any other concepts: they cannot be defined in terms of physical and 
functional concepts, and no such concepts are involved in fixing their reference 
(since their sustaining mechanisms are non-cognitive). From this the conceptual 
irreducibility  of phenomenal concepts follows; as Aydede and Güzeldere put it: “this 
means that sensory [and phenomenal] concepts cannot be derived from any other 
concepts or theories couched in them” (Aydede & Güzeldere, 2005, p. 231).
5.1.3 Monadic markers as the sensory bases of sensory/
phenomenal concepts
Within the cognitive architecture, Aydede and Güzeldere concentrate on the 
conceptual faculty. In their account, the emphasis is on the characteristics of sensory 
and phenomenal concepts—the explanatory work is claimed to be done by these 
concepts due to their special nature: namely that they track the environment via 
tracking internal structures (sensory representations). This, Aydede and Güzeldere 
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11 Again, compare this with Papineau’s view in §3.5.2.
12 Cf. §3.1 for more details about conceptual irreducibility.
argue, is a unique feature—all other concepts13  track their distal causes without 
tracking proximal sensory representations.
The consequence is that whereas sensory/phenomenal concepts digitalise the most 
specific information carried by  their sensory  bases, and thus have a minimal 
abstraction/digitalisation distance, observational (and perceptual) concepts digitalise 
only some aspects of the analog information nested in the most specific information 
carried by their sensory bases, and thus disregard a lot of otherwise available 
information. But what is the reason for this difference in the first place? Why do 
sensory/phenomenal concepts digitalise the most specific rather than only some less 
specific information carried by the relevant sensory representation?
In fact, Aydede and Güzeldere have an answer to this question. They claim that 
those sensory  representations, which serve as the sensory  base of sensory/
phenomenal concepts carry their analog information in a non-extractable form. We 
have seen in §5.3.1 that a signal carries its analog information content in a non-
extractable form if the signal has no such information carrying property in virtue of 
which the signal carries that particular piece of analog information but not  other 
pieces nesting the analog information in question. In other words, if the signal has no 
other property distinguishable for a digitaliser than the very property in virtue of 
which the signal carries the most specific information, then the digitaliser will not be 
able to digitalise the analog information carried by  the signal. The best the digitaliser 
can do is to respond to the only property  the signal has, and thus to digitalise the 
most specific information the signal carries. According to Aydede and Güzeldere, this 
is exactly  the case with those sensory representations which form the bases of 
sensory/phenomenal concepts (e.g. the sensory representation of a certain shade of 
red). As they put it:
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13  In accordance with the classification Aydede and Güzeldere provides, these are observational and 
perceptual concepts.
“[The relevant information carrying feature of the sensory representation] by 
carrying information about a surface’s being red16, also carries the analog 
information that it has a spectral reflectance, or that it (just) reflects light at 
different wavelengths. These are nested in the information that the surface is 
red16. But these pieces of analog information cannot be recovered or extracted 
from the signal, i.e., from whatever feature of the sensory representation carries 
the color information in question.” (Aydede & Güzeldere, 2005, p. 207)
The crucial point, as we have seen, is that the digitaliser is not able to selectively 
respond to a certain piece of analog information carried by the signal, because the 
signal has no information carrying property (which the digitaliser is sensitive to) 
other than the one in virtue of which it carries the most specific information. That is, 
sensory/phenomenal concepts cannot extract  analog information from (and thus must 
digitalise the most specific information carried by) their sensory bases because the 
sensory  representations in question have only one information carrying property the 
conceptual system is sensitive to—i.e. because they  are monadic (unstructured) for 
the conceptual system. The sensory  bases of sensory/phenomenal concepts thus are 
monadic markers.14 
That is, in a certain respect, the Aydede and Güzeldere account is very close to the 
Monadic Marker Account: the two accounts agree that among our sensory/perceptual 
representations some are monadic, i.e. (in information-theoretical terms) carry  analog 
information in a non-extractable form. However, the two accounts differ in many 
respects.
First of all, recognising that there are monadic markers amongst sensory/perceptual 
representations is, at best, only half of the story. Explaining what monadic markers 
are (cf. §4.3.1 and §4.3.2), and how it is possible that for central processes some 
perceptual representations are monadic, whereas others are structured (cf. the Core 
Hypothesis and §4.2.3) is a crucial part of the Monadic Marker Account. Aydede and 
Güzeldere do not  really address this question. Or to be more precise, it is not clear 
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14 Cf. §4.3.1 and §4.3.2.
whether they have anything more in mind than the ‘unstructured representations due 
to a sensitivity threshold’ argument (cf. §4.3.2). Formulated in terms of their 
vocabulary, the question is why it is the case that some sensory  representations carry 
analog information in a non-extractable form, whereas others carry it in an 
extractable form. Aydede and Güzeldere’s answer starts in the following way:
“One of the most basic truths about autonomous intentional systems is that 
they  have to interact with their environment informationally. So they have to 
have information entry mechanisms. These mechanisms cannot deliver every 
piece of information in analog form, i.e., in a form that is always nested by 
some further more specific information. There will have to be a cut-off point 
about the most specific information the mechanism can provide about the 
environment.” (Aydede & Güzeldere, 2005, p. 211)
In this passage Aydede and Güzeldere argue that the digital information content of 
representations generated by the input mechanisms of a cognitive system is 
determined by  the sensitivity  threshold of the input mechanism. This is equivalent 
with the argument presented in §4.3.2 explaining how an informational cut-off point 
is established at the entry level of a representational hierarchy by the finite sensitivity 
of the corresponding input mechanism. However, Aydede and Güzeldere do not stop 
here. They continue by arguing that from this fact about entry level representations it 
follows that these representations must carry analog information in a non-extractable 
form.
“If this piece of digital information carries the analog information nested in it 
in an extractable format, then there will have to be structural features of the 
output representation carrying the (total) digital information that  nest this 
information. Then the same question arises about the digital content of these 
features and its format. This process cannot go indefinitely. At some point there 
will have to be representational features with digital informational content  that 
nests the analog information carried by  them in a non-extractable format, at 
which point the property  digitally  represented won’t be represented as having 
internal constituents.” (Aydede & Güzeldere, 2005, pp. 211-212)
Roughly, Aydede and Güzeldere argue along the following lines. If the analog 
information nested in the digital information content of (i.e. the most specific 
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information carried by) the entry level representations is carried in an extractable 
form, then these representations must have features, which, taken individually, are 
responsible for carrying (in digital form) each piece of the extractable analog 
information but not the most specific information (cf. §5.1.1). Now the question 
Aydede and Güzeldere asks is whether the analog information nested in the digital 
content of the individual features is carried in an extractable form or not. By the very 
same reasons, there must be more fine grained features ensuring that the analog 
information is extractable, etc. To escape infinite regress, Aydede and Güzeldere 
conclude that there must be a point where the analog information is carried in a non-
extractable form. That is, Aydede and Güzeldere argue that since no signal can be 
infinitely structured, there is always information which is carried by a signal in non-
extractable form.
Note however, that there are two different issues here. The first issue is how specific 
the digital information content of the entry  level representations is.15  The second 
issue is whether the analog information carried by theses representations as nested in 
their digital content is extractable or not. Aydede and Güzeldere in the first quote of 
the previous page, and in line with the argument of §4.3.2, argue that the first issue is 
determined by the sensitivity  threshold of input mechanisms. Then, in the second 
quote of the previous page, they  argue that the second issue is determined by how 
detailed feature sets (i.e. information carrying property-structure) these 
representations can have. Note however, that the two issues are interrelated. Entry 
level representations simply do not carry information about those states of affairs, 
which are below the sensitivity  threshold of the input mechanisms generating these 
representations. That is, the most specific information carried by  these 
representations is finite, and thus a finite set of information carrying property-
structure is sufficient for making all the analog information16 in principle extractable. 
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15 That is, how specific the most specific information entry level representations carry is.
16  At least about the physical properties of the represented object, which is the important issue from 
our present perspective—cf. 5.3.1.
The very fact, that there is a cut-off point at  the entry  level, i.e. that the most detailed 
information an entry  level representation carries is constrained by  the sensitivity 
threshold of the input mechanism means that the input mechanism is insensitive to 
the fine-grained structure of the represented object. If so, then those features of an 
entry  level representation in virtue of having which the representation is able to carry 
information about the finest-grained structure the input mechanism is sensitive to 
simply  carry no further information about the below-threshold properties of the 
represented object. The finer grained structure (i.e. the structure below the sensitivity 
threshold) of the represented object can change arbitrarily, it will not affect the 
representation generated by the input mechanism (cf. §4.3.2).17 
From all these observations regarding the account Aydede and Güzeldere put forth, 
two related conclusions follow. First, the answer provided by Aydede and Güzeldere 
to the question of why there are unstructured representations is no different from the 
‘due to a sensitivity  threshold’ argument introduced in §4.3.2. However, as we have 
seen it there, this argument is problematic, since the representational base it points at 
is a poor candidate for being the ‘locale’ of consciousness. Second, although the 
information-theoretical notion of ‘representations carrying analog information in 
non-extractable form’ might be corresponded to the notion of ‘unstructured 
representations’ as used in §4,18  not all unstructured representations are monadic 
markers—i.e. good candidates for being related directly to conscious experiences.19 
In other words, the first major difference between the Monadic Marker Account and 
Aydede and Güzeldere’s approach is that the latter cannot provide a sufficient answer 
to the question of why  some of those representations which are good candidates for 
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17 That is, it is in principle possible that if a represented object has no physical properties below the 
sensitivity threshold of a relevant input mechanism, and the representations generated have 
sufficiently detailed information carrying property-structure, then these  representations will carry all 
the information about the physical properties of the object in an extractable form. Cf. 5.3.1.
18  Only roughly, though, since as we have just seen, when representations are unstructured due to a 
sensitivity threshold of the input mechanisms they might carry all the information they carry about 
physical properties in extractable form.
19 Cf. 4.3.2.
being the ‘locale’ of consciousness are unstructured, whereas others are structured. 
The Monadic Marker Account contributes significantly  to understanding this issue—
from a certain point of view, solving this problem is one of the main motivation 
behind the Monadic Marker Account. 
The second main difference is connected to a related issue. The Aydede-Güzeldere 
account presupposes not just that there are representations carrying analog 
information in a non-extractable way, but also that there are representations which 
carry  analog information in an extractable way. As we have seen this latter point is 
equivalent with there being structured representations in our cognitive system. 
Aydede and Güzeldere do not argue for this claim at all, they simply accept that  this 
is the case. However, as it has been pointed out in §4.2.2, it is far from trivial how 
one could support this claim in cognitive terms—especially given modern 
approaches to perception, like e.g. the Bayesian approach. As we have seen, the 
problem there is that within the Bayesian framework all representations are 
unstructured, i.e. none of them carry analog information in an extractable form.
That is, from the perspective of modern theories of perception grounding structured 
representations in cognitive processes is a challenge. The Aydede-Güzeldere account 
does not recognise this challenge—it leaves this question entirely open. Contrary  to 
this, the Monadic Marker Account has a fundamental constituent, the Core 
Hypothesis, which explains how certain representations within an accessible range of 
the representational hierarchy (where representations are unstructured for the 
processes at the next higher level) could nevertheless appear as structured for central 
processes. 
The Aydede and Güzeldere account suggests a picture, where the perceptual system 
provides an array of representations with rich digital information content nested in 
which they carry analog information in an extractable form. Some of these 
representations, however, are such that  they do not have information carrying 
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properties encoding individually all the analog information the representations carry, 
and thus their analog content is carried in a non-extractable form. Aydede and 
Güzeldere sometimes talk about the latter set of representations as they appeared at 
higher levels of abstraction, which suggests that representations carrying analog 
information in non-extractable form are based on representations carrying analog 
information in an extractable form.20  This is in stark contrast with the picture 
suggested by modern (e.g. Bayesian) approaches. According to this picture, since in a 
sense every representation is unstructured (i.e. carries analog information in a non-
extractable form), it is the representation of structure which must be based on 
monadic representations and their organisation.21
Interestingly, the Aydede and Güzeldere approach seems to be unable to account for 
this latter picture. In the Dretskean framework, representations carrying analog 
information about the structure of an object in an extractable form cannot be based 
on representations carrying analog information about the same structure in a non-
extractable form. Since representations carrying analog information in non-
extractable form have no information carrying properties encoding the structure in 
question, there is simply  nothing further mechanisms could be sensitive to in order to 
decode said structure, and thus no further representations can be formed which could 
carry  information about this structure in an extractable form. The Monadic Marker 
Account proposes a solution via its Core Hypothesis—the organisation of 
unstructured representations and the way they are accessed by central processes must 
be taken into consideration. That is, where Aydede and Güzeldere’s theory fails the 
Monadic Marker Account succeeds: it  is able to incorporate the picture of perceptual 
representations suggested by modern approaches.
Finally, the third major difference between the Monadic Marker Account and Aydede 
and Güzeldere’s theory is that whereas the latter mainly concentrates on the 
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20 Kulvicki (2004, 2005) argues for a similar picture.
21 Cf. §5.3.1 and especially Footnote 38 there for more on this.
conceptual level, and provides a detailed account of how sensory and perceptual 
concepts work (thereby  directly  supporting the Phenomenal Concept Strategy), the 
former claims that the focus should be shifted to the features of perceptual 
representations themselves. On the one hand, this move brings the Monadic Marker 
Account closer to contemporary theories of cognitive architecture, and on the other 
hand, it  makes it  possible to account for features of consciousness independently of 
one’s commitments regarding what concepts are and how they  work. From the point 
of view of the Monadic Marker Account, the special conceptual features versions of 
the Phenomenal Concept  Strategy (e.g. the Aydede and Güzeldere account) talk 
about are only symptoms—consequences of the fact that there are monadic markers 
among perceptual representations.
To show this, i.e. to support the claim that it is the Monadic Marker Account which 
points out the relevant level of analysis where the real explanatory work is done, the 
next section will demonstrate that monadic markers can do the job even in a psycho-
semantic framework which assigns no special characteristics to phenomenal 
concepts.
5.2 Monadic Markers & Fodorian Psycho-Semantics
The framework which allows us to further investigate the capabilities of the Monadic 
Marker Account is Jerry  Fodor’s theory of concepts (Fodor, 1987, 1998, 2008). On 
Fodor’s account sensory and phenomenal concepts are not in any way special. To see 
why this is so, first, let’s briefly summarise the main characteristics of this approach.
5.2.1 General Fodorian framework
The framework this section works with is a generalised version of Fodor’s account. 
According to this general framework, what one can find inside the conceptual faculty 
are concepts and files. Concepts are atomic Language of Thought symbols which are 
nomically locked to the properties they  are concepts of. Concepts are associated with 
files which are placeholders for information about the property being represented by 
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the concept. These files typically  contain abstract information about the object/
property  the concept stands for, but perceptual prototypes also play an important  role 
in concept acquisition.22  Consequently, files can be characterised as having two 
‘slots’, one for perceptual templates (P-slot) and one for abstract knowledge (A-slot). 
Typically, P-slots get filled by perceptual templates via perceptually  experiencing the 
object in question. The content of an A-slot, on the other hand, is what one reports 
when explaining the meaning of a particular concept.23  However, files are not 
constitutive of concepts—on the Fodorian view concepts are strictly  atomic 
Language of Thought symbols. Nevertheless, concepts might have complex 
representational content (as most of them do) which might be accessible for further 
cognitive processing via the associated files if those are not empty. 
Take the example of seeing a day-old chick. When one, upon seeing a day-old chick, 
recognises it  and entertains the concept DAY-OLD CHICK what happens in one’s 
conceptual faculty is the following. The concept DAY-OLD CHICK is an atomic 
Language of Thought symbol which is asymmetrically causally  dependent on day-
old chick occurrences. The file associated to the DAY-OLD CHICK concept has its 
P-slot filled with a perceptual template of a day-old chick, and its A-slot containing 
abstract knowledge of day-old chicks, like ‘it is an animal’, ‘it has yellow feather’ 
and so on.
Perceptual templates filling P-slots are typically, but not necessarily formed via 
perception—they might also be formed from abstract knowledge. Following Fodor 
and Pylyshyn, this latter case might be called simulation of look in imagery 
(Pylyshyn, 2002, 2003). According to Fodor and Pylyshyn, imagination is simulation 
based on concept deployment. Combining concepts with perceptual templates in the 
P-slot of their associated files are accompanied by combining these perceptual 
180
22 See especially in Fodor (1998 Ch. 6; 2008 Ch. 6) and also Margolis (1998).
23 Note how extremely similar this is to Papineau’s (2007) account—cf. §3.5.
templates. This is how one might acquire complex perceptual templates from abstract 
knowledge.
For instance, consider an ornithologist, who, as it happens, has not yet seen any day-
old chick so far—not even pictures thereof. However, she knows everything that can 
be learned from descriptions about the look of day-old chicks. This knowledge, 
together with her previous encounters with other birds via which she could form 
perceptual templates of wings, claws, bills etc. make her able to imagine day-old 
chicks. What she does is entertaining the combined concepts YELLOW, FEATHER, 
LEG and so on. Given that the P-slots of these concepts have already  been filled, 
entertaining these concepts is accompanied by  visual memories of yellow, feather, 
leg, etc. Roughly speaking, the visual image she constructs on entertaining DAY-
OLD CHICK is one that arises from remembering actual perceptions of feathers, 
legs, the colour yellow, and so on.24
Perceptual representations mediate between sensory input systems and the central 
cognitive system—they are outputs of quite complex mechanisms taking place 
within the sensory  input systems, and inputs of the conceptual faculty. However, no 
matter how complex and structured the low level processes are, they remain hidden 
from higher cognition. According to the Fodorian framework, mechanisms within the 
input systems are modular and encapsulated. Though this claim in its strictest sense 
is almost certainly  false, at least in a sufficiently modest form it seems to be 
compatible with both scientific evidence and our everyday  experience.25 In terms of 
everyday experiences, mechanisms within the input systems are modular and 
encapsulated to a degree which makes these processes inaccessible to conscious 
reflection. One might have detailed knowledge about what happens in one’s visual 
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24 Note two things. First,  structural descriptions,  i.e. descriptions instructing the ornithologist how to 
combine the concepts YELLOW, FEATHER, etc. are necessary for the ornithologist to succeed. 
Second, what is explained here within the Fodorian framework, is exactly what happens with 
marsupial-deprived Josephine in §4.1.1—she simulates the look of a new-born joey by combining her 
concepts SPHERE, CONE, PINK, etc. on the basis of a structural description.
25 Cf. e.g. Kosslyn (1994), Bryson (2000) and McDermott (2001).
system when one has the experience of, say, seeing something red; nonetheless, one 
is unable to consciously reflect on actual processes of one’s early visual system, nor 
can one consciously  influence these processes in any way. For such an interaction to 
take place, a sufficiently direct  and detailed information transfer would be required 
between these two levels of representation. This kind of information transfer 
certainly does not obtain between e.g. colour processing and propositional 
representations.
5.2.2 Causal role exchange and functional un-analysability
Now that the stage is set, let’s see what happens if we supplement the above 
framework with the additional claim that some of the perceptual representations 
mediating between the sensory and the conceptual systems are monadic markers. To 
be able to evaluate this situation we first need to consider an important  consequence 
of having monadic markers, i.e. unstructured perceptual representations in one’s 
cognitive architecture.
 
This consequence is the possibility of causal role exchange: monadic markers, and 
unstructured representations in general, are able to exchange the causal role they play 
in a system. The very same unstructured representation might play different causal 
roles in the same system at different times, and also, different unstructured 
representations might play the very same causal role in the same system (or in 
different systems of the same type). 
Intuition pumps back up this claim. In what follows two cases shall be considered: 
the case of colour versus shape experience inversion, and the case of role exchange 
between conceptual atoms versus sentences. First, consider the contrast between 
colour experience inversion scenarios and visual shape experience inversion 
scenarios.26  It is quite easy  to conceive of a colour experience inversion scenario 
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26  Recall that in §4.1.1 we have seen that colours are good candidates for unstructured experiences, 
whereas shapes are paradigmatic forms of structured experiences. 
where the colour of ripe tomatoes look to colour-inverted subjects the way the colour 
of grass looks to the rest of the population without there being any further difference 
in their cognitive architecture. Contrary to this, visual shape experience inversion 
scenarios are harder to conceive of. If, due to some optical distortion, a subject 
misperceives circles as squares this tends to give rise to mistaken inferences in her 
mind about the shapes of certain objects. A fairly complex change in subsequent 
processing is needed to straighten out all geometrical inferences related to squares 
and circles in the subjects mind; and this is only a very  simple case of shape 
inversion.
Second, take two atomic symbols of Mentalese, X and Y. Suppose that, in subject A’s 
mind, X is locked to spoons, and has an associated file containing a perceptual 
template of spoons and relevant abstract knowledge. Also in subject A’s mind, Y is 
locked to knives and has an associated file with proper contents. However, in subject 
B’s mind, X is locked to knives and is associated with the knife-file, whereas Y is 
locked to spoons and has the spoon file associated with it. If the Fodorian view of 
concepts (in which atomic concepts are locked to the properties they represent and 
are associated with relevant knowledge) is right, then the role switch just sketched 
seems straightforwardly  possible. Contrary to this, the semantic inversion of 
sentences (complex linguistic representations) is an utterly  strange idea. Imagine that 
the sentence “Budapest  is the capital of Hungary” expresses a geographical fact for 
subject A, but for subject B it expresses the very zoological fact “giraffes are taller 
than dogs” expresses for subject A.
 
The moral that  follows is that complex representations are much more tightly 
embedded in a system than unstructured representations. Two complex 
representations cannot assume each others causal role, for instance, without a 
significant reorganisation of the whole system, whereas unstructured representations 
seem to be able to exchange their causal roles freely.
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Although causal role exchange between unstructured representations seems to be a 
coherent idea, it does not follow that in adult subjects’ minds such an exchange can 
easily happen. For unstructured representations UR1 and UR2 to exchange causal 
roles all the causal connections UR1 has to other states and behaviour need to be 
assumed by  UR2 and vice versa. That  is, for minds in which a large number of 
learned connections are already firmly  in place actual causal role exchange seems to 
be impossible. Therefore, what  the possibility  of causal role exchange really means is 
this: the role an unstructured representation actually  plays in a cognitive system 
could have been filled by some other unstructured representation equally  well, in 
other words, the unstructured representation in question does not fill the role it 
actually fills necessarily.
This is an important consequence of being unstructured since it entails the functional 
un-analysability of unstructured representations. Since an unstructured representation 
does not fill the role it actually  fills necessarily, knowing what role it fills (no matter 
how detailed the description is) does not help in specifying what unstructured 
representation it is that actually  fills the role. Although the causal role actually filled 
by the unstructured representation is characteristic of the unstructured representation 
as a part of the actual system, since the very  same causal role could have been filled 
by a different unstructured representation, it does not characterise the actual filler 
uniquely and thus does not distinguish it from other possible fillers.27 
5.2.3 Explaining the epistemic gap within the Fodorian 
framework
With all the resources at  hand, it is time to see how monadic markers embedded in a 
Fodorian framework are able to account for the occurrence of the epistemic gap. 
First, recall the case of the ornithologist who has never ever seen a day-old chick. 
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27 Here my main aim was only to flash the idea that functional un-analysability might be accounted for 
in terms of certain characteristics of unstructured representations. For a detailed discussion of how 
features of unstructured representations entail functional un-analysability, see §5.3.2.
Though the A-slot of the file associated to her DAY-OLD CHICK concept is filled 
with detailed propositional knowledge about day-old chicks, its P-slot is empty. Now 
consider that this is the first time she tries to imagine a day-old chick. Based on 
descriptions mentioning such simple shapes (e.g. feather, wing, claw, etc.) and 
colours (e.g. yellow) which the ornithologist has prior experience of she is able to 
simulate the look of a day-old chick. That is, her abstract knowledge drives her 
imagination resulting in a perceptual template which now fills the so far empty  P-
slot. Note that the P-slots of the files associated with the concepts YELLOW, 
FEATHER, and so on, must have been filled in order for abstract knowledge to be 
able to generate the day-old chick template by simulating the look.
 
Now compare this case with the case of Mary  (Jackson, 1982, 1986) the future 
neuroscientist, who has never ever seen anything red.28  However, she knows 
everything there is to know—in terms of descriptions—about seeing something red. 
That is, just like in the case of the ornithologist, though the A-slot of the file 
associated to Mary’s concept RED is filled with detailed propositional knowledge, its 
P-slot is empty. Nonetheless, there is an important difference between Mary and the 
ornithologist, namely that whereas the ornithologist is able to fill the relevant P-slot 
with a day-old chick template by  simulating its look based on constituent structure, 
Mary (before leaving her room) is unable to fill the P-slot of the file associated to the 
concept RED with a red experience template. What makes the difference here is the 
fact that while the perceptual representation corresponding to the experience of 
seeing a day-old chick is structured the perceptual representation corresponding to 
the experience of seeing something red is not. The latter is a monadic marker, an 
unstructured representation, and as such its perceptual template cannot be simulated 
on the basis of the abstract knowledge Mary could acquire within her chamber.29
 
To see why  this is so, let’s first unpack what happens with Mary. Before her release, 
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28 Cf. §2.2.4.
29 Perceptual templates might best be thought of as patterns of activation within the perceptual system, 
i.e. as stored perceptual representations. Cf. §3.5 and Footnote 4 in §5.1.2.
she learns from books that seeing something red is identical with a salient 
neurological response pattern in subjects’ V4 what she calls ‘neuro response X’, and 
so forms the concept NEURO RESPONSE X of it. That is, the A-slot of the file 
associated to pre-release Mary’s NEURO RESPONSE X concept is filled with 
relevant neurological information, but its P-slot is empty—she has no idea of the 
relevant phenomenal character of occurrent neuro responses.30
 
Then, after her release, Mary is shown a piece of paper with a patch of red on it 
(Nida-Rümelin, 1996). She locks the dummy concept XYZ to this kind of stimulus.31 
Whereas the P-slot of the associated file is filled with the perceptual template of red, 
its A-slot is at least nearly empty. Nonetheless, deployment of the concept XYZ 
helps Mary in recognising and categorising new varieties of the red stimulus, and in 
this way, contextual information can fill the A-slot of the associated file with 
information like ‘it is the colour of London buses’, or ‘it is the colour of ripe 
tomatoes’.32
Note, that  there is no a priori connection between Mary’s XYZ and NEURO 
RESPONSE X concepts. First, Mary cannot fill the A-slot of XYZ with information 
like ‘neuronal activation X’ based on introspection when seeing something red, 
because this level of processing is encapsulated—inaccessible to conscious 
reflection.
 
Second, Mary is unable to fill the P-slot of NEURO RESPONSE X with a perceptual 
template of a red experience solely on the basis of the content of its A-slot. Since the 
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30  Given that Mary knows everything there is to know about the nervous system, and that the only 
kind of visual stimuli she lacks is colour-stimuli, it is likely that the P-slot of the file associated to her 
NEURO RESPONSE X concept will not be empty but filled with a perceptual template of an 
assembly of activated neurons. Nevertheless, it won’t help her in simulating the look of red.
31 According to Fodor’s innateness thesis, our conceptual system is full of dummy concepts waiting to 
get locked to a new kind of stimulus.  One does not need to buy innateness here though, for one could 
argue that Mary acquires a new concept XYZ which is nomically locked to perceived redness. For 
example, this new concept could be a newly acquired perceptual concept in Papineau’s (2007) sense—
cf. §3.5.
32 Again, compare this with how perceptual concepts work in Papineau’s (2007) account—cf. §3.5.
perceptual representation corresponding to the red experience is a monadic marker, it 
has no constituent structure that could help Mary (like prior experiences of wings 
and claws helped the ornithologist). Nor has Mary access to the features33  of red 
experiences—features of monadic markers do not form standalone experiences, the 
only way to experience them is as features of the overall experience (seeing 
something red), which is exactly what Mary lacks.
 
Moreover, neither structural nor functional information conveyed by the abstract 
knowledge in the A-slot is of any  use. Structural information cannot help in 
simulating monadic markers due to the fact that monadic markers lack any structure, 
and functional information cannot help  either due to the functional un-analysability 
of monadic markers.
The only way  for Mary to connect the two concepts is via filling the A-slot of the 
XYZ concept with contextual information she is familiar with from her pre-release 
studies. If, for example, Mary learns that XYZ is utilised when seeing the colour of 
London buses, and if she has learned inside her room that neuro response X answers 
to the colour of London buses in neuro-typical individuals, then she can conclude 
that the two concepts XYZ and NEURO RESPONSE X co-refer. In effect, the A-
slots of the two concepts can get merged—all the conceptual information associated 
with XYZ gets associated with NEURO RESPONSE X, and vice versa: all scientific 
information associated with NEURO RESPONSE X gets associated with 
XYZ. 
However, even if one can link and merge the A-slots, the phenomenology  is tied to 
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33 Hue, saturation and lightness. Cf. §4.1.1.
the P-slots.34  This entails, that when the content of a P-slot is based on monadic 
markers, abstract knowledge necessarily leaves out what it is like to have the relevant 
experience—since such a P-slot cannot be filled solely on the basis of the 
corresponding A-slot. That is, no matter how detailed abstract knowledge one can get 
via merging the A-slots of scientific concepts, it remains ineffective in simulating the 
phenomenology if one lacks the basic constituents—monadic markers—of the 
perceptual template.
This is the epistemic gap, and also the reason why we have the intuition that the 
physical and the phenomenal are distinct. Note that the explanation introduced above 
does not need to presuppose any  difference at the conceptual level. So-called 
phenomenal and physical concepts share the same characteristics inherited from the 
Fodorian framework: they  are atomic LOT symbols with associated files containing 
abstract information and perceptual templates. The explanatory  work is done by the 
fact that monadic markers form the representational bases of perceptual templates 
alone. This, then, validates the fundamental tenet of the Monadic Marker Account, 
claiming that the right level of analysis is the level of perceptual representations.35
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34 The P-slot, as we have seen it, contains a perceptual template,  which might best be thought of as an 
organised set or pattern of stored perceptual representations some of which are monadic markers (cf. 
§5.3.1). According to the Monadic Markers Account, the phenomenal qualities of a conscious 
experience are determined by the structural information extractable from this pattern of 
representations plus the way monadic markers are interpreted by central processes (cf. §4.3.3).  This is 
why the phenomenology is tied to the P-slot. See Papineau (2007), who also argues that the 
phenomenology is tied to perceptual templates (cf. 3.5).
35  Note that all that has been said so far is neutral with regard to Papineau’s or Aydede and 
Güzeldere’s claim that we deploy the same concepts in introspection and when referring to object 
stimuli. That is, I do not argue against their account of how phenomenal concepts work. What I am 
arguing for, however,  is the claim that the level of phenomenal concepts is not the right level of 
analysis—the special features of phenomenal concepts (if any) can be accounted for in terms of the 
features of monadic markers, and moreover, the Monadic Marker Account is able to explain the 
philosophically most important features of conscious experience directly, i.e.  without relying on any 
particular theory of concepts.
5.3 The Explanatory Power of the Monadic Marker 
Account
The previous two sections of this chapter have already flashed a few illustrations 
about the explanatory  power of the Monadic Marker Account. §5.1 has clarified the 
relationship  between the Monadic Marker Account and an influential approach 
derived from the Dretskean framework by Murat Aydede and Güven Güzeldere 
(2005), and John Kulvicki (2004, 2005). It has been shown that the Monadic Marker 
Account is compatible with information-theoretic psycho-semantics. §5.2 has further 
expanded the boundaries of the applicability of the Monadic Marker Account by 
showing how monadic markers can be fitted into a Fodorian framework. Moreover, 
we have seen how the existence of monadic markers accounts for the occurrence of 
the epistemic gap within these different  psycho-semantic frameworks. In what 
follows, I try to demonstrate the real explanatory power of the Monadic Marker 
Account by showing how—without being committed to any  particular psycho-
semantic theory—it is able to account for such fundamental features of conscious 
experience as the facts that it resists functionalisation, and that it necessitates an 
epistemic gap. However, before turning our attention towards these issues, first let’s 
consider how the Monadic Marker Account is able to make the apparent distinction 
between primary  and secondary qualities intelligible, and thus supports the 
observations made in §4.1.2.
5.3.1 Explaining the primary-secondary quality distinction
In §4.1.2 it has been argued that the relationship between colour experiences and 
colour stimuli seems to be different from the relationship  between shape experiences 
and shape stimuli. There is something more to colours than what is presented by 
colour experiences, whereas it  seems not to be the case with regard to shapes 
(Kulvicki, 2005). Or to put it in another way: shape experiences seem to be 
revelatory in a way  in which colour experiences are not  (Jakab, 2003, 2006). Or to be 
put in yet another way: shape experiences seem to resemble the corresponding 
features of object  stimuli, whereas colour experiences do not  (Locke, 1690/1987). 
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The locus classicus of this revelation/resemblance claim is, of course, Locke’s 
famous passage, where he formulates it in this way:
“[T]he ideas of primary qualities of bodies, are resemblances of them, and their 
patterns do really  exist in the bodies themselves; but the ideas, produced in us 
by these secondary qualities, have no resemblance of them at all.” (Locke, 
1690/1987, II, viii, 15)
That is, upon reflection, there seems to be a natural way in which the properties we 
experience as possessed by objects can be classified into two distinct sets. On the one 
hand, there are perceived properties which seem to reveal or resemble the 
corresponding properties of the object stimuli—these are the so-called primary 
properties. Typical examples are shapes, spatial structures in general, and motion. 
My experiences when looking at a day-old-chick inform me about the specific 
physical shape of the chick, and do so in a quite effective way in the following sense: 
‘shape science’—i.e. the scientific endeavour aiming at  revealing the source of the 
information carried by my shape experience—up until a certain resolution, will not 
report anything very different from the shape as experienced. On the other hand, 
there are perceived properties which do not seem to reveal much about the 
corresponding properties of the object stimuli—these are the so-called secondary 
properties. Typical examples are colours, smells, tastes, sine-wave tones. My 
experiences when looking at  the day-old-chick present the chick as being yellow. 
However, colour science reports that the source of the information carried by my 
yellow experience is a certain range of values of surface reflectance. Surface 
reflectances, as colour science reports them, seem to be very  different from colour 
experiences.36
Observing these differences is one thing, explaining them and rendering them 
intelligible is another. The Monadic Marker Account is able help in just that. 
Remember, the Monadic Marker Account introduces the following picture. Only a 
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36  Similarly, molecular shapes and vibrations seem to be very different from smells and tastes; air-
compression waves seem to be very different from sounds, etc. 
range of the whole representational hierarchy is accessible for central processes (in a 
relevant way). Central processes are able to extract structural information regarding 
the objects representations within this range stand for. However, due to the lack of 
central access to lower levels, representations at the earliest  stage of this range are 
monadic markers. Simple experiences—i.e. the very colours, smells, tastes, and sine-
wave tones, which are the paradigmatic examples of secondary qualities—
correspond to monadic markers in the sense that the phenomenal character of these 
experiences is identical with how monadic markers are interpreted by central 
processes. Similarly, complex experiences—i.e. the very  shapes and spatial 
structures, which are the paradigmatic examples of primary properties—correspond 
to higher level representations within the accessible range, and their structure 
corresponds to the structure central processes extract from the range of 
representations they access in the sense that the phenomenal character of complex 
experience is jointly determined by  the structure extracted, and by how monadic 
markers are interpreted by central processes. 
That is, there is a range of hierarchically organised representations such that 
representations at each level stand for constituents of what representations at the next 
higher level stand for. Though each representation is unstructured for the processes at 
the next higher level, central processes can extract structural information from the 
hierarchically organised range itself. This structure, together with how monadic 
markers at the bottom (i.e. entry) level of the accessible range are interpreted by 
central processes determine the phenomenal characteristics of complex experiences. 
In this sense, thus, monadic markers are the bases of complex experiences—they 
provide the bedrock for encoding further, structural features.
Monadic markers, as we have seen, screen-off the features of the represented objects
—all they  do is indicating or marking the occurrence of a certain state-of-affairs. 
They  do not  map the features of the objects they stand for, only indicate their 
presence. Nevertheless, the monadic markers together are able to carry  certain 
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structural information. The guiding analogy  here is that  of a set of tags. One can 
indicate quite complex states of affairs with certain arbitrarily  chosen simple tags. In 
such a tagging system, even if the tags themselves have complex features they are 
interpreted as monadic wholes. Their individual features are unimportant, what is 
important is that they are reliably connected to appropriate states of affairs. In this 
way, they can be used as the basis of mapping ‘further’ structure. Once the tags are in 
place, their organisation can map features of how the individual states of affairs are 
related to each other. That is, with the whole set of tags it becomes possible to 
capture ‘inter-states-of-affairs’ structure. Contrary to individual tags, which do not 
reveal any structure about the states of affairs they stand for, the set of tags itself 
does reveal some structure: the structure characteristic of the interrelations of the 
states of affairs the individual tags represent.
The Monadic Marker Account, thus, tells us that our cognitive system tags the world 
with monadic markers. Certain states of affairs in the world (e.g. certain wavelength 
of light  reflecting from a surface) are tagged with a particular monadic marker. The 
way the system interprets these monadic markers determines (is identical with) the 
corresponding conscious experience (e.g. perceived yellow). Since these tags are 
monadic they screen-off the features of the states of affairs they stand for, i.e. make 
them unavailable for central processes. This is why the corresponding experience 
will be very different from the feature it  is an experience of. Nonetheless, other states 
of affairs—i.e. interrelations of those states of affairs of the world which are 
originally  tagged (e.g. how different surfaces reflecting certain wavelengths of light 
are related to each other)—are registered not directly by  monadic markers 
themselves, but by the organisation of the hierarchy of monadic markers and higher 
level representations also accessible for central processes. This whole range of 
representations is able to make information regarding the particular physical 
structure available for central processes. And since, in accordance with the Monadic 
Marker Account, the phenomenal character of the corresponding experiences is 
partly determined by the structure central processes are able to extract from the range 
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of accessible representations, these experiences will be similar to the object features 
they  are experiences of to a much greater extent than the experiences corresponding 
to monadic markers.37
That is, the Monadic Marker Account explains the primary-secondary quality 
distinction by claiming that those properties which are typically considered as 
secondary  qualities are represented by monadic markers, whereas those properties 
which are typically considered as primary qualities are encoded by the organisation 
of higher level representations of the accessible range within the representational 
hierarchy38 (cf. Kulvicki, 2004, 2005).39 
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37  Note an interesting prediction of the Monadic Marker Account. Different modalities differ in the 
amount of structure discernible for subjects in their modality-specific conscious experiences. 
Similarly,  the ability of discerning structure in one’s experiences differ with expertise.  The Monadic 
Marker Account predicts that this difference in the amount of detail one is able to discern in one’s 
conscious experiences is due to a difference in the range of levels of perceptual representations 
accessible for central processes. For example, for untrained subjects,  in the gustatory or olfactory 
systems all representations are monadic—only one level of the representational hierarchy is accessible 
for working memory.  This range of accessible levels of representations,  however, can be extended 
with expertise: the more expert someone becomes in mastering a certain modality, the more levels of 
the hierarchy of representations will be accessible for central processes.
38  As a consequence of this,  the Monadic Marker Account suggests that simple shape (edge) 
representations themselves are not monadic but are derived from a more primary set of representations 
(which, in turn, are the ‘real’ monadic markers of the system).  For example, in the visual modality, 
edges might be derived as borders between regions of different colours (cf. Smith, 2010, who argues 
that we see the shape of an object in virtue of seeing its colours). Similarly, in the somatosensory 
system edges might be derived as borders between regions of different pressure-areas. Furthermore, 
shape-percepts generated by sonar-like sensory systems might also be derived from primary auditory 
tags, i.e. monadic sound representations. Note that this line of thought might be helpful in shedding 
new light on the multi-modal nature of shape experiences.
39 John Kulvicki—using an information-theoretical terminology—argues for a similar explanation of 
the primary-secondary distinction. As he summarises his view: “perceptual systems must satisfy a 
certain structural constraint in order to make parts of their abundant information extractable and thus 
available to cognition. Specifically, the properties in virtue of which the system carries information 
about the environment [...] must be isomorphic [...] to the properties about which they carry 
information. [...] Perceptual representations of colors are not isomorphic to the colors to the extent that 
perceptual representations of shapes are isomorphic to the shapes.” (Kulvicki, 2005, p. 105, emphasis 
added) The kind of isomorphism Kulvicki has in mind here is “constituent structure isomorphism 
[which] requires that whenever one information carrying property is a constituent of another, then the 
properties about which they carry information are also related in this way, and conversely” (Kulvicki, 
2005, p. 113). Kulvicki motivates this distinction by a detailed account of how early stages of the 
visual system work (cf. Kulvicki, 2005, pp. 115-122). However, note a problem with this: as we have 
seen, the early stages of the visual system seem to be a bad candidate for being the ‘locale’ of 
conscious experiences of primary and secondary properties (cf. §4.3.2). Moreover, note a further 
problem with Kulvicki’s approach: Kulvicki concludes that perceived colours are less isomorphic to 
colours than perceived shapes to shapes (cf.  the emphasis added to the quote above).  Contrary to this, 
however, Locke’s original problem is not that perceived colours resemble the relevant features of 
object stimuli less than perceived shapes, but that they do not resemble them at all. The Monadic 
Marker Account, contra Kulvicki’s account, explains why this is so.
5.3.2 Explaining functional un-analysability
Now let’s move on towards the philosophically  most important features of conscious 
experience: its functional un-analysability  and the fact that it gives rise to an 
epistemic gap. §5.2.2 has already provided some intuition pumps supporting the 
claim that the Monadic Marker Account is able to explain why the phenomenal 
qualities of conscious experience resist functionalisation. The aim of this section is to 
develop a thorough argument supporting this conclusion. 
Consider a machine consisting of a camera system with pattern recognition 
capabilities and an output unit, being able to distinguish ‘joey-sightings’ from all 
other forms of possible stimuli. When an object is presented to the camera, the 
camera system processes the information registered and if it identifies the stimulus as 
a joey it sends a specific electric signal to the output unit. The output unit produces a 
‘this is a joey’ behaviour if it receives the specific electric signal—upon receiving 
any other kind of signal it stays in (returns into) a ‘not joey’ state. 
In this example, the specific electric signal is an unstructured representation. For the 
output unit  it screens off the features of the joey; the output unit has no access to 
such details as how the joey actually  holds its tiny arms, or what state of 
development it is in. The specific electric signal carries the ‘it’s a joey’ information 
without any further details about the object represented. Were distinct electric signals 
sent to the output unit  corresponding to (carrying information about) e.g. cones, 
cylinders, beans, and their spatial positions (or a complex signal the parts of which 
encoded parts of the joeys), structural facts would not be screened off, and the output 
unit would have access to more details about the joey.40 
The specific electric signal might have a lot  of features (strength, duration, etc.), i.e. 
it might be a complex vehicle, still for the output system these features do not 
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40  However, this still would be a system with monadic markers: in this case those signals would be 
monadic markers, which indicate the presence of cones, cylinders, etc. without carrying any more 
information about them. A system entirely without unstructured representations would be one that is 
capable of registering and processing all the details in the stimuli. Cf. §4.3.2.
represent independent features of the joey. In so far as this is the case—as the 
features of the electric signal do not convey  independently identifiable bits of 
information for the output unit—it is an unstructured representations.
Note that as a mere marker or indicator of the presence of the joey, the features of the 
signal are insignificant. The actual features of the specific electric signal do not play 
any role in indicating ‘joey-occurrences’. The system could have been set up  in a 
quite different way, where a totally different electric signal would have played the 
very same role the actual signal plays. Compare this with the case where a complex 
signal is sent from the camera system to the output unit carrying all different sorts of 
information about cones, cylinders, spatial positions etc. Since different features of 
such a signal are interpreted independently by the output system, i.e. they  are 
‘meaningful’ for the rest of the system, they cannot be freely  altered. The more 
information features of the signal carry about the features of the represented object 
the more difficult it is to change the actual signal to a different one. Similarly, the 
more features of the signal are processed independently  by  the output system the 
more tightly it is embedded into the system. That is, there are heavy constraints in 
play  determining which complex signal could and which could not play a specific 
role in a given system.
However, in the case of unstructured representations, there are no such constraints. 
Mere indicators can freely exchange the role they  play  without an extensive 
restructuring of the whole system. Imagine a similar machine as the one above, 
except that its camera system responds to ‘day-old chick occurrences’ with a signal 
totally  different from the one playing a part in the joey  identifying machine. As long 
as the output units of the two machines interpret the incoming signal as an 
unstructured whole, the two machines could be reset in a way  that the original joey 
signal plays the appropriate role in the day-old chick identifying machine and vice 
versa. Any kind of signal with whatever features is apt for playing the role of an 
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unstructured representation in so far as the rest of the system treats it as an 
unstructured monadic whole. 
Of course, once a system is set up, changing the mediating signal would ruin the 
desired behaviour. Nonetheless, the system could have been set up  differently, with 
an entirely  different unstructured representation filling the role. That is, unstructured 
representations in general can freely  exchange the role they play in a system: the role 
an unstructured representation actually  plays could have been filled by any other 
(arbitrary) unstructured representation. Unstructured representations, thus, are 
functionally un-analysable. The causal-functional role an unstructured representation 
plays in a given system does not specify the features of the actual role filler—it does 
not determine which unstructured representation it is that actually plays the role. 
Even if one knew everything there is to know about a system’s organisation and the 
role filled by  an unstructured representation within the system, one would still find it 
possible that the role might have been filled by another unstructured representation.
That is, if one accepts the Monadic Marker Account, i.e. if one accepts that monadic 
markers (which, as we have seen, are a special set of unstructured representations—
cf. 4.3.2) as-interpreted-by-central-processes are identical with the phenomenal 
qualities of simple conscious experiences, then one becomes able to explain why 
phenomenal qualities resist functionalisation.
5.3.3 Explaining the epistemic gap
Besides functional un-analysability, the other (and closely  related) fundamental 
feature of conscious experience is that it gives rise to an epistemic gap. As it has 
been introduced in §2.2.1, the claim that there is an epistemic gap between the 
physical and phenomenal realms amounts to the denial of an epistemic entailment 
from physical truths to phenomenal truths. In fact, the notion ‘epistemic gap’ is an 
umbrella term covering such manifestations as the explanatory gap (cf. §2.2.2), 
Mary’s inability to deduce colour-facts from physical facts (cf. §2.2.4), and the 
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conceivability of zombies (cf. §2.2.3). In this section, I argue that  the Monadic 
Marker Account in itself is apt for explaining why the epistemic gap occurs. In order 
to support this claim, I show that  any  cognitive system with the right sort of 
representational hierarchy and cognitive architecture41 will necessarily find physical 
explanations leaving phenomenal qualities out, phenomenal facts being non-
deducible from physical facts, and zombies being conceivable. 
According to the Monadic Marker Account, our phenomenal knowledge of complex 
experiences is based on our phenomenal knowledge of simple experiences, which in 
turn is of monadic marker states as they are interpreted by  the central processes of 
the cognitive system. There are five different aspects of this situation scientific 
investigations (our physical knowledge) can inform us about: (1) what processes give 
rise to the monadic marker states, (2) what features their vehicles have, (3) what role 
monadic markers play  within the system, (4) what objects they  stand for, and (5) how 
they  are embedded in the system. The source of the epistemic gap is that there is no a 
priori connection between any of these different bits of physical knowledge and how 
the system itself interprets monadic markers, simply  because of restrictions in 
access. Restriction in access affects both directions. On the one hand, access to how 
the system interprets monadic markers is privileged—it is restricted to the system 
itself—whereas, on the other hand, the system lacks access to any  of those features 
scientific investigations can provide information about. To see why, let’s consider 
each aspect individually.
(1) Though scientific investigations can tell us subtle details about the nature of the 
brain processes giving rise to monadic markers, i.e. about the processes within the 
input mechanisms and at lower levels of the representational hierarchy resulting in 
monadic markers, the central system has no access to these activities. This follows 
from the Core Hypothesis claiming that levels of the representational hierarchy 
below the level of monadic markers are inaccessible for relevant central processes, 
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41 Implementing the Core Hypothesis discussed in §4.2.3.
and from standard considerations regarding information encapsulation denying a rich 
and direct information flow between the input mechanisms and the central system.
(2) Scientific investigations can also reveal fine-grained information about the nature 
of the neural signals acting as the vehicles of monadic markers. However, as we have 
seen, the physical properties of the vehicles are unimportant. Recall the example of 
the smoke indicating the outcome of the papal conclave (cf. §4.3.1). Information 
about the neural states implementing monadic markers is analogous with information 
about, say, the molecular structure of the smoke signal. These are not the properties 
the system processing the signal is sensitive to, i.e. these are not information carrying 
properties of the signal. Monadic markers are special, since they  do not have an 
information carrying property-structure mapping features of the represented objects
—they  are interpreted as monadic wholes. Thus the central system is insensitive (and 
in this sense do not have access) to the neural features in question here.
(3) Another kind of information that  can be the subject of physical knowledge is a 
specification of the causal-functional roles monadic markers play in the system they 
are embedded in. However, as we have seen in §5.3.2, this is of no help in matching 
physical knowledge with knowledge of how monadic markers are interpreted by a 
system. Central processes, by interpreting monadic markers, only  tag the objects 
monadic markers stand for. The actual nature of these tags are independent  of the 
specific role they play  in the system. The outcome of the papal conclave, as it 
happens, is indicated by  a smoke signal, but it could have also been indicated by a 
buzzer, for instance (cf. §5.1.1), or any arbitrary tag. Monadic markers are 
functionally un-analysable: knowing what causal-functional roles they fill does not 
tell us anything about their nature. 
(4) Similarly, and relatedly, physical knowledge about the objects the presence of 
which is indicated by monadic markers will not help either. Since monadic markers 
have no information carrying property-structure mapping the features of the 
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represented objects, the properties of these objects are screened off for the system. 
Central processes cannot extract information from monadic markers about the 
physical properties of the represented objects. 
(5) Finally, the last aspect is information about how monadic markers are embedded 
into the system. What physical knowledge can tell us about this is structural and 
organisational information depicted from outside the system. These structural and 
organisational characteristics, just like the causal-functional features, are, however, 
independent of the way  monadic markers are interpreted by central processes. The 
right sort of organisation might be necessary for a monadic marker to play a 
particular causal-functional role, it is, nevertheless, unrelated to how monadic 
markers are interpreted. So, for example, even if the relative position of the smoke 
signal to St Peter’s Square is essential for it  to be a signal of the outcome of the papal 
conclave (had the fire occurred above a different rooftop, people on St. Peter’s 
Square would have called for fire fighters), this relative position is unrelated to the 
nature of the actual tag.42 
Now, note that all that a physical explanation can rely on are exactly  these properties 
of the cognitive system: what processes give rise to monadic marker states, what 
features their vehicles have, what role they play within the system, what objects they 
stand for, and how they are embedded in the system. Since there are no connections 
between these physical properties and the way a monadic marker is interpreted by 
the system itself, any system fulfilling the above characterisation (entertaining a 
hierarchy of perceptual representations with central access to a range of this 
hierarchy) will necessarily give rise to an explanatory gap: the physical explanation 
will leave out monadic-markers-as-interpreted-by-central-processes. No matter how 
detailed physical descriptions are given, the question why a certain monadic marker 
is interpreted in a particular way will nevertheless remain an unanswered question. 
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42 Note that the organisation of the system monadic markers are embedded in does play an essential 
role in carrying information about features that are characteristic of assemblies of those objects 
monadic markers stand for—cf. ‘structured representations’ as discussed in §5.3.1.
This is how the Monadic Markers Account explains the occurrence of the 
explanatory gap (cf. §2.2.2).
Similarly, with Mary (cf. 2.2.4). All Mary can learn in her black-and-white room are 
facts about the physical properties mentioned above. Since the way monadic markers 
are interpreted by a system itself (i.e. from the inside) cannot be deduced from 
knowledge about these physical properties, Mary is unable to come to a conclusion 
regarding how her (or any other person’s) cognitive system will interpret the 
monadic marker standing for e.g. redness—i.e. how the system will tag the physical 
property  redness,—no matter how detailed knowledge she has about the way 
monadic markers are embedded in a system or the roles they play (etc.). When she 
finally leaves her room and is presented a patch of red on a sheet of paper her visual 
system processes the information, and generates certain perceptual representations, a 
range of which then is accessed by (or becomes accessible for) the central system. 
Only then will she be able to grasp from the inside how her system tags colours, i.e. 
interprets monadic markers standing for colours. However, this piece of new 
knowledge will not reveal a new fact of the world—all Mary learns is an old fact 
(having a monadic marker with certain functional roles embedded in a cognitive 
system in a certain way, being processed in a certain manner, etc.) in a new way: 
from within the very system in question.
Finally, given that any physical information a system can collect about its working 
mechanisms falls short in characterising the way it is for the system itself to deal 
with monadic markers, it is possible for the system to conceive of scenarios where 
the same monadic markers with exactly the same vehicles, embedding structure and 
processing mechanisms are nevertheless interpreted in a different way (spectrum 
inversion cases), or not interpreted at all (zombie cases). That is, the conceivability 
of zombies (cf. §2.2.3) is a natural consequence of having monadic markers in one’s 
cognitive system. However, from this conceivability  no possibility  follows. Zombies 
are conceivable, because due to restrictions in access first person information 
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gathered by a system cannot be matched onto third person information. Nevertheless, 
the first and the third person information is about the very same fact. Metaphysically, 
there is only one thing. 
In general, since by assumption, phenomenal character is identical with how certain 
representational states (monadic markers) properly  embedded in a system are 
accessed/treated/interpreted by the system itself, and the result  of this interpretation, 
i.e. the nature of the tag the system uses to indicate the corresponding states of 
affairs, is independent of what processes give rise to monadic markers, what features 
their vehicles have, what role they play within the system, what objects they stand 
for, and how they  are embedded in the system, third-person physical knowledge 
about this system will lack any kind of a priori connection to the phenomenal 
domain.
To wrap  up: in this section it has been shown that  the Monadic Marker Account 
provides resources to explain fundamental features of conscious experience in purely 
physical terms. The fundamental features of consciousness in question are its 
functional un-analysability  and the fact that it gives rise to an epistemic gap. The 
Monadic Marker Account equates the phenomenal qualities of conscious experience 
with the way  monadic markers are interpreted by central processes of a cognitive 
system. On the one hand, due to their unstructured nature, monadic markers can 
freely exchange their roles within a system, and thus they  themselves are 
functionally un-analysable. On the other hand, third person physical knowledge 
consists of knowledge about what processes give rise to monadic marker states, what 
features their vehicles have, what role they  play within a system, what objects they 
stand for, and how they  are embedded in a system. None of these features have a 
priori connections with the way  monadic markers are accessed (interpreted) by a 
system itself. Therefore any system embedding monadic markers is subject to an 
epistemic gap: it will find monadic-marker-interpretations-as-from-the-inside 
unexplainable in terms of, and underivable from physical knowledge.
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Note that the Monadic Marker Account does not tell us why it  is the case that the 
internal interpretation of a monadic marker comes with the specific phenomenal 
character it does, or why it  comes with any at all. But that is all right—the Monadic 
Marker Account  wants to acknowledge the presence of the epistemic gap. It  starts 
from the very observation that there is such a gap, and its main motivation is to 
provide a physical explanation of why this gap occurs. That is, the Monadic Marker 
Account does not bridge the epistemic gap. On the contrary, it acknowledges it, and 
accounts for it  in terms of certain features of the cognitive-representational system. 
Consequently, the Monadic Marker Account disarms the corresponding anti-





Reduction, Reductive Explanation, 
and Identities
6.1 Reduction and Reductive Explanation
In the previous part of the dissertation, explanations of why consciousness resist 
functionalisation and why it gives rise to the explanatory  gap have been introduced. 
In this final part, I would like to concentrate on the question whether these 
explanations are reductive or not. On the face of it, since the explanations as spelled 
out in §5.3 rely  only on the features of the cognitive-representational system, they 
seem to be reductive. However, the explanations explicitly  utilise the identity claim 
formulated in §4.3.3, and thereby  directly  invoke phenomena from the target domain 
(i.e. from the domain of the phenomenon to be explained), which suggests that they 
are not reductive. In order to be able to evaluate this question properly we need to be 
clear about what reductive explanation amounts to.
However, before turning our attention towards reductive explanation itself, first I 
would like to pause here for a second and clarify  a terminological issue with regard 
to reduction. As it happens, different  authors use the same terms for different 
purposes. For example, Tim Crane uses ‘reduction’ as a general term, denoting a 
relationship, which has an ontological and an explanatory aspect (Crane, 2001a), 
whereas e.g. for David Chalmers, the term ‘reduction’ signifies only the ontological 
aspect (Chalmers, 1996).
This ontological aspect of reduction is an identity claim. As Crane puts it:
“[A] reduction (in Huw Price’s phrase) ‘identifies the entities of one domain 
with a subclass of entities of another’. Or, to put it another way: we start off 
with the ‘target’ entity, X, and find a reason for identifying X with Y. Our 
reduction tells us something we didn’t know about X: that it  is Y. Claims of 
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reduction in this sense are identity claims [...] Understood ontologically, then, a 
reduction of A to B involves the claim that A = B.” (Crane, 2001a, p. 54)
Classical scientific examples of reduction—such as the reduction of temperature to 
mean molecular kinetic energy, or of water to H2O—all show that the concept of 
reduction has this strong ontological connotation: they are typically understood as 
claiming that temperature is identical with mean molecular kinetic energy, and water 
is identical with H2O.
However, this ontological claim in itself cannot exhaust the idea of reduction. As 
Crane draws attention to it:
“For identity is a symmetrical relation, but a reduction of A to B is not a 
reduction of B to A. And there are plenty of identity claims which are not 
reductions: it would be (at best) pointless to say that the discovery  that 
Hesperus is Phosphorus is a reduction of Hesperus to Phosphorus. What 
reduction needs, in addition, is the idea that the ‘reduced phenomenon’ is made 
more comprehensible or intelligible by being shown to be identical with the 
‘reducing phenomenon’. We understand thermodynamical phenomena better 
when we are shown that they are (so the story goes) identical with certain kinds 
of mechanical activity. And we understand mental properties better when we 
are shown that they  are (so the story goes) identical with physical properties of 
the brain.” (Crane, 2001a, p. 54)
The idea here is that reduction cannot be (only) identity, because there are identity 
claims which are clearly not cases of reduction (we do not reduce Hesperus to 
Phosphorus, or Bob Dylan to Robert Allen Zimmerman), and, moreover, whereas 
identifying A with B is symmetrical (A is identical with B = B is identical with A) 
reducing A to B is not  (A is reducible to B ≠ B is reducible to A). This further 
connotation of reduction, which goes beyond a mere identity  claim, is an explanatory 
aspect. By  showing that temperature reduces to mean molecular kinetic energy, or 
that water reduces to H2O we gain a better understanding of the characteristics of 
temperature and water. 
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It is this explanatory aspect which carries the epistemological virtue of reduction. 
Whereas the ontological aspect expresses that certain terms of our theories refer to 
the same object, and thus tells us something about the world itself, the explanatory 
aspect contributes by showing how our knowledge of the reduced phenomenon is 
related to our knowledge of the reducing phenomenon, and thereby makes the 
reduced phenomenon more intelligible to us. Reducing temperature to mean 
molecular kinetic energy  shows us how temperature-phenomena as described by 
thermodynamics fit into the world of molecules as described by statistical mechanics. 
6.1.1 Reduction and physicalism
Crane calls the ontological aspect ontological reduction and the explanatory aspect 
explanatory reduction. Typical cases of scientific reductions (e.g. the reduction of 
water to H2O, or that of temperature to mean molecular kinetic energy, etc.) are such 
that they implement both aspects. However, the two aspects do not necessarily go 
together. To see the full taxonomy, consider the four possible combinations of 
ontological and explanatory  reduction: (FR) full reduction, where one has both 
ontological and explanatory reduction; (POR) pure ontological reduction, where 
there is ontological but not explanatory reduction; (PER) pure explanatory reduction, 
where one has explanatory but not ontological reduction; and (ANR) absolutely no 
reduction, where neither ontological nor explanatory reduction is available. 
In §1.3.2 and §1.3.3 we have already seen that the notion of reduction plays an 
important part in differentiating between various versions of physicalism. There, 
following the literature, a distinction has been made only between reductive and non-
reductive physicalism. However, now that we have all the different combinations of 
ontological and explanatory reduction at hand, we can enrich this picture, and 
investigate how (FR), (POR), (PER), and (ANR) fit into the physicalist worldview. 
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Physicalism, as defined in Chapter 1, is a metaphysical doctrine, claiming that the 
prima facie non-physical is metaphysically  determined by  the physical.1 Identity, the 
fundamental claim of ontological reduction, is a version of metaphysical 
determination, which makes (FR) and (POR) straightforwardly compatible with 
physicalism. Since identity is not the only form of metaphysical determination, 
(PER) and (ANR) are also reconcilable with physicalism. In fact, there are actual 
physicalist positions held by certain authors which fall into these categories.
Full reduction is the case where the prima facie non-physical is identified with 
something physical (hence it is committed to metaphysical determination), and 
moreover, an explanation is provided making the prima facie non-physical 
intelligible. This, as we have already seen, is the case in standard scientific 
reductions. 
Pure ontological reduction also identifies the prima facie non-physical with 
something physical (and thus it is also committed to metaphysical determination), 
however, it  denies any  explanatory  link between the two. This, for example, is the 
case of Phenomenal Concept Strategy.2  Phenomenal Concept Strategy  claims that 
phenomenal concepts and the corresponding physical concepts refer to the same 
entities, nevertheless any kind of explanatory link is impossible due to the mutual 
conceptual irreducibility of phenomenal and physical concepts (cf. §3.1). 
Physicalism plus pure explanatory reduction denies identity, but nevertheless 
maintains some other form of metaphysical determination, and moreover, claims that 
the prima facie non-physical can be made intelligible on the bases of the physical. 
This, for example, is the case of role functionalism. According to role functionalism, 
functional role properties are not identical with realiser properties, nevertheless, via 
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1 Or,  in accordance with the conclusion of §1.6.4, physicalism about a certain domain claims that the 
distinguishing features of the domain in question are metaphysically determined by a base not 
containing these features or their governing laws.
2  Crane’s original example for the case of the ontological aspect without the explanatory aspect is 
Davidson’s anomalous monism (Davidson, 1970; Crane, 2001a).
clarifying how realiser properties are able to fill the very causal roles definitive of 
role properties, role functionalism provides the relevant explanatory link. And since 
any realiser property  filling the relevant causal roles necessarily brings about the 
related role property, metaphysical determination is ensured.3
Physicalism plus absolutely no reduction is the case of pure metaphysical 
determination—a case where the prima facie non-physical is metaphysically 
determined by (but  not identical with) the physical, and no explanatory  link helping 
us understand the prima facie non-physical better on the grounds of the physical is 
available. This, for example, is the case of weak emergence. Proponents of weak 
emergence argue that certain—typically  biological (Bedau, 1997), but  sometimes 
chemical (McIntyre, 1999, 2007), and even macro-physical (Laughlin & Pines, 2000; 
Batterman, 2002)4—phenomena, though metaphysically  determined by the (micro-) 
physical, are nevertheless in principle unexplainable in physical terms due to certain 
theoretical limitations.5
6.1.2 Reductive explanation
The explanatory  aspect of any reductive endeavour aims at accounting for a target 
phenomenon in terms of a base phenomenon, thereby advancing our understanding 
of the target phenomenon. Though Crane (2001a) calls it explanatory reduction, in 
the literature it is most often called reductive explanation (Chalmers, 1996; Block & 
Stalnaker, 1999; Hill & McLaughlin, 1999; Chalmers & Jackson, 2001; Kim, 2005). 
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3 See, however, Block (forthcoming) for an argument claiming that role functionalism and physicalism
—as metaphysical doctrines—are incompatible.
4 Under a particular reading. See §1.6.3 for an ontological interpretation of Laughlin and Pines (2000) 
and Batterman (2002).
5  In the literature the term reduction is often restricted to the ontological aspect (cf. e.g. Chalmers, 
1996; Papineau, 2002; Kim, 2005), which renders (FR) and (POR) versions of reductive physicalism, 
and (PER) and (ANR) versions of non-reductive physicalism. This, however, yields a quite 
unfortunate and terminologically confusing result: role functionalism, as a version of physicalism plus 
pure explanatory reduction becomes a version of non-reductive physicalism—that is, reductive and 
non-reductive (though in different sense) at the same time.  
A reductive explanation is only  one of the many possible ways a phenomenon might 
be explained. Historical, teleological and causal explanations are other forms of 
making a particular phenomenon more intelligible. Very roughly, a historical 
explanation explains the genesis of a phenomenon by enumerating a series of events 
in chronological order leading to the explanandum. A teleological explanation 
explains a phenomenon via clarifying how its features qualify  as appropriate means 
towards a specific end. A causal explanation contributes to our understanding of a 
certain phenomenon by revealing the chain of causes and effects resulting in the 
particular phenomenon. 
Contrary  to all of these versions of explanation, which are diachronic in nature, 
reductive explanation is synchronic. Instead of providing a chronological order of a 
temporal sequence of events, it relies on a set of phenomena as the explanans, which 
co-occur with the phenomenon to be explained. Moreover, as opposed to causal 
explanations, which are always intra-level (cf. Craver & Bechtel, 2007), reductive 
explanations are typically  inter-level6—they advance our understanding of a higher 
level phenomenon by accounting for it  in terms of lower-level phenomena. That is, 
reductive explanations are synchronic, and rely on lower levels as explanatory 
resources.7
A paradigm example of reductive explanation, for instance, is the explanation why 
water boils (or freezes) at a certain temperature.8 Joseph Levine famously  relies on 
this very example in his On leaving out what it’s like (Levine, 1993). He provides the 
following sketch of how the specific reductive explanation in question works.
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6  Only typically, because certain models of reduction incorporate theory-succession where a 
phenomenon is explained not on the basis of a theory describing lower level phenomena, but on the 
basis of a newer theory describing the same level phenomena differently. Cf. Bickle (1998).
7 How exactly levels are to be understood depends on the actual model of reductive explanation.  In 
§6.2 I will distinguish between three different models of reductive explanation and investigate how 
they define higher and lower levels.
8 Note that the facts that water boils at 100°C and that it freezes at 0°C at sea level are a priori truths, 
since the Celsius scale has been defined in accordance with the boiling and freezing point of water (cf. 
Kripke, 1980). Nonetheless, this problem does not arise if we set up the question by relying on the 
Kelvin or Fahrenheit scales.
“Molecules of H2O move about at various speeds. Some fast-moving 
molecules that happen to be near the surface of the liquid have sufficient 
kinetic energy to escape the intermolecular attractive forces that keep  the liquid 
intact. These molecules enter the atmosphere. That’s evaporation. The precise 
value of the intermolecular attractive forces of H2O molecules determines the 
vapour pressure of liquid masses of H2O, the pressure exerted by molecules 
attempting to escape into saturated air. As the average kinetic energy of the 
molecules increases, so does the vapour pressure. When the vapour pressure 
reaches the point where it is equal to atmospheric pressure, large bubbles form 
within the liquid and burst forth at the liquid’s surface. The water 
boils.” (Levine, 1993, p. 129)
The passage explains why water boils by relying on the behaviour and governing 
laws of H2O molecules. This reductive explanation is synchronic, since the molecular 
processes it cites are passing off at the same time when water boils, and it relies on 
lower levels since individual H2O molecules are the constituents of a body  of water. 
Once we understand what is going on at the lower level, the higher level 
phenomenon immediately becomes intelligible. In a very restricted sense, reductive 
explanation is eliminative: it eliminates any sense that there is anything extra going 
on in addition to the processes present at the lower level. Of course, reductive 
explanation is not eliminative in the sense of eliminative physicalism (cf. §1.3.1)—it 
does not eliminate the higher level phenomenon; a reductive explanation of water-
properties in terms of H2O does not render the term ‘water’ obsolete, on the contrary, 
it, in a sense, justifies our use of this term by showing how water-phenomena fits into 
the world of molecules (cf. §1.3.2).  
The key characteristic of reductive explanation is that it removes a mystery related to 
the higher level phenomenon (the explanandum). As David Chalmers puts is: “once 
we have told the lower-level story  in enough detail, any sense of fundamental 
mystery  goes away: the phenomena that needed to be explained have been 
explained” (Chalmers, 1996, p. 42). 
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So reductive explanation is a synchronic bottom-up process connecting a lower level 
to a higher level and thereby making the higher level intelligible. The interesting 
question related to reductive explanation is concerned with how it is able to connect 
the different levels, that  is, what resources it can rely on in order to be able to create 
an explanatory link between the entities and processes of two distinct levels. As 
Chalmers formulates it:
“[I]n general, a reductive explanation of a phenomenon is accompanied by 
some rough-and-ready analysis of the phenomenon in question, whether 
implicit or explicit. [...] Without such an analysis, there would be no 
explanatory  bridge from the lower-level physical facts to the phenomenon in 
question. With such an analysis in hand, all we need to do is to show how 
certain lower-level physical mechanisms allow the analysis to be satisfied, and 
an explanation will result.” (Chalmers, 1996, pp. 43-44)
In the following section, I will introduce three major approaches to reductive 
explanation and investigate this very question—what kind of analysis or other 
resources allow them to make the explanatory leap from a lower level to a higher 
level. 
6.2 Models of Reduction
As we have seen in §6.1 reductive explanation is in fact an important  aspect of any 
general reductive attempt. In this section, I examine three different models of 
reduction, with special focus on their explanatory  aspect, and consider how they 
perform with regard to connecting the level of the explanans with the level of the 
explanandum.
6.2.1 Nagelian theory reduction
In 1948 Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim published a paper addressing the problem 
of scientific explanation. They suggested that: “the question ‘Why does the 
phenomenon occur?’ is construed as meaning ‘According to what general laws, and 
by virtue of what antecedent conditions does the phenomenon occur?’”(Hempel, 
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1965, p. 246) That is, to explain a phenomenon is to show that its description follows 
deductively from laws (laws of an actual theory) and antecedent conditions. 
Similarly, to explain a law is to show that it follows deductively from other laws (and 
appropriate auxiliary premises). This is the so-called deductive-nomological model of 
explanation.
It was Ernest Nagel, who by applying the deductive pattern of explanation to the 
history of science introduced the notion of reduction. As he put it: “Reduction [...] is 
the explanation of a theory or a set of experimental laws established in one area of 
inquiry, by a theory usually  though not invariably formulated for some other 
domain” (E. Nagel, 1961, p. 338). According to Nagel, a fundamental feature of 
reduction is that a so-called primary science (the reducing theory  or base theory) 
absorbs a relatively autonomous secondary science (the theory that is reduced, i.e. 
the target theory). That is, in the history of science there are more inclusive theories 
which replace antecedent (less inclusive) theories by absorbing their laws and 
covering their observational phenomena.
According to Nagel there are two types of this absorption or reduction. He 
distinguishes homogeneous reduction from heterogeneous reduction. In 
homogeneous reduction a phenomenon or law of a theory is incorporated into 
another theory which utilises “substantially the same” terms that occur in the first 
theory. In the second type of reduction—in the heterogeneous case—the 
incorporating theory lacks some of the terms in which the phenomena or laws of the 
theory  to be incorporated are expressed. Nagel’s own example is the reduction of 
classical thermodynamics to statistical mechanics. Terms like ‘temperature’ and 
‘entropy’ occur in the laws of classical thermodynamics but are not present among 
the terms of statistical mechanics (E. Nagel, 1961, pp. 339-345).
So for Nagelian reduction the different  levels in question are levels of descriptions as 
represented by  different scientific theories. In this sense, temperature-related 
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phenomena are at  the level of phenomenological thermodynamics, whereas 
molecular motion-related phenomena are at the level of statistical mechanics.9 The 
problem of Nagel’s heterogeneous case is that the vocabulary utilised to form the 
descriptions of the level of thermodynamics is different from the vocabulary utilised 
to form the descriptions of the level of statistical mechanics. The explanatory tool of 
the Nagelian approach—namely the deductive-nomological method—needs to 
bridge this gap between the level of the explanans and the level of the explanandum.
For this reason, in the heterogeneous case the process of reduction is not an obvious, 
self-evident process; one has to formulate some connections between the adequate 
terms of the different theories in question. Nagel emphasised that the conditions for 
reduction could be formulated only for branches of science that had been formalised. 
One requirement for formalisation is fixing the meanings of the terms occurring in 
the theories by  rules of usage appropriate to each discipline. Given that this is the 
case, the following is a necessary  condition for the reduction of a target-theory to a 
base-theory: for each term which occurs in the target-theory but not in the base-
theory, there must be a connecting statement—a so-called bridge law—which links 
the term with an expression formulated within the base-theory.10
 
Before moving on, it is of crucial importance to understand correctly what Nagel 
meant by bridge laws. As we could see it explicitly in the second paragraph of this 
section, for Nagel reduction is explanation of one theory  by another: one uses 
“descriptive terms” (E. Nagel, 1961, p. 339) formulated in the reducing base theory 
to express statements formulated in the target theory. What bridge laws are designed 
to do is connecting the descriptive terms of the base theory to those descriptive terms 
of the target theory, which are absent in the base theory. The condition of such a 
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9 So as far as the term ‘level’ is associated with an idea of hierarchical organisation, levels within the 
Nagelian framework are levels of the hierarchy of sciences. Compare this picture with that of 
Oppenheim and Putnam in their The Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis (Oppenheim & 
Putnam, 1958).
10  Note that ‘bridge law’ is not Nagel’s term. Nagel calls what later reflections dubbed ‘the 
requirement for bridge laws’ as the “condition of connectability” (E. Nagel, 1961, p. 354).
connection is co-reference: Nagelian bridge laws pair theoretical expressions of 
different theories in such a way  that  the paired ones refer to the same state of affairs. 
This is how introducing a bridge law helps the base theory  express a statement of the 
target theory: by connecting the theoretical term ‘temperature’ of thermodynamics to 
the theoretical expression ‘mean kinetic energy of molecules’ of statistical mechanics 
one is able to express facts about temperature within statistical mechanics if the 
theoretical expression ‘mean kinetic energy of molecules’ formulated within 
statistical mechanics picks out the same referent as the theoretical term 
‘temperature’ of thermodynamics (cf. E. Nagel, 1961, p. 341). That is, original 
Nagelian bridge laws connect theoretical terms (or constructs of theoretical terms), 
and express co-reference.
Bridge laws are in the centre of Nagel’s approach. They provide the basic 
connections between the terms of the target  theory and the base theory, and make the 
target derivable from the base. That is, these bridge laws are the resources Nagel 
relies on in order to bridge the gap between the level of the explanans and the level 
of the explanandum. Nagelian reduction is a logical derivation of the laws of the 
target theory from the laws of the base theory and some initial conditions—bridge 
laws. That is, bridge laws serve as initial conditions in the deductive process of 
Nagel’s approach. 
The explanatory aspect of Nagelian reduction is manifested in the deductive-
nomological method. Nagelian reduction makes the target-phenomenon intelligible 
on the basis of the base theory by proving that its description can be deduced from a 
set of premises consisting in (1) certain laws of the base theory, (2) some auxiliary 
premises specifying boundary conditions, and (3) bridge laws connecting the terms 
utilised in the description of the target-phenomenon with certain terms of the base 
theory. That is, Nagelian reduction explains the target phenomenon by showing that 
given these premises the description of the target-phenomenon necessarily follows.
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The ontological aspect of Nagelian reduction is provided by  bridge laws. As we have 
seen, by connecting terms of the target and the base theory, bridge laws express co-
reference—by formulating a particular bridge law it is claimed that the target and 
base terms connected by the bridge law in question pick out the same thing. Creating 
a bridge law, for example, between ‘temperature’ and ‘mean molecular kinetic 
energy’ signifies the commitment that temperature as conceived by  those thinking in 
terms of phenomenological thermodynamics and the mean kinetic energy of 
molecules as conceived by those thinking in terms of statistical mechanics are not 
two distinct  entities—the two different uses of the two different terms refer to the 
same entity.
6.2.2 Hooker’s reduction
Nagel’s interpreters often refer to bridge laws as biconditionals (cf. e.g. Schaffner, 
1969).11 Biconditional bridge laws require that for each and every  theoretical entity-
type (those kinds picked out by the theoretical expressions) of the target theory there 
must be a nomologically  coextensive theoretical entity-type of the reducing base 
theory. This very consequence is the target of the most common and severe critique 
of Nagelian reduction, the argument from multiple realisability, which claims that 
biconditional bridge laws are in general unavailable (see e.g. Putnam, 1967; 
Davidson, 1970; Fodor, 1974). This is why recent approaches to reduction try  to do 
their best in order to construct a model of reduction, which is able to jettison bridge 
laws. As we will see in this and the next section, alternative approaches to reduction 
all advertise themselves with the claim that they are able to successfully evade bridge 
laws. Before turning our attention to Kim’s functional model, which is the major 
contender of Nagel’s approach in contemporary  literature, first I would like to 
introduce a novel account of theory reduction, which, instead of offering an entirely 
different approach concentrates on refining the original Nagelian model.
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11 Note, however, that the original Nagelian model is not committed to biconditionals—bridge laws as 
one way conditionals would do the job perfectly. Nagel was well aware of this: in one of his footnotes 
he explicitly stated that bridge laws were not necessarily biconditional in form (E. Nagel, 1961, p. 
355, n. 5).
This account  of reduction is Clifford Hooker’s model (Hooker, 1981), which has 
gained significant  support in recent years (Bickle, 1998; Marras, 2002). According to 
Hooker’s view—let T(B) and T(R) be the reducing base theory and the reduced 
target theory respectively—in order to reduce T(R) to T(B) one has to construct T(R)
*, an analogue of T(R) in a way that T(B) together with some initial conditions C 
entails T(R)*. This T(R)* is the ‘image’ of T(R) within T(B)—i.e. T(R)* is entirely 
formulated within the vocabulary  of T(B), and the relation between T(R)* and T(B) 
is straightforward deduction. Ausonio Marras summarises this reinterpretation of 
Nagel in three steps using the example of the derivation of Boyle-Charles’ law, as 
part of the reduction of thermodynamics (T) to statistical mechanics (T*):
“1. The formulation of a number of limiting assumptions and initial 
conditions (LA/IC) centering around the identification of a fixed volume of an 
ideal gas with a fixed number of molecules.
2. The derivation, from the principles of statistical mechanics (T*) together 
with LA/IC, of a law L*, namely pV = 2E/3, which is the mechanical 
counterpart (an ‘image’ or ‘close analogue’) of the Boyle-Charles’ law pV = 
kT (call this L). L* is of course entirely in the vocabulary of T*.
3. The postulation of a bridge law (BL), 2E/3 = kT, consequent upon a 
‘comparison’ of L* with L, enabling the formal derivation of L from 
L*.” (Marras, 2002, p. 238)
As opposed to Nagel’s model, here a bridge law is not a premise of the deduction, 
but the consequence of a two step process of deducing an ‘image’ description within 
the base theory, and its comparison to the target description. So deduction remains 
the core concept of this kind of reduction too, but what gets deduced within Hooker’s 
account is different from what gets deduced in the Nagelian approach. Nagel tries to 
deduce the original T(R) itself, and thus he needs inter-theoretical bridge laws, 
whereas Hooker deduces T(R)*, an ‘image’ of T(R), already within the vocabulary  of 
the reducing theory T(B). By doing so, it seems as though Hooker’s account 
succeeded in avoiding the need for bridge laws.
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Besides the reduction relation, the other central notion of Hooker’s model is the 
analogue relation AR, which connects T(R)* and T(R) and warrants that  the 
reduction relation R holds between T(B) and T(R). As Hooker formulates it: “( T(B) 
& C ⊃ T(R)* ) & ( T(R)* AR T(R) ) warrants ( T(B) R T(R) )” (Hooker,	  1981,	  p.	  49).12 
However, Hooker himself does not provide a general specification of these analogue 
relations. John Bickle (1998), in his Psychoneural Reduction, argues that although 
analogue relations are quite similar to Nagelian bridge laws, there is an important 
difference, namely that the elements of the analogue relations are only
“ordered pairs of terms drawn from the nonlogical vocabularies of the two 
theories. Their sole function is to indicate the term substitutions in T(R)* that 
will yield the laws of T(R). […] No worry arises about the ‘logical status’ of 
ordered pairs of terms, even when one of a pair has no empirical extension. 
By themselves, these ordered pairs imply  neither synonymy, synthetic 
identity, nor coextension.” (Bickle, 1998, pp. 28-29)
 
Hooker’s account tries to capture the whole range of possible reduction relations, 
with all the different kinds of ontological consequences. That is, the analogue 
relation is indeed a continuum. At one endpoint, one can talk about ‘smooth 
reductions’, where there are only a few and simple initial conditions which do not 
contain wildly counterfactual restricting conditions, and the laws of T(R) find close 
syntactic analogues within T(R)*. This is the case of inter-theoretic identities, where 
no large-scale corrections to the reduced theory are needed, and where the theoretical 
entities of the reduced theory are identified with (sets of) theoretical entities of the 
reducing theory. At the other endpoint there are ‘bumpy reductions’—the initial 
conditions do contain numerous and wildly  counterfactual restricting conditions, and 
even with the help of these extreme conditions the analogue relation between the 
laws of T(R) and T(R)* remains weak (Bickle, 1998, p. 29). The ontological 
consequence of ‘bumpy reduction’ is elimination, i.e. the replacement of the 
theoretical entities of the reduced theory by that of the reducing theory.
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12 In the Hooker quote ‘C’ stands for the same set of initial conditions which are designated by ‘LA/
IC’ in the Marras quote. 
According to Bickel, we can place historical theory  reductions along the continuum 
of the analogue relation. Near to the smooth or identity  end there is the reduction of 
physical optics to Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory. Near to the other end (the 
bumpy, or elimination end) there is the relation between phlogiston chemistry and 
oxygen chemistry. And in between, for example, nearer to the smooth end there is the 
reduction of Kepler’s laws to Newtonian mechanics, and nearer to the bumpy end 
there is the reduction of classical equilibrium thermodynamics to statistical 
mechanics (Bickle, 1998, pp. 30-31).
That is, Hooker’s model follows Nagel in that the explanatory aspect of reduction is 
manifested in the utilisation of the deducitive-nomological method, whereas the 
ontological aspect is provided not by bridge laws, but by the so-called analogue 
relation. It is the tool of analogue relation that bridges the gap  between the levels of 
explanandum and explanans in Hooker’s account. The analogue relation is designed 
to be much more ‘flexible’ than bridge laws: it requires neither identity nor 
coextension to be built into the premises of the derivation. 
6.2.3 Functional reduction
Bridge laws as premises of a deduction are generally considered as a serious flaw of 
the original Nagelian model. For Jaegwon Kim, the main problem with the inclusion 
of bridge laws in the premises is that it prevents Nagelian reduction to implement 
real reductive explanation. For Kim, the source of the problem is that bridge laws 
connect the base entity with the target  entity, and since in accordance with the 
original Nagelian picture they  become part of the base theory, this brings the target 
entity down into the base domain, so the proposed explanation does not rely solely 
on base level resources (Kim, 2005, pp. 98-105).13
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13  David Chalmers shares this worry with Kim. As he puts it: “Perhaps we might get some kind of 
explanation by combining the underlying physical facts with certain further bridging principles that 
link the physical facts with consciousness, but this explanation will not be a reductive one. The very 
need for explicit bridging principles shows us that consciousness is not being explained reductively, 
but is being explained on its own terms.” (Chalmers, 1996, p. 107).
Remember, reductive explanation ought to provide an account of a target 
phenomenon in terms of certain base phenomena, and it should rely, as explanatory 
resources, on the base phenomena only. As Kim puts it: “The explanatory premises 
of a reductive explanation of a phenomenon involving property  F must not refer to F 
[...] or must not include a law pertaining to F” (Kim, 2005, p. 105). This requirement 
can even be strengthened by adding that the explanatory  premises must not  refer to 
any other property at the level of F—that is, they  must refer only to properties at 
levels lower than that of F (Kim, 2005, p. 106). 
Now a bridge law inclusive model of reduction clearly  violates this requirement, 
since the very links it utilises to bridge the gap between the level of the explanandum 
and the level of the explanans work by evoking target phenomena in the premises of 
the deduction. However, the afore-mentioned gap between the different levels needs 
to be bridged, otherwise the explanation would not be able to “make a deductive 
transition from the base level, where our explanatory  resources are located, to the 
higher level, where our explanandum is located” (Kim, 2005, p. 107). 
Kim (1998, 2005), and others (Levine, 1983, 1993; Chalmers, 1996; Chalmers & 
Jackson, 2001) argue that this can be achieved by relying on conceptual connections, 
i.e. “definitions providing conceptual/semantic relations between the phenomena at 
the two levels” (Kim, 2005, p. 108). The desired conceptual connections are 
provided by functional analysis—by re-defining the target phenomenon in terms of 
its causal roles described in a base level vocabulary (Kim, 2005, p. 111).14  The 
resulting model of reduction is the so-called functional model. Kim provides the 
following schematic form of functional reduction:
“Step 1 [Functionalization of the target theory]
Property M to be reduced is given a functional definition of the following 
form:
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14 What matters is that the relevant connection be a priori. See §6.3 and §7.1 for a detailed discussion.
Having M = (def.) having some property or other P (in the reduction base 
domain) such that P performs causal task C. […]
Step 2 [Identification of the realizers of M]
Find the properties (or mechanisms) in the reduction base that perform the 
causal task C.
Step 3 [Developing an Explanatory Theory]
Construct a theory that explains how the realizers of M perform task C.”
(Kim, 2005, pp. 101-102, original emphasis)15
Here, by ‘realizer’ of a functionally defined property  M, Kim means any  property in 
the base domain that fits the causal specification definitive of M.
To dig into the details, take A and B as the domains of the reduced and the reducing 
theories respectively, i.e. let A be the domain of the properties to be reduced and B 
the domain of properties serving as the reduction base. Property M ∈ A, and property 
P ∈ B.
Step 1 says that first a functional definition of M is given such as it  ‘redefines’ or 
‘reconstrues’ M in the vocabulary of the reduction base B: having M  = having some 
P such that P performs C. Here the causal task C = {c1,…, ci, e1,…, ei}, where {c1,
…, ci} are certain causes and {e1,…, ei} are certain effects (presuming that the same 
property  can play a role in different cause-and-effect chains). The idea is that M is 
redefined as a functional property according to its causal roles.
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15 Versions of this schema can be found in the writings of different proponents of functional reduction. 
Kim’s functionalisation, for example, is explication in Chalmers’  terminology. The first two steps of 
Kim’s model correspond to explication, i.e. the clarification of what it is that needs to be explained by 
means of analysis, and explanation, where we see how that analysis comes to be satisfied by the low-
level facts (Chalmers, 1996, p. 151).
Similarly,  Levine refers to these two steps in the following way: “Stage 1 involves the (relatively? 
quasi?) a priori process of working the concept of the property to be reduced ‘into shape’  for reduction 
by identifying the causal role for which we are seeking the underlying mechanisms. Stage 2 involves 
the empirical work of discovering just what those underlying mechanisms are.” (Levine, 1993, p. 132)
Step 2 is about finding a realizer property  in the B base domain which satisfies the 
causal specification C, i.e. plays the specific roles defined by C such as {c1,…, ci} 
cause P to be instantiated and P causes {e1,…, ei} to be instantiated.
 
Step 3 says that a theory T(B) at the level of the B-domain is needed which can 
describe the causal relations {c1,…, ci, e1,…, ei} and P’s part in them, and thus can 
explain how the realizer property P (as a theoretical entity  of T(B)) fulfils the causal 
roles specified by C.
In this functional model of reduction there is no talk of bridge laws, and thus it seems 
(or so the proponents of this approach think) that, by using the functional model, one 
can get rid of all the problems related to the bridge-law-inclusive Nagelian model. 
The explanatory  question asking why  a property occurs at a given time can easily be 
answered: because having the property in question (the target property) is, by 
definition, having a property  with a certain causal role, and the investigated system, 
at the given time, has a particular property realising the target property (i.e. filling the 
appropriate causal roles). That is, the target property  is a functional property defined 
by its causal roles, so if in a given system a particular property realises these causal 
roles, then the system will automatically (by  definition) exhibit the target property. 
The realizer property is exactly the property  that  fits the causal specification, so 
having the realizer property entails having the target property. 
That is, the explanatory aspect of functional reduction is provided by a deductive 
argument, consisting in two sets of premises, and the conclusion. The first set of 
premises determines a theory of the base domain, i.e. a theory describing the 
behaviour of the base level phenomena. The second set  of premises defines the target 
phenomena in terms of base level causal roles. From the first set of premises a causal 
description of base level phenomena follows. If one combines this with the 
definitions of the target phenomena in terms of base level causal roles, then the 
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conclusion—the target phenomena—necessarily follows. Thereby, the target 
phenomena is made intelligible on the basis of the base phenomena.
In the functional model of reduction the definitions of the target phenomena (that is, 
their funcitonalisations) bridge the gap between the levels of the explanandum and 
the explanans. Kim argues that since defining higher level phenomena in terms of 
lower level causal terms is just a definition, the functional model does not violate the 
requirement that reductive explanation must not refer to target level entities. 
Definitions, Kim stresses, are not real explanatory premises, they are “cheap  in 
proofs, they are free” (Kim, 2005, p. 111). It follows that, contrary to the Nagelian 
model, functional reduction yields true reductive explanation. 
The ontological aspect of functional reduction (at least of the version proposed by 
Kim himself) is provided by an independent line of reasoning, the so-called causal 
exclusion argument, which is a version of the causal argument presented in §1.2. It 
identifies the higher level target phenomenon with the lower level base phenomenon. 
So Kim-style functional reduction, just like Nagelian reduction creates an ontological 
link between the phenomena of the reduced domain and the phenomena of the 
reducing domain in the form of an identity claim. However, a crucial difference 
between functional and Nagelian reduction is that whereas in the case of Nagel’s 
model the identity plays a part in the deduction itself as a premise, and therefore it is 
a prerequisite of successful reduction, in the case of Kim’s account the identity is 
rather the conclusion of the whole reductive process.
6.3 Identities and Reductive Explanation
In §6.2 I have introduced the received view with regard to the major approaches to 
reduction currently  on the table, and explored their explanatory and ontological 
aspects. I will return to them in §7.2, and will criticise this received view. However, 
before doing that, first I would like to slow down and focus on the main topic of this 
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whole chapter—the relationship  between identities and reductive explanations. In 
this section I will investigate this relationship in more depth. 
As we could see, classical Nagelian reduction needs identity claims as prerequisites, 
as premises in the deductive arguments fulfilling the explanatory  requirement of 
reductive attempts. In stark contrast with this, modern approaches to reduction like 
Hooker’s account or the functional model argue that identity claims, in fact, ‘fall 
out’ of the process of reduction, i.e. are provided as conclusions of the deductive 
arguments. In recent literature related to the debates over consciousness-based anti-
physicalist arguments, the role identities play in reductive explanations became of 
central importance. In what follows, I introduce the opposing views.
6.3.1 Identities are justified by reductive explanation
Let’s start  by reconstructing one of the central examples of the literature—the way 
one can get from truths about H2O to truths about water. The truths about water in 
question include, for example, the fact that water boils at 212 °F (or 373 K) at 
standard pressure (sea level) (cf. Levine, 1983, 1993), and the fact that water covers 
60% of Earth (cf. Jackson, 1994, 1998, 2003). 
Levine and Jackson (together with e.g. Chalmers, 1996; Chalmers & Jackson, 2001; 
Chalmers, 2003) argue that it is possible to get a priori from truths about  H2O to 
truths about water. Jackson (2003) refers to it as the “a priori passage principle”, 
whereas Chalmers and Jackson (2001) calls it “transparent epistemic connection”, 
“transparent entailment”, “transparent explanation”, and most expressively, 
“transparent reductive explanation”16. The argument runs as follows.
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16  Jackson defines the a priori passage principle in the following way: “for each true statement 
concerning our world, there is a statement in physical terms that a priori entails that 
statement” (Jackson, 2003, p.  84); whereas what Chalmers and Jackson have in mind under the name 
of transparent reductive explanation is something like that “an ideal reasoner who knows all the 
relevant physical facts and who has the concept ‘water’ would be in a position to judge that if the base 
facts are a certain way then the extension of ‘water’ is H2O, and thereby be in a position to know 
various facts about water” (Polger, 2008, p. 111). 
First, note that a sufficiently full and detailed set  of base level (physical) theories and 
facts accounts for the fundamental properties like position, mass, etc., and hence the 
distribution and behaviour of H2O molecules in the entire Universe. From this it is 
straightforwardly deducible17 that  ‘H2O covers 60% of planet  Earth’. We would like 
to get from this to the conclusion that ‘water covers 60% of planet Earth’. All 
physicalists agree that physical (in this case, H2O) facts entail all other (in this case, 
water) facts; the question is whether (and how) H2O facts imply water facts.18 
Jackson, and other proponents of the availability of an a priori passage accept that 
the straightforward move from ‘H2O covers 60% of planet Earth’ to ‘water covers 
60% of planet  Earth’, although valid (in the sense that in every world where the H2O 
claim is true, the water claim is also true), is only necessary a posteriori, not a priori 
(cf. Jackson, 1998, pp. 81-82). Nonetheless, they argue, the initial H2O truth can be 
supplemented by further truths, which together a priori necessitate the desired water 
claim. 
The required supplementation consists of two further premises. The first one is an a 
priori truth saying that ‘water is the stuff that plays the water role’ (or according to 
alternative formulations: ‘water is the watery stuff’), where the ‘water role’ or 
‘watery  stuff’ is a shorthand for “being potable, odourless, falling from the sky, being 
the stuff that makes up various bodies of liquid of our acquaintance” (Jackson, 2003, 
p. 86), etc.—that is, is a shorthand for a list of the reference fixers for ‘water’.19 The 
second additional premise is the contingent a posteriori truth that ‘H2O is the stuff 
that plays the water-role’—which, as proponents of this view argue, is also deducible 
from the set of base level theories and facts. Supplementing the argument with this 
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17 Supposing that it is true.
18 “On our usage, P entails Q when the material conditional P ⊃ Q is true: that is, when it is not the 
case that P is true and Q is false. An a priori entailment is just an a priori material conditional. For 
ease of usage, we will speak of a priori entailment as implication.  On this usage, P implies Q when the 
material conditional P ⊃ Q is a priori; that is, when it is possible to know that P entails Q with 
justification independent of experience. On this usage, entailment is a nonmodal notion, while 
implication involves an epistemic modality.” (Chalmers & Jackson, 2001, p. 316)
19 Given that ‘watery stuff’  is understood in this reference fixing sense, the a priori status of ‘water is 
the watery stuff’ “rests on the general thesis that ‘N = the F’ is a priori when ‘F’ specifies the 
reference fixers for ‘N’” (Jackson, 2003, p. 86). 
further empirical fact is compatible with the original claim, which states that  there is 
some set of empirical facts concerning the base level which leads a priori to the 
target fact. That is, the argument runs as follows.
 Transparent reductive explanation:
Premise 1 (deducible from the base set):
H2O covers 60% of planet Earth.
Premise 2 (from a priori conceptual analysis):
Water is the stuff  that plays the water role.
Premise 3 (deducible from the base set):
H2O is the stuff that plays the water role.
Conclusion 1 (from Premise 2 and Premise 3):
H2O is water.
Conclusion 2 (from Premise 1 and Conclusion 1):
Water covers 60% of planet Earth.
Since the conditional ‘Premise 1 & Premise 2 & Premise 3 → Conclusion 2’ is a 
priori knowable—so the argument goes—there is, in fact, an a priori passage from 
base level facts to target level facts. Moreover, this is a fully qualified reductive 
explanation, since the water fact is explained purely  in terms of H2O facts. Still 
moreover, in the course of this reductive explanation, the identity claim that ‘H2O is 
water’ is a conclusion rather than a premise. That is, proponents of transparent 
reductive explanation—i.e. those arguing for the availability of an a priori passage 
from the base level to the target level—think of identity  claims as being justified by, 
or being the results of successful reductive explanations. 
Note, that this is the very thought underlying Joseph Levine’s explanatory gap 
argument. In §2.2.2 we have seen that Levine pinpoints a crucial dissimilarity 
between standard scientific identities and the identity claims related to phenomenal 
consciousness. He argues that  whereas consciousness involving identity  claims 
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demand further explanations, standard scientific identities do not. The reason for this 
is that in the standard scientific case our knowledge of the low level processes 
readily makes the high level phenomenon intelligible, i.e. there is an a priori passage 
from low level processes to a high level phenomenon similar to the one above in the 
water case. As Levine puts it:
‘our knowledge of chemistry and physics makes intelligible how it  is that 
something like the motion of molecules could play the causal role we associate 
with heat. Furthermore, antecedent to our discovery  of the essential nature of 
heat, its causal role [...] exhaust our notion of it. Once we understand how this 
causal role is carried out there is nothing more we need to 
understand.’ (Levine, 1983, p. 357)
That is, we are persuaded of the identity between heat and mean molecular kinetic 
energy by being shown how the motion of molecules can play the very causal role, 
which is definitive of heat. In other words, once we know enough about the 
behaviour of molecules—and possess the concept of heat—we are immediately  in a 
position in which we are able to pronounce on the identity claim in question.
This process must be familiar by  now: concluding on an identity  claim as a result of 
a deductive argument starting from a premise determining the theory describing the 
behaviour of the base level phenomena, and another premise defining the target 
phenomenon in terms of base level causal roles is, in fact, Kim’s functional model of 
reduction. In accordance with this, Kim (2005) characterises all the earlier 
proponents of the a priori passage approach as deploying versions of his functional 
model of reduction.20
In §6.1.2 we have seen that any reductive explanation requires some kind of a 
resource rendering it possible to make the explanatory  leap from the lower level of 
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20  Note an important difference, though. Whereas Kim is explicit about that the requirement of 
functionalisation must involve a re-description of the target phenomenon in terms of base level causal 
roles, the Chalmers-Jackson approach deploys a conceptual analysis of the folk (target) concept 
‘water’ in terms of other folk (i.e.  target level) concepts like ‘potable, odourless, colourless’, etc. Here 
my purpose is only to draw attention to this distinction. I will come back to this problem, and discuss 
it in more detail in §7.1.
the explanans to the higher level of the explanandum. In the case of the functional 
model of reduction, this link is provided by the conceptual (functional) analysis of 
the target phenomenon. This is step  one in Kim’s schema: the target phenomenon 
must be re-defined in terms of certain causal roles. Analogously, in the detailed 
example of the reductive explanation of water facts in terms of H2O facts presented 
above, the required link is provided by Premise 2, i.e. a conceptual analysis resulting 
in a list of the reference fixers of ‘water’. Therefore, for those who think of reductive 
explanation in terms of the functional model of reduction, and hence for proponents 
of the view that identity  claims are results of reductive explanations, it is conceptual 
(functional) analysis that makes the explanatory leap  from the base level to the target 
level possible (cf. Levine, 1983, 1993; Chalmers, 1996; Kim, 1998, 2005). That is, a 
priori conceptual analysis plays the very  same role bridge laws play as part of the 
explanatory  aspect of Nagelian reduction: it connects the base level (the level of the 
explanans) with the target level (the level of the explanandum). In a certain sense, 
thus, the debate turns on the very fact whether the actual bridge closing the gap 
between the levels of the explanans and the explanandum is a priori available or not. 
Proponents of the a priori passage approach naturally claim that this bridge is a 
priori available via conceptual analysis, whereas opponents argue that it is not.
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6.3.2 Identities do not need explanation
Block and Stalnaker (1999) famously  raise a series of objections arguing that the 
kind of conceptual analysis required by the proponents of the a priori passage view 
is unavailable.21 As they say it: 
“What is offered is not an argument for this [that a priori conceptual analysis is 
required to close the explanatory gap], but examples that show that if a 
conceptual analysis of a certain kind were always available, then we could use 
these conceptual analyses to account for the necessary a posteriori truths of 
reductive explanation. We have no quarrel with this conditional. What we 
doubt is that these conceptual analyses are very often available.” (Block & 
Stalnaker, 1999, p. 14)
Consequently, Block and Stalnaker think that  reductive explanations are rarely 
transparent.  They  argue  that  instead  of  a  priori  available  conceptual  links,  the gap
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21 Block and Stalnaker attack both Premise 2 and Premise 3 of the transparent reductive explanation 
argument.  Against Premise 2, Block and Stalnaker argue that a priori conceptual analyses of folk 
concepts are neither necessary, nor sufficient.  Take, for example, the folk concept of life. In order to 
provide a transparent reductive explanation of features of life in terms of physical (base level) theories 
and facts, an a priori conceptual analysis of ‘life’  is required analogous to Premise 2 stating that ‘life 
is the stuff that plays the life role’. Remember, though, on the face of it, this statement is a tautology, 
and thus clearly a priori,  in fact, it is a shorthand for a list of  the causal roles all living things play,  i.e. 
the reference fixers of ‘life’ or ‘living’, like get born, die, reproduce, locomote, digest, respire, etc. 
However, drawing the line between living and non-living beings is notoriously difficult, and hence 
coming up with a list of necessary and sufficient conditions seems to be hopeless.
The other main problem with the transparent reductive explanation argument Block and Stalnaker 
identify is the requirement of a ‘uniqueness clause’. Premise 2 and Premise 3 won’t result in 
Conclusion 1 (‘H2O = water’) unless the water role gets amended by a uniqueness and an indexical 
criterion stating that there is only one ‘unique stuff that plays the water role around here’. The 
indexical criterion is required because we do not want to exclude the “possibility that there are other 
[watery] stuffs elsewhere that are unrelated to our applications of the concept of water” (Block & 
Stalnaker, 1999, p. 17). The uniqueness criterion guarantees that H2O = water: without it, it might be 
the case that besides H2O, there are other stuffs (e.g. ghost water) around here that play the water role. 
However, according to Block and Stalnaker, the problem with such an amendment is that it “throws 
doubt on the claim that [Premise 3] of the argument is a microphysical fact” (Block & Stalnaker, 
1999, p. 17), i.e. that ‘H2O is the unique stuff that plays the water role around here’  can be deduced 
from the set of base level theories and facts.
Block and Stalnaker’s objections haven't remained unanswered, though: Chalmers and Jackson (2001) 
and Jackson (2003) have offered reasons to believe that Block and Stalnaker’s criticisms are mistaken. 
Both papers argue that the required conceptual analysis in question is different from the traditional 
understanding of conceptual analysis aimed at finding necessary and sufficient applicability 
conditions. (See more on this crucial issue in §7.1.) Moreover, Jackson (2003, especially pp. 168-169) 
argues that the uniqueness objection is readily answered by the fact that a ‘stop clause’  needs to be 
built in into the a priori passage principle anyway. Cf. Footnote 29 in §2.3.
between the levels of the explanans and the explanandum are bridged by  classical 
(i.e. Nagel-like) connecting principles available only a posteriori. 
“[M]any of the required bridge principles connecting folk with scientific 
vocabulary (such as that water is H2O, and that boiling is the particular 
microphysical process that it is) will not be analytic definitions: very  often, 
what is needed are the notorious necessary a posteriori truths.” (Block & 
Stalnaker, 1999, p. 5)
The “notorious necessary a posteriori truths” in question are proper identity claims. 
Since we are not able to get from H2O facts to water facts by a priori conceptual 
analysis, we need to connect the two levels by other means. A straightforward way to 
create the required connections is to identify entities and processes of the target level 
with entities and processes of the base level: e.g. identify water with H2O, and 
boiling with the particular microphysical process that  it is.22 The resulting model of 
reductive explanation, which I will call non-transparent, differs from the transparent 
version in that instead of the extra supplement captured by Premise 2 and Premise 3 
of the original transparent reductive explanation argument (resulting in the identity 
claims in question as a conclusion), it directly  relies on the identity claims as 
premises of the deductive argument.
 Non-transparent reductive explanation:
Premise 1 (deducible from the base set):
H2O covers 60% of planet Earth.
Premise 2 (a posteriori truth; empirical hypothesis23):
H2O is water.
Conclusion (from Premise 1 and Premise 2):
Water covers 60% of planet Earth.
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22 More accurately, what happens here is this. We connect the folk concept ‘water’  with the scientific 
concept ‘H2O’ by claiming that the extension of ‘water’ is the same as the extension of ‘H2O’. Cf. 
§6.2.1.
23 See §6.3.3 for Block and Stalnaker’s reasons for accepting such identity claims as premises.
Therefore, identities play a very different role in non-transparent reductive 
explanations compared to their role in the transparent version. This different role, 
however,—namely that they  become premises rather than conclusions—means that 
non-transparent reductive explanations themselves give no independent reason for 
thinking that the identities in question are actually true. Proponents of the a priori 
passage view argue that this is a fatal flaw: identities should not be unexplained or 
brute—without any reason for believing in them why would anyone hold them true?
Block and Stalnaker resist by claiming that their opponents are mistaken in thinking 
that identities should be explained—in fact, Block and Stalnaker argue, identities do 
not need explanation. They support this claim by drawing attention to cases of 
identity  claims involving proper names, like ‘Cicero is Tully’, ‘Bob Dylan is Robert 
Allen Zimmerman’ or ‘Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens’. Block and Stalnaker tell the 
following story to illuminate their point:
“Suppose one group of historians of the distant future studies Mark Twain and 
another studies Samuel Clemens. They happen to sit at the same table at  a 
meeting of the American Historical Association. A briefcase falls open, a list of 
the events in the life of Mark Twain tumbles out and is picked up by a student 
of the life of Samuel Clemens. ‘My Lord,’ he says, ‘the events in the life of 
Mark Twain are exactly the same as the events in the life of Samuel Clemens. 
What could explain this amazing coincidence?’ The answer, someone observes, 
is that  Mark Twain = Samuel Clemens. Note that it  makes sense to ask for an 
explanation of the correlation between the two sets of events. But it does not 
make the same kind of sense to ask for an explanation of the identity. Identities 
don't have explanations (though of course there are explanations of how the 
two terms can denote the same thing). The role of identities is to disallow some 
questions and allow others.” (Block & Stalnaker, 1999, p. 24)
What this example sheds light on is the importance of correlations in the context of 
formulating identity claims. The crucial step  in this story happens when someone 
realises that  the list  of events studied by  the historians interested in the life of 
Samuel Clemens is the very same list of events which is studied by  their colleagues 
interested in the life of Mark Twain. The question ‘What could explain this amazing 
coincidence?’ asks for an explanation of this correlation—it asks how it  can be that 
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Samuel Clemens and Mark Twain lived such a similar life. The identity claim is the 
answer to this question: it  says that, in fact, there is only one life here—Samuel 
Clemens and Mark Twain lived the very same life because they were the very same 
person. 
Block and Stalnaker argue that it does not make sense to ask why Mark Twain is 
Samuel Clemens. After all, the information we have gained by learning that Mark 
Twain is identical with Samuel Clemens is exactly  that there is only one person. 
Asking why Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens seems to amount to asking why this 
person is identical with herself—which, according to Block and Stalnaker, is not the 
most sensible question to be asked. As David Papineau formulates it: “[t]he point is 
that genuine identities need no explaining. If ‘two’ entities are one, then the one 
doesn’t ‘accompany’ or ‘give rise to’ the other—it is the other. And if this is so then 
there is nothing to explain.” (Papineau, 2002, p. 144)
So instead of asking for an explanation of the identity itself, one should aim at 
explaining the concomitant correlation. Asking for an explanation of why  the two 
sets of events are so tightly correlated is the legitimate question here, and the identity 
claim delivers the answer to that question. Mark Twain and Samuel Clemens visit  the 
same places, meet the same people, and react in the same way because they are the 
same person. That is, the identity claim itself, instead of requiring further 
explanation, provides explanation. 
The solution Block and Stalnaker offer focuses on correlations. It claims that what 
really happens is that we observe a correlation between two sets of events and want 
to understand it. Postulating identities is the means to this end. However, note that on 
the face of it, this situation is quite different from the original problem of trying to 
account for a target phenomenon in terms of some base level facts and theories. In 
fact, it is a misdescription of the a priori passage view to say that it  asks for an 
explanation of an identity. Proponents of transparent reductive explanation do not 
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start with observing an identity and then asking for an explanation. All they 
emphasise is that the identity  itself does not remain unexplained. As we have seen in 
§6.3.1, in the process of accounting for higher level phenomena in lower level terms, 
the identities ‘fall out’ automatically, and moreover, readily explained—all the reason 
why we should hold them true are readily at  hand.24  In a certain sense, thus 
proponents of the a priori passage view do agree with Block and Stalnaker that 
identities do not need any extra explanation: once all the base level facts are given 
(and we possess the higher level concept) we can ‘read off’ the identity claim. And 
this is what is important  from the perspective of the a priori passage view. Chalmers 
and Jackson try to support this position with the following passage:
“A subject who knows all the qualitative truths in question—physical, mental, 
social—and who possesses the concepts ‘Mark Twain’ and ‘Samuel Clemens’ 
will be in a position to deduce that the identity is true, even if the subject is 
initially ignorant  of it. The subject will be in a position to know that there was 
an individual who was known to his parents as ‘Samuel Clemens’, who wrote 
books such as Huckleberry Finn and the like under the name ‘Mark Twain’, 
whose deeds were causally  responsible for the current discussion involving 
‘Mark Twain’ and involving ‘Samuel Clemens’, and so on. From all this 
information, the subject will be able easily  to deduce that Mark Twain was 
Samuel Clemens, and the deduction will be a priori in the sense that it will not 
rely  on any empirical information outside the information specified in the base. 
So this identity is not epistemically primitive.”
(Chalmers & Jackson, 2001, p. 355)
Note, however, that the deduction of the ‘Mark Twain = Samuel Clemens’ identity 
above is significantly different from how transparent reductive explanation works. 
Transparent  reductive explanation starts with a full description of the base level, and 
then proceeds by  connecting it with the target level via a priori conceptual analysis. 
In the above example of Mark Twain and Samuel Clemens, though, it is not the case 
that one is provided with a detailed description of the life of Samuel Clemens, and 
then, on the bases of a conceptual analysis of the name ‘Mark Twain’ one recognises 
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24 Cf. how Conclusion 1 follows straightforwardly from Premise 2 and Premise 3 in §6.3.1.
that Mark Twain = Samuel Clemens.25 Rather, the identity claim is formulated on the 
basis of the fact that “the events in the life of Mark Twain are exactly the same as the 
events in the life of Samuel Clemens” (Block & Stalnaker, 1999, p. 24); that is, on 
the basis of the observation that there is a special correlation between Mark Twain’s 
and Samuel Clemens’ lives: the very  same events occur in the apparently  distinct 
lives. How can it be that two persons live the same life? The answer emerges quite 
naturally: the two persons must be the same. True, once one knows everything there 
is to know about the events in Mark Twain’s life and in Samuel Clemens life, one 
will immediately  be able to deduce the identity in question. However, this has 
nothing to do with the transparent model of reductive explanation—it is a 
consequence of the special fact that the two lives consist of the very same events.
In this sense, the ‘Mark Twain and Samuel Clemens’ case as presented by Block and 
Stalnaker is a quite poor analogue to the typical mind-body issue. In the latter case, 
the two sets of events in question (the mental, i.e. target level, and the neural, i.e. 
base level) are stunningly different. Actually, the very fact that apparently  there is 
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25 Proper names refer directly, and not via associated descriptions (cf. Kripke, 1980). David Papineau 
argues in detail that this feature of proper names makes identities like ‘Samuel Clemens = Mark 
Twain’ perfect analogues to mind-brain identities. Papineau thinks that we refer to our phenomenal 
qualities with so-called phenomenal concepts,  the crucial feature of which is that they—just like 
proper names—pick out their referents directly, and not via an associated description (Papineau, 2002, 
cf. Chapter 3). Since neither proper names, nor phenomenal concepts have associated descriptions, no 
conceptual analysis could connect them to other concepts. According to Papineau, this difference in 
associated descriptions results in a difference between standard cases of scientific identities and the 
mind-brain case. As he puts it:
“[W]e can thus explain ‘why this quantity is temperature’, understanding this as the question of why it 
is raised by inputs of heat and causes heat sensations in humans, and we can explain ‘why this 
discharge is lightning’, in the sense of explaining why it is produced by thunderstorms and illuminates 
the sky. [...] But the scientific examples are not really explanations of identities. We aren’t explaining 
why this liquid is water—that is,  why it is the liquid which in this world plays the role of being 
colourless,  odourless, and so on. This would be to explain why this liquid is itself, which would be 
misplaced.  Rather, we are explaining why this liquid is colourless, odourless, and tasteless. We are 
explaining why it satisfies the descriptions with which it is pre-theoretically associated. This is a 
perfectly good thing to explain, and I allowed above that physics can explain such things. However 
this is not a matter of explaining an identity—of explaining why some entity is itself—but rather of 
explaining why some entity possesses certain further attributes.” (Papineau, 2002,  pp. 148-150, 
original emphases) 
And since in the case of consciousness (and proper names) there are no such further attributes—due to 
the fact that phenomenal concepts (proper names) don’t have associated descriptions,—no further 
explanations are required. 
nothing similar in mental and physical (neurological) events is an important part of 
the mystery of the mind-body  problem (cf. e.g. Block, 2007). Thus a somewhat 
better example could be the case of Superman and Clark Kent. Superman and Clark 
Kent have very different abilities and characteristics, they never appear at the same 
place, etc. If we suppose that all there is to know about Superman is about him qua 
Superman (and vice versa with Clark Kent), then in this case, asking ‘How could 
they be the same person?’ seems to be a valid question.  
Note the difference with the Mark Twain case. There, if one knows everything there 
is to know about Mark Twain and Samuel Clemens, then, as Block and Stalnaker set 
up the example, simply  on the basis of the fact that a significant amount of Mark 
Twain related information will literally be the same as what can be known of Samuel 
Clemens, one will be able to conclude on the identity without the need of any kind of 
further analysis. Contrary to this, in the Superman case as introduced above, even if 
one has a full description of Superman qua Superman and of Clark Kent qua Clark 
Kent, one will not be able to deduce that ‘Superman = Clark Kent’, simply because 
none of the Clark Kent attributes will be recognisable amongst the Superman 
attributes26, and no further conceptual analysis could reveal more27. Thus if one is 
told that actually  Superman is Clark Kent, one seems to be justified in being 
sceptical, and asking for an explanation of how this could be true. In this case, then, 
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26 Of course, there is one important sign which could arouse suspicion, namely the fact that Superman 
is always absent when Clark Kent is present, and vice versa.
27 Cf. Kripke (1980) and Footnote 25 above in §6.3.2.
one asks for an explanation of an identity  claim between two entities because their 
accessible features are different.28
Of course, this Superman case is still not a perfect analogue. Its flaw is that there are 
no real correlations in it—there are no ‘Clark Kent events’ which really co-occur 
with certain ‘Superman events’. The mind-brain case is more like a combination of 
the two proper name involving examples: very different target and base level events 
(as different as in the Superman case) correlate really tightly  with each other (as 
tightly as in the Mark Twain case). This is not unprecedented, though. As we will see 
in §7.2, standard examples of scientific explanations all share these characteristics. 
But before getting there, let’s first summarise where we are at the moment. 
Recall the original question at hand. It asked how we could get from lower level 
truths (e.g. truths about H2O) to higher level truths (e.g. truths about water); that is, it 
asked for a model of reductive explanation. Levine, Chalmers, Jackson, Kim and 
others argue that the correct model of reductive explanation is the transparent version 
as depicted in §6.3.1. This model requires a priori conceptual analysis, which, 
according to Block, Stalnaker, Hill, McLaughlin, Papineau and others, is usually 
unavailable. However, they claim that despite the general unavailability of a priori 
conceptual analysis, reductive explanation of the target phenomenon is still possible. 
The model of reductive explanation they provide is the non-transparent version as 
depicted here in §6.3.2. Both models rely  on identity claims in order to be able to 
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28  There is, however, a way to convince the sceptical: by helping her hide in the dressing room of 
Clark Kent. If there our sceptical subject saw Clark Kent changing his outfit,  and leaving the room as 
Superman,  then this experience would most probably convince her.  What would happen in this case, is 
that we would create an epistemic situation where the sceptical subject would have a chance to anchor 
her ‘Clark Kent’  and ‘Superman’  tags to the very same object. The problem with the mind-brain case 
is that due to the impossibility of crossing the subjective-objective dividing line, such an epistemic 
situation in which the subject could co-anchor her phenomenal and physical tags is unavailable. 
In §7.1 and §7.2 I will argue that the mind-brain case is not the only example with such 
characteristics. I will show that in this respect classical scientific identities are very similar to the 
mind-brain case. Typically, in the case of cross-level scientific identity claims, when at least one of the 
featuring properties or processes is such that it is inaccessible for our human senses, and the two sides 
of the identity are defined both theoretically and experimentally by different frameworks (i.e. their 
observation-conditions are different), then it is impossible to create an epistemic situation where the 
necessary co-anchoring could be done. Nonetheless, as we will see, there is a working model of 
reductive explanation even in these cases as well.
conclude on target level truths—however, whereas the transparent version gets them 
‘for free’ via a priori conceptual analysis, the non-transparent version introduces 
them as premises coming from empirical considerations. Herein lies the important 
role of correlations. Proponents of the non-transparent version argue that typically 
one becomes able to bridge the gap between the target and the base levels, i.e. 
reductive explanation becomes possible, if there are interesting correlations between 
the two levels. On the bases of these correlations one formulates the identities in 
question, which, on the one hand, are justified by the fact that they provide 
explanations of the correlations observed, and, on the other hand, connect the two 
levels, transfer explanatory power from the base to the target level, and thereby 
ensure reductive explanation.29
6.3.3 Identities are justified by inference to the best 
explanation
Identities, according to the non-transparent  version of reductive explanation, rather 
than being conclusions of deductive arguments, are justified on other grounds— 
typically by invoking the so-called principle of inference to the best explanation.  
The principle of inference to the best explanation (cf. Harman, 1966) starts from the 
available evidences, i.e. the observational facts, and infers to the truth of that 
hypothesis, which best explains these facts. In this sense, inference to the best 
explanation is reversed thinking: whereas in the case of deduction, for example, one 
moves from certain premises to the conclusion which follows logically from those 
premises, in the case of inference to the best explanation one moves backwards—one 
starts with the outcome, and looks for that premise which would have resulted in 
such a conclusion. The problem of this method is that there can be many possible 
premises resulting in the same conclusion, i.e. there can be many possible 
explanations of the same available evidence. This is why  the principle looks for the 
best explanation of the given observation—it claims that that particular hypothesis of 
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29 In fact, these two claims belong to two different approaches. Compare Hill (1991) and McLaughlin 
(2001) with Block and Stalnaker (1999). See §6.3.3 for more details.
the many  possible hypotheses should be accepted as true, which is able to account 
for the observation better than any of its alternatives. 
As it happens, different proponents of the non-transparent version of reductive 
explanation emphasise different aspects of the deployment of the inference to the 
best explanation principle. Christopher Hill (1991) and Brian McLaughlin (2001, 
2010), for example, focus on the observed correlation between the target and the base 
domains, and claim that identities are justified on the grounds that they provide the 
best explanation of these correlations. As McLaughlin puts it in relation with the 
mind-body issue:
“It is fairly  widely believed that felt bodily sensations (aches, pains, itches, 
tickles, throbs, cramps, chills, and the like) have physical or at least functional 
correlates. That is to say, the following thesis is fairly widely believed:
Correlation Thesis. For every  type of sensation state, S, there is a type of 
physical or functional state, P/F, such that it  is nomologically necessary that for 
any being, x, x is in S if and only if x is in P/F.
The Correlation Thesis, if it is true, would not, of course, solve the mind-body 
problem for sensations. For the Correlation Thesis is compatible with virtually 
every  theory of mind: not only with noneliminativist materialism and 
functionalism, but also with Cartesian Dualism, dual-aspect theory, neutral 
monism, and panpsychism.
Some philosophers, however, myself included, maintain that  the following 
thesis would offer the best explanation of the correlation thesis:
Type Identity Thesis. For every  type of sensation state, S, there is a type of 
physical or functional state, P/F, such that S = P/F.” (McLaughlin, 2001, p. 319, 
original emphases)
Here, the available evidence, i.e. the observational fact, McLaughlin considers is the 
correlation between sensations and physical-functional states. The so-called 
Correlation Thesis expresses this observation. This observation, however, as 
McLaughlin acknowledges is compatible with many different explanation: e.g. 
functionalism, Cartesian dualism, dual-aspect theory, type identity, etc. Among these 
possible explanations, McLaughlin claims, the type identity thesis is the best 
explanation of the observed correlation. 
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Other proponents of the non-transparent version of reductive explanation emphasise 
other aspects of the deployment of the inference to the best explanation principle. For 
example, Block and Stalnaker, point out that identities can also be justified on the 
grounds that they allow for explanations, which otherwise would be unavailable. As 
they formulate it: 
“Why do we suppose that heat = molecular kinetic energy? [...] Suppose that 
heat = molecular kinetic energy, pressure = molecular momentum transfer, and 
boiling = a certain kind of molecular motion. (We are alluding to an empirical 
identity  claim, not the a priori behavioral analysis considered earlier.) Then we 
have an account of how heating water produces boiling. If we were to accept 
mere correlations instead of identities, we would only have an account of how 
something correlated with heating causes something correlated with boiling. 
Further, we may wish to know how it is that increasing the molecular kinetic 
energy of a packet  of water causes boiling. Identities allow a transfer of 
explanatory  and causal force not allowed by mere correlations. Assuming that 
heat = mke, that pressure = molecular momentum transfer, etc. allows us to 
explain facts that we could not otherwise explain. Thus, we are justified by the 
principle of inference to the best explanation in inferring that these identities 
are true.” (Block & Stalnaker, 1999, p. 23)
This passage emphasises that identities make it possible to transfer explanatory and 
causal power from the base level to the target level. This is why  identities are able to 
act as a true bridge between the two levels and allow us to account for target level 
phenomena in terms of base level processes. Identities—Premise 2 of the non-
transparent reductive explanation argument in §6.3.2—connect the target level to the 
base level by tying co-referring terms and expressions together. They map the target 
level onto the base level along these co-referring terms. In other words, identities are 
tools for projecting base level descriptions onto the target level. In this sense, they 
transfer “explanatory and causal force”.30
The above example evokes an argument similar to the one illustrating non-
transparent reductive explanation in §6.3.2. To see this, let’s specify  the identities in 
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30 That is, on Block and Stalnaker’s view, identities best explain target level causal phenomena (given 
base level causal processes) rather than correlations between target level and base level events.
more detail. Let’s say that ‘boiling = molecular process MP’ and that ‘heating = 
increase of mean molecular kinetic energy’. Then from facts and theories of the base 
level (in this case, statistical mechanics) it is possible to deduce the claim that 
‘increasing the mean molecular kinetic energy of a certain state of molecules causes 
molecular process MP’. Adding mere correlation claims to this picture saying that 
‘boiling correlates with molecular process MP’ and ‘heating correlates with 
increasing mean molecular kinetic energy’ leads us only to the conclusion that 
‘something correlating with heating causes something correlating with boiling’. 
However, if we add the identity claims specified above, we can conclude that 
‘heating causes boiling’.
Premise 1 (deducible from the base set):
Increasing the mean molecular kinetic energy of a certain state of molecules 
causes molecular process MP.
Premise 2 (empirical hypothesis):
Heating is increase of mean molecular kinetic energy.
Premise 3 (empirical hypothesis):
Boiling is molecular process MP.
Conclusion (from Premise 1, Premise 2, and Premise 3):
Heating causes boiling.
Here the competing hypotheses are the correlation claim and the identity claim. 
Whereas the correlation claim does not allow us to draw a conclusion with regard to 
the target domain, the identity claim does contribute to accounting for target  level 
phenomena. That is, the identity  claim is the one amongst the competing hypotheses, 
which explains target level phenomena better. So in accordance with the principle of 
inference of to the best explanation, Block and Stalnaker claim, the identities in 
question are justified.31
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31 For a more recent defence of this position, see Block (forthcoming).
Of course, proponents of the transparent version of reductive explanation criticise the 
justification of identities on the basis of the principle of inference to the best 
explanation. Jaegwon Kim (2005), for example, offers a series of objections targeting 
both the general method of inference to the best explanation and the particular role 
identities play in explanations. In what follows, I am going to focus on what  he has 
to say about the central topic of this chapter, the role of identities.32
Kim’s fundamental problem is that, according to him, referring to identities as 
providing best explanations is deeply mistaken, simply  because identities are not 
explanatory devices. Kim supports this claim by three slightly different arguments. 
First, Kim argues that the Hill and McLaughlin approach is bound to fail, since 
identities do not explain correlations—rather they eliminate them. On the one hand, 
by claiming that there is correlation between two sets of events, one automatically 
commits oneself to the further claim that the two sets of events are two distinct sets 
of events. That is, in the present context of correlating target and base level events, 
Hill’s and McLaughlin’s correlation thesis really tells us that the target level 
phenomena are something over-and-above the base level phenomena. On the other 
hand, in the case of formulating identities, one inherently  commits oneself to the 
claim that the two sets of events identified are, in fact, the same event. That is, the 
very message of an identity claim is that there is only  one thing, and so the target 
phenomena are nothing over-and-above the base phenomena. In other words, Kim 
claims, an identity  does not explain a correlation, rather it shows that, in fact, there is 
nothing to be explained, which means that the principle of inference to the best 
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32 Though see Footnote 34 below (at the end of §6.3.3) for a brief summary of his other points. 
explanation is unavailable to Hill and McLaughlin, because no explanation can be 
such that if the explanans is true then the explanandum is false.33
Second, Kim draws attention to the fact, that in typical scientific practice correlations 
are never explained by identities. True, science often progresses by first  observing 
certain correlations and then trying to identify possible explanations of that particular 
correlation. Moreover, even inference to the best explanation might play a role in 
choosing between the alternative explanations. However, identities never appear 
among the alternatives—in scientific practice identities are not considered as 
candidates for providing explanations of correlations. Typically, observed 
correlations are either explained by underlying common mechanisms (i.e. a single 
process at some lower level underlying both phenomena correlating), or by  a 
common cause. Kim illustrates this point by the examples of the correlation between 
thermal and electrical conductivity, and the correlation between tidal movements and 
phases of moon (cf. Kim, 2005, p. 134). In the former case, the observed correlation 
is explained by  the claim that “both types of conduction involve the movement of 
free electrons through the lattice structure of metals” (Kim, 2005, p. 134)—i.e. by 
pinpointing an underlying common mechanism. In the latter case, the observed 
correlation is explained by the claim that both tidal movements and phases of moon 
are “causal effects of the relative positions of the earth and the moon in relation to 
the sun” (Kim, 2005, p. 134)—i.e. by finding a common cause.
Finally, Kim points out that it is not surprising that identities are not utilised in real 
scientific cases as explanations of correlations, since literally, identities do not 
explain anything at all. To drive this point home, Kim invites us to consider the 
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33 Note that Kim (2005) attributes the same position to Block and Stalnaker, and consequently argues 
that the Hill-McLaughlin and the Block-Stalnaker implementations of the principle of inference to the 
best explanation are incompatible. However, this can’t be the case. As we have seen in §6.3.2 Block 
and Stalnaker are explicit about the importance of the observed correlations. According to them, these 
correlations, and not the identities themselves, are the real targets of the explanatory questions. As 
they write it: “[n]ote that it makes sense to ask for an explanation of the correlation between the two 
sets of events. But it does not make the same kind of sense to ask for an explanation of the 
identity” (Block & Stalnaker, 1999, p. 24). That is, Block and Stalnaker agree with Hill and 
McLaughlin that identities are the answers to these explanatory questions targeting the observed 
correlations. See also McLaughlin’s response to Kim for a similar conclusion (McLaughlin, 2010).
alleged explanation of why Cicero is wise in terms of the fact that Tully  is wise. Such 
an explanation proceeds from the first premise saying that ‘Tully is wise’ through the 
second premise saying that ‘Tully  is Cicero’ to the conclusion that ‘Therefore, Cicero 
is wise’. Kim observes that:
“If anyone should offer this as an explanation of why Cicero is wise, we surely 
would not take it seriously. [...] [The identity] seems to do no explanatory 
work. If it does anything to move the inference along, it is by allowing us to 
rewrite the premise ‘Tully is wise’ as ‘Cicero is wise,’ by putting equals for 
equals (that is, via the substitutivity of identities). The fact represented by the 
first premise ‘Tully  is wise’ is the very same fact as the fact represented by the 
conclusion ‘Cicero is wise’; in moving from premise to conclusion, the same 
fact is redescribed. There is no movement here from one fact to another, 
something that surely must happen in a genuine explanatory  argument. 
Identities seem best taken as mere rewrite rules in inferential contexts; they 
generate no explanatory connections between the explanandum and the 
phenomena invoked in the explanans; they seem not to have explanatory 
efficacy of their own.” (Kim, 2005, p. 132, original emphasis)
Apparently, Kim is committed to the view here that an explanation ought to connect 
one fact  with another. Since identities do not  connect different facts, but rather, at 
best, tell us that different descriptions are descriptions of the same fact, all they are 
capable of is acting as a rewrite rule. In other words, identities themselves “do not 
play  a role in generating explanations; they only allow us to redescribe facts” (Kim, 
2005, p. 134). Hence, Kim concludes, identities do not have any explanatory efficacy 
on their own. 
However, even if identities are not the right tools for generating explanations, Kim 
acknowledges that they can play an important role in explanations: they can, as he 
says, “defend or justify explanatory claims” (Kim, 2005, p. 136). What Kim has in 
mind is this. Let’s suppose that we have a base level theory from which we can 
deduce a certain claim about a particular base level phenomenon. Without the help  of 
identities that’s all we can have: an explanatory claim about a particular base level 
phenomenon. Now, the nice thing about identities is that they allow us to make 
explanatory  claims which we wouldn’t be able to make if the identities weren’t 
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available. Say, there is an identity  connecting the particular base level phenomenon 
in question to some target level phenomenon. Then, since the identity rewrites our 
explanatory  claim about the base level phenomenon into an explanatory claim about 
a target level phenomenon we get a new explanatory claim, which can be defended 
or justified on the basis of this very process.
Note that this is the same feature of identities which is emphasised by Block and 
Stalnaker. As we have seen earlier on in this section, Block and Stalnaker justify 
identities on the basis of the fact that they are able to transfer explanatory  and causal 
power from the base level to the target level. By rewriting or redescribing base level 
phenomena in terms of the target level, identities project the base level explanation 
onto the target level, thus contributing to the explanation of the target level 
phenomenon. 
However, Kim nevertheless thinks that it is not enough for endowing identities with 
their own explanatory efficacy. Take, for instance, the example of non-transparent 
reductive explanation of this section, the derivation of ‘heating causes boiling‘ from 
facts and theories of the base level. Kim claims that the “explanatory activity  is over 
and done” (Kim, 2005, p. 145) right after we get the first premise (namely that 
‘increasing the mean molecular kinetic energy of a certain state of molecules causes 
molecular process MP’). That is, Kim argues, the real explanatory  activity  is the 
deduction of this claim from the base level theory. Once it is done all that happens in 
the argument is that this claim gets restated with the aid of the two identities 
(Premise 2: ‘heating is increase of mean molecular kinetic energy’, and Premise 3: 
‘boiling is molecular process MP’). This restatement (the conclusion, i.e. the claim 
that ‘heating causes boiling’), though is a new explanatory claim, it  is only a 
redescription of a phenomenon that has already been explained by the first premise. 
As Kim himself puts it:
“The identities [...] serve only as rewrite rules, and they are not implicated in 
the explanatory  activity. All the explaining represented in the derivation occurs 
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within [the base level], and when we derive [Premise 1 from the base level] 
theory, we are doing some genuine explaining. And that is the only explaining 
involved here. The identities kick in only after the explaining is finished. True, 
these identities do have a role in the derivation of [‘heating causes boiling,’] 
but this is not an explanatory derivation; rather, it is a derivation in which we 
put ‘equals for equals,’ and thereby redescribe in folk vocabulary a 
phenomenon that has already been explained.” (Kim, 2005, pp. 145-146)
If so, then Block and Stalnaker cannot be right when they justify  the identities in 
question on the basis of the principle of inference to the best explanation, because 
these identities are not part of the explanations involved. The principle of inference 
to the best explanation cannot justify the identities in question if they themselves do 
no explanatory work. Since these identities are “not implicated in explanations of the 
sorts Block and Stalnaker have in mind” they “cannot be the beneficiaries of 
inference to the best explanation” (Kim, 2005, p. 146). 
To summarise, Kim thinks that both the Hill-McLaughlin and the Block-Stalnaker 
version of the inference to the best explanation approach fail—the former because 
identities do not explain correlations, the latter because identities do not play an 
explanatory role in the deductive arguments considered.34
6.3.4 Is the non-transparent model really a version of 
reductive explanation?
Of course, proponents of the inference to the best explanation approach do not accept 
Kim’s objections. To answer the first  challenge, McLaughlin (2010) pinpoints that 
even if Kim is right that identities and correlations exclude each other, it is irrelevant 
to the inference to the best explanation argument he and Hill offer. For what drives 
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34  Kim (2005) formulates some additional worries in general about the principle of inference to the 
best explanation. The most significant of these additional worries emphasises that inference to the best 
explanation is a version of inductive reasoning, and as such it must respect the principle of total 
evidence—i.e. the data, or evidence, to be explained must be all the data relevant to the issue at hand. 
Kim claims, that if one also considers—over and above psychophysical correlations—data like 
“presumptive authoritativeness and privacy of first-person access to one’s own mental states, the 
persistence condition of persons, the multiple physical realizability of mental properties,  the 
possibility of qualia inversion, the possibility of ‘zombies,’ and the like” (Kim, 2005, p. 129) then 
identities might cease to appear to be the best of the available explanations.
Kim to the conclusion that identities and correlations are incompatible is—as we 
have seen—the observation that by claiming that two sets of events correlate one 
inherently  commits oneself to the further claim that the two sets of events are 
distinct. However, Hill and McLaughlin do not commit themselves to this further 
claim since they do not even commit themselves to the correlational claim in this 
serious sense. All Hill and McLaughlin presuppose is the thesis that “for any type of 
state of phenomenal consciousness C there is a type of physical state P such that it is 
true and counterfactual supporting that a being is in C if and only if the being is in 
P” (McLaughlin, 2010, p. 267),35  which is perfectly  compatible with C being 
identical with P. So even if Kim were right that identities and correlations are 
incompatible, the only conclusion that really would follow from this would be that 
Hill and McLaughlin gave a misleading name to the thesis above (cf. McLaughlin, 
2010, p. 271).
However, McLaughlin argues, Kim is actually wrong: identities and correlations do 
not exclude each other. In fact, identities do explain correlations. To see how this 
works McLaughlin asks us to consider a derivation of a correlational thesis from an 
identity originally put forward by Jared Bates (2009). The argument runs as follows:
P1: M = P.  (assumption)
P2: Ma.   (assumption)
C1:  Pa.   (from P1 and P2 by substitutivity rule)
P3:  Pa.   (assumption)
C2: Ma.   (from P1 and P3 by substitutivity rule) 
C3: Ma ↔ Pa.  (from P2-C1 and P3-C2; biconditional proof)
C4: ∀x(Mx ↔ Px). (from C3; universal generalisation)
(cf. Bates, 2009, p. 322)
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35 Compare this with its earlier version that has already been cited: “for every type of sensation state, 
S,  there is a type of physical or functional state,  P/F, such that it is nomologically necessary that for 
any being, x, x is in S if and only if x is in P/F” (McLaughlin, 2001, p. 319).
Here the final conclusion (C4) is a universal correlational claim, and P1, P2 and P3 
are the three independent premises, among which the identity  statement (P1) is the 
only one carrying explanatory  weight. That is, this deduction shows that it is possible 
to derive a correlational claim from an identity statement, and moreover, in the 
course of this derivation the identity is the only explanatory premise. 
Moreover, even if Kim is right in his observation that the identity featuring in the 
‘explanation’ of ‘Cicero is wise’ in terms of ‘Tully is wise’ (cf. §6.3.3) does not play 
any explanatory  role, it doesn’t follow that no identity plays any  explanatory role at 
all. Kim’s main reason for denying that the identity  statement ‘Cicero is Tully’ plays 
any significant explanatory role here is that, as he puts it, it is only  a rewrite rule. 
‘Tully  is wise’ is the very same fact  as ‘Cicero is wise’, we only redescribe this fact 
with the aid of the identity. Since, according to Kim, an explanation should move us 
from one fact to a different  fact, the deduction of ‘Cicero is wise’ from ‘Tully is 
wise’ via ‘Cicero is Tully’ is not an explanation. However, as Bates (2009) shows it, 
Kim’s generalisation is too hasty. There are arguments featuring identity statements 
as premises which do move from one fact to another. Consider, for example, the 
argument from the premise ‘Tully = Cicero’ to the conclusion that “Therefore Tully 
is here iff Cicero is here.” (Bates, 2009, p. 323). This argument clearly moves from 
one fact to a different fact, since “Tully’s identity  with Cicero” and “the constant 
joint appearance of Tully  and Cicero” (Bates, 2009, p. 323) are two different facts, 
thus the argument satisfies Kim’s requirement concerning explanations. Moreover, it 
is precisely  the premise that explains the conclusion. “To put it simply, once we 
understand that Tully just is Cicero, it is no wonder that wherever Tully goes, there 
goes Cicero. In fact, no correct explanation of this fact could fail to mention that 
Tully  and Cicero are one and the same.” (Bates, 2009, p. 323) That is, the identity is 
the best explanation of the correlation. 
This is still not the end of the story. As McLaughlin points out, Kim is even wrong in 
requiring that an explanation should connect two different facts. This condition 
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might be valid on causal explanations, but it is definitely not on reductive 
explanations. The main difference between a causal and a reductive explanation is 
exactly  that whereas the former explains via moving from one fact to another, the 
latter explains via re-descriptions. Remember to the very starting point of this 
chapter, where we saw there that there were many different versions of explanation 
(cf. §6.1.2). Causal explanation is certainly one of them, however, here in this 
chapter we are concerned with another kind of explanation, namely the one which 
tries to provide an explanation of a target phenomenon in terms of some 
synchronously co-occurring base phenomenon. Both the transparent and the non-
transparent versions of reductive explanation proceed via identifying certain target 
phenomena with the appropriate base phenomena—that is, via re-descriptions. The 
crucial difference between the transparent and the non-transparent version is that the 
later one relies on a posteriori identities, i.e. identities which are cognitively 
informative. Kim is right: the initial premise and the final conclusion of the non-
transparent reductive explanations both talk about the same fact. However, they talk 
about the same fact in different ways. Identities create the connections between these 
different ways of talking about the same fact. That is, literally, identities inform us 
that these different descriptions are of the same fact and moreover, about how it can 
be that they are of the same fact.  Our understanding, thus, is advanced by  the 
identities in question.
So, contra Kim, explanation in general is not necessarily achieved by  moving from 
one fact to another. In certain cases (e.g. causal explanation) it is achieved in such a 
way, but in other cases (e.g. reductive explanation) it is not. Explanation is all about 
making something—described in a certain way—intelligible by invoking either other 
things or other descriptions. In this sense, explanations have an ontological and an 
epistemic aspect. The epistemic criteria for an explanation is that the explanatory 
premises need to epistemically imply the conclusion (cf. McLaughlin, 2010, p. 298). 
And identities do contribute to this epistemic aspect of explanations. As McLaughlin 
puts it:
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“[E]xplanation has an epistemic dimension. Facts, in Kim’s sense, explain and 
are explained only under descriptions or conceptualizations. (That is true even 
in the case of causal explanations.) [Identities deployed by the non-transparent 
model] do their explanatory work within the epistemic dimension of 
explanation. Only by taking into account the epistemic dimension can we 
capture the idea that explanations provide understanding, and give reasons for 
belief.” (McLaughlin, 2010, p. 298)
That is, the identity statements non-transparent reductive explanations rely on are 
real explanatory premises, and thus they are open to be justified by the principle of 
inference to the best explanation. So the non-transparent version seems to be a viable 
alternative to the transparent model of reductive explanations.
This leaves us with our last question. Let’s accept that the non-transparent  model 
advocated by Block, Stalnaker, Hill, and McLaughlin does provide genuine 
explanations, i.e. that the transparent and the non-transparent versions are on a pair 
as far as explanations are concerned—but does the non-transparent model qualify as 
reductive explanation?
In a certain sense, of course, proponents of transparent reductive explanation are 
right when they claim that the non-transparent version does not explain the target 
phenomenon purely in terms of the base level, since it explicitly relies on identity 
statements as premises, which themselves refer to certain features of the target 
domain. In another sense, though, the explanation a non-transparent argument 
provides is reductive explanation good enough. Even if we cannot ‘read off’ the 
identities in question from a full description of the base level, and need to rely on 
empirical considerations, the identities themselves still express co-reference; that  is, 
they  allow us to see how a story told in the vocabulary  of the base level covers 
phenomena from the target level. Remember, the transparent version of reductive 
explanation also needs identities in order to be able to project base level descriptions 
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to the target level36. The only  difference between the transparent and the non-
transparent case is the source of the identity claim—whether it comes from a priori 
or a posteriori considerations. But even in the a priori case, one needs to possess and 
master target level concepts.37  That is, even the transparent version of reductive 
explanation relies on a considerable amount of knowledge about the target 
phenomenon. So, it seems that even the transparent model fails to qualify  as an 
explanation purely in terms of the base level (in the strictest sense of ‘purely’). On 
the other hand, though, if we allow a certain amount of information about the target 
phenomenon—necessary  for connecting the base and target levels—to be included in 
the deductive argument, then, it seems, the non-transparent version qualifies as 
reductive explanation just as well as the transparent version. After all, contrary  to 
what opponents of the non-transparent version sometimes exaggeratively  claim, it 
does not explain the higher level phenomenon in terms of the higher level 
phenomenon itself. In other words, it does not provide trivial explanations. On the 
contrary: it tells a story formulated purely in the vocabulary of the base level, and 
then shows how it can be projected to the target level. In this, the transparent and the 
non-transparent versions are very similar. Premise 1 of both arguments tell the base 
level story. Then Premise 2 of the non-transparent version, and Premise 2 together 
with Premise 3 (via Conclusion 1) of the transparent version project this story  to the 
target level. Premise 1 is formulated purely in terms of the base level in both cases. 
Then, again, the ‘projection devices’—the tools for bridging the gap between the 
base and the target levels—include information about  the target level in both cases. 
Hence, the two arguments go together: if the transparent version qualifies as an 
249
36 To see this, consider the role of Conclusion 1 in reaching Conclusion 2 in the transparent argument 
in §6.3.1.
37  Note how Kim’s approach differs from Chalmers and Jackson’s approach in this respect. For 
Chalmers and Jackson, the reasoner needs to master the concept picking out the target level 
phenomenon so that she will become able to identify the reference fixers of that concept (cf. Premise 
2 in §6.3.1). Note that these reference fixers, as identified by Chalmers and Jackson (e.g. odourless, 
colourless,  etc. for water), belong to the target level. Contrary to this, Kim’s approach re-defines the 
target level phenomenon in terms of base level causal roles. On the face of it, by this move Kim 
manages to get rid of the burden of relying on the target level. However, as we will see in §6.4,  this 
move is problematic.
instantiation of reductive explanation, so does the non-transparent version as well. 
The only difference is that they rely on different projection devices.
Remember, as we have seen in the introduction to this chapter, there are many 
different kinds of explanation. Here we are interested in those, which make the target 
phenomenon more intelligible on the basis of some underlying base level. This is 
what we call reductive explanation—it ought to provide an account of a target 
phenomenon in terms of certain base phenomena, and it should rely, as explanatory 
resources, only on the base phenomena.38  The rationale behind this requirement is 
the following. Consider three different strategies all aiming at providing an 
explanation of the observation that certain target and base level phenomena co-occur. 
Let the first strategy be the method of transparent reductive explanation. This 
framework emphasises analytic definitions or a priori conceptual connections 
between the target and the base. Consequently, it becomes able to account for the 
target level phenomena in terms of a fixed base level ontology, and thus 
accomplishes the task of reductive explanation. The second strategy to be considered 
is ontological emergentism. Within this framework, trans-ordinal laws connect the 
base and the target levels telling us that whenever a certain base phenomenon occurs 
a particular target phenomenon also occurs (cf. §1.3.3). Such trans-ordinal laws, 
when included in an explanation of why the target phenomenon occurred extend the 
ontology  of the base level on the basis of which one accounts for the target level 
phenomenon (literally, such arguments add the target phenomenon plus the 
corresponding trans-ordinal law to the base ontology). By  this, ontological 
emergentism clearly violates the requirement of reductive explanation.39 In fact, the 
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38  Note that this requirement, as Kim originally formulated it was straightforwardly false. Kim said: 
“The explanatory premises of a reductive explanation of a phenomenon involving property F must not 
refer to F” (Kim, 2005, p. 105). However, since terms of the base level descriptions (initial premises) 
co-refer with terms of the target level descriptions (final conclusions),  the explanatory premises of all 
reductive explanations necessarily refer to their particular target phenomena. To avoid this trivial 
failure, it is better to reformulate this constraint in the following way: “the explanatory premise of a 
reductive explanation of a phenomenon involving property F under the name or description α must not 
contain a use of α” (McLaughlin, 2010, p. 290).
39 Cf. the importance of the base ontology in concluding on a domain-relative terminology in Chapter 
1.
motivation behind this requirement is to exclude strategies, which explain a target 
phenomenon by first extending the base ontology with the very target in question, 
and thus, literally, solve the task by cheating. Now consider the third strategy: non-
transparent reductive explanation. Non-transparent  reductive explanation relies on 
identities as explanatory  premises. These identities express co-reference, so they do 
not extend the base ontology  in any sense. On the contrary, the non-transparent 
model is just as conservative relative to the base domain as the transparent model. 
The description it  projects onto the target level is a description derived from the 
initial base domain. So there is no cheating on the ontological side. And as we have 
already seen it, there is no cheating on the epistemic side either—a posteriori 
identities are cognitively informative, and therefore the projection of the base level 
descriptions onto the target level via these a posteriori identities really  do explain, 




Reductive Explanation and Prior Identities
7.1 Does Transparent Reductive Explanation Deliver?
Before moving on, note that proponents of the a priori passage view might not feel 
persuaded by what has been said in the closing sections of the last chapter (§6.3.4). 
They  might want to object that in the preceding section I have overemphasised the 
similarities, and turned a blind eye to the main difference between the transparent 
and the non-transparent model. This main difference is, of course, the fact  that 
whereas non-transparent reductive explanation relies on unexplained identities (in 
the sense that they cannot be ‘read off’ from a full description of the base), the 
transparent model is committed to epistemically non-primitive identities.1 Chalmers 
and Jackson formulates it in the following way:
“It is sometimes held that ‘identities do not need to be explained’ (for example, 
Papineau 1993). Block and Stalnaker say something similar (‘Identities don’t 
have explanations’). But this seems to conflate ontological and epistemological 
matters. Identities are ontologically  primitive, but they  are not epistemically 
primitive. Identities are typically  implied by underlying truths that  do not 
involve identities. [...] Once a subject knows all the truths about DNA and its 
role in reproduction and development, for example, the subject will be in a 
position to deduce that genes are DNA. So this identity  is not epistemically 
primitive. Of course, just as with other truths involving macroscopic 
252
1  Note that on the basis of this, Chalmers and Jackson think that the identities deployed by non-
transparent explanations are epistemically quite similar to trans-ordinal laws, which, contrary to what 
I have said in the previous section, disputes the reductive status of non-transparent explanations. As 
Chalmers and Jackson put it:
“[In the non-transparent case,] at best, there is an explanation in terms of physical processes plus 
psychophysical identities. And epistemically, the psychophysical identities play exactly the same role 
as psychophysical laws. They are inferred from regularities between brain processes and 
consciousness, in order to systematize and explain those regularities. And most importantly, the 
identities are not themselves explained, but are epistemically primitive. [...] Ontologically, these 
identities may differ from laws. But epistemically, they are just like laws. They are epistemically 
primitive psychophysical ‘bridging’ principles that are not themselves explained, but that combine 
with physical truths to explain phenomenal truths. An explanation of the phenomenal will have two 
epistemically irreducible components: a physical component and a psychophysical component. By 
calling the bridging principles identities rather than laws, this view may preserve the ontological 
structure of materialism. But the explanatory structure of this materialist view is just like the 
explanatory structure of property dualism.” (Chalmers & Jackson, 2001, pp. 353-354)
phenomena, subjects do not typically  come to know these identities by 
deducing them from microscopic truths. But the identities are so deducible all 
the same, and their deducibility is what makes the phenomena in question 
reductively explainable.”
(Chalmers & Jackson, 2001, p. 354)
That is, according to Chalmers and Jackson, and as we have seen, according to the a 
priori passage view in general, in all the standard cases, there are reasons for 
formulating identity  statements. A cogent reasoner is able to conclude on the identity 
of water and H2O because she knows a priori that ‘water is colourless, odourless, 
etc.’ (i.e. ‘water is the watery stuff’), and is able to deduce from a full description of 
the base level (again, a priori) that ‘H2O is colourless, odourless, etc.’ (and similarly 
with, e.g. genes and DNA). That is, one concludes on an identity statement because 
one realises that the two entities in question, in fact, share their features.2
Proponents of the a priori passage might even dare to claim that their analysis 
applies to the very examples their opponents rely on. Consider, for instance, an 
example mentioned by Brian McLaughlin. McLaughlin, after arguing that identities 
and correlations are compatible, goes on and cites the following case to illustrate 
that, contra Kim, in actual scientific practice correlations are not explained only  by 
common causes and common underlying processes, but in certain cases, by  identities 
as well. 
“[T]here is a third way  correlations are sometimes explained in science: by 
appeal to identity claims. When Maxwell’s calculations showed that 
electromagnetic waves have the same speed in a vacuum as the known speed of 
light, he famously  made ‘the bold conjecture’ that light waves = 
electromagnetic waves (Harman 1998; Maxwell 1973). Electromagnetic waves 
are refracted when going from one kind of material to another in a manner that 
depends on the refractive indices of the material. When it was established 
experimentally that light has the same refractive indices as electromagnetic 
radiation, this was taken to confirm Maxwell’s bold conjecture. The hypothesis 
that light waves are electro-magnetic waves was invoked to explain why (1) 
electromagnetic waves and light waves occur in the same spatial regions at the 
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2 Cf. the cases of ‘Mark Twain and Samuel Clemens’, and ‘Superman and Clark Kent’ in §6.3.2.
same time, why (2) electromagnetic waves have the same speed in a vacuum as 
light waves, and why (3) the refractive indices in materials are exactly the 
same for light waves and electro-magnetic waves. This explanation, touted as 
one of the greatest  achievements of classical physics, is an explanation by 
appeal to identity. Moreover, the identity claim was, arguably, taken to be 
justified by inference to the best explanation of the correlations in 
question.” (McLaughlin, 2010, p. 282)
Here McLaughlin tries to show that the reductive explanation of some optical 
phenomena in terms of some electromagnetic phenomena follows the non-
transparent pattern. The identity  claim ‘light waves = electromagnetic waves’ is an 
empirical hypothesis, a bold conjuncture, which is justified on the bases of the 
principle of inference to the best explanation, given its ability to explain observations 
that light and electromagnetic waves co-occur, they have the same speed in vacuum, 
and also share refractive indices in different materials. 
Note however, that proponents of the a priori passage view could point out that 
anyone, who is presented with a full description of electromagnetism, becomes able 
to deduce that ‘electromagnetic waves have speed c in vacuum; the refractive indices 
for them in mediums m1, m2, ... , mi are n1, n2, ..., ni respectively, etc.’. Then given 
that one masters the concept of light, i.e. knows that ‘light has speed c in vacuum; 
the refractive indices for it  in mediums m1, m2, ... , mi are n1, n2, ..., ni respectively, 
etc.’, one becomes able to conclude a priori that ‘light is an electromagnetic wave’. 
In other words, it is the fact that  light and electromagnetic waves share their features 
that lies at the very heart of this example, and motivates the formulation of the 
identity  statement. Therefore, this identity is epistemically  motivated, i.e. non-
primitive.
Now the familiar argument can kick in: since the mind-body case cannot be 
motivated in a similar fashion, it  is fundamentally different from typical cases of 
reductive explanation.
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In the first part of this chapter my main aim is to show that this line of thought is 
mistaken. In order to see why, I will provide a detailed analysis of one of the 
prototypical examples of transparent reductive explanation—the reductive 
explanation of the boiling point of water in terms of a full description of a base (in 
this case, molecular) level. 
7.1.1 From H2O to water
As it happens, the way one can move from H2O facts to water facts is the prime 
example in the debate over transparent reductive explanation (cf. Levine, 1983, 
1993; Block & Stalnaker, 1999; Levine, 2001; Jackson, 2003; Polger, 2008). For 
instance, Joseph Levine famously relies on the reductive explanation of ‘water boils 
at 212 °F at sea level’ in terms of H2O facts to illustrate that the explanatory  gap is 
unique to phenomenal consciousness (Levine, 1993). That is, Levine argues, there is 
an a priori passage from H2O facts to the fact that ‘water boils at  212 °F at sea level’. 
My aim in this section is to reconstruct this particular case of purported transparent 
reductive explanation in detail. At first pass, the deduction runs as follows (I follow 
the general structure of transparent reductive explanations as discussed in §6.3.1):
 Transparent reductive explanation of ‘water boils’ – first pass
Premise 1 (deducible from the base set):
H2O boils at 212 °F at sea level.
Premise 2 (from a priori conceptual analysis):
Water is the stuff  that plays the water role.
Premise 3 (deducible from the base set):
H2O is the stuff that plays the water role.
Conclusion 1 (from Premise 2 and Premise 3):
H2O is water.
Conclusion 2 (from Premise 1 and Conclusion 1):
Water boils at 212 °F at sea level.
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This deduction, however, is problematic. Note that Premise 1 should be deducible 
from the base set, i.e. from facts and theories of the molecular level (or the ‘chemical 
theory  of H2O’, as Levine (1993) calls it). However, as it happens, Premise 1 is not 
so deducible. The source of the problem is this: H2O molecules do not boil. The 
concept of ‘boiling’ is not part of the vocabulary  utilised at the molecular level—it is 
a folk concept3, belonging to the same vocabulary as ‘water’. The claim that can be 
deduced from the base set is something like the following: ‘H2O is engaged in 
behaviour B4 at  212 °F at sea level’. So for the deductive argument to succeed it 
needs to establish a connection between ‘boiling’ and ‘molecular behaviour B’. As 
we have seen, transparent reductive explanations typically  establish such cross-level 
connections via conceptual analysis. So a more precise version of the argument looks 
as follows:
 Transparent reductive explanation of ‘water boils’ – second pass
Premise 1 (deducible from the base set):
H2O is engaged in behaviour B at 212 °F at sea level.
Premise 2 (from a priori conceptual analysis):
Water is the stuff  that plays the water role.
Premise 3 (deducible from the base set):
H2O is the stuff that plays the water role.
Conclusion 1 (from Premise 2 and Premise 3):
H2O is water.
Premise 4 (from a priori conceptual analysis):
Boiling is the process that plays the boiling role.
Premise 5 (deducible from the base set):
Molecular behaviour B is the process that plays the boiling role. 
Conclusion 2 (from Premise 4 and Premise 5):
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3  Or, at best, a concept of phenomenological thermodynamics—a macro-level theory crucially 
different from the micro-level theory of statistical mechanics.
4 In the context of the Block-Stalnaker argument, the same molecular counterpart of ‘boiling’—called 
behaviour B here—was called ‘molecular process MP’. Cf. §6.3.3.
Molecular behaviour B is boiling. 
Conclusion 3 (from Premise 1, Conclusion 1, and Conclusion 2):
Water boils at 212 °F at sea level.
What happens here is this. The original Premise 1 of the transparent reductive 
explanation above claiming that ‘H2O boils at 212 °F at sea level’ is problematic for 
at least two reasons. First, the predication it makes (i.e. H2O boils) refers to a higher 
level phenomenon (i.e. boiling), and thus violates the very requirement proponents of 
transparent reductive explanation take really seriously: that the explanatory  premises 
of the deductive argument should not refer to phenomena belonging to the target 
level. Second, in accordance with the structure of transparent reductive explanation, 
Premise 1 should be deducible from base level facts and theories (‘chemical theory 
of H2O’ or statistical mechanics). However, since the premise in question refers to 
some target level activity, it cannot be deduced solely  from the base level. The very 
gap lurking behind and jeopardising every reductive explanatory  effort (of the 
heterogeneous sort) pops its head up here as well. 
At a first pass, ‘water boils’ cannot simply be deduced from a molecular level theory, 
because molecular level theories do not use the term ‘water’. For a deductive 
argument to go through, one needs to connect ‘water’ to those terms which are used 
at the molecular level (e.g. H2O). This is recognised by the original transparent 
reductive argument, hence its amendment with the original ‘Premise 2 – Premise 3 – 
Conclusion 1’ triad generating the required connection between the levels of the 
explanandum and the explanans by identifying water with H2O. 
Now, at second pass, we realise that molecular level theories do not use the term 
‘boiling’ either. So we need an extra explanatory ‘triad’, a new ‘Premise N – Premise 
N+1 – Conclusion K’ amendment generating a new connection between the levels of 
the explanandum and the explanans, this time by identifying boiling with its 
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counterpart described in molecular terms. This counterpart is ‘molecular behaviour 
B’ in the above argument. 
Note how difficult it is to clear the way for a proper reductive explanation. Even our 
second pass argument will not go through: its Premise 1 (‘H2O is engaged in 
behaviour B at 212 °F at  sea level’) is still not deducible from the base facts and 
theories, since the term ‘212 °F’ refers to a particular value of temperature, and 
‘temperature’, just like ‘water’ and ‘boiling’, is not part of the base level vocabulary. 
What can be deduced from the base level theory instead, is a claim about ‘mean 
molecular kinetic energy’. That is, one needs another explanatory triad connecting 
temperature to mean molecular kinetic energy. And even more, since the term ‘sea 
level’ stands for a certain amount of atmospheric pressure (1 bar)—something which 
is also inaccessible within the base level vocabulary.5  So the most promising 
candidate for a proper (i.e. not trivially unsound) transparent reductive explanation 
of ‘water boils at 212 °F at sea level’ looks something like this:
 Transparent reductive explanation of ‘water boils’ – third pass
Premise 1 (deducible from the base set):
H2O is engaged in behaviour B at mean molecular kinetic energy MKE when 
the average force exerted by molecular collisions at a unit surface area is F.
Premise 2 (from a priori conceptual analysis):
Water is the stuff  that plays the water role.
Premise 3 (deducible from the base set):
H2O is the stuff that plays the water role.
Conclusion 1 (from Premise 2 and Premise 3):
H2O is water. 
Premise 4 (from a priori conceptual analysis):
Boiling is the process that plays the boiling role.
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5 Pressure in the sense of ‘atmospheric pressure’ is a term of phenomenological thermodynamics and 
is defined via the volume and the temperature of a body of gas. The term ‘pressure’ as utilised by 
statistical mechanics, on the other hand, is defined within an entirely different vocabulary, via the 
amount of force exerted by molecular collisions on a surface area. 
Premise 5 (deducible from the base set):
Molecular behaviour B is the process that plays the boiling role. 
Conclusion 2 (from Premise 4 and Premise 5):
Molecular behaviour B is boiling. 
Premise 6 (from a priori conceptual analysis):
‘212 °F’ is the stuff that plays the ‘temperature 212 °F’ role.
Premise 7 (deducible from the base set):
‘Mean molecular kinetic energy MKE’ is the stuff that plays the ‘temperature 
212 °F’ role. 
Conclusion 3 (from Premise 6 and Premise 7):
Mean molecular kinetic energy MKE is 212 °F. 
Premise 8 (from a priori conceptual analysis):
‘1 bar pressure’ is the stuff that plays the ‘pressurethermodynamics 1 bar’ role.
Premise 9 (deducible from the base set):
‘Average force F exerted by molecular collisions at a unit surface area’ is the 
stuff that plays the ‘pressurethermodynamics 1 bar’ role. 
Conclusion 4 (from Premise 8 and Premise 9):
Average force F exerted by molecular collisions at a unit surface area is 1 bar 
pressure. 
Conclusion 5 (from Premise 1, Conclusion 1, Conclusion 2, Conclusion 3, 
Conclusion 4 and the target  level observation that the pressure at sea level is 1 
bar):
Water boils at 212 °F at sea level.6
As complicated as it might be, proponents of the a priori passage view are perfectly 
happy with this argument. The ‘triads’ ‘Premise 2 – Premise 3 – Conclusion 1’, 
‘Premise 4 – Premise 5 – Conclusion 2’, ‘Premise 6 – Premise 7 – Conclusion 3’ and 
‘Premise 8 – Premise 9 – Conclusion 4’ provide the a priori passages from H2O to 
259
6 Of course, putting things this way is still inaccurate. Throughout the dissertation I greatly simplify 
the base level expressions. So, for example, it is not H2O that plays the water role, and hence is 
identical with water, but rather a ‘certain physical state of an aggregate or collections of H2O 
molecules’. 
water, from specific molecular behaviour to boiling, from mean molecular kinetic 
energy to temperature, and from force exerted on a surface to thermodynamical 
pressure respectively. With all these in place, the argument runs through smoothly, 
and so the particular water fact in question becomes transparently reductively 
explainable in terms of H2O facts—or does it?
Note that with these purported a priori passages come the additional premises 
Premise 3, Premise 5, Premise 7 and Premise 9, all implying that a certain statement 
is deducible from the facts and theories of the base level. The content of these 
statements is crucial for the fate of the transparent model of reductive explanation. 
The devil is in the details of how the ‘water role’, ‘boiling role’, ‘temperature role’, 
etc. are spelled out. Here, different versions of the transparent model of reductive 
explanation differ significantly. In this section I am going to concentrate on what I 
call the ‘standard model’ of transparent reductive explanation featuring, for example, 
in the early writings of Chalmers (1996) and Levine (1983, 1993). In the next section 
(§7.1.2) I will compare this version with Kim’s functional reduction, and finally, in 
§7.1.3, I will investigate how Chalmers and Jackson (2001) try to overcome the 
difficulties detailed below.
According to the ‘standard model’ of transparent reductive explanation, ‘water role’, 
‘boiling role’, ‘temperature role’ etc. are shorthands for a list of the reference fixers 
of ‘water’, ‘boiling’, ‘temperature’, etc. respectively (cf. §6.3.1). For example, the 
reference fixers of ‘water’, as Jackson argues, include: “being potable, odourless, 
falling from the sky, being the stuff that makes up various bodies of liquid of our 
acquaintance” (Jackson, 2003, p. 86). So Premise 3 above can be spelled out in this 
way: ‘H2O is the stuff that is potable, odourless, falling from the sky, etc’.
Now note the crucial fact: ‘potable’, ‘odourless’, and similar terms like ‘transparent’, 
‘colourless’ etc., which typically feature in the different examples of how the ‘water 
role’ (or ‘watery  stuff’) can be spelled out are—in a fundamental sense—just like 
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‘water’. They all belong to the same ballpark of concepts, so to speak, i.e. they 
belong to the vocabulary  utilised at the target level. That is, the terms ‘potable’, 
‘odourless’, etc. refer to target level phenomena. Moreover, these terms cannot be 
found in the vocabulary of the base level. The chemical theory of H2O, as Levine 
would put it, or statistical mechanics, as others prefer to call it—i.e. the base level 
theory,—tells us nothing about being ‘potable’ or ‘odourless’. Just as there is nothing 
described as ‘water’ at the base level, there is nothing ‘odourless’ at the base level, 
and just  as H2O does not boil, H2O is not ‘transparent’ either. That is, it is impossible 
to deduce only from the base level facts and theories the statement that  ‘H2O is 
odourless’, or that ‘H2O is transparent’.
But wait, wasn’t the sole purpose of introducing Premise 3 (along with Premise 2 and 
hence Conclusion 1) to make the move from the base level to the target level 
possible? Remember, the very task at hand is to account for higher level phenomena 
in terms of lower level phenomena. The difficulty  with this task is that in almost all 
interesting cases7  the descriptions available at the higher target level utilise a 
different vocabulary than those available at  the lower base level. That is, it  is not 
trivial to decide whether it is the same fact that the two different descriptions of the 
target and the base level talk about—let alone identifying which description of the 
base level corresponds to which description of the target level. This is the so-called 
‘gap’ between the target  and the base level (cf. §6.3.1), which needs to be bridged by 
any attempt of reductive explanation.
The standard model of transparent reductive explanation claims that it is able to 
bridge this gap by conceptual analysis, which amounts to amending the original 
deductive argument with ‘Premise N – Premise N+1 – Conclusion K’ triads 
consisting of an a priori conceptual analysis of a higher level concept in terms of its 
reference fixers, and an a priori deduction solely from the facts and theories 
available at the base level of the claim that the particular role defined by the 
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7 Nagel calls these heterogeneous cases (E. Nagel, 1961).
reference fixers is filled by a certain base level entity or process. As we have just 
seen, however, the standard model of transparent reductive explanation runs into 
difficulties regarding the latter a priori deduction: the statements that ought to be 
deduced deploy terms which belong to the target vocabulary  and thus cannot be 
deduced solely from the base.
That is, the purportedly deducible premise of the amendment is, in fact, not 
deducible. There is a gap between the base level facts and theories, on the one hand, 
and the statement to be deduced from them due to the fact that they utilise different 
vocabularies. Without bridging this gap, the deductive argument as a whole cannot 
go through. But  the only tool the standard model of reductive explanation can rely  on 
to bridge this gap  is the same conceptual analysis based method that has been 
deployed in the first instance. That is, for the argument to go through, the standard 
model of reductive explanation needs to amend the argument with yet  again a new 
‘Premise N – Premise N+1 – Conclusion K’ type triad, where the new Premise N is 
an a priori conceptual analysis of the target level concept featuring in the Premise N
+1 of the previous iteration in terms of its reference fixers, and the new Premise N+1 
is an a priori deduction solely from the facts and theories available at the base level 
of the claim that the particular role defined by  the reference fixers of the target level 
concept deployed by the previous iteration of Premise N+1 is filled by a certain base 
level entity. This whole process, of course, leads to a vicious circle. 
To illustrate the problem with a concrete example, consider how the water case 
escalates into a vicious circle. As we have seen, to get from H2O to water, one needs 
to be able to get e.g. from H2O facts and theories to potability. However, in order to 
do so, first one needs to analyse ‘potable’ in terms of its reference fixers. Such an 
analysis could be provided along the following line: ‘potable is the stuff that can be 
digested, is fluid, non-toxic, etc.’. As a next step, one also needs to be able to get 
from H2O facts and theories to digestibility, fluidity, etc. Now since digestibility and 
fluidity are water-level phenomena, and the related terms do not feature in the 
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vocabulary of H2O level facts and theories, it is impossible to deduce digestibility-
involving claims from the base level facts and theories, unless one provides a 
conceptual analysis of digestibility in terms of e.g. consumption and secretion, and a 
corresponding deduction from the base level facts and theories how a particular base 
level entity fills the role defined by consumption and secretion, etc. Which, in turn—
since ‘consumption’ and ‘secretion’ are not parts of the base level vocabulary—is, of 
course impossible unless yet another layer of conceptual analysis comes to the 
rescue.
Within the framework of the standard model of reductive explanation, this problem 
seems to be in principle unsolvable. The reason for this is the following: for Premise 
N to be a priori available via conceptual analysis, it needs to rely on such reference 
fixers which belong to the same ballpark of concepts as the very concept under 
analysis. The problem of the different vocabularies is so pressing exactly because 
there are no cross-vocabulary conceptual connections between concepts of the target 
domain and concepts of the base domain. Any given macro-concept can be analysed 
a priori only in terms of other macro-concepts. If it were otherwise, figuring out the 
chemical underpinnings of biology, or doing quantum chemistry  would be a matter 
of armchair conceptual analysis.
That is, the transparent version of reductive explanation in general faces a dilemma: 
either Premise N is a priori available via conceptual analysis, in which case, the 
reference fixing roles get determined by target level concepts, and thus Premise N+1 
becomes unavailable at the base level, or we try  to make Premise N+1 available at 
the base level by determining the reference fixing role of the problematic target level 
concept in terms of base level concepts, in which case Premise N becomes 
unavailable. As we have seen in this section, the so-called standard version of 
transparent reductive explanation is on the first horn of this dilemma. In contrast with 
this, Kim’s functional model of reductive explanation is on the second horn. I explain 
why in the next section.
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7.1.2 Kim’s functional reduction
On the face of it, Jaegwon Kim’s functional model of reduction is quite similar to 
what I have been calling the ‘standard model’ of reductive explanation. To bridge the 
gap between the levels of the explanandum and the explanans (or as Kim (2005) 
refers to it, to secure the explanatory ascent) the standard model introduces a 
‘Premise N – Premise N+1’ pair (bringing along Conclusion K), which first connects 
the target level concept  to a specific role, and then determines what base level entity 
fills that particular role. As we have seen in §6.2.3, Kim’s model has the same 
structure. The first two steps of the three-step  process of functional reduction look as 
follows:
“Step 1 [Functionalization of the target theory]
Property M to be reduced is given a functional definition of the following 
form:
Having M = (def.) having some property or other P (in the reduction base 
domain) such that P performs causal task C. […]
Step 2 [Identification of the realizers of M]
Find the properties (or mechanisms) in the reduction base that perform the 
causal task C.”
(Kim, 2005, pp. 101-102, original emphasis)
Step 1 (just like Premise N of the standard model) connects the target phenomenon 
(property  M, in this quote) to a particular role. This role is explicitly a functional, or 
causal role in Kim’s case. So what step 1 does is re-defining the target phenomenon 
in terms of this functional role; hence the name ‘functionalisation’. Step  2, then, 
(again, just like Premise N+1 within the standard model) identifies that  particular 
base level entity which fills the role definitive of the target phenomenon. These two 
steps together create the required connection—the bridge—between the target and 
the base levels. Given these similarities, it is no surprise that Kim (2005) actually 
spends a considerable amount of time drawing analogies between his model and 
other descriptions of reductive explanation put forward by Chalmers (1996) and 
Levine (1983, 1993). 
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However, there is a fundamental difference between the ‘standard model’ of 
transparent reductive explanation and the view advocated by Kim. If we take a closer 
look at Kim’s step 1, what we find is this: “Having M = (def.) having some property 
or other P (in the reduction base domain) such that P performs causal task C” (Kim, 
2005, p. 101). This definition ties the target  phenomenon to a causal task performed 
by an entity  of the base level. That is, the causal task in terms of which Kim’s 
functionalisation re-defines the target level phenomenon belongs to the base level. 
This is in stark contrast  with how Premise N of the standard model connects the 
target phenomenon to a list of reference fixers described in the vocabulary of the 
target level. 
At a first pass, this move might seem promising: it seems to open up  the possibility 
of solving the problem of the standard model and rescuing transparent reductive 
explanation from the vicious circle. Remember, the original problem with the 
standard model was that providing an analysis of the target concept in terms of other 
target level concepts does not help at all in bridging the gap  between the levels of the 
target and the base. Now if Kim’s functional model is able to re-define the target 
level phenomenon in terms of a base level causal role, then that might do the trick.
Unfortunately (for the proponents of transparent reductive explanation), it isn’t. Note 
that the process of functionalisation is an intra-theoretic process. As we have already 
seen, in typical cases of scientific reduction (remember, Kim proposes his account as 
a model of scientific reductions) there are different theories in operation at the target 
and the base level. And it is the theory in operation at a given level which determines 
the kinds of causal relationships that can obtain between the entities of that level. 
That is, when Kim re-construes the target phenomenon as defined by causal relations 
to entities in the reduction base, he glosses over the differences between the 
interactions of the target entities and the interactions of the base entities as 
determined by the different target and base level theories. One cannot functionalise a 
target entity relating it to the entities of the base theory, since one cannot 
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functionalise an entity of a given theory relating it to entities of another theory. What 
is possible is to functionalise the target entity and separately  to functionalise the base 
entities; that is, to (re-)define the target entity by  its causal relations to other entities 
of the target theory, and to outline a similar causal-relational network of the entities 
in the base theory. So any  statement expressing the causal role of the target entity 
that can be formulated must rely only on entities and interactions of the target theory, 
and similarly any statement expressing the functional relationships in the base theory 
must rely only on entities and interactions of the base theory.
That is, instead of a single functional role C characteristic of both the target property 
M and the corresponding base property P, as Kim in the quote above assumes, in fact, 
there are two different functional tasks (at least in the interesting heterogeneous 
cases, where the vocabularies of the two theories significantly  differ): CT of M  in the 
target T-domain, and CB of P in the base B-domain. M fulfils the causal roles 
described by CT = {cT1,…, cTi, eT1, eTi, …} in a way that {cT1,…, cTi} cause M to be 
instantiated and M causes {eT1,…, eTi} to be instantiated, and so does P with CB = 
{cB1,…, cBj, eB1,…, eBj}. Consider, for example, M  = heat and P = mean molecular 
kinetic energy. CT connects heat with pressure, volume etc. CB connects mean 
molecular kinetic energy with velocity, mass, etc.8  These are different sets of 
theoretical entities described by different theories. 
Let’s pause here for a moment. Kim tries to connect the base and the target levels by 
the first two steps of his functional model of reduction. In the first step, he (re-)
defines the properties picked out by the theoretical expressions of the target theory in 
terms of the causal roles they  play. In the second step, he tries to find the relevant 
causal roles amongst the causal roles of the properties picked out by  the theoretical 
expressions of the reducing base theory. However, in order to functionalise a 
property  picked out by a theoretical term of the target theory one needs to track down 
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8 The target level theory determines, for example, that ‘if the temperature of a gas is increasing then, 
given a fixed volume, the pressure of the gas will increase too’, whereas the base level theory 
determines that ‘if the mean kinetic energy of a bunch of molecules in a tank increasing then the 
number of the impacts on the wall of the tank will increase too’.
the causal connections this property  has—and any property  as picked out by a term 
of the target theory has causal connections only with other properties picked out by 
other terms of the target theory. That is, the causal roles of the properties as picked 
out by the expressions of the target theory  are determined by the target theory itself. 
In the same way, the causal roles of the properties picked out by the terms of the base 
theory  are determined by the base theory itself. CT and CB are thus causal roles 
defined by different  theories: the target theory and the base theory respectively. {cT1,
…, cTi, eT1,…, eTi} are determined within the target theory, whereas {cB1,…, cBj, eB1,
…, eBj} are determined within the base theory. 
What Kim has to confront here is the second horn of the dilemma discussed at  the 
end of the previous section: if one tries to make the claim connecting a certain target 
level entity to a particular causal role deducible at the base level by  determining the 
causal role in terms of base level concepts, then there will be no connection between 
this specific causal role and the very target level entity one wanted to tie to the base 
level in the first place.
7.1.3 The Chalmers-Jackson proposal
One of the major criticisms Block and Stalnaker (1999) have formulated against 
transparent reductive explanation claims that the kind of explicit conceptual analysis 
the standard model relies on is in general unavailable.9 Chalmers and Jackson (2001) 
in their response defend the a priori passage view by arguing that it does not need to 
rely  on explicit  conceptual analysis. At first sight, their proposal is a good candidate 
for rescuing transparent reductive explanation from the dilemma both the standard 
model and Kim’s model have to face with. In order to evaluate whether Chalmers 
and Jackson succeed in solving the problem discussed in the previous sections, let’s 
consider their proposal in detail. 
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9 Cf. Footnote 21 in §6.3.2.
Behind the proposal, there is a fundamental analogy Chalmers and Jackson rely on. 
They  invite us to consider Gettier’s second case (cf. Gettier, 1963), and argue, on the 
basis of that example that a priori entailment is available even without explicit 
conceptual analysis. They formulate this argument in the following way: 
“Let G be the conjunction of the statements in the following passage: ‘Smith 
believes with justification that Jones owns a Ford. Smith initially has no beliefs 
about Brown's whereabouts. Smith forms a belief that Jones owns a Ford or 
Brown is in Barcelona, based solely on a valid inference from his belief that 
Jones owns a Ford. Jones does not own a Ford, but as it happens, Brown is in 
Barcelona’. Let K be the statement ‘[Smith] does not know that Jones owns a 
Ford or Brown is in Barcelona’. It is plausible that [G entails K] is a priori. But 
it is also plausible that  there is no explicit analysis of the concept of knowledge 
using the terms involved in G. If so, a priori entailment does not require 
explicit  analyses of the terms in the consequent using the terms in the 
antecedent. It is also somewhat plausible that there is no explicit analysis of the 
concept of knowledge at all. If so, a priori entailment does not require explicit 
analyses of the terms in the consequent.” (Chalmers & Jackson, 2001, pp. 
320-321)
In this example G is a description of Gettier’s second case. The description utilises 
terms like ‘belief’, ‘justification’, ‘valid inference’, etc., but not ‘knowledge’. K is a 
statement involving the term ‘knowledge’. Chalmers and Jackson argue that “it  is 
plausible that G a priori entails K”. However, at the same time, as Gettier shows us, 
the concept of knowledge cannot be analysed in terms of justified true belief, and 
moreover, as Chalmers and Jackson further argues, it is also plausible that there is no 
other “explicit analysis of the concept of knowledge using the terms involved in G”. 
If this is true, then a priori entailment is possible without an explicit conceptual 
analysis of the target concept in terms of the concepts utilised in the base. If the 
further claim, according to which “it  is also somewhat plausible that there is no 
explicit  analysis of the concept of knowledge at  all” is also true, then a priori 
entailment is possible even without any kind of an explicit conceptual analysis of the 
target concept (not even in terms of other concepts of the target domain).
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Compare now this to what we have learned so far of transparent reductive 
explanation. According to Kim’s model, the target phenomenon must be re-defined in 
terms of base level causal roles. Since Kim thinks of this kind of functional analysis 
as a version of conceptual analysis, Kim’s model requires an explicit conceptual 
analysis of the target concept in terms of concepts utilised at the base level. On the 
other hand, the standard model of transparent reductive explanation is committed to 
an explicit conceptual analysis of the target concept in terms of other concepts of the 
target level (cf. the utilisation of a list of reference fixers). So the Chalmers-Jackson 
proposal, which claims that a priori entailment is possible without any  kind of 
explicit  conceptual analysis, is a true alternative to both Kim’s model and the 
standard model.
Note, however, how radical this proposal is, compared to what either the standard 
model or Kim’s approach says about how transparent reductive explanation naturally 
proceeds. As we have seen, the major trouble every reductive attempt needs to 
overcome is bridging the gap between the target and the base domains. Conceptual 
analysis serves this very purpose in transparent  reductive explanation. According to 
the standard model, the target and the base is connected by the application of the 
conceptual analysis of the target level concept (originally formulated at the target 
level utilising other target level concepts) at the level of the base domain. Although 
Kim’s approach disagrees, and analyses the target level concept directly in terms of 
base level concepts, it is only  a minor difference regarding how conceptual analysis 
should be performed. The two versions of transparent reductive explanation do not 
dispute the role of conceptual analysis—they both agree that without conceptual 
analysis the target and the base domains cannot be connected.
Contrary  to all this, Chalmers and Jackson’s proposal claims that there is no need for 
an explicit bridge between the target and the base domains. They  argue that it is a 
fundamental fact about concepts: once one masters a concept, one is able to decide 
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whether that specific concept  can be applied in a situation originally described by  a 
different vocabulary. As Chalmers and Jackson put it:
“[It is a] general feature of our concepts. If a subject possesses a concept and 
has unimpaired rational processes, then sufficient  empirical information about 
the actual world puts a subject in a position to identify the concept's extension. 
For example, if a subject possesses the concept ‘water’, then sufficient 
information about the distribution, behavior, and appearance of clusters of H2O 
molecules enables the subject to know that water is H2O, to know where water 
is and is not, and so on [...] a ‘water’-free description of the world can enable 
one to identify the referent of ‘water’, and a ‘knowledge’-free description of 
the world can enable one to decide whether a given belief is an instance of 
knowledge. In these cases, we can say that nontrivially sufficient information 
enables identification of a concept's extension.” (Chalmers & Jackson, 2001, p. 
323) 
That is, Chalmers and Jackson claims that if we master the target  level concept, and 
are given a base level description rich enough, then we will be able to pick out that 
bit of the base level description which co-refers with the target level concept.10 This 
allows us to transfer the explanatory power of the base level to the target  level 
without further ado. Consequently, transparent reductive explanation, according to 
Chalmers and Jackson, looks as follows:
 Transparent reductive explanation of ‘water boils’ – C&J interpretation
Premise 1 (deducible from the base set):
H2O is engaged in behaviour B at mean molecular kinetic energy MKE when 
the average force exerted by molecular collisions at a unit surface area is F.
Conclusion 1 (from mastering ‘water’, and a rich-enough description of the 
base level):
H2O is water. 
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10  The view that one does not need to rely on explicit conceptual analysis, i.e. that for any concept 
subjects possessing the concept are able to identify the extension of the concept in a sufficiently rich 
description is called ascriptivism.  As Diaz-Leon summarises, ascriptivism is the view that “[f]or any 
concept C, there is an application condition like this: (AC): ‘If x is F, then x falls under C’.” (Diaz-
Leon,  2011, p. 102) For the denial of this claim, i.e. for a defence of non-ascriptivism, see, for 
example, Levine (2001).
Conclusion 2 (from mastering ‘boiling’, and a rich-enough description of the 
base level):
Molecular behaviour B is boiling. 
Conclusion 3 (from mastering ‘temperature’, ‘fahrenheit’, etc., and a rich-
enough description of the base level):
Mean molecular kinetic energy MKE is 212 °F. 
Conclusion 4 (from mastering ‘pressure’, ‘bar’, etc., and a rich-enough 
description of the base level):
Average force F exerted by molecular collisions at a unit surface area is 1 bar 
pressure. 
Conclusion 5 (from Premise 1, Conclusion 1, Conclusion 2, Conclusion 3, 
Conclusion 4 and the target  level observation that the pressure at sea level is 1 
bar):
Water boils at 212 °F at sea level.
In this model of transparent reductive explanation, no extra premises are added to the 
argument creating a connection between the target and the base level. Any subject 
mastering the target level concepts and having “unimpaired rational processes” is 
able to conclude on the identities; i.e. is able to read off from the base level 
description, which base level expression corresponds to which target level concept.
If this model of transparent reductive explanation is correct, then Chalmers and 
Jackson do not need to worry about  the dilemma introduced above. As we have seen, 
the dilemma itself is a consequence of the need for a bridge connecting the target 
level concept and the base level description. If, however, no such bridge is necessary, 
then, of course, there is no dilemma either. So, it looks as though the version of 
transparent reductive explanation Chalmers and Jackson propose outperformed both 
the standard model and Kim’s approach as well. 
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In what follows, I will argue that this appeal of Chalmers and Jackson’s proposal is 
only superficial. Once one analyses the notion of concept-mastery they heavily rely 
on, it turns out that Chalmers and Jackson are not able to avoid the very  dilemma that 
has already proven fatal for the other two versions of transparent reductive 
explanation. 
First of all, consider the following passage from the quote above: 
“For example, if a subject possesses the concept ‘water’, then sufficient 
information about the distribution, behavior, and appearance of clusters of H2O 
molecules enables the subject to know that water is H2O, to know where water 
is and is not, and so on.” (Chalmers & Jackson, 2001, p. 323)
What happens here is that the subject, by possessing the concept ‘water’, becomes 
able to pick out H2O as the base level term co-referring with ‘water’. According to 
Chalmers and Jackson, by mastering a target level concept, one becomes able to 
identify the corresponding base level expression. This is very similar to how a 
conceptual analysis of a target level concept allows proponents of the standard model 
to pinpoint the corresponding base level term. That is, in Chalmers and Jackson’s 
framework concept-mastery plays the role explicit conceptual analysis plays in the 
standard model of transparent reductive explanation—i.e. this is the tool that 
connects the target and the base levels. 
Now as we have seen, the idea of connecting the target and the base levels via 
conceptual analysis faces a dilemma. Either the conceptual analysis of the target 
level concept is a priori available (cf. standard model), in which case, the reference 
fixers get determined by target  level concepts, and thus these reference fixers cannot 
be straightforwardly applied at the base level, or one tries to determine the reference 
fixers of the problematic target level concept in terms of base level concepts (cf. 
Kim’s approach), in which case the conceptual analysis (functional re-definition) of 
the target concept becomes unavailable. Can the notion of concept-mastery overcome 
this obstacle? 
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It is hard to see how concept-mastery  could ever get beyond what is depicted by  the 
list of reference fixers of a concept within the standard model. True, the notion of 
concept-mastery does not presuppose an explicit list of reference fixers, i.e. it is 
compatible with cases where the subject  is able to apply  the concept correctly 
without checking the actual situation against an explicit list of application conditions 
(that is, the subject ‘just knows’ when to apply the given concept). This makes 
Chalmers and Jackson’s proposal a valid answer to Block and Stalnaker’s initial 
criticism.11  However, the problem the afore-mentioned dilemma poses is quite 
different from Block and Stalnaker’s challenge. The question is not whether giving 
an explicit list  of reference fixers is possible, but whether it is possible to match 
reference fixers as described in one vocabulary with concepts belonging to another 
vocabulary.
To see how this latter question is related to Chalmers and Jackson’s proposal, 
consider what possessing or mastering a concept amounts to. Of course, the way one 
thinks about concepts in general greatly affects what one thinks about this particular 
issue. However, under contemporary theories of concepts, categorisation, i.e. the 
application of a concept is based on certain core features—application conditions 
which have to be fulfilled in order to trigger the actual use of the concept (cf. Prinz, 
2002). These core features guiding the application of a given concept are tied to the 
characteristics of e.g. perceptual prototypes, and the most typical scenarios in which 
the concept is applied. Note that these characteristics and scenarios, when turned 
explicit, are described with the aid of the very same vocabulary to which the original 
concept belongs. For example, the concept ‘water’ is most typically applied when 
someone sees something which is transparent, liquid, odourless, tasteless, etc. and is 
placed in a cup, flows from the tap, or faces us on the beach. That is, when someone 
is given a sufficiently  detailed description of the distribution, behaviour, and 
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11 Claiming that an explicit conceptual analysis in not always available—cf. Footnote 21 in §6.3.2.
appearance of such a liquid, one is able to know where water is and is not, etc. (cf. 
the quote above).
The problem is that the subject is in an entirely different situation if she is given a 
sufficiently detailed description of the distribution, behaviour, and appearance of 
H2O molecules. Such a description would talk about the different characteristics (e.g. 
position, impetus, energy, etc.) of molecules, and say  nothing about being 
transparent, odourless, etc. This is a point which has already been emphasised in the 
previous sections—the very  source of the dilemma poisoning transparent reductive 
explanation: in the typical, and most interesting cases of scientific reductions and 
purported reductive explanations, the base and the target level descriptions utilise 
entirely  different vocabularies. In the present  context, the result is that the description 
of H2O molecules, no matter how detailed it is, will be very unfamiliar for the 
subject, will clash with the application conditions of the concept ‘water’, and thus 
will not trigger the use of the concept. In other words, Chalmers and Jackson 
misdescribes the situation. Contrary  to what they  claim, “if a subject possesses the 
concept ‘water’, then” even available “information about the distribution, behavior, 
and appearance of clusters of H2O molecules” will not enable “the subject to know 
that water is H2O, to know where water is and is not, and so on” (Chalmers & 
Jackson, 2001, p. 323). 
However, Chalmers and Jackson might want to dig their heels in here and argue that 
the theory of concepts evoked above is not the right one. For their standards, the set 
of application conditions of a concept is not exhausted by features of the most typical 
scenarios, but contains all the features of all the possible scenarios in which the 
concept can be applied. That is, only those subjects qualify as possessors of a given 
concept who are able to identify the extension of a given concept if presented with a 
sufficiently rich description—even if the description is formulated entirely  with the 
vocabulary of a lower level. According to this view, then, those unable to identify the 
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extension of, say, the concept ‘water’ if presented with a full microphysical 
description of the world, in fact, do not possess or master the concept in question.
Note, however, how unintuitive this view is. My grandma, for example, has never 
ever heard of molecules, let alone microphysics. I am sure that if she was provided 
with a description of the behaviour of a collection of H2O molecules, then she would 
be, well, quite confused. She would not be able to make any  sense of it. Nonetheless, 
she has lived a whole lifetime during which she has used the concept ‘water’ many 
times. She knows what to do when I ask for a glass of water. She knows how to use it 
when making a soup. She even understands the word ‘billabong’, a word she has 
never ever heard before, if I explain it using the word ‘water’ along with others like 
‘still’, ‘river’, ‘cut off’, etc. My grandma masters the concept  ‘water’. By any 
intuitive standard, she possesses this concept.
Esa Diaz-Leon (2011) calls the view attributed to Chalmers and Jackson above, 
namely that lower level application conditions are part of a concept’s possession 
conditions reductive ascriptivism.12  Diaz-Leon argues in length that  reductive 
ascriptivism is unintuitive. She uses the example of the concept ‘square’, and a 
corresponding application condition “If x1, x2 ... xn instantiate properties F1, F2 ... Fn, 
then r is square” (Diaz-Leon, 2011, p. 107), where x1, x2 ... xn are microphysical 
entities and F1, F2 ... Fn are microphysical properties. She asks us to imagine Tina, a 
subject who does not know this application condition. Nonetheless, Tina is able to 
entertain thoughts involving the concept. As Diaz-Leon puts it:
“It seems perfectly compatible with lacking such a conditional ability  that she 
could in effect use the word ‘square’ very much as other subjects who have the 
conditional ability would. She can have conversations with those subjects, in 
which they apply the word ‘square’ to the same objects. If Tina did not possess 
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12  As she puts it: “[Reductive ascriptivism is the view that] for any concept C at level n, there is an 
application conditional like this: (AC): ‘If x is F, then x falls under C’, where F is described using 
concepts from a lower level m” (Diaz-Leon, 2011, p. 109). Cf. Footnote 10 above for Diaz-Leon’s 
definition of ascriptivism.
the concept SQUARE, then how can she understand what the others are 
saying? How can she communicate with them?” (Diaz-Leon, 2011, p. 110)
From this Diaz-Leon concludes that Tina, in fact, possesses the concept ‘square’. In 
drawing this conclusion, Diaz-Leon explicitly relies on a principle proposed by 
Williamson, according to which “[i]f one understands the word ‘C’, one has the 
concept C” (Williamson, 2003, p. 290; cited by Diaz-Leon, 2011, p. 111). If, 
however, subjects who do not know the microphysical application conditions of a 
given concept nevertheless possess the concept, then reductive ascriptivism cannot 
be true. But then, the only way ascriptivism itself (i.e. the view that concept 
possession does not presuppose explicit  definitions) can be true is if it  is restricted to 
application conditions utilising same-level concepts.13 
This then leaves us with the problem already discussed. Since in the typical 
heterogeneous cases of scientific reductions and reductive explanations the base and 
the target level descriptions utilise entirely different vocabularies, reductive 
explanations need to bridge this gap  between the base and the target levels. Chalmers 
and Jackson’s proposal—emphasising ascriptivism over non-ascriptivism—is no 
better candidate for bridging this gap  than either the ‘standard’ version or the Kimian 
version of transparent reductive explanation. Chalmers and Jackson’s version relies 
on concept ascription based on application conditions, but as we have seen, since 
target level concepts cannot be ascribed on the basis of base level application 
conditions, the Chalmers-Jackson proposal leaves the base and the target levels 
unbridged.14 
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13 Diaz-Leon calls this version of ascriptivism non-reductive ascriptivism: “For any concept C at level 
n, there is an application conditional like this: (AC): ‘If x is F, then x falls under C’, where feature F is 
described using only concepts at level n.” (Diaz-Leon, 2011, p. 109)
14 Diaz-Leon argues that the Chalmers-Jackson proposal is unable to overcome this obstacle even by 
restricting the possessors of a given concept to experts. Experts are “those who know what properties 
determine whether something falls under a certain concept, and therefore they could find out the 
extension of such a concept, given a sufficiently rich description of a scenario” (Diaz-Leon, 2011, p. 
111).  This move, Diaz-Leon argues, is problematic for at least two reasons. First, it would trivialise 
the notion of a priori knowledge by rendering empirical discoveries instances of a priori knowledge. 
Second, it would result a technical notion of apriority which would, in turn, make Chalmers and 
Jackson’s further claim that phenomenal truths are not a priori knowable on the basis of physical 
truths implausible (cf. Diaz-Leon, 2011, pp. 111-115).
Finally, note that Chalmers and Jackson even fail to provide a single example 
supporting their claim. The core example they rely on, i.e. Gettier’s second case, has 
no implications whatsoever regarding the issue at hand: the heterogeneous cases of 
reductive explanation with different base and target  level vocabularies. Even if they 
are right in their analysis that one is able to apply  correctly  the term knowledge in a 
situation described in a ‘knowledge-free’ vocabulary, from this alone it does not 
follow that one is able to apply  any concept in any situation described in an 
appropriate ‘given-concept-free’ vocabulary. The difficulty all attempts of reductive 
explanation have to face with, as we have seen it, stems from the fact that the target 
concept belongs to a different vocabulary than those terms which are utilised to form 
the base level description. In this respect, Gettier’s second case is crucially different 
from the issue at hand. The terms ‘knowledge’, ‘belief’, ‘justification’, etc. belong to 
the same ballpark of concepts, i.e. to the same vocabulary. Even if we cannot come 
up with an explicit analysis of one of them in terms of the others, still, there are 
inherent links between them. For example, accidentally  true beliefs do not constitute 
knowledge—this much we know, and it plays a part in the application conditions of 
‘knowledge’. This is the reason why  we intuitively judge Gettier’s second case as 
such in which the concept ‘knowledge’ is not applicable. That is, even if the concept 
of ‘knowledge’ cannot be explicitly analysed in terms of ‘belief’, ‘justification’, etc., 
there are conceptual links between these terms. No such links exist between a 
concept  belonging to one vocabulary (e.g. ‘water’ of folk vocabulary, or 
‘temperature’ of thermodynamics) and a set of other concepts belonging to a different 
vocabulary (e.g. ‘H2O’ of chemistry, or ‘mean molecular kinetic energy’ of statistical 
mechanics).
In other words, not even the Chalmers-Jackson proposal is immune to the threat  due 
to the fact that different vocabularies are in use at the target and the base level. On 
the contrary, just as the standard model and Kim’s version of transparent reductive 
explanation, the Chalmers-Jackson proposal too has to face with, and ultimately is 
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invalidated by, the dilemma: if, on the one hand, we want to ensure that the subject 
becomes able to apply the target concept, then we have to provide a description 
utilising concepts belonging to the same vocabulary  as the target concept, in which 
case the description provided will not talk about the base level as such, whereas, on 
the other hand, if we provide a proper description of the base level utilising base 
level vocabulary, then the subject will not be able to apply the target concept. In 
either way, there will remain an unbridged gap between the target and the base 
domains, and hence the Chalmers-Jackson version of transparent reductive 
explanation will fail.
7.2 Reductive Explanation via ‘Prior Identities’
As a last resort, proponents of transparent reductive explanation might want to argue 
that even if it is true that there is a gap between a microphysical description utilising 
the vocabulary of, say, a molecular theory and our folk concepts, this gap evaporates 
once one considers the close relationships between different scientific theories at 
adjacent levels. In other words, the arguments says, it is possible to get  from a micro-
description to a macro-description via consecutive steps, with smooth transitions 
between the different vocabularies. And once one arrives at the macro-level, one 
becomes able to straightforwardly apply  the folk concepts in question. That is, it 
seems possible to generate all the identities needed to get from the base level to the 
target level in small steps. Chalmers and Jackson have something very similar in 
mind. As they formulate it:
“[I]n a reductive explanation of a phenomenon such as water or life, we find 
that a low-level account of the physical processes involved will in principle 
imply and explain truths about the macroscopic structure, dynamics, behavior, 
and [...] appearance of relevant systems. And our concepts of ‘water’ or ‘life’ 
dictate that systems with appropriate sorts of structure, dynamics, behavior, 
and appearance automatically qualify as water or as alive (at least if they  are 
appropriately situated in our environment, or are relevantly  related to systems 
in our environment).” (Chalmers & Jackson, 2001, p. 351)
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Of course, this passage in itself is more like a testimony than an argument. It simply 
states that  a low level account of physical processes in principle implies and explains 
truths about macroscopic features. So this claim needs some serious support. Let’s 
see how Chalmers and Jackson back it up. They say:
“[A] macroscopic description of the world in the language of physics is 
implied by  a microscopic description of the world in the language of physics. 
Such a thesis is extremely  plausible: it is not subject to any worries about 
translation between vocabularies, and involves only a change of scale. The 
only worry  might concern the status of bridging principles within physical 
vocabulary: for example, is it a priori that the mass of a complex system is the 
sum of the masses of its parts?15 If there are any concerns here, however, they 
can be bypassed by stipulating that the relevant physical principles are built 
into [physics].” (Chalmers & Jackson, 2001, pp. 330-331, emphases added)
Now this is interesting. Chalmers and Jackson seem to presuppose that micro and 
macro descriptions are all formulated with one single vocabulary: the “language of 
physics”. This presupposition goes against the whole body  of contemporary 
philosophy of science, where it  is one of the most fundamental insights that in order 
to understand a complex macro system in terms of its constituents, one needs to rely 
on a plurality  of different scientific theories. This is because different levels of 
description utilise different scientific theories—each with very different 
vocabularies.
In order to see this, in the next  section I turn towards the most significant 
contemporary  theory of scientific explanation, the so-called mechanistic model of 
explanation (Machamer, et al., 2000). My aim in this next section is to establish the 
claim that  moving up from a micro description to a macro description step by step 
through adjacent levels is not that trivial as proponents of transparent reductive 
explanation presume, and thus has to face with the very same problem which we 
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15 Based on this example of the mass of a complex system, what Chalmers has in mind here when he 
uses the term ‘bridging principle’ is not bridge laws in the Nagelian sense (cf. §6.2.1), but rather what 
Beckermann (2000) calls ‘rules of combination’—rules determining how certain properties (e.g. 
scalars, vectors, etc.) combine.
have already identified: the problem of bridging the gap  between different 
vocabularies.
7.2.1 Mechanistic explanations and prior identities
The mechanistic approach identifies a phenomenon via identifying the tasks 
performed—i.e. the causal roles played—by the phenomenon as a whole. The very 
point of the mechanistic approach is to explain a phenomenon by  understanding the 
mechanism responsible for the task performed by the phenomenon.
 
Understanding the relevant mechanism consists in decomposing the phenomenon 
into parts, specifying the properties and causal roles of the parts, and understanding 
the spatial and temporal organisation of the parts. The mechanistic approach employs 
two interdependent building blocks for characterising mechanisms: entities and 
activities. Entities are the parts composing the mechanism, their activities are in 
virtue of what they contribute to the working of the mechanism. Entities and 
activities are interdependent because “entities and a specific subset of their properties 
determine the activities in which they are able to engage” and “activities determine 
what types of entities are capable of being the basis of such acts” (Machamer, et al., 
2000, p. 6). A mere aggregate of entities and their activities is not a mechanism, 
however. Entities and activities must be arranged into a specific spatial and temporal 
order otherwise they would not be able to perform a certain task together. That is, the 
mechanistic approach tries to account for the phenomenon (the explanandum) in 
terms of the organised activity of its constituent parts.
 
Consider Figure 116. S is the phenomenon in question, which gets identified via the 
task it performs—its ψ-ing. The arrows indicate how S ψ-ing is connected to its 
context, i.e. to other entities at  its level. According to the mechanistic approach, S ψ-
ing can be accounted for in terms of the components X1, X2, X3, X4 and X5, and their 
activities (Φ1-ing, Φ2-ing, Φ3-ing, Φ4-ing, and Φ5-ing respectively) organised in an 
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16 Figure 1 is based on Figure 2 in (Craver, 2001, p. 66) and Figure 1.1 in (Craver, 2007, p. 7).
appropriate way. These entities and activities organised in the appropriate way 
constitute the mechanism responsible for the ψ-ing of S.
Fig. 1 The general scheme of mechanistic explanations.
S performs the task ψ-ing. On descending levels it is decomposed 
into the organised activities of its constituent parts.
As it is shown on Figure 1, the mechanistic approach is a multilevel approach. Once 
one decomposed the ψ-ing of S into the lower level organised structure of entities 
(Xi-s) and their activities (Φi-ing) it  is possible to apply  the same methodology again 
in order to account for the Φi-ing of Xi-s in terms of a still lower level mechanism. 
So, for example, the Φ3-ing of X3 can be accounted for in terms of the organised ρi-
ing of some Pi. P1 ρ1-ing, P2 ρ2-ing, and P3 ρ3-ing (organised in an appropriate way) 
together constitute the mechanism responsible for the Φ3-ing of X3.
In order to anchor the abstract characterisation introduced so far let’s consider the 
following example: a person looking at Ishihara plates. What happens is that  the 
person in question, when presented with an Ishihara plate and asked what she is 
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seeing utters, say, 47. Ishihara plates contain a circle of dots of different sizes and 
colours. Some of the dots, coloured by similar shades, form numbers. Subjects with 
normal trichromat vision are able to group these dots together and recognise the 
number. So the phenomenon here is a person discriminating colours, which—in 
accordance with the mechanistic approach—gets identified via the task performed: 
once presented with an object stimulus the person makes a colour judgement. This 
level of description is called the level of the original phenomenon (LP) on Figure 2.
Fig. 2 Mechanisms of colour discrimination.
The mechanistic approach claims that explaining this phenomenon amounts to 
descending one level down and identifying a mechanism responsible for the task 
performed. This mechanism, roughly, consists in the light reflecting from the 
Ishihara plate and entering the eye, the eye transducing the energy of the light into 
the language of the nervous system, the optic nerve signalling and projecting to the 
lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN), the activation of the primary visual cortex (V1), 
then higher visual areas (especially V4) and other areas of the cortex, and finally  the 
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motor action of moving the mouth and the tongue (etc.) properly (sketched at the 
level LP-1 on Figure 2).
Each of these activities can be further analysed by descending one more level down 
(to level LP-2), and identifying that mechanism which is responsible for the given 
activity at level LP-1. So for example, the mechanism responsible for the activity  of 
the eye is an organised activity of the parts of the eye. The pupil allows the light to 
enter the eye. The two muscles of the iris can vary the size of the pupil thus affecting 
the amount of light entering the eye. The lens inverts and focuses the light onto the 
retina. The ciliary  muscles adjust the shape of the lens thus affecting its focus point. 
The retina converts the light into electrochemical signals. (Cf. level LP-2 on Figure 2.)
One need not stop here. Due to the advance of neurochemistry  and molecular biology 
we are able to descend one more level down and identify  the mechanism responsible 
for the activity of photoreceptors in the retina.17  Electromagnetic radiation is 
absorbed by a photopigment in the membrane of the disks in the outer segment of the 
photoreceptors. Photopigments are receptor proteins (opsins) with a prebound 
chemical agonist (retinal, a derivative of vitamin A). The absorption of light causes a 
change in the conformation of retinal so that it  activates the opsin. This stimulates a 
G-protein in the disk membrane (transducin) which in turn activates an effector 
enzyme phosphodiesterase (PDE). PDE breaks down cyclic guanosine 
monophosphate (cGMP), an intracellular second messenger which keeps the sodium 
channels in the membrane of the photoreceptor open. The reduction in cGMP causes 
the sodium channels to close and the photoreceptor membrane to hyperpolarize. (Cf. 
Kandel, et al., 2000, pp. 507-515; Bear, et al., 2001, pp. 283-299) This is reflected at 
level LP-3 on Figure 2.
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17 Note that here I skip (at least) one intermediate level between the level of the retina and the level of 
the processes within photoreceptors. At this intermediate level one is able to describe the specific 
organisation of ganglion cells, amacrine cells,  bipolar cells, horizontal cell and photoreceptors 
forming the retina itself.
Sure, there are further mechanisms explaining e.g. how the electromagnetic radiation 
is absorbed by the photopigment, or how PDE breaks cGMP down. However, we 
need not go into further details here. The rough sketch of what happens at these four 
levels suffices for my present purposes. In what follows, I am going to refer back to 
this example of how inter-level mechanistic explanation works in order to anchor the 
abstract points I am about to make.
The notion of constitution plays a central role within the mechanistic framework—as 
we have seen, the fundamental claim of the approach is that the organised activity of 
the parts constitutes the whole. However, understanding what is meant by 
constitution within the mechanistic framework properly is not straightforward.
 
Note that, on the one hand, proponents of the mechanistic approach evoke the 
constitution relation as an alternative to identity (cf. e.g. Craver, 2007). To this 
extent, they are buying in a widely held position. As it is often argued, the lump of 
clay constitutes the statue, but not vice versa: the statue does not constitute the lump 
of clay. That is, constitution—contrary to identity—is an asymmetric relation 
(Johnston, 1992; Baker, 1997). On the other hand, though, constitution is usually 
understood as an intra-level relation (cf. e.g. Paul, 2007). Compare this with the way 
the mechanistic approach deploys constitution explicitly  as an inter-level relation. 
The lump of clay and the statue are at the same level of composition/aggregation, 
whereas a whole and its spatially and temporally organised parts are at different 
levels of composition/aggregation.
Moreover, consider how Craver and Bechtel claim, on the one hand, that it is 
constitution that  relates a higher level with a lower level, whereas, on the other hand, 
they claim that the relation between levels is symmetrical. They say:
“The relation is symmetrical precisely because the mechanism as a whole is 
fully  constituted by the organized activities of its parts: a change in the parts is 
manifest as a change in the mechanism as a whole, and a change in the 
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mechanism is also a change in at  least some of its component parts.” (Craver & 
Bechtel, 2007, p. 554)
Note, however, that the symmetrical relation in question holds between what the 
mechanism as a whole does and the behaviour of the spatially and temporally 
organised parts. That is, the symmetrical relation connects the activity  of the whole 
and the organised activity  of the parts. To put it in another way, the proper answer to 
the question why a certain spatial and temporal organisation of parts constitutes a 
whole is that because the parts together do the same thing that the whole itself does. 
That is, the overall behaviour of the parts is identical with the behaviour of the 
whole. Let’s unpack this in detail.
Consider what the relation between the behaviour of the whole and the behaviour of 
the organised structure of its parts is. This question focuses on the causal role played 
(the activity performed) by  the mechanisms as a whole and the causal role played by 
the spatial and temporal organisation of the parts.
 
Remember how mechanistic explanations proceed. First, a certain phenomenon is 
grasped via the task performed by  a system, then the system gets decomposed via the 
identification of its parts, their activity and organisation. The very point of the 
mechanistic approach is to explain how a system performs certain tasks by 
understanding how its parts organised in the right way perform the very same task. 
Had the organised structure of the lower level entities performed an activity different 
from what the higher level entity performs, the account of what happens at the lower 
level would not have been able to explain the higher level phenomenon in question, 
and the organised activity of the lower level entities would not have constituted the 
higher level whole. In this sense, mechanistic explanations identify the activity  of the 




That is, the very way mechanistic explanations proceed requires the activity of the 
organisation of the parts at the lower level to be the same as the activity of the whole 
at the higher level.
 
Consider Figure 3, which is a slightly altered version of Figure 1. Figure 3 indicates 
certain activities of the entities playing part  in a mechanistic explanation. Let’s say 
that the entity at the higher level is connected to its context (other entities at its level) 
by causal relations Ci, Cj, Ck18, whereas the lower level entities in question are 
connected to their context by causal relations Cl, Cm, Cn. These causal relations 
characterise the causal role played by the higher level entity and the organised 
structure of the lower level entities respectively.
The very  fact that it is possible to explain the task performed by the higher level 
entity in terms of the organised activity of the lower level entities entails that the 
causal roles played at the higher level (Ci, Cj, Ck) and at the lower level (Cl, Cm, Cn) 
are the same. That is, for a mechanistic explanation to get off the ground the causal 
profile characterised by Ci, Cj, Ck must be identical with the causal profile 
characterised by Cl, Cm, Cn. It is thus an internal consequence of the very way 
mechanistic explanations work that causal connections utilised to characterise the 
activities at different levels must be identical with each other.
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18  One who is subscribed to Shoemaker’s analysis (2003, 2007) might want to say that Ci and Cj 
represent backward looking whereas Ck represents forward looking causal powers of X3.
Fig. 2 An inherent commitment of mechanistic explanations.
Causal connections Ci, Cj, Ck of entity X3 belong to the higher 
level L0, whereas causal connections Cl, Cm, Cn of the organised 
structure of entities P1, P2, P3 belong to the lower level L-1. The 
mechanistic approach must be committed to the claim that the 
higher level causal role characterised by Ci, Cj, Ck is identical with 
the lower level causal role characterised by Cl, Cm, Cn.
Note that  the organisation of the lower level parts would not constitute the higher 
level whole if their activities weren’t identical. That is, the constitution claim the 
mechanistic approach makes amounts to an identity  claim: the causal role played by 
the organisation of the parts is the very  same causal role that is played by the whole. 
The conclusion that follows, then, is this: by claiming that the whole is constituted by 
the organised activity of its parts the mechanistic approach inherently commits itself 
to the claim that whatever the whole does is something that is done by the 
organisation of its parts.
287
There is, however, something that seems to be in tension with the conclusion of the 
last section: literally, entities at higher levels do different things than entities at lower 
levels. Consider again the example of the descending levels of mechanisms 
responsible for the task performed by the eye. E.g. at the level of the lens and the 
retina entities ‘focus light rays’ and ‘send neuronal signals’, whereas at the lower 
level of opsin and transducin there are activities like ‘closing ion channels’ and 
‘hyperpolarising’. What the claim that at different levels entities do different things 
emphasises is the simple fact that e.g. whereas at the higher level there are no entities 
hyperpolarising, at the lower level there is nothing focusing light rays.
 
Notice how different vocabularies are utilised in order to describe entities and 
activities at different levels. As one descends from level to level one needs to change 
the vocabulary of psychology to the vocabulary of anatomy, then to the vocabulary 
of neuroscience then to that  of molecular biology, and so on. In other words, it is 
hard to see how a task performed at a higher level could possibly  be the same as a 
task performed at a lower level because different  vocabularies are used at different 
levels to describe entities and activities.
 
However, it is possible to reconcile the observation that entities at different levels do 
different things with the constraint that the mechanistic approach inherently commits 
itself to the claim that the behaviour of the whole is identical with the overall 
behaviour of the organisation of its parts. What the mechanistic approach needs here 
are bridging principles connecting the vocabularies utilised at the different levels. 
The need for bridging principles is something Bechtel himself is considering as well. 
He, however, says:
“Herein lies the explanation for the need for bridge principles in the theory-
reduction account – different vocabulary is needed to describe what the parts of 
a mechanism do than is required to describe what the mechanism as a whole 
does. The appropriate bridge in this case, however, is not a set of translation 
rules, but an account of how the operations of the parts of the mechanism are 
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organized so as to yield the behavior of the whole mechanism” (Bechtel & 
Hamilton, 2007, p. 25, emphasis added)
That is, though Bechtel acknowledges that different vocabularies describe activities 
at different  levels, and he also acknowledges that different vocabularies are dealt 
with by employing bridge principles in the theory-reduction (D-N) account, he still 
thinks that bridge principles are unnecessary within the mechanistic framework—all 
one needs is an account of the organisation of the parts’ activities.
 
However, this is not quite right. It is not enough simply to describe the organisation 
of the constituents. An account of the organisation of the parts’ activities is still 
formulated within the vocabulary  of the lower level (e.g. it talks about the spatial and 
temporal organisation of the transducin activating PDE, the photoreceptor membrane 
hyperpolarizing, etc.), whereas the behaviours at the higher level are described in 
another vocabulary  used at that particular level (describing how the lens focuses 
light, the retina converts light into neuronal signal etc.). Proper bridging principles 
need to be evoked here to connect the different vocabularies. These bridging 
principles express co-reference of different causal terms: they state e.g. that the term 
‘the eye transducing light causes the optic nerve to signal’ refers to the very  same 
causal role than the term ‘the photoreceptor hyperpolarises’. They  express that the 
causal roles evoked by descriptions at different levels are the same. 
The moral, then, is this. Mechanistic explanations need to incorporate proper identity 
statements connecting causal roles (activities) at different levels.19 
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19 The fact that mechanistic explanations do use identity statements can nicely be pinpointed in some 
of the texts published by the proponents of the account. For the sake of the example consider the 
following two quotes.
“In this sketch of events involved in remembering a lecture, I twice stepped down levels by appealing 
to an identity between the effect on a system and a change in constituents of the system. At the lower 
level the causal story was an ordinary causal one. Then I stepped up a level by appealing to an identity 
between the new operations within the mechanism and the way it behaved as a whole. At the level of 
the whole the story was again an ordinary causal one.” (Bechtel, 2008, pp. 154-155, emphases added)
“And insofar as that non-functioning constitutes the general’s death, we explain her death. Notice that 
when we reach the state of the mechanism that constitutes the state of death, we do not say, with Betty 
Crocker, that it causes death. It just is death.” (Craver & Bechtel, 2007, p. 557, emphasis added)
Nowadays, mechanistic explanations are generally considered as our best models of 
how scientific enquiries connecting micro-phenomena to macro-phenomena are 
carried out. As we have seen, these enquires typically  span through different  levels, 
and rely on different theories at different levels. That is, contrary to what Chalmers 
and Jackson imply, the ‘from-micro-to-macro transition’ crosses several levels some 
of which utilise very  different theories with distinct vocabularies—i.e. there is no 
single language in which both micro and macro descriptions could be formulated.20 
Therefore, in order to be able to cross these levels, one needs some kind of a tool 
bridging this gap and connecting the terms (descriptions) of the different levels. As 
we have seen, the transparent version of reductive explanation cannot deliver this 
tool: there is no a priori passage from one level to another. What one needs here, 
thus, are a posteriori identities—identity  statements that are prerequisites of the 
argument generating reductive explanation.
I call these identities ‘prior identities’, since we need to have them prior to the actual 
start of the explanatory process. Reductive explanations cannot get off the ground 
without them. 
Prior identities are in many respect quite similar to the identities Hill, McLaughlin, 
Block and Stalnaker rely on in their non-transparent  versions of reductive 
explanation. However, there is an important dissimilarity: I do not agree with what 
they  claim to be the role of these identities in the process of reductive explanation. 
My main goal in what follows is to propose a positive account—which is different 
from theirs—of what the main function of these prior identities is in reductive 
explanations. 
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20 Chalmers and Jackson talk about the language of physics. Note that although the particular example 
of this section is concerned with the micro and macro descriptions of a biological system, the major 
line of thought generalises: micro descriptions of purely physical systems rely on theories like QCD 
(quantum chromodynamics), etc. (i.e. the so-called ‘standard model’  of particle physics), whereas a 
macro-physical description typically relies on theories like e.g.  condensed matter physics with a 
vocabulary quite unlike that of the standard model. (Cf. e.g. Laughlin and Pines (2000) for an 
illustration of how physicists themselves demarcate macro-physics from micro-physics.)
Before turning our attention to this issue, however, I would like to tie all loose ends 
by considering Hooker’s model of reduction. It is an inherent feature of prior 
identities that  they are not results, but preconditions of successful reductive 
explanations. I have already argued that  the different transparent versions of 
reductive explanation as they typically appear in the literature related to philosophy 
of mind are unable to deliver these identities as results of the explanatory process. 
However, as we have seen it in §6.2 there are other approaches—typically motivated 
by considerations coming from philosophy of science—whose view on the role 
identities play in reductions coincides with that of the transparent versions of 
reductive explanations. Hooker’s model of reduction is the most significant example 
of these approaches (cf. §6.2.2). It argues for a model of reduction which does not 
require identities (bridge laws) as premises, but rather concludes on them. Therefore, 
in order to clear the way for my  account of prior identities I first  need to show that 
Hooker’s model of reduction is unsuccessful in avoiding identities as preconditions. 
This is what I am going to do in the next part.
7.2.2 Hooker’s model of reduction and prior identities
In §6.2.2, I have started my introduction of Hooker’s model of reduction with a quote 
from Ausonio Marras. In that quote Marras argues (in the third point) that the 
postulation of bridging principles (identities) is just a final step within a reductive 
attempt which is necessary only for enabling the formal derivation of a law of the 
‘image-theory’ T(R)* from the corresponding law of the original target theory T(R), 
and thus identities do not play a central role in the process of reduction. What  does 
play  the central role is the deduction of the so-called image of the target theory from 
the base theory. And this deduction—since the terms of the image T(R)* are inside 
the vocabulary of the base T(B)—is straightforward.
 
In Marras’ example we have two equations, namely pV = 2E/3 (L*) and pV = kT (L). 
From this Marras postulates the bridging principle 2E/3 = kT. First, note that Marras 
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provides only a coarse-grained overview of the process of reduction. It is true that L 
is a law of classical equilibrium thermodynamics, but what one can deduce from the 










Here N is the number, m is the mass, v is the velocity of the molecules of a gas, and l, 
h, w denote the length, height and width of a rectangular volume which contains the 
gas.
Given all this, the following question arises: how can one know that  (1) is the so-
called image of L? Marras’ coarse-grained story takes it  for granted that (1) talks 
about the same thing as L, i.e. that the terms ‘pressure’ and ‘volume’ in L can be 
mapped onto an appropriate combination of the terms ‘mass’, ‘velocity’, etc. in (1). 
But remember, L is within the vocabulary  of T(R) (i.e. classical equilibrium 
thermodynamics), whereas (1) is within the vocabulary of T(B) (i.e. statistical 
mechanics), and these two vocabularies are different. This very difference is the 
reason why one needs bridging principles at all. Hooker’s account tries to avoid the 
need for bridging principles by deducing the image-theory inside the base theory’s 
vocabulary. But to be able to conclude that what is being deduced inside T(B) is an 
image of T(R) one needs connections between the terms of the deduced T(R)* and 
the original T(R). In Marras’ case these connections go as follows:
(2) 
  








These connections are inter-theoretic connecting principles. They  help us in the 
mapping of the vocabulary of the target theory to the vocabulary of the base theory. 
Strictly speaking, (2) and (3) express co-reference. What (2) tells us is that the 
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theoretical term ‘V’ (volume) of the target theory (classical equilibrium 
thermodynamics) co-refers with the expression ‘
  
l ⋅ w ⋅ h ’ which is constructed out of 
the terms of the base theory  (statistical mechanics). And similarly, (3) tells us that the 
theoretical term ‘p’ (pressure) of thermodynamics co-refers with a certain expression 
constructed out of some of the theoretical terms of statistical mechanics (i.e. 
‘velocity’, ‘mass’, etc.). (3) shows that the case in question is indeed a heterogeneous 
case: one in which there are target-level terms which are not part of the base level 
vocabulary, and vice versa. Since crossing the levels in heterogeneous cases is the 
very purpose of introducing bridging principles, these connections are indeed 
bridging principles—i.e. prior identities, which are prerequisites of the process of 
reduction (in this particular case, the formulation of the ‘image-theory’).
Of course, Marras is right that in this particular case the postulation of the further 
bridging principle 2E/3 = kT is just a final step—the conclusion drawn on the basis 
of the analogue relation between the target theory  and the image-theory,—but he is 
silent about those bridging principles which connect the terms like ‘pressure’ of 
thermodynamics to the so-called analogue terms of statistical mechanics. And these 
bridging principles are necessary for the construction of the image of T(R), and thus 
they are preconditions rather than results of the process of reduction.
 
It is correct to say that Hooker’s account is about ‘image-deduction’, but for the very 
notion of an ‘image’ one needs the ability of ‘image-recognition’—that is, one needs 
to know whether some structure within the reducing theory T(B) is an image of the 
reduced theory T(R). And this ability  is ensured by prior identities connecting certain 
structures of the reducing base theory  to corresponding structures of the reduced 
target theory.
John Bickle, who has advocated a reformulated version of Hooker’s original model 
(Bickle, 1998) might want to argue here that for me (2) and (3) appear as 
preconditions rather than results only because I forget about the first half of the 
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whole process of reduction. (1), Bickle could argue, can be deduced entirely within 
the reducing base theory  T(B), without the need of any prior identities. Once we have 
(1), we can conclude on (2) and (3) by comparing (1) to (L) and relying on an 
analogue relation between them. So the whole process of reduction would go like 
this. First, we deduce (1) from the base theory  (i.e. statistical mechanics). This is an 
image of the target (L). Then by comparing (1) and (L) we can formulate (2) and (3). 
Once we have them we can further conclude on the famous 2E/3 = kT identity. That 
is, all the three identities are in fact consequences of the process of reduction.
This argument, however, is mistaken. To see why, let’s reconstruct the deduction of 
(1) from statistical mechanics (cf. Bickle, 1998, pp. 36-37). Suppose that in a 
rectangular container (with length l, height h and width w) we have N molecules of a 
gas, each molecule with a mass m, and a velocity v. Because of the random motion of 
the molecules, it is a sound assumption that one-third of the molecules are moving 
along the x-axis. Statistical mechanics tells us that the momentum of a molecule (I) 
is the product of its mass and velocity and that  (by assumption) molecular collisions 







From Newton’s Second Law of Motion (5) we can calculate the force exerted by 
these molecules as the quotient of the total impulse and the time of the total change 
of momentum. Since the amount of time between two collisions of a molecule with 


















From this Bickle constructs an analogue structure of the Boyle-Charles’ law by 
multiplying the pressure (the quotient of the force and the area of the wall (7)) with 



















And finally, comparing (8) with the Boyle-Charles’ law Bickle introduces the 
bridging principles (2) and (3), and consequently 2E/3 = kT.
On the face of it, this reconstruction supports Bickle’s claim. However, in order to 
construct the analogue structure (8) Bickle relies on (5) and (7). (5) is the definition 
of force in classical Newtonian mechanics, whereas (7) gives the definition of force 
in classical thermodynamics. In (8) Bickle uses the term ‘force’ of Newtonian 
mechanics as though it was the term ‘force’ of thermodynamics. But it is not. Bickel 
is only able to proceed with his deductive argument because he accepts the implicit 
assumption that the term ‘force’ of the target theory  (thermodynamics) and the term 
‘force’ of the base theory  (mechanics) refer to the very same thing. That is, what 
happens here is an application of yet another bridging principle (i.e. prior identity) 
connecting a term of Newtonian mechanics to a term of thermodynamics. It is a 
premise (and not a conclusion) of the argument. Without it the argument would 
equivocate on the term ‘force’ and would not go through.
True, some identities are the results of the process of reduction, but there are other, 
so-called ‘prior identities’ in play  as premises of the same reductive arguments. In 
other words, one does not only  conclude on identities on the basis of comparing 
image-theories with original theories, but one also needs to rely on certain identities 
in order to be able to construct the very image-theories themselves.
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When one deduces an image-structure in the base theory analogous to a structure of 
the original target theory one needs some connecting principles to designate what an 
image-structure would look like within the vocabulary  of the base theory. Without 
these ‘prior identities’ one would not be able to recognise whether the image deduced 
was an image of the target  structure at all. In the above case, what Bickle does in (8) 
is replacing the terms of thermodynamics with the terms of Newtonian mechanics 
within the structure of the Boyle-Charles’ law. And what let him do so are the 
connecting principles between the terms of force and volume of Newtonian 
mechanics and those of thermodynamics.
One might want to question whether identities are really needed in order to assure us 
that the term ‘force’ of thermodynamics and the term ‘force’ of mechanics refer to 
the very  same thing. Note, however, that the fact that we use the same word in both 
contexts is quite misleading. The concept ‘force’ as in mechanics is defined via a 
change in ‘impetus’, whereas the concept ‘force’ as in thermodynamics is defined via 
the term ‘pressure’. Neither ‘impetus’ is a part of the vocabulary of thermodynamics, 
nor ‘pressure’ is part of the vocabulary of mechanics. The very fact that we use the 
same word reveals the implicit application of an identity claim, which was originally 
formulated as an empirical hypothesis.
7.2.3 The role of prior identities in reductive explanations
So far I have argued that the transparent model of reductive explanation does not 
work. Since there is no a priori passage available between the target and the base 
level, one needs to rely  on explicit identities as premises of the deductive argument 
constituting reductive explanation. I call these identities ‘prior identities’. It’s worth 
emphasising that despite the somewhat similar name, prior identities are not a priori 
identities—on the contrary, they are a posteriori, empirically  based identities: instead 
of being the results of a priori conceptual analysis, they are empirical hypotheses, 
which are necessary premises of any reductive attempt.
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Interpreting the identities that play a role in reductive explanations as empirical 
hypotheses must sound familiar: this is the view defended by Hill (1991), Hill and 
McLaughlin (1999), Block and Stalnaker (1999), and McLaughlin (2010). According 
to them, the identities in question provide the best explanation for the observed 
correlations between the target and the base levels, and thus can be justified on the 
basis of the method of inference to the best explanation. However, as I shall argue in 
what follows, this account of what role identities play in reductive explanations is 
also problematic. 
Recall McLaughlin’s example quoted in §7.1. He claims that Maxwell made the 
“bold conjecture” that light waves = electromagnetic waves in order to explain the 
correlations between the spatial position, the speed in vacuum, and the refractive 
indices in materials of light  waves and electromagnetic waves (cf. McLaughlin, 
2010, p. 282). This, however, is an incorrect account of the discovery that light rays 
are electromagnetic waves. The “bold conjecture” that light rays are electromagnetic 
waves is not Maxwell’s own hypothesis. It was originally proposed by  Michael 
Faraday 	  (1846). Faraday observed that light rays were affected by electromagnetism: 
under specific conditions a magnetic field could alter the plane of polarisation of a 
linearly  polarised light ray.21  On the basis of this observation, he subsequently 
hypothesised that light was a form of electromagnetic vibration. Maxwell knew this 
hypothesis, and was highly motivated by Faraday’s work. In fact, he explicitly 
acknowledged that Faraday’s hypothesis had guided his own research. Right after his 
famous conclusion drawn from his calculations regarding the velocity  of 
electromagnetic waves, namely that “[t]his velocity is so nearly that of light, that it 
seems we have strong reason to conclude that light itself [...] is an electromagnetic 
disturbance in the form of waves propagated through the electromagnetic field 
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21 As Maxwell himself summarises Faraday’s observation: “When a transparent diamagnetic substance 
has a ray of polarized light passed through it,  and if lines of magnetic force are then produced in the 
substance by the action of a magnet or of an electric current, the plane of polarization of the 
transmitted light is found to be changed, and to be turned through an angle depending on the intensity 
of the magnetizing force within the substance.” (Maxwell, 1861, pp. 86-87)
according to electromagnetic laws” (Maxwell, 1865, p. 466) he immediately added 
that 
“[t]he conception of the propagation of transverse magnetic disturbances to the 
exclusion of normal ones is distinctly set  forth by Professor Faraday in his 
‘Thoughts on Ray Vibrations.’ The electromagnetic theory of light, as proposed 
by him, is the same in substance as that which I have begun to develop in this 
paper, except that in 1846 there were no data to calculate the velocity  of 
propagation.” (Maxwell, 1865, p. 466)
The moral is that the light = electromagnetic wave identity  claim is not evoked in 
order to explain the correlations McLaughlin cites (cf. same speed, same refractive 
indices). These correlations had not yet been recognised when the identity  claim got 
originally  formulated. What happened, instead, was this: Faraday observed certain 
similarities between the behaviour of light rays and electromagnetic disturbances 
(namely that they are similarly affected by  magnetic fields). On the basis of this 
similarity, he proposed an identity claim. This identity claim then motivated 
Maxwell’s research, who consecutively showed that there is another similarity, 
namely that the speed of these electromagnetic disturbances in question is “so nearly 
that of light”. Further research shed light on even more similarities, namely  those 
between the refractive indices of light and electromagnetic waves. Not some kind of 
inference to the best explanation, but these further evidences uncovering more and 
more similarities were what finally confirmed the original hypothesis.
As we have seen, proponents of the transparent version of reductive explanation 
could object here that since, light and electromagnetic waves share all these 
properties, given that one knows everything there is to know about light rays and 
about electromagnetic waves, one becomes able to simply infer—and hence does not 
need to hypothesise—the identity claim connecting them. Against this line of 
reasoning I have argued that in the general (and philosophically interesting) 
heterogeneous cases of reductive explanations one cannot realise that entities at the 
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target level and at the base level share certain properties, because target- and base-
level entities are described by different vocabularies.22 
Notice how this claim further complicates the situation for the inference to the best 
explanation approach. If the target and the base levels are described by different 
vocabularies, then it is not so straightforward to recognise correlations between the 
two levels. It is well illustrated by the example of §7.2.2: without prior identities 
anchoring particular terms from the vocabulary of statistical mechanics to certain 
terms from the vocabulary of thermodynamics, it is impossible to recognise which 
structures of statistical mechanics are the ‘images’ of the structures of 
thermodynamics, i.e. it is impossible to recognise the very correlations the inference 
to the best explanation approach starts with. 
Perhaps this claim—i.e. that it is exactly  the utilisation of prior identities that reveals 
correlations—is even more evident in the case of mechanistic explanations (cf. 
§7.2.1). Note that in the local (lower level) context of those entities the organised 
activity of which constitutes a higher level whole there are other entities which 
interacts with the supervenience base of the higher level whole. Without prior 
identities, i.e. without a firm starting point designating certain lower level processes 
to a higher level process, one has no grounds whatsoever on the basis of which one 
could start grouping certain lower level entities and activities together as 
organisations corresponding to higher level activities. That is, without prior identities 
one could not see the organised activity of which lower level entities it is that co-
occurs (i.e. correlates) with a higher level phenomenon. In the case of mechanistic 
explanations, these prior identities are typically provided by considerations stemming 
from cross-level experiments—i.e. intervening at the higher level, and recording the 
effects at the lower level (cf. Woodward, 2003).
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22 Note that in this respect, the above example of light and electromagnetic wave is misleading—from 
the perspective of the terms ‘velocity’, ‘refraction’, etc. it is a special homogeneous case. 
Hypothesising prior identities, thus, precedes the proper formulation of correlational 
claims. That is, explaining correlations is not the primary  role prior identities play in 
reductive explanation. Instead, they are tools to anchor the target level to the base 
level. They  are formulated on the basis of some initial similarities, and then they 
guide the mapping of target-level phenomena to base-level phenomena. They are 
justified if they  are successful in this process of guiding these mappings, i.e. if on the 
bases of them, one is able to uncover more and more connections, structural and 
functional similarities between the target and the base domains. Along these further 
structural and functional similarities, prior identities make it possible to project  the 
explanatory  power of the base level onto the target level, and subsequently, to 
reductively explain the properties of target level phenomena on the basis of the 
properties of base level phenomena. 
In this latter sense, the model of non-transparent reductive explanation I propose here
—which might be called reductive explanation via prior identities—resembles Block 
and Stalnaker’s version of non-transparent reductive explanation. As we have seen in 
§6.3.3, Block and Stalnaker emphasise that identities make it possible to transfer 
explanatory  and causal power from the base level to the target level. Though in this 
respect, my approach is similar to theirs, there are also significant differences 
between the two view. Most importantly, Block and Stalnaker rely on the principle of 
inference to the best explanation in justifying the identities themselves. They claim 
that we accept  identities over mere correlations, exactly because identities allow us 
to transfer explanations from the base level to the target level. That is, Block and 
Stalnaker’s approach concentrates on the advantages of identity  claims over 
correlational claims. This attitude suggests that identities are evoked only when 
correlations are observed. Contrary to this, my approach draws attention to the fact 
that certain prior identities are necessary even for formulating correlational claims. 
Moreover, these prior identities do not compete with correlational claims, but with 
other, alternative prior identities—alternative ways of mapping the target level onto 
the base level. Those prior identities are supported over the alternatives which allow 
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for an extension of the initial mapping, and make the process of uncovering further 
similarities between the target and the base domains possible. 
The closest match to my  account of reductive explanation via prior identities is the 
so-called heuristic identity theory of McCauley and Bechtel (McCauley, 1981; 
Bechtel & McCauley, 1999; McCauley & Bechtel, 2001). McCauley and Bechtel are 
mainly concerned with the role identities play  in scientific explanations in general. 
They  observe that different scientific theories describing the target and base levels of 
typical reductive explanations usually  co-evolve: the explanatory tools and devices 
developed at one level affect and foster novel methods, models and hypotheses at  the 
other level, and vice versa. This co-evolution is due to the formulation of heuristic 
identities, which are hypothesised in order to connect  the different levels and thus 
advance explanatory endeavours and scientific development. For example, 
psychologists have developed certain behavioural tools, which then guided the 
discovery  of “hypotheses about underlying neural mechanisms”, which, then, in turn 
prompted “the development of increasingly sophisticated information-processing 
models at the psychological level” (McCauley  & Bechtel, 2001, p. 745). The main 
driving force of this mutual influence “is the hypothetical identifications of 
information-processing activities with brain processes (in characteristic brain 
areas).” (McCauley & Bechtel, 2001, p. 745)
McCauley and Bechtel think of heuristic identities as crucial devices of furthering 
the advancement of science. As they put it:
“Hypothesizing cross-scientific identities is a pivotal engine of scientific 
development. Hypothetical identities in interlevel contexts serve as valuable 
heuristics of discovery for inquiry at both of the explanatory levels involved. 
Crucially, scientists accept or reject these hypotheses for the same reasons that 
they  accept or reject any other hypothesis in science. These are the same 
reasons involved in establishing the truth of any abductive inference, namely 
the resulting hypotheses’ abilities to stand up to empirical evidence, to 
stimulate new research and to foster the integration of existing 
knowledge.” (McCauley & Bechtel, 2001, p. 751)
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That is, McCauley  and Bechtel’s heuristic identities, very similar to my prior 
identities, are justified on the basis of their success in mapping the higher and the 
lower levels onto each other, thus allowing for the projection of explanatory  power 
originally present at one level onto the other level. 
McCauley and Bechtel go on and identify the main role of hypothesising these 
heuristic identities as follows:
“According to [the heuristic identity  theory], [...] identities are not the 
conclusions of scientific research but the premises. The logic behind their use 
looks to the converse of Leibniz’s law. Instead of appealing to the identity of 
indiscernibles, this strategy exploits the indiscernibility of identicals. [...] The 
theories at each level ascribe distinct properties to the entities and processes 
that the interlevel, hypothetical identities connect. Since they both address 
features of the same physical systems, though, scientists have grounds from the 
outset to expect that  these accounts will gradually evolve so as to mirror one 
another more and more. By virtue of the proposed identities, scientists can use 
related research at each explanatory level to stimulate discovery at the 
other.” (McCauley & Bechtel, 2001, pp. 753-754)
Again, heuristic identities within McCauley  and Bechtel’s approach of scientific 
research play a role very similar to the role that prior identities play in my approach 
of reductive explanation. They  both are premises, starting points, which are 
necessary  for specific kinds of scientific research or reductive explanation to get off 
the ground.  Heuristic identities make it possible to use the results of certain research 
originally  related to one level at another level, and similarly, prior identities make it 
possible to anchor the target level phenomenon to the base domain and utilise the 
explanatory  apparatus of the base domain to account for the target phenomenon. 
Moreover, just as heuristic identities are evaluated on the basis of how efficient they 
are in fostering the co-evolution of the two different accounts originally formulated 
within the two distinct scientific theories to mirror each other, prior identities are 
evaluated on the basis of how efficient  they  are in mapping the target and the base 
domains onto each other and advancing the discovery of further similarities. 
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Finally, McCauley  and Bechtel’s heuristic identity theory is similar to my account of 
reductive explanation via prior identities in one more respect: heuristic identities, just 
like prior identities are unexplained explainers—they themselves cannot be 
explained in the sense proponents of transparent reductive explanation think 
identities are explained, but rather are hypothesised on the basis of empirical 
considerations, and utilised in explaining certain features of phenomena at one level 
in terms of the features of phenomena at the other level (in the case of reductive 
explanation, the target level and the base level respectively). As McCauley  and 
Bechtel puts is:
“What matters about hypothetical cross-scientific identities is not how they 
should be explained (they can’t be) but what they explain, how they suggest 
(and contribute to) other, empirically successful, explanatory hypotheses, and 
how they create opportunities for scientists at one explanatory level to enlist 
methods and evidence from alternative levels of explanation.” (McCauley & 
Bechtel, 2001, pp. 756-757)
7.3 Conclusion: the Monadic Marker Account as a 
Reductive Explanation Via Prior Identities
In the last part of this dissertation (Chapter 6 and Chapter 7) I have investigated the 
process of reductive explanation. Two general types of reductive explanation have 
been distinguished, the so-called transparent and the so-called non-transparent 
versions. I have argued that the transparent version of reductive explanation (a.k.a. 
the a priori passage view) faces a dilemma, neither horns of which is acceptable for 
the proponents of the transparent version. I have also shown that the traditional 
understandings of the non-transparent version misrepresent  the role identities play in 
reductive explanations.
On the basis of how actual reductive attempts proceed, I have proposed a new 
account of reductive explanation, which utilises so-called prior identities. Reductive 
explanation via prior identities, thus, is a novel version of the non-transparent model. 
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It relies on identities as premises in the process of deducing a target-level claim from 
base level theories and descriptions. These identities are prerequisites rather than 
outcomes of successful reductive explanations—hence their name, prior identities. 
Prior identities are proper identity claims, which themselves are unexplained but are 
nevertheless necessary for mapping the features to be explained onto the features the 
explanation relies on. That is, they designate which base level phenomenon 
corresponds to which target level phenomenon, thereby  projecting the explanatory 
power of the base level onto the target level. They  are hypothesised in order to foster 
the formulation of explanatory claims accounting for target level phenomena in terms 
of base level processes—and they are justified if they  are successful in doing just 
that. Prior identities are justified if they help projecting base level explanations to 
‘new territories’ of the target level, covering phenomena, which would have 
otherwise (i.e. had the prior identities not been formulated) remained unexplained in 
lower level terms.
Now recall the identity  claim proposed in Chapter 4 as part of the Monadic Maker 
Account of conscious experience. It says that the phenomenal character of simple 
conscious experiences is identical with how monadic markers are interpreted by 
central processes of a cognitive system. First, note that formulating this identity 
claim was not an ad hoc step: it has been hypothesised on the basis of certain 
similarities recognised between the phenomenal domain and the cognitive-
representational domain.23  Second, note that it has not been used to explain the 
observed similarity  itself, but rather to extend the initial mapping of the phenomenal 
domain to the target domain and uncover further similarities between these two 
domains—e.g. similarities between certain features of monadic markers, and features 
of secondary qualities like their ‘dissimilarity’ to physical properties, or features of 
phenomenal qualities like their functional un-analysability. Third, note that on the 
basis of these further similarities uncovered with the aid of the initial identity  claim, 
explanations of certain characteristics of the phenomenal domain in terms of 
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23 Cf. the similarities between the observations (O1), (O2), (O3) and the claims (C1*), (C2*), (C3*) in 
§4.3.3.
characteristics of the cognitive-representational domain have been proposed. In 
particular, the identity  claim of the Monadic Marker Account made it possible to put 
forth explanations of the primary-secondary quality distinction (cf. §5.3.1), the fact 
that conscious experiences resist  functionalisation (cf. §5.3.2), and why  the 
explanatory  gap arises, why Mary learns something new, or why  zombies seem 
conceivable (cf. §5.3.3)—i.e. to formulate explanations of target-level phenomena 
solely in terms of the base level.
That is, the identity  claim of the Monadic Marker Account is a prior identity. It is an 
unexplained explainer, deployed in order to uncover similarities between the 
phenomenal and the cognitive-representational domains, and to project  the 
explanatory  power of the cognitive-representational domain onto the phenomenal 
domain. It helps explaining features and phenomena of the phenomenal domain 
which otherwise would remain unexplained. These explanations, thus,—in 
accordance with the model of reductive explanation via prior identities, and contrary 
to the received view of contemporary literature—are reductive explanations proper. 
The identity  claim featuring in them is justified similarly to the way  standard 
scientific identities are justified, and the explanations provided are formulated 
analogously to how standard scientific explanations are formulated.
The Monadic Marker Account, then, is the result of the very same methodology that 
is characteristic of all those scientific endeavours, which aim at fostering 
understanding of the reductive kind—i.e. the understanding of particular target 
phenomena in terms of certain lower level base phenomena. In this sense, the 
Monadic Marker Account introduces the problem of phenomenal consciousness into 
scientific discourse, and therefore offers a bridge between the philosophy and the 
science of consciousness: it offers an approach to conscious experience which, on the 
one hand, tries to account for the philosophically most important features of 
consciousness, whereas, on the other hand, does it  in a way which smoothly fits into 
the everyday practice of scientific research.
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The Monadic Marker Account provides a theoretical framework, a cognitive model, 
which when implemented by a particular empirical theory—originally focusing on 
those aspects of consciousness that can be operationalised—helps the embedding 
theory  to address important questions related to the qualitative character of conscious 
experience. Ned Block (2010) famously criticises cognitive and biological theories 
of consciousness that they are unable to account for the presence of the explanatory 
gap. The novel approach promoted in my dissertation holds the promise of being 
helpful in just that—it can act  as a universal plug-in for different scientific theories 
of consciousness and further their reach by  providing access to its own explanatory 
resources connecting cognitive processes to the distinguishing features of conscious 
experience.24
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24 One might feel tempted here to raise a final challenge at this point by drawing attention to the fact 
that the conclusion of Chapter 5 and the conclusion of Chapter 7 seem to be in tension with each 
other. For, on the one hand, in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 it has been acknowledged that there is an 
explanatory gap between the phenomenal and the physical domains, whereas,  on the other hand, 
Chapter 7 has concluded that features of conscious experience can be explained very similarly to how 
standard scientific explanations proceed, which seems to imply that, in fact, there is no explanatory 
gap between the phenomenal and the physical domains.  To answer this challenge, note first that the 
explanatory gap that has been acknowledged in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 is a gap between a particular 
phenomenal quality and a corresponding monadic marker. The Monadic Marker Account does not 
close this gap—it does not provide any explanation of why a particular monadic marker when 
interpreted by a cognitive system properly embedding it is identical with a specific phenomenal 
quality. Rather, the Monadic Marker Account, presupposing such identities,  provides explanations of, 
for example, why primary qualities resemble physical properties whereas secondary qualities don’t, 
why consciousness resists functionalisation, and why the explanatory gap between a particular 
monadic marker and phenomenal quality pair arises.  That is, whereas the acknowledged explanatory 
gap claims about a particular target phenomenon that it is unexplainable in base level terms, the 
proposed reductive explanation explains a different target phenomenon. Second, note the related point 
that the novel account proposed here, i.e. reductive explanation via prior identities,  takes the identity 
claims featuring in this approach to be unexplained explainers—they are not conclusions of the 
deductive arguments yielding reductive explanations, but rather premises in such arguments, and are 
justified on independent grounds. That is, in the sense in which the transparent version of reductive 
explanation uses the term, there are indeed explanatory gaps between the entities flanking these 
identity signs.  But again, the reductive explanations proposed do not explain these identities, but 
rather utilise them to explain other phenomena. However, in accordance with the reductive 
explanation via prior identities view, this is true of all cases of scientific reductions. So why does the 
case of explaining the features of consciousness seem intuitively different from the case of,  say, 
explaining the features of water? On the present account,  there are similar explanatory gaps between 
the features of water and features of H2O than between monadic markers and phenomenal qualities. 
Why do these two cases nevertheless seem to be different? This intuitive difference, I propose, stems 
from the functional un-analysability of phenomenal qualities. The functional un-analysability of 
phenomenal qualities is a unique feature of theirs, which tell them apart from all the properties of 
physical systems. Although this difference does not affect the reductive explanations provided (cf. 
Chapter 7), it gives rise to the aforementioned ‘intuition of distinctness’. This however, does not pose 
a problem for the Monadic Marker Account—since it is able to explain functional un-analysability, it 
is also able to explain the intuition of distinctness. Cf. Papineau (2002, 2010) for arguments that the 
intuition of distinctness plays a crucial role in the mind-body issue.
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